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This thesis is an examination of the semiologies of age in modem and contemporary prose. 
The chapters that follow emerge from my continuing interest in how anti-senescence 
medicine, gerontophobia, and the commodification of immortality in discourses o f 
consumerism have impacted literary representations of time, organic decay, and the meaning 
of death. Each chapter deals in different ways with the question of how to represent mortality 
in the context of a culture incredulous of ageing and the laws of nature, and a populace 
seeking to aestheticise, medicalise, and verbalise its way out of the ageing process. 
Paradoxical though it is, I argue that Anglo-American culture’s jejune and oneiric fantasies of 
immortality, rejuvenation, and perpetual youth are not located in science fiction, mythos, 
extropian philosophy, or trans-/posthumanist discourse, but in the literature of ageing and the 
very spectacle of decay. The contemporary literature of ageing offers a clear thematic 
preoccupation with the pathos of mortality and senility. However, at the same time, the 
conventional or canonical indices of decay and decline are replete with counterrealist 
inflections and semiotic echoes of immortality. From the prose and dramaturgy of Samuel 
Beckett to post-2000 Alzheimer’s fiction, the literature o f ageing, I argue, transforms the 
depreciation of old age readily into its ideality, and makes the reader cognisant o f the realities 
in which we, as members of a culture at once ageing demographically and anti-ageing 
ideologically, currently operate.
INTRODUCTION: A GENEALOGY OF ANTI-AGEING
‘Oh that there were a medicine curing age...’1 
Regimen o f Health o f  Salerno (eleventh century)
This thesis examines how western discourses of ageing have impacted on representations of 
time, organic decay, and the meaning of death in contemporary Anglophone literature. In 
each of its four chapters I address the question of whether there can be a stable semiology of 
ageing in the context of a culture incredulous of mortality and the laws of nature, habituated 
to anti-ageing ideologies, and expectant of their reification. I will examine the ways in which 
literature, from the works of Samuel Beckett to post-2000 Alzheimer’s fiction, has responded 
to or been affected by developments in geriatric and prolongevity medicine; gerontophobia 
and age prejudice; demographic change2 and ‘uncharted territory in which we find ourselves 
both as aging individuals and as an aging nation;’3 and the blandishments, sophistry, and 
cultural saliency of anti-ageing. Paradoxically, humanity has never been more familiar with 
immortality than in the era where medical and scientific capability render unavoidable, and 
even extend, the period of life that most inescapably reminds us of our mortality: old age. Put 
simply, it is the success of an anti-ageing culture that gives rise to an ageing one. As Mike 
Hepworth notes, ‘ours is probably the most age-conscious period in human history,’4 but it is 
one defined also by its wilful and adroit repression of the realities of age, by the jejune 
attempts to aestheticise one’s way out of ageing, and by humanity’s libidinal fear of death -as 
exemplified in the ideological imperialism of anti-ageing.
'Cited by Harold Maxwell et al., A Histoiy o f  Medicine (USA: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1947), p. 313.
2 The UK Actuary’s Department predicts that the ‘UK population over 100 years of age will increase 100-fold 
from 10,000 now to 1 million in 2074’. Guy Brown, The Living End: The Future o f  Death, Aging, and 
Immortality (London & New York: Macmillan, 2008), p. 4.
3 Sharon R. Kaufman, The Ageless Self: Sources o f Meaning in Late Life (USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1986), p. 4.
4 Mike Hepworth, Stories o f  Ageing (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), p. 3.
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At once ageing and anti-ageing, western culture today is placing antithetical and incompatible 
demands on literature-is challenging ‘the very language used to articulate the ageing 
process.’5 The ageing-literature nexus is frequently, if circumspectly, evoked as postmodern 
consumer culture demands that people be increasingly cognisant of the signs o f  ageing. The 
noun ‘signs’ has both aesthetic and semiotic connotations, and with this double entendre in 
mind, what this thesis will examine are the ways in which the conventional or canonical 
signs, or signifiers, of age hold less and less credence representationally -and are called upon 
to change -as people become increasingly adept at aestheticising and medicalising their way 
out of the physical signs of ageing. However, far from being a uniquely modem 
preoccupation, ‘anti-ageing’ has evolved over centuries, dominating medical epistemologies, 
from the ancient Egyptian papyri; the ancient values of morality, good diet, cleanliness, 
hygiene, and sobriety and temperate habits; the medicalisation of old age from Galenic 
humoural nosologies to Baconian-scientific theories; the Romanticised ideas about the 
perfectibility of the body in post-medieval writing; the blossoming of dietary, 
pharmaceutical, and biomedical theories from the eighteenth century; the institutional 
solution to old age in the mid-nineteenth century with the formation of geriatrics; 
examination on the pathological features of senescence in Emil Kraepelin and Alois 
Alzheimer’s histological research on brain atrophy; the flourishing of prolongevity, or anti­
senescence, medicine in the twentieth century with ‘developments in biotechnological 
interventions, bioengineered or robotic solutions, [and] applications classified more as 
cosmetic care and mental training;’6and finally, and more banally, the commodification of 
immortality in discourses of consumerism. This humanist fallacy, anti-ageing, has formed the 
basis of a consistent and evolving programme of meliorism, and has in recent decades
5 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination: Dynamics o f  Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999), p. 66.
6 Astrid Stuckelberger, Anti-Ageing Medicine: Myths and Chances (Hochschulverlag AD an der ETH Zurich, 
Switzerland, 2008), p. xiii.
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become more prevalent with rising life expectancies and demographic change. Although 
science and medicine have progressed significantly in recent decades, ideologically ‘anti- 
ageing’ today, in both medicine and postmodern consumerism, differs little from its early, 
noninterventionist scientific roots. What I want to do in this introduction is explore some of 
the cultural and medical antecedents of anti-ageing. I shall examine the extent to which the 
rich genealogy of anti-ageist thought has left the possibility of clear, uncontested definition of 
old age elusive, if not impossible; and how the cultural antinomies in which the subject of 
ageing is besieged has impacted the literature and language of ageing over the past six 
decades.
i) Historicising Anti-ageing: Medical and Cultural Antecedents
Although geriatrics only really came into existence after the mid-nineteenth century7 and 
gerontology as late as 1945,8 clinical inquiry into ageing and its attendant ills has persisted 
for centuries. Anti-ageing is neither a new nor particularly contentious ideology. The 
‘attempts to hide, postpone or relieve the effects of biological ageing [...] are not necessarily 
either modem or scientific in origin but are frequently presented as such.’9 Anti-ageing is a 
cultural artefact that has persisted for generations; it is an intellectual edifice that has evolved 
and been shaped by religious doctrine, changing medical and scientific nosologies, and 
prevailing cultural norms for generations. In recent decades anti-ageing has grown into the 
panacea to rising life expectancies and demographic change -the gerontopia, that is, forged 
unwittingly and inopportunely through medical achievements of the last century. As life 
expectancies have risen, anti-ageing seems to have grown into a new form of humanism and
7 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, trans. By Patrick O’Brian (London & New York: W.W. Norton, 
1996), p. 21.
8 Thomas R. Cole et al., ‘Humanistic Gerontology and the Meaning(s) of Aging’ in Gerontology: Perspectives 
and Issues, 3rd edn., ed. by Janet Wilmoth et al. (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2007), p. 245.
9 John Vincent, ‘Anti-Ageing Science and the Future of Old Age’ in The Futures o f  Old Age, ed. by Chris R. 
Phillipson et al. (London: Sage, 2006), pp. 192-201 (p. 196).
healthcare paradigm. It is an ideology that has gained greater credence with advances in 
prolongevity medicine and bio-gerontological research, yet it is also one articulated in more 
oneiric or fanciful terms in postmodern consumer culture. Consumer capitalism has arguably 
de-sensationalised more conventionally science fictional, occult, or philosophical notions of 
immortality, and has secularised the premise of victory over death -reincarnation, 
transmigration, resurrection, and immortality -that underpins many monotheistic religions. 
However, sempitemity and rejuvenation (or reversing age) are immemorial desires. They 
have dominated medical epistemologies and practice for centuries, and have such cultural 
antecedents as: the Greek myth of Tithonus, the Sumerian Epic o f  Gilgamesh (c. 1440 BC); 
the Epicurean gods who were immortal yet material beings; Iolas in The Children ofHerakles 
(430BC) by Euripides (c. 480-406 BC), who is rejuvenated prior to battle, which is described 
as a ‘magical negation of old age itself;’10 Aristophanic comedy, which often includes elderly 
characters who ‘rejuvenate themselves (and thus by definition cease to be old men);’11 the 
themes of transformation and rejuvenation in Ovid’s (43 BC- AD 17/8) Metamorphoses 
(8AD); the Peter Pan fallacy; the immortal Struldbruggs in Jonathan Swift’s (1667-1745) 
Gulliver's Travels (1726); and Oscar Wilde’s (1854-1900) The Picture o f  Dorian Gray 
(1890).
Rejuvenation has dominated the literary imagination, from the earliest known work of 
literature -the Sumerian Epic o f Gilgamesh -to  contemporary science-fictional utopias. 
However, it is as rife in medicine, and is perhaps one subject that has united literature and 
medicine more so than any other. ‘At a very early stage in his evolution prehistoric man must 
have sought a solution for the age-long problem of death,’12 and with time religious
10 Thomas Van Nortwick, Imagining Men: Ideals of Masculinity in Ancient Greek Culture (USA: Praeger 
Publishers, 2008), p.143.
11 Thomas K. Hubbard, ‘Old Men in the Youthful Plays of Aristophanes’ in Old Age in Greek and Roman 
Literature, ed. by Thomas M. Falkner & Judith De Luce (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 
90-114 (p. 91).
12 Douglas Guthrie, A Histoiy o f  Medicine (Toronto & New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1946), p. 3.
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configurations of immortality passed into scientific interest,13 and ideas of rejuvenation and 
immortality gradually departed from some of their religious,14 mythical, and folkloric roots 
and came to dominate medical and scientific epistemologies —spreading, in more recent 
decades, to the more quotidian realm of consumer capitalism. Today, anti-ageing is defined 
as ‘a therapy that reduces the amount of a life span-limiting pathology, either by slowing its 
development over time (senescence-slowing therapy) or by repairing it (senescence- 
remediation therapy).’15 However, anti-ageing has been a consistent and evolving form of 
humanism over the course of medical history. Susannah Ottaway comments on how ‘[i]deals 
about how to counter the symptoms and discomfort of old age, and to actually extend the life 
course, were a consistent preoccupation from the classical and biblical worlds into the 
modem day.’16 In China, Taoism sought physical immortality through the domination of 
harmony with natural forces, whilst alchemists made improvements in metallurgy and dyes 
with the goal of life extension. The goal of human life extension has comprised relatively 
otherworldly remedies, and we see how the Gnostic imagination merges with the medical 
pretension to intervene in and cure or defer the effects of age, with remedies including:
alchemy, the use of precious metals [...] that have been transmuted from baser 
binerals; ‘shunamatism’ or ‘gerocomy’ (cavorting with young girls); grafts (or 
injected extracts) from the testicles, ovaries, or glands of various animal species; cell 
injections from tissues of newborn or fetal animals; consumption of elixirs, ointments, 
drugs, hormones, dietary supplements, and specific foods; cryonics; and rejuvenation
13 Thomas J. Moody, The Histoiy and Politics o f  Life Extension: Live Forever or Die Dying  (USA: Xlibris 
Corporation, 2011), p. 49.
14 In the bible it was the eating of the forbidden fruit that ‘brought death into the world, and all our woe’ 
(Romans 5:12), without which immortality is the natural state of Man.
15 Preston W. Estep III, ‘The promise of Human Life Span Extension’ in Biopsychosocial Approaches to 
Longevity: Annual Review o f  Gerontology and Geriatrics, vol. 27 (2007), ed. by Leonard W. Poon et al. (New 
York: Springer Publishing Company, 2008), p. 32
16 Susannah Ottaway, ‘Medicine and Old Age’ in The Oxford Handbook o f  the Histoiy o f  Medicine, ed. by Mark 
Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 338-355 (p. 347).
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from devices and exposure to various substances such as mineral and thermal 
springs.17
As well as being a theme in the earliest known literary text, rejuvenation/immortality is also a 
feature of the earliest known medical text, the Ebers Papyrus (c. 1600 BC). The ancient 
Egyptian papyri contain a collection of remedies for various ailments, including age- 
associated characteristics such as the thinning and greying of hair. The Ebers papyrus 
includes several sections ‘devoted to stemming the ravages of age,’ with ‘remedies to prevent
the hair turning grey’ and ‘remedies to be applied for transforming an old man into a
1 8 *youth.’ Ancient Egyptians were not only highly conscious of the unfavourable 
consequences of age but sought ‘to find ways to retain their faculties in old age’ and, like 
consumer culture today, aestheticise their way out of age. Several sections of the papyri offer 
‘a variety of cosmetic preparations designed to “transform the skin,” “to open up the outer 
flesh,” to stretch the face,” [and] to drive away wrinkles from the face.’” 19 Similarly, in 
ancient Rome, old age was perceived as sexually unattractive and ugliness and deformity 
formed the basis of much irreverent Roman humour on the subject. As Karen Cokayne 
highlights, examples can be found of:
attempts to cover up the physical ravages of old age by the use of cosmetics or other
“tricks” in order to retain a youthful appearance, as old men were said to dye or to
20pluck out their grey hair and cover up their baldness by wigs.’
17 Robert H. Binstock and Jennifer R. Fishman, ‘Social Dimensions of Anti-ageing Science and Medicine’ in 
The Sage Handbook o f  Social Gerontology, ed. by Daniel Dannefer and Chris Phillipson (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 2010), p. 472.
18 John F. Nunn, Ancient Egyptian Medicine (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), p. 95.
19 Bruno Halioua & Bernard Ziskind, ‘From Cradle to Grave: Old Age and Deformities’ in Medicine in the Days 
of the Pharaohs, trans. by M.B DeBevois (USA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 69-95 (pp. 95-7).
20 Karen Cokayne, Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 16.
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Classical Greek and Roman medical literature on age form an interesting body of proto- 
scientific thought on the biology of ageing, and collectively conceptualise ageing as a state to 
be prevented. Seneca’s axiom senectus morbidus est, or ‘old age is a disease’21 is a clear 
summation of the perception of ageing at the time and the nosological picture of age that was 
gaining momentum from this time. In On the Soul, a treatise on the nature and functioning of 
the human soul, Aristotle explains how ‘[t]he incapacity in old age is due to an affection not 
o f the soul but o f its vehicle, as occurs in drunkenness or disease.’22 In the Hippocratic 
corpus, ageing was perceived as an illness relating to a gradual process of cooling. It was 
believed that at birth an individual received a certain amount heat or vital spirit which, over 
the years, would diminish. Whilst this heat necessary to life could be replenished through 
eating, drinking and breathing, it could never be fully restored, and thus the diminishment of 
the body’s heat resulted in the weaknesses attributed to age.23 The cooling of the body, which 
brought about an imbalance of the humours (blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm), 
weakened the body and ageing would occur. It is this pathology of the humours that old age 
was attributed to, and ‘by implication,’ Karen Cokayne writes, ‘old age would therefore be 
classified as an illness.’24 In Aristotle’s opinion:
...the word for “old age”, gems, was etymologically related to the word for “earth”, 
ge, and old age was thought to have the cold and dry qualities of earth. An “illness”, 
such as grey hair, was considered the result of a lack of warmth, something
21 (Seneca) Multiple Contributors, The Cambridge Handbook o f  Age and Ageing, ed. by Malcolm L. Johnson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 22.
22 Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. by J. A. Smith (USA: Kessinger Publishing), p. 15.
23 Robert Kastenbaum, ‘Scientific Legacy of Antiquity’ in Encyclopaedia o f  Adult Development (Arizona: Oryx 
Press, 1993), p. 121.
"4 Cokayne, Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome, p. 35.
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characteristic of old age. If it were possible to restore the health and strength of the 
person, a change would occur, i.e. the old person would regain his youth.25
For Galen, old age was a ‘state between health and illness,’26 and although his works, like his 
contemporaries, offer classificatory system and remedies to help arrest or meliorate the 
ageing process, they remain relatively conservative: he ‘limited himself to cautious hygienic 
measures designed to moderate, but not basically to alter, the inexorable development of the 
constitutional imbalance of old age.,27His work contributes significantly to medical discourse 
on the subject of ageing, and later in the eighteenth century, Gerard Van Swieten (1700-72) -  
a proponent of Galen -echoed aspects of Galenic humouralism, proposing age as an incurable 
disease.
From the Middle Ages prolongevity and romanticised ideas about the perfectibility of the 
body began to flourish in medicine and science. The Estruscans were using false teeth 
obtained from deceased children and animals, and Roger Bacon (1214-94), notable for his 
works on old age and preventive hygiene, became the first to suggest using lenses to correct 
poor sight.28 The desire to palliate or defer some of the undesirable consequences of age are 
examined by Bacon in his book The Cure o f Old Age, and Preservation o f Youth (trans. 1683) 
in which he examines the ‘causes of Old Age [and] the Remedies which hinder them, and 
after what manner they may be hindered.’29 Commenting on the unfavourable consequences 
of age, he examines ‘by what ways these Faculties may be recreated, and being weak may be
25 Daniel Schafer, “That Senescence itself is an Illness”: A Transitional Medical Concept of Age and Ageing in 
the Eighteenth Century’, Medical History (2002), vol. 48, pp. 525-548 (528).
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. gov/pmc/articles/PMC 10445 63/pdf/medhist00005-0071 .pdf (accessed 12/11/11],
26 Rasma Lazda-Cazers, Old Age in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Interdisciplinary Approaches to a 
Neglected Topic, ed. by Albrecht Classen (Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), p. 206.
27 Klaus Warner Schaie, ‘The History of Geropsychology’ in Handbook o f  the Psychology o f  Aging, ed. by 
James E. Birren & K. Warner Schaie, 5th edn. (London: Academic Press, 2001), p. 9.
28 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 19.
29 Roger Bacon, The Cure o f  Old Age, and Preservation o f  Youth (London: Publisher Unknown, 1683), p. 11.
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30strengthened.’ One of the oldest monographs on the pathologies of age, Gerontocomia 
(1489) by Gabriele Zerbi (1445-1505), discusses ‘old age as a disposition beyond nature,’ as 
‘a form of illness which proceeds from the necessity of nature.’ He describes how, although 
death is inevitable, it may be postponed: ‘death follows old age nor can an old man return to 
those earlier ages by any means whatsoever although the rate of its approach can somehow be 
retarded.’31 Also at this time Amald of Villanova (1235-1311) writes Defense o f Age and 
Recovery o f  Youth (1540), and in Libellus (1542), Bacon writes on:
the causes of old age, its remedies, chief phenomena, wrinkles and other signs, 
debility of the senses, the food and drink appropriate for the aged, [...] the means of 
retarding old age and preserving strength, the care of the skin, and finally some 
medicines and a regimen for reviving the imagination, reason, and memory.32
In a similar vein Paracelsus (1493-1541) regarded alchemy as ‘important for the curing of 
diseases and the prolongation of life [...] of perfecting what Nature had left in an imperfect 
state.’33 Many aspects of Paracelsean medicine and medical philosophy are geared towards 
the prolongation of life through the understanding and categorisation of disease. It 
demonstrates a clear empiricism and clinical objectivity akin to what Michel Foucault later 
tenned the ‘medical gaze.’34 In a preface to The Diseases that Deprive Man o f his Reason 
(1567) Paracelsus writes:
In nature there are not only diseases which afflict our body and our health, but many 
others which deprive us of sound reason, and these are the most serious. While 
speaking about the natural diseases and observing to what extent and how seriously
30 Ibid., p. 35.
31 Gabriele Zerbi, Gerontocomia: On the Care o f  the Aged and Maximianus, Elegies on Old Age and Love, 
trans. by L. R. Lind (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1988), p. 76-7.
32 L. RLind, Gerontocomia, p. 5.
33 Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, ‘The Philosophy, Medicine, and Theology of Paracelsus’ in Paracelsus: Essential 
Readings, trans. by Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke (Great Britain: Crucible, 1999), p. 33.
34 Michel Foucault, Birth o f  the Clinic (London: Routledge Classics, 2003), p. 9.
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they afflict various parts of our body, we must not forget to explain the origin of the 
diseases which deprive man of reason.35
Whilst earlier medical paradigms, such as those of Hippocrates, saw Time -specifically 
bodily time -as predetermined, Paracelsus strove ‘to eliminate the causes of disease by active 
interference: “[h]e should act against time. For physic has to overcome time.’” 36 For 
Paracelsus, biological age is made malleable by clinical rationalism and deduction -by  
human intervention. From this time, ‘[kjnowledge of germs and improved surgical techniques 
transformed early twentieth-century medical view of the human body and greatly enhanced 
the possibilities for intervening against disease and senescence.’37 However, as suggested by 
texts such as The Art o f Living Long (1550) by the Venetian nobleman Louis Comaro (1417- 
1566), the medicalisation of old age was met by ideas of self-intervention or self-help. The 
prolongevity advocate Comaro postulates temperance and extreme moderation as the key to a 
long life, and argues that ‘Nature does not deny us the power of living many years’ but is 
determined by each individual, and that there is no inherent reason old age should result in, or 
be associated with, infirmity.
In post-medieval philosophical, religious, and medical thought, romanticised ideas about the 
perfectibility of the body and the ability to control the human life span flourished. Francis 
Bacon’s (1561-1626) History Natural and Experimental o f Life and Death or O f the 
Prolongation o f  Life (1623) and Richard Allestree’s (1619-1681) A Discourse Concerning 
the Period o f Human Life: Whether Mutable or Immutable (1677) clearly demonstrate that 
seventeenth-century culture was still preoccupied with ideas of arresting or deferring old age.
35 Paracelsus, Four Treatises, trans. by C. Lilian Temkin et al., ed. by Henry E. Sigerist (Baltimore & London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 142.
36 Walter Pagel, Paracelsus: An Introduction to Philosophical Medicine in the Era o f  the Renaissance (Basel & 
New York: S. Karger, 1958), p. 76.
37 Susannah Ottaway, The Oxford Handbook o f the Histoiy o f  Medicine, p. 349.
38 Louis Comaro, The Art o f  Living Long, trans. by William F. Butler (New York: Springer Publishing Company 
Inc., 2005), p. 7.
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The movement from proverbial, moralistic, and Gnostic literature to medical and scientific 
enquiry —and with it religious or biblical prolongevism39 to medical prolongevism —was 
perhaps most pronounced from the eighteenth century onwards with more materialist 
reasoning of iatrophysics (the medical application of physics, explaining physiological 
phenomena in mechanical terms) and the bourgeois support of rationalism and 
mechanicalism in the study of the body.40 The study of old age advanced considerably during 
this time as medicine advanced empirically, and old age was ‘more sharply defined in 
pathological terms as details of the body’s deteriorating systems were revealed through post­
mortem research.’41 Physician and proto-psychologist George Cheyne (1671-1743) wrote An 
Essay on Health and Long Life (1725) and Sir John Floyer (1649-1734) wrote the influential 
Medicina Gerocomica (1724), which sought a scientific explanation to senescence and 
provided ideas, mainly pertaining to diet and sobriety, as to how old age might be arrested:
Luxuiy, Slothfulness, dull and weaken the Body, but Labour and Temperance 
strengthen it, and prolong the Youth [...] Envy, Ambition, Covetousness, Anger, do 
decay the body; but Hope, Love, Joy, are Prolongers of our Lives by their Influence 
on the Humours. It is necessary to conquer the vitious Passions which attend old 
Age.42
Harcouet de Longeville (c. 1660-1720), in Long Livers: A Curious History o f  Such Persons o f  
Both Sexes who have Liv ’d  Several AGES, and Grown Young Again: With the rare SECRET
39 There are many instances of religious prolongevism, including: (Christianity) Saint Servatius, bishop of
Tongeren. who was alleged to have lived 375 years; Saint Shenouda the Archimandrite, 117/118 years, Welsh 
bard Llvwarch Hen. 150 years; Saint Kevin of Glendalough (120 years); the Maharishi o f  Kailas (over 300 
years); (biblical longevity) Methuselah (969 years), Jared (962 years), Noah (950 years), Eve (940 years), Adam 
(930 years), Seth (912 years), Kenan (910 years), Enos (905 years), Mahalalel (895 years), Lamech (777 years), 
Shem (600 years), Eber (464 years) etc.; (Hinduism) Devraha Baba (over 700 years); The sadhaka Loknath 
Brahmacari (159/60 years); Hindu saint Swami Govindanath Bharati (137 years), (Roman empire) Tiresias 
(over 600 years); Epimenides of Crete (nearly 300 years)
40 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 20.
41 Sally Palmer Thomason, The Living Spirit of the Crone: Turning Aging Inside Out (USA: Fortress Press, 
2006), p. 65.
42 John Floyer, Medicina Gerocomica: Or the Galenic Art o f Preserving Old M en’s Healths (USA: Amo Press 
Inc., 1979), pp. 6 & 21.
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o f Rejuvenency o f Arnoldus o f  Villa Nova, And a Great Many Approv ’d  and Invaluable Rules 
to Prolong Life (1722), writes of Man’s frustrated desire for immortality:
He has Apprehensions of losing his Life as soon as he begins to be. He desires to 
perpetuate his Days without comprehending how few they are: and despairing to bring 
this about himself, he tries at least to immortalize his Name by his famous Actions. 
Thus Men desire Children, to live again in future Times by their Posterity; Learned 
Men write to delude Oblivion by the Reputation of their Works; Princes build Palaces 
and Cities to make themselves for their Magnificence famous after Death; and 
Conquerors make the World desolate, to establish to themselves Renown, surrounded 
with horrid Slaughter, and Seas of Blood.43
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, John Hill (1716-1775) extends the earlier theories 
of preventive hygiene in his book The Old M an’s Guide to Health and Longer Life: With 
Rules fo r  Diet, Exercise, and Physick (1764). He comments on how:
Old mens diseases are hard to cure; but easy to prevent [...] Moderate diet and due 
exercise are the best guardians of health in all: but in the advanced period here 
considered there are two great preservatives besides; these are Ease and 
Cheerfulness 44
In a similar vein in The Virtues o f Sage, in Lengthening Human Life With Rules to Attain Old 
Age in Health and Cheerfulness (1765), Hill comments again that:
If there can be any thing that can prolong human life, it is our interest, and our duty to 
apply it [...]There is no absurdity in the opinion, that life may be prolonged. We can
43 Harcouet de Longeville, Long Livers: A Curious Histoiy o f Such Persons o f Both Sexes who have L iv’d  
Several AGES, and Grown Young Again: With the rare SECRET o f  Rejuvenency o f  Arnoldus o f  Villa Nova, And 
a Great Many Approv’d  and Invaluable Rules to Prolong Life (London: Publisher Unknown, 1722), pp. 7-8.
44 John Hill, The Old M an’s Guide to Health and Longer Life: With Rules fo r  Diet, Exercise, and Physick, 5th 
edn. (London: Publisher Unknown, 1764), p. 4.
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see it can be shortened by imprudent courses; and it is just to infer a better regulated 
conduct may extend it.45
This is followed by The Art o f Prolonging Life (1797) by German physician Christoph 
Wilhelm Hufeland (1762-1836), which offers a sustained, scientific examination of the 
human life course and physiology in relation that found in the animal kingdom. It is proposed 
that Man has within him the necessary conditions requisite to live through and surpass old 
age, and we see in Hufeland’s text the spirit of transition and continued medico-philosophical 
inquiry on the subject of age and longevity:
Various are the methods and plans which have been proposed for the prolongation of 
life. The old superstitious, astrological, and fantastic methods we have already 
examined and appreciated; but there are others, more modem, which appear to be 
founded on juster principles of life and vital duration, and which deserve some inquiry 
before we proceed to establish that which alone is possible 46
However, perhaps the starkest enquiry into medical/scientific progressivism in relation to 
human longevity is articulated by French Enlightenment thinker Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas 
de Caritat (1743-1794):
Would it be so absurd now to suppose that the improvement of the human race should 
be regarded as capable of unlimited progress? That a time will come when death 
would result only from extraordinary accidents or the more and more gradual wearing 
out of vitality, and that, finally, the duration of the average interval between birth and
45 John Hill, The Virtues o f  Sage, in Lengthening Human Life With Rules to Attain Old Age in Health and 
Cheerfulness, 4th edn. (London: Publisher Unknown, 1765), pp. 4-5.
46 Christoph William Hufeland, The Art o f Prolonging Life (USA: Kessinger Publishing, 2003), p. 137.
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wearing out has itself no specific limit whatsoever?...cannot the span constantly 
increase...?47
As Sussanah Ottaway remarks, ‘[w]hile the hope for eternal youth is eternal, the methods for 
achieving it map onto the medical expertise and mentalities of each era.’48 With empirical 
advances in medicine as more post-mortems are conducted, the correlation between clinical 
symptoms and observations pave the way for important transitions from interpreting and 
balancing the body to intervening actively upon it,49 and from ideas of prevention to those of 
treatment and cure. In the nineteenth century there was a ‘desire to document, quantify, and 
classify old age.’50 This period saw the pathologisation of the ageing body and the imposition 
of a discipline, geriatrics, on the elderly:
One effect of nineteenth-century medical researchers’ careful classification of the 
workings of the human body was that the body became fixed in description as a set of 
signs. Because these signs were interpreted as indicators of health or infirmity and of 
normality or deviance, researchers laying the groundwork for the disciplines of 
gerontology and geriatrics were also imposing discipline upon the body. The old body 
was treated as a sign system which signalled deterioration and degeneration, and these 
signs could be interpreted only by scientists.51
Revealing how the medical episteme impacts on language, it was in the mid-Victorian era 
that the words ‘senile’ and ‘senescence’ gained pathological connotations. In previous eras
47 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, quoted by Mary Effosini Gregory in Freedom in French 
Enlightenment Thought (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2010), p. 156.
48 Susannah Ottaway, The Oxford Handbook o f  the Histoiy o f  Medicine, p. 349.
49 Stephen Katz, Disciplining Old Age: The Formation o f  Gerontological Knowledge (USA: The University 
Press of Virginia, 1996), p. 39.
50 Teresa Mangum, ‘Growing Old: Age’ in A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture, ed. by Herbert F. 
Tucker (USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004), p. 104.
51 Ibid., p. 105.
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the words referred to old age (1481), to growing old (1695), or to becoming infirm as a result 
of age (1791); but by 1841 they referred to weakness and later in the century, to a specific 
pathological state.52 From the noninterventionist role of premodem medicine there is an 
impulse in the nineteenth century to observe, diagnose, and meliorate the ageing body: to 
intervene actively on senescence. This is reflected on the publications that emerged during 
this time, such as The Code o f Health and Longevity (1806) by Sir John Sinclair (1754-1835), 
An Essay on the Disorders o f  Old Age (1819) by Sir Anthony Carlisle (1768-1840), Clinical 
Lectures on the Diseases o f  Old Age (1867) by Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-93), Grey’s 
Anatomy (1856) -which viewed the body as a visible anatomical map on which disease could 
be localised and disciplinary knowledges coordinated -  Thomas Bailey’s (1785-1856) 
Records o f Longevity (1857), William J. Thoms’ (1803-85) Human Longevity: Its Facts and 
Its Fictions (1873), Arnold Lorand’s Old Age Defended (1912), and Elie Metchnikoff The 
Prolongation o f  Life: Optimistic Studies (1907). In Old Age Deferred: The Causes o f  Old age 
and its Postponement by Hygiene and Therapeutic Measures, Lorand opens with the 
following premise:
[WJhile it is still impossible for us to create a young man out of an old one, it is quite 
within the boundaries of possibility, as we shall endeavour to demonstrate herein, to 
prolong our term of youthfulness by ten or twenty years. In other words we need no 
longer grown old at forty or fifty; we may live to the age of ninety or one hundred 
years, instead of dying at sixty or seventy. All this can be brought about by the 
observance of certain hygienic measures, and by improving the functions of a certain
53few of the glandular structures in our body.
52 Stephen Katz, Disciplining Old Age, p. 41.
53 Arnold Lorand, ‘Preface’, Old Age Deferred: The Causes o f  Old age and its Postponement by Hygiene and 
Therapeutic Measures, 4th edn., trans. by Arnold Lorand (Philadelphia: F.A Davis Company, 1913), p. iii.
15
Old Age Deferred shows the same positivist bias as much geriatric/gerontological research 
and prolongevity medicine today. In the nineteenth century medical advancements, meliorist 
efforts of reformers in public health, and the gradual secularisation of life give rise to a new 
prescriptive literature on old age. Ideas and theories on rejuvenation and ‘immortality’ move 
from the stale scholasticism of some of its theological, philosophical, noninterventionist 
medical roots to the commonplace of society and a reaffirmation of meliorism in response to 
the problem of death in an ageing society. Lorand explains why age-associated phenomena 
occur, offering a synthetic description of their manifestations and in the process extending the 
work of its forbearers such as Hippocrates and Celsus and their work on the clinical aspects 
of ageing.
The binary logic of normal versus pathological was far more visible with the development of 
geriatrics (1850) and institutions such as La Salpetriere and Bicetre in France where 
observations on the elderly were accumulated. At this time ‘the studies of old age became 
exact and systematic’ 54(with the exception of Charles Eduourd Brown-Sequard who, in 1889 
claimed he could ‘rejuvenate old men with a tonic containing the crushed testicles of dogs’)55 
and senescence became a more acutely medicalised phase of life as the elderly began to be 
studied in the therapeutic and juridical space of the asylum. It is possible that one root of age 
prejudice and gerontophobia today is in the early nineteenth century’s institutional solution to 
the problems of old age, as well its moralistic ideas about senescence where individuals, 
‘committed to limitless accumulation of wealth and health, deman[d] relentless control over 
one’s body and physical energy and vie [wed] physical decline and disease essentially as
54 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 21.
55 Stephen S. Hall, Merchants o f Immortality: Chasing the Dream o f  Human Life Extension (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), p. 193.
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failure or sin.’56 It was during the latter half of the nineteenth century that the very onset of 
old age was in dispute, with the Friendly Societies Act of 1875 establishing 50 as the age at 
which individuals were eligible for charitable gifts; the Old Age Pensions Committee of 1898 
establishing 65 as the retirement age for men; and the Old Age Pensions act of 1908 pushing 
this up to 70.57 In An Essay on the Principle o f  Population (1798)Thomas Malthus gives 
some indication of the changes old age is undergoing: ‘man will not absolutely become 
immortal, yet the duration between his birth and natural death will increase without ceasing 
[...] and may be properly expressed through the word indefinite.’58 However, perhaps one of 
the most formative periods in the formation of gerontological thought emerged in the early 
twentieth century with the work of psychiatrist and neuropathologist Alois Alzheimer (1864- 
1915) and his contemporaries. Conceptualising the ‘senile’ within a biomedical and 
psychiatric framework, research into Alzheimer’s disease contributed ‘to the transformation 
of what had been generally considered “senility” into a specific disease with specific 
pathological characteristics and symptoms.’59 The work of Alzheimer and Emil Kraepelin 
(1856-1926) on the pathological features of senility was perhaps a significant turning point in 
the pathologisation of age and the emergence of old age as a sub-discipline of medicine. The 
histological work of Alzheimer on Auguste D., charting the progress of brain atrophy in 
sufferers of dementia, challenged what may have been the conventional or canonical indices 
of decline in the elderly, and significantly destabilised the ‘assumption that mental and
56 Thomas R. Cole, ‘The “Enlightened” View of Aging: Victorian Morality in a New Key’ in What Does it 
Mean to Grow Old?: Reflections from the Humanities, ed. by Sally Gadow & Thomas R. Cole (USA: Duke 
University Press, 1986), pp. 115-131 (p. 115).
57Teresa Mangum, A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture, p. 104.
58 Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle o f  Population, vol. 2 (London: Elibron Classics, 2006), p. 
5.
59 Patrick Fox, From Senility to Alzheimer's Disease: The Rise of the Alzheimer's Disease Movement, The 
Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 1 (1989), pp. 58-102 (59), http://www.istor.org/stable/3350070 [accessed 
12/11/ 11].
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physical deterioration were normal in old age.’60 Robert Butler (1927-2010), who coined the 
term ‘ageism’ in 1968, believed that ‘virtually all of the physical and mental deterioration 
commonly attributed to old age was more properly understood as the product of disease 
processes distinct from aging,’61 which is what has been perhaps the consistent implication in 
many of the earlier medical texts on ageing. The consignation of senility to the realm of 
choice, as implied in its very medicalisation and the sheer amount of literature dedicated to its 
cure, is neither novel nor particularly contentious by this period.
For centuries, the subject of ageing has been connected less with existential angst or libidinal 
fear of death, and more with a liberal humanism and growing secularism as people have 
increasingly sought insight into, control over, and freedom from mortality. We might suggest 
that prolongevity today is split between religion, mythos, and science fiction on the one hand, 
and clinical rationality and scientific sophistication on the other. Oneiric fantasies of 
immortality, notions of turning back time, defying age, or regaining one’s youth now 
comprise relatively quotidian cultural discourses of ageing. They form the basis of trite 
liberal humanist ideologies where individuals are invited to assume control over their body 
and wilfully aestheticise, medicalise, or simply consume their way out of age. One is invited 
to hold death in abeyance through a regimen of accoutrements in consumer culture and 
biomedical interventions, including:
pharmaceutical drugs, cosmetic surgery, dieting and exercise, resonate with the 
strength of consumer culture to create the desire for health, longevity, sexual 
fulfilment, youth and beauty [...] [T]he malfunctioning body can be repaired, holding
60J.F. Ballenger, ‘Progress in the History of Alzheimer’s Disease: The Importance of Context’ in Alzheimer’s 
Disease: A Centwy o f  Scientific and Clinical Research, ed. by George Perry et al. (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 
2006), p. 7.
61 Ibid., p. 10.
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at bay the ravages of time [...] promising the prospect of erasing boundaries between 
chronobiology and physiological capacities in old age.b2
Ideas of rejuvenation, or even the possibility of sempitemity, are overcome by a triteness, 
rationalism, and pragmatism; they are swept up in high-income, youth-obsessed capitalist 
cultures and associated less with science fiction and myth and more with healthcare 
stratagems, commodity fetishism, dilettantish consumer beauty regimes, and medical and 
scientific ambition. Immortality may retain its inherent transcendentalism, but may be 
characterised as a bathetic transcendentalism -an  ideology with religious, mythical, and 
science-fictional origins, and a new form of humanism in the context of demographic change, 
a panacea to the gerontocracy forged unwittingly from medical achievements of the past 
century. As such, immortality begins to characterise more rational, logico-scientific 
discourses of ageing, the everyday consumer vernacular, a liberal humanism and secular 
optimism as people seek control over and insight into the ageing body and reconceptualise as 
optional, reversible, or preventable the most quintessentially mortal of conditions: ageing. 
Notions of turning back or arresting time are dominated by a triteness and uncanny 
pragmatism as they increasingly characterise aspects of medicine, consumer capitalism, the
63everyday vernacular and bourgeois mentality. With the plethora of anti-ageing products, 
discourses of immortality, it seems, are becoming further and further removed from the 
realms of myth, alchemy, and more recently the alternative epistemologies of science fiction. 
From the Gnostic imagination to empirical facticity, immortality and prolongevism comprise 
a bureaucratic, medically and scientifically sophisticated system aimed not simply at
62 Pia C. Kontos, Ageing and Place: Perspectives, Policy, Practice, ed. by Gavin J. Andrews et al. (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 33.
63 E.g.: Clarins Multi-Active Night Youth Recovery Cream; Clarins Multi-Active Day Early Wrinkle Correction 
Cream; D ’Occitane Immortelle Anti-Ageing Recovery Set; Decleor Aroma Night Regenerating Beauty Cream; 
Gamier Youthful Radiance Eye Roll-on; Clarins Age Control Hand Lotion; Decleor Vitaroma Wrinkle 
Prevention Energising Eye Cream; L’Oreal Paris Dermo-Expertise Youth Code Rejuvenating Anti-Wrinkle 
Night Cream; Emma Hardie Amazing Face Rejuvenating Night Cream; Darphin Age-Defying Dermabrasion; 
Betty Hula The Secret Anti-Ageing Wonder; md Formulations Vit-A-Plus Anti-Ageing Serum; Trilogy Age- 
Proof CoQIO Serum; Lierac Diopticreme Age-Defense Cream for Winkles Around the Eyes.
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pathologising age but mortality. Rejuvenation, like for Aeson in Metamorphoses and Iolas in 
The Children ofHerakles, is swept up in notions of right and entitlement in high-income, 
youth-obsessed capitalist cultures - a  hedonistic utilitarianism where one has the right, and 
more recently the means, to triumph over the limitations of the body:
The goal of staying “forever youthful” has become something of a fetish in modem 
societies: the popularity of Botox, Viagra, facelifts, anti-ageing potions and other 
modem elixirs of youth testify to that.64
The anti-ageing phenomenon in contemporary western culture has secularised more religious 
configurations of immortality or the afterlife; have de-sensationalised the transcendentalism 
and imaginative or alternative epistemologies of science fiction; have blurred the boundaries 
between mythos and science, magic and technology; and have rendered science fiction a new 
prescriptive literature for an ageing society. Discourses of immortality and rejuvenation have 
deviated from their mythical, literary, religious, and esoteric medical roots, and have become 
embroiled in a crass consumerism and banality as phrases such as ‘age rewind’, ‘age defy’, 
and ‘turn back time’ begin to prevail in the more quotidian realm of consumer capitalism, 
prolongevity medicine, and healthcare paradigms. Arguably they have even been connected 
to a sense of urgency, a humanitarian concern or cultural exigency, as previously fantastical 
or arcane realities and epistemologies gain a different significance -inherit a sardonic 
pragmatism, perhaps -in  the context of a society trying to cope with an ageing culture: the 
gerontocracy, that is, forged unwittingly from its own medical achievements of the past 
century.
The pathologisation of age has been considered by Tom Kitwood in Dementia Reconsidered 
(1997) as a form of ageism. Kitwood argues that anti-ageing justifies and gives credence to
64 John Macnicol, ‘Analysing Ageism and Age Discrimination’ in Age Discrimination: An Historical and 
Contemporary Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 5.
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prejudicial or gerontophobic attitudes,65 and has the effect of transforming blatant hostility 
and incredulity toward old age into ‘enlightened’ prejudice. The nature of anti-ageing 
medicine is summarised by Dr Ronald Klatz, of the American Academy of Anti-Ageing 
Medicine (A4M):
We shouldn’t be celebrating ageing. We should be fighting tooth and nail against 
ageing. Because ageing is linked to a disease process, so is it natural? Tuberculosis 
was natural, polio was natural, the plague was natural. We at 4AM are saying that 
ageing can and should be treated. The degenerative processes of ageing are diseases, 
ageing per se is not a disease, but the pathological processes of ageing that lead to 
chronic degenerative diseases and death are.66
This is echoed by the gerontologist Tom Kirkwood, who in the 2001 Reith Lectures 
commented:
We now understand that our bodies are not programmed with some unavoidable sell- 
by date; we are not programmed to die [...] The first and most encouraging message is 
that as soon as we recognise that we are programmed not to die, but to survive, we 
can see that the ageing process is malleable. Ageing comes about through the gradual 
build-up of unrepaired faults in the cells and tissues of our bodies as we live our lives, 
not as a result of some active mechanism for death and destruction. If we can discover 
the nature of these faults, we can hope to slow their accumulation.
65 Bavidge (2006) likewise argues that the systemic pathologisation of the elderly is a form of ageism: ‘we 
should think of old age as offering alternative rather than impaired ways of experience life’ (cited by Julian C. 
Hughes, ‘Future Scoping: Ethical Issues in Aging and Dementia’ in The Oxford Handbook o f  Neuroethics, p. 
616).
66 Ronald Klatz, cited by Astrid Stuckelberger in Anti-Ageing Medicine: Myths and Chances (Hochschulverlag 
AD an der ETH Zurich, Switzerland, 2008), p. 210.
67 Tom Kirkwood, The End o f  Age: Why Everything About Ageing is Changing (London: Profile Books, 2001), 
pp. 11 & 13.
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Kirkwood eschews the apparent inevitability and determinism of age. He portrays senescence 
as more a series of curable pathologies than a biologically, or divinely, preordained process 
of decline and decay. Consequently, ideas of rejuvenation, or even the possibility of 
immortality, begin to characterise more rational, logico-scientific discourses, and emerge 
from the dry scholasticism and conceptual realities of earlier literatures into an increasingly 
dominant and prosaic cultural meme. I ask not only how the literature and language of ageing 
today has been challenged by contemporary medical and cultural constructions of age, but 
where they stand in relation to the cultural antecedents of anti-ageing. The literature and 
language of ageing, I argue, is not responding to a uniquely modem destabilisation of age and 
age categories, but one that has persisted for generations. I hope to demonstrate how this 
timeless humanist fallacy inheres within the semiology of age in modem and contemporary 
literature, and how the representation of ageing remains ‘the ultimate challenge for the 
novelist’68 as both medical capabilities and the hopes and sophistry of the anti-ageing 
revolution continue to alter the nature of human ageing.
ii) The Literature of Age: Intimations of Immortality
In literature today, immortality is not a subject most likely found in science fiction and 
fantasy, but traditional realist narratives of ageing. It is embedded within the very semiology 
of ageing in modem and contemporary prose, and in each of this thesis’ four chapters I hope 
to show how, within the formal, semantic, and structural properties of old age narratives, rests 
a powerful but implicit repudiation of age. Chapter 1 is an analysis of Beckettian prose and 
stagecraft in relation to the ordeal of ageing. In Beckett’s oeuvre ageing is represented as a 
malign external force: a theatrical contrivance, and a disturbing, often perverse affectation
68 Mike Hep worth, Stories o f  Ageing, p. 3.
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that is rarely natural or normal. His theatre is bound in an aesthetics of failure, characterised 
by a linguistic, scenic, and choreographic sparseness; and likewise his prose, often highly and 
disorientatingly tautological, lacking in plot and character developments, both is and yields 
little more than a hermeneutics of despair. His characters are burdened as much by their 
senescing bodies -bodies doomed to decay and to die -as by Beckett’s ostensibly spiteful 
indifference in the face of his own novelistic and directorial obligation to create. His 
dramaturgy in particular suggests a failure or refusal to enliven his own creations: a self- 
styled reluctance, negligence, or exhaustion in the face of artistic creation. Consequently, the 
themes of waiting, anticipation, and confusion prevail in his works. His choreographic, 
scenic, stylistic and linguistic decisions torture, tantalise, and spite his characters, whilst 
permitting them to exist - i f  only just. His characters senesce not because it is natural or 
timely but because it is imposed upon them, and as a result ageing has much less to do with 
the fate of the body than with the machinations of theatre (within which the characters are 
unwittingly trapped) and the artistic disobligation of the novelist/director -Beckett himself.
It is all too tempting to essentialise the Beckett oeuvre. A great deal of scholarly work has
labelled Beckett an oppressive and pessimistic writer and his work a negative, prejudicial
portrait of old age that eludes any sense of hope or optimism. His representation of
senescence has been described as ‘a horrific study of the implications of growing old and the
undesirability of reaching those twilight years, when all we have to look forward to is bad
health, isolation, and the overwhelming need to reach the grave.’69 Despite the serio-comic
plights of individual characters, the subject of organic decay is used by Beckett as injunction
to face the broader realities of human existence in the twentieth century. Following his death
in 1989, it was written of Beckett in The Irish Times that ‘old age seemed peculiarly
becoming to him, seemed his proper element, its characteristics of isolation and immobility
69 Kathryn White, ‘Old Age: The Dictatorship of Time’ in Beckett and Decay (London & New York:
Continuum, 2009), p. 22.
according best with his general view of humanity’s lot.’70 The necrotic minimalism of his 
dramaturgy and the confused, disembodied, and reflective isolation of his prose works create 
an aesthetics of failure and despair that would seem to take its lead from the ordeal of ageing. 
Literature, for Beckett, is not an imaginative, pastoral retreat from the world and its 
exigencies. He rejects literary and theatrical embellishments that interpose themselves 
between reality and representation, and instead admits the condition of western culture and 
the phenomenology of ageing body into his prose and dramaturgy. In doing so, he offers a 
bodily and representational sense of failure and affliction: ‘he had a compulsion to create his 
own wounds and rub salt in them. Aesthetically, he needed to suffer pain.’71 Through the 
choreographic, linguistic, and scenic sparseness and his disembodied reflective meditations 
on ageing and decay he rehearses the twentieth century’s ‘social and military horrors, its 
criminal wastage of lives and of the planet’s resources, [and] its refusal to look at the 
consequences of selfishness and short-term profit.’72 His literary aesthetic, though densely 
self-referential in parts, and elitist and exclusivist in its modernistic complexity, comprises a 
pretension to evoke the whole world and truths about the condition of Man. Beckett still uses 
the ordeal of ageing and its universality as a vehicle through which invoke a sense of human 
rather than specifically national crisis -the condition of humankind as a whole and ‘the chaos 
and general mess of all existence [my italics]. ,73He offers a sense of social, political, and 
moralistic breakdown metaphorised in the decaying body and extended mimetically in his 
adoption of an ostensibly negligent and deteriorative aesthetic. Some of his major prose 
works, such as Molloy and Watt, for example, are syntactically difficult and tautological in 
places, mimicking the eponymous characters’ ineffectual attempts at locomotion. In the same
70 Fintan O’Toole et al., ‘Modern Irish Dramatists: Samuel Beckett, Irish Times 25 December 1989’ in Critical 
Moments: Fintan O ’Toole on Modern Irish Theati'e, ed. by Julia Furay & Redmond O’Hanlon (Dublin: A 
Carysfort Press Book, 2003), p. 307.
71 John Calder, The Philosophy o f  Samuel Beckett (London: Calder Publications, 2001), p. 3.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 9.
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vein, scenically and choreographically, his plays ‘tak[e] the form of a cycle run-down. We 
perceive a process of dying, both psychic and physical,’74 as his characters, often encased, 
entombed, or buried, are rendered silent and/or immobile in such a way as to plunge his plays 
into a death-like torpor and a jointly oppressive and transcendent stillness. Paradoxically, his 
exaggeratedly senescent characters seem like victims of time; yet in their inertia and silence 
they also seem liberated from  time and exempt from death. Their moments of stasis and 
speechlessness yield a humbling and candid admission of their humanity; but they are also 
immortalised by their stillness, embalmed, it seems, by Beckett’s own stylised negligence. 
The actors in Beckett’s plays are inhibited, stultified by his choreographic/scenic decisions: 
buried, entombed, or encased on stage, Beckett does not permit freedom of movement or 
creative artistic licence, and so a self-crafted impotence pervades his dramaturgy.
Beckett’s characters senesce in a way that is rarely normal or natural; senescence is not a 
natural decline but a perverse, non-human affectation, a form of self-abuse, even. Although 
his thematic and stylistic preoccupation with age and decay has been linked to a pretention to 
evoke broader existential and humanistic issues, scholars have attributed it to rising life 
expectancies and demographic change in post-war western culture. With improvements in 
health care comes a greater affluence of old people and age-related pathologies. The 
prevalence of decrepit, ageing characters in Beckett’s oeuvre is described as ‘a reflection of 
the condition of more and more people in the ageing western world.’75 It is a paradox of 
modem medicine today that whilst improvements in the quality of life are made, the period of 
life most associated with retrograde change, where the body experiences greater homeostatic 
imbalance (and is thus more susceptible to disease and death), is extended. The atrophying, 
maladroit bodies occupying so many of Beckett’s works, and the vast, ostensibly incalculable 
age of characters such as Malone in Malone Dies, is ‘prescient, foreshadowing the situation
74 Andrew K. Kennedy, Samuel Beckett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 33-4.
75 Fintan O’Toole, Critical Moments, p. 307.
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of many frail elderly today who live into their eighties, nineties, and beyond.’76 In Beckett’s 
works, each character’s abject, ‘endless little body [my italics]’77 gives the sense not of 
ageing naturally, but as ageing inhumanely, as if afflicted by a malign external force. 
Collectively, his dramatis personae force us to confront the world of rising life expectancies 
and demographic change -a  future where ‘onward looks like downward; their ageing, their 
deterioration, their time-spinning [...] all a part of a run-down, towards their eventual ends.’78 
His characters are afflicted; their old age is a sadistic imposition, an injunction to senesce 
(without ever attaining death) made by some malevolent, unseen inquisitor. His aesthetics of 
despair, provoked by ‘a heightened awareness of the senescent’79 in ageing Europe, is 
described as ‘the product of a civilisation which has become suddenly old.’80 Despite the 
universality of ageing, Beckett dehumanises the old, confers decay and impotence upon his 
very aesthetic, and consequently the subject of ageing oscillates between consoling 
familiarity and profound alienation. His characters’ unreal, stylised senescence and the serio­
comic strangeness and uniqueness of their plights magnify their frustrations and physical 
maladies, as well as the malevolent machinations of the theatre within which they remain 
trapped. As Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman have commented: ‘it is strange that in 
a generation which has put all its stress on youth and achievement, he alone should have
written about old age, loneliness and decrepitude, a subject which arouses perhaps our
81deepest repressed guilt and fears.’
The premise from which this chapter starts is that Beckett’s work, conscious though it is of 
the plights of humanity in an ageing post-war society, does not reflect but refracts the
76 Kathleen M. Woodward, Ageing and its Discontents: Freud and Other Fictions (USA: Indiana University 
Press, 1991), p. 132.
77 Samuel Beckett, Lessness (London: Calder & Boyars, 1970), p. 12.
78 Kennedy, Samuel Beckett, p. 43.
79 Zoe Brennan, ‘Paradigms of Ageing and Ageism’ in The Older Woman in Recent Fiction (Carolina: 
McFarland & Company Inc., 2004), p. 18.
80V.S Pritchbtt, ‘44: New Statesman (1966)’ in Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage, ed. by Lawrence Graver 
& Raymond Federman (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 216-20 (p. 219).
81 Lawrence Graver et al., Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage, p. 219.
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realities of ageing -is  a tacit monument, even, to immortality. For Beckett’s dramatis 
personae, ageing is an imposition, a strange affectation, a form of abuse from some malign, 
unseen inquisitor, and at times even a form of self-harm. As such it is a condition that can, if 
his characters did but know it, be discontinued at will. Despite Beckett’s ostensible 
preoccupation with ageing, much of his prose work and dramaturgy subtly invert the 
conventional or canonical indices of decay and decline —transform them into a new paradigm 
of hope. His semiology of age in his prose works and his choreographic, scenic, and linguistic 
choices in his dramaturgy are replete with allusions to choice, and gesture often to the 
possibility of cessation, remittance, or respite. The anatomical and directorial are often 
conflated: bodily failure, for instance, is not conveyed through the actors’ bodies, but through 
the use of props whereby they are restricted, stultified, confused, and impotent. Age is not a 
condition of the body, but a theatrical contrivance; a condition that comes not from within but 
from without, and as such ‘much of Beckett’s work can be read on one level in terms of a 
conflict between tormentors and victims. ,82In both his prose and his plays, it is not the 
referent of the body that dominates the representation of ageing and decay, but the milieu of 
props, prostheses, mechanisms, and technologies that surround it. Beckett’s bodies are a 
plethora of technological annexations, and as such the body is not a totality but a series of 
occlusions operated inexpertly, maladroitly, and tragicomically by his characters. In 
Beckett’s theatre, his characters’ obscure and fractal bodies and reluctant locutions seem at 
the mercy of the spite of the theatre and its inauspicious machinations. Beckettian theatre is a 
miasma of failure, and the characters’ hyperbolic and stylised decrepitude and the 
aversiveness and constrictiveness of their bodies conjoin the theatrical and the anatomical. As 
such it is the theatre itself that goes on to metaphorise old age or indeed impose old age on its 
characters. Ageing is rarely a natural or normal condition for Beckett’s characters, but an
82 Garin Dowd, Abstract Machines: Samuel Beckett and Philosophy after Deleuze and Guattari (Amsterdam & 
New York: Editions Rodopi, 2007), p.168.
unnatural and alien burden, a carapacial or pseudo-senescence, imposed on them by a malign 
external force whose origin, in his prose and theatre, seems technological and directorial 
respectively. His dramaturgy engages with old age thematically, but belies its ostensibly 
realist tableau in its self-reflexivity and modernistic predilection for novelty and polemicism. 
Amir Cohen-Shalev comments that ‘making existential despair a springboard for creative
O'}
work was the essence of his literary innovation.’ Similarly Andrew Kennedy argues that in 
Beckett’s works ‘the dark (which includes despair and recurrent nihilism) yields a kind of 
light, the acute sense of impotence releases a kind of strength’ and constitutes a ‘powerful 
negative/creative force.’84 He offers, then, a subtly conflicted portrait of ageing and decay. In 
a similar vein his prose constitutes a thematic engagement with old age on the one hand, but 
its semiological transcendence on the other. His characters’ bodies are fractal, ersatz, and 
‘robot-like’, and fatigue like ‘over-used automat [a].’85 The descriptions of wizened, 
senescing bodies as run-down automata -o r even vehicular prostheses -function both as an 
admission of and release from old age. His metaphors compound a sense of dispossession, 
alterity, and strangeness in age, yet offer a bathetic transcendence of age with the scarcity of 
the conventional or canonical ‘signs’ of ageing and his refusal to narrate ageing in the flesh. 
This is reflected in the scholarly works emerging on Beckett that focus on the implicit 
technologisation of Beckettian bodies, including: Yoshiki Tajiri’s Samuel Beckett and the 
Prosthetic Body (2007), Garin Dowd’s Abstract Machines: Samuel Beckett and Philosophy 
after Deleuze and Guattari (2007), and Ulrika Maude’s Beckett, Technology and the Body 
(2009). The characters exist in bodies beyond bodies, suffering from age but exempt from 
death; and this highlights, and to some extent literalises, the themes of decay and entropy, but
83 Amir Cohen-Shalev, Both Worlds at Once: Art in Old Age (USA: University Press of America, Inc., 2002), p. 
112.
84 Kennedy, p. 14.
85 Kennedy, p. 97.
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also, if covertly, is teasingly and provocatively germane to trans- and posthumanist 
discourses.
The origins of ageing in the Beckett canon are not physiological, but theatrical and 
technological, and in adroitly suppressing the body in favour of its technological or 
mechanical uncannies, Beckett also evades the subject of age. What I will seek to examine is 
how Beckett’s characters exist on both sides of the divide aged/ageless, old/young. Beckett’s 
preoccupation with ageing is highly conflicted: thematically, it evokes broad humanistic, 
moralistic, and existential issues on the condition of Man, metaphorised in the decaying 
body; yet various features of his prose and stagecraft undermine and even invert the indices 
of decay and decline by giving them a sense of artifice and a seditious metatheatricality. In 
essence, whilst his thematic preoccupation centres upon the pathos of age, by contrast the 
formal features of his work are quite simply salvatory: they contribute to the representation of 
age as inhuman, excrescent, or not natural, and have the effect of conveying the ageing 
process as optional -as a disturbing affectation or imposition from a malign external force. 
Ageing, for Beckett’s characters, is a theatrical contrivance, an affectation or form of self­
abuse, and at times results in actions or postures that stem less from pain, disability, or 
cripplement, and more from a sense of compulsion, obsession, or nervous tic. As such 
Beckett’s literature of age is characterised by a wry defeatism, although this is perhaps the 
basis for Woodward’s claim that ‘[w]hat is blatantly manifest in Beckett’s work over the 
length of his career -the representation of old age -seems to have been systematically 
misrecognized by his literary critics.’ In suggesting Beckett’s aesthetic is in some way bound 
up in an adroit resistance to the realities of age, Woodward suggests that ‘we come up against 
the repression of ageing and old age.’861 aim to demonstrate, however, that the repression of 
ageing is fundamental to his very language of age and the nature of his stagecraft. Allusions
86 Woodward, Ageing and its Discontents, p. 132.
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to technology and inorganic structures dominate Beckett’s visual lexicon of ageing in his 
prose, and this is extended in his dramaturgy as Beckett’s own directorial decisions are 
alluded to, magnified, and emerge as a metaphor -and ultimately the very reason -for his 
characters’ decrepitude. In his prose the boundaries between the biological and technological 
determinism are blurred, and on stage the boundaries between the anatomical and the 
dramaturgical/directorial are blurred.
However, this chapter moves beyond the Beckett canon, as I both examine Beckett’s 
semiology of age and use that as a foundation from which to critique what it means to age in 
a technologically progressive society. As well as an examination of Beckettian bodies, this 
chapter forms a critique of trans-/posthumanism from a humanist perspective -a  topic I 
readdress in the final chapter. I will go on to consider the ordeal of ageing and the 
victim/tormentor dynamic as part of a dialectical critique on the technologisation of 
humankind. I will study the pervasiveness of technology in contemporary culture, and how 
dependence on social media and assistive technologies displaces the primacy of the body and 
renders the human ‘at best a mere appendix to the machine, at worst the machine’s obliterated 
victim’87 -in  other words, ironically fulfilling a death wish in the powerful renunciation of 
mortality. I shall argue that there is little that is promethean in current technological 
innovation; that the technologisation of humankind represents a hyperfinality, or escalation of 
finalities as we systematically and wilfully retire parts of the body/bodily functions; and that 
as a result, technological discourses, inevitably and bathetically, invoke gerontological ones 
-the ‘fate of inertia in a saturated world [...] swept up in this gigantic process of inertia by 
acceleration.’881 will examine technological discourses as embroiled inextricably in a 
hermeneutics of failure and dejection, extending the argument of Paul Virilio that reliance on
87 James E. Katz et al., ‘Introduction’ to Mediating the Human Body: Technology, Communication, and Fashion 
(New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2003), p. 2.
88 Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, trans. by Philip Beitchman et al., ed. by Jim Fleming (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1990), p. 13.
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technology predicates dependency, highlights the exciting yet ultimately threatening 
permeability of the body and the duplicability of its functions, holding able-bodied, 
functional Man in abeyance -o r in the words of Virilio: ‘mak[ing] the super-equipped able- 
bodied person almost the exact equivalent of the motorized and wired disabled person.’89 The 
chapter, then, is a study of how Beckett’s stagecraft, his prose works’ bathos and conflicted 
semiology of ageing, and the decay-victimisation nexus that occurs throughout Beckettian 
art, advances the philosophical study of technology and poses questions about what it means 
to age in a technologically progressive culture.
Chapter two examines the semiology of age in modem and contemporary realist narratives of 
ageing, and extends many of the issues raised in the previous chapter. I examine how the 
inorganic objects and structures dominate the visual lexicon of ageing in contemporary prose. 
The literature I examine in this section, including Kingsley Amis’ Ending Up (1972) and 
Alice Sebold’s The Almost Moon (2007), are works that represent the human experience of 
time, organic decay, and death with recourse not to the senescing body but to architecture, 
domestic furnishings, and miscellaneous objects in the throes of decay, neglect, or disrepair. I 
term this the prosthetic vision of age. In the prosthetic vision, the milieu of objects, from 
dilapidated architecture to broken crockery, recapitulates aspects of the characters’ 
corporeality, and thus the external environment becomes akin to an extended, prosthetic 
body. The prosthesis is a conflicted image, with both positive and negative connotations. On 
the one hand the prosthesis is a metonym for disablement, a commemorative monument to 
the body’s lost or dwindling efficacies; on the other hand it is a corrective, substitutive 
addition that exceeds, extends, and survives the body’s constitutively fragile structure. It is in 
this sense an image of persistence and survival. I examine how writers metaphorise the milieu 
of objects that survive, and exist outside of and around the body; and how the external
89 Paul Virilio, Open Sky, trans. by. Julie Rose (London & New York: Verso, 1997), p. 11.
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environment is implicated in the representation of age-associated pain and the innermost 
sensations -the kinaesthesias and coenaesthesias -o f  the senescing body. In the prosthetic 
vision, the physical environment, from abandoned architecture to lacerated tennis balls, 
function as a cartography of the decaying body and constitute a hyperbolic and provocatively 
inhuman rendering of the vicissitudes, invisible geographies, and subjective experiences of 
the ageing body. The semiology of ageing in this sense, I argue, hinges on the representation 
of bodies beyond bodies; a representation that does not impassively trace but actively extends 
the contours of the ageing body, dispersing the ageing body, both entropically and 
posthumanly, across different substrates. The central question of this chapter will be whether 
representationally the prosthetic vision is a mimesis of decay -presenting the body not as a 
totality but as a series of irreducibly varied objects and spaces, and resisting all holistic and 
associationist conceptions of the body -o r whether the prosthetic vision marks traditional 
realist narratives of ageing as covertly transhumanist.
The prosthetic vision as much marks as masks the senescent subject, both elucidating and 
eliding the ageing body; conferring some naturalism onto the representation of age, but 
causing the textual images of age to fade into sublimation and repression. The prosthetic 
vision is problematic and paradoxical in the sense that it represents human ageing, but 
without recourse to the human body. It draws on themes associated with traditional realist 
narratives of age but problematises the traditional indices of decay and decline through a 
metaphorical use of objects and structures that can be replaced or restored. In its wilful, 
deliberate, and systematic effacement of the senescing body, the prosthetic vision stresses a 
sense of alterity, foreignness, and strangeness or excrescence in age -a  hyperbolic evocation, 
perhaps, of the western cultural narration of a ‘dehumanized old age.’90 The prosthetic vision 
maps the contours and cadences of the senescing body in its most unruly, abject, and exigent
90 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 7.
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states; but the contingency of metaphor, the densities in connotation or semantic open- 
endedness foster a sense of distance and deviation from its subject matter, plunging the cold 
realities of old age into illusion and sophistry. As Emmanuel Levinas describes: ‘every verbal 
signification lies at the confluence of countless semantic rivers, ,91and this chapter is a study 
of the implications of metaphor and polysemy in narratives of ageing. As Susan Sontag 
argues, ‘illness is not a metaphor, and [...] the most truthful way of regarding illness -and the 
healthiest way of being ill -is  one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking.’92 
This chapter analyses the use of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms in socio- 
literary discourses of ageing, asking how the synthetic dominates the visual lexicon of age 
and analysing the anthropomorphisation of architecture, domestic furnishings, and assistive 
devices in the representation of age-related pain and discomfort. This, I argue, renders the 
aged subject not simply post-biological, but post-gendered; the characters exist in bodies 
beyond bodies in both a plaintive and emancipatory sexlessness/agelessness; and this gives 
rise to a conflicted semiology of ageing where a character can at once suffer from and 
transcend the biological/physiological markers of age and sex in a single instance. I shall ask 
how far the prosthetic vision of age implicitly unites gerontological and trans-/posthumanist 
discourses; how the semiotics of immortality pervade traditional realist narratives of ageing; 
how such narratives engage with the pathos of ageing but offer also a new paradigm of hope; 
and what this means for the study of age and mortality in literature.
In recent years, a great deal of scholarship has emerged on the impact of demographic change 
and medical progressivism on literary topic and expression, as well as pragmatist conceptions 
of narrative as a medical resource. Hepworth describes fiction as ‘an imaginative resource for 
understanding variations in the meaning of the experience o f ageing in society,’ and that it is
91 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Signification and Sense’ in Humanism o f  the Other, trans. by Nidra Poller (USA: 
University of Illinois Press, 2003), p. 11.
92 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), p. 3.
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a ‘particularly valuable resource precisely because it allows the writer, through the exercise 
of imagination, access to the personal variations and ambiguities underlying the common
• • • Q lcondition of growing older.’ Literature and literary erudition have also been considered:
...an essential form of seeking and representing knowledge has profoundly shaped 
gerontology’s understanding of the search for meaning and identity. [...] Along with 
interpretation and narrative, rhetoric has also emerged as a tool of gerontological 
study.94
In 1959 novelist and scientist Charles Percy Snow lamented the emergence o f ‘two cultures’:
I believe the intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split 
into two polar groups... Literary intellectuals at one pole -a t the other scientists, and 
the most representative, the physical scientists [...] Their attitudes are so different that, 
even on the level of emotion, they can’t find much common ground.95
Chapter three examines how the ordeal of ageing -specifically the pathologies of ageing -has 
united these two cultures. I seek to demonstrate how developing neurological theory and 
medical insights into Alzheimer’s disease have impacted literary representations of thought 
and thinking in contemporary fiction. In the century since Alois Alzheimer’s research, 
literature has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to reflect the changing nature and depth 
of knowledge about the brain. Literary modernism saw the development of stream-of- 
consciousness (a phrase used by William James in Principles o f Memory in 1890): a mode of 
narration in which writers attempted to reproduce the nature, course, and rhythm of 
consciousness in narrative form. Writers such as Virginia Woolf did not attempt to mediate,
93 Ibid., 1 & 4.
94Multiple Contributors, Gerontology: Perspectives and Issues, 3rd edn., ed. by Janet Wilmoth et al. (New York: 
Springer Publishing Company, 2007), p. 253.
95 C.P Snow, ‘The Rede Lecture, 1959: Two Cultures’ in The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 3-4.
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domesticate, or tidy the vagaries of the mind into a logical, grammatical order, but strove 
toward a greater sense of equivalence between cognitive and linguistic states. What I shall be 
examining in this chapter is how literary experimentalism in a modernist vein can give insight 
into the nature and experience of Alzheimer’s disease from the perspective of the sufferer. I 
shall consider how the use of mimetic form and the self-reflexivity and poeticisation of prose 
style in contemporary Alzheimer’s fiction reflects modernist techniques, and the extent to 
which this is giving rise to a second, more conspicuously ‘medical’ phase of literary 
modernism. In conjunction with this I will consider how, in its associations with modernistic 
nova and artistic ferment, energy, flair, and polemicism, ageing is presented as a powerful 
force for change and creativity in Anglophone literature. As Gene D. Cohen comments:
While most of us accept that wisdom is a special provenance of ageing, many people 
have the reverse view of creativity: they believe it is a flower of youth that blooms 
less and less frequently as the decades pass. This is yet another myth about ageing that 
persists stubbornly in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.96
I shall analyse the cultural importance of countertraditional experimentalism in Alzheimer's 
fiction, and the implications of a body of literature that confers novelty on Alzheimer’s. I 
shall analyse how literary experimentalism, as used to explore and elucidate 
neuropathological states, is shedding the self-reflexivity and exclusivism often linked with 
anti-humanist visions of high modernism, and is instead demonstrating its potential value as a 
medical and gerontological resource. I ask how the use of mimetic form in neuro-atypical 
writing can give the illusion of an unmediated, subjective portrayal; how far this prompts a 
‘clinical’ attitude towards textual analysis; and the extent to which a medically-attuned,
96 Gene D. Cohen, The Mature Mind: The Positive Power o f  the Ageing Brain (New York: Basic Books, 2006),
p. 168
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symptomatic or ‘pathological’ aesthetic formalism, where neurological condition dictate 
narrative construction, is medically useful.
As life expectancies rise, there is a call for literature and literary criticism to be more 
receptive to alternative modes of cognition and expression. In the last two decades there has 
been a great deal of non-fiction written by sufferers about the experience of Alzheimer’s 
disease.97 Speaking of psychological and neurological conditions, Philip Sandblom has 
commented on how art and literature, produced by sufferers, has ‘provided fundamental 
insight into certain manifestations of mental disorder, and in certain cases even help us reach
• • 98a diagnosis.’ Art confers form and visibility on psychological or neuro-atypical processes, 
and Sander Gilman has described this as an act of ‘seeing disease.’99 As Ruth Nadelhaft 
comments, ‘what can literature offer the sufferer or the bystander in the face of the endless 
formlessness and present tense of the experience of pain and suffering? Literature offers 
form, structure, and the illusion of dimension to what was out of control and without limit.’100 
However, as I shall go onto examine, form in subjective Alzheimer’s fiction is by no means 
salvatory, since the task of the novelist is to is to approximate a progressive loss of form, a 
form uninhibited, as Sandblom suggests, by clinical rationality and mediating intellect -in  
short, an aesthetics of disarticulation. Gilman has gone on to describe psychiatric art as 
inherently elucidative in the sense that, unlike non-psychiatric art, it is not codified by social 
or literary/artistic conventions: it is characterised by ‘greater linguistic richness and freedom,
97 E.g. Robert Davis’ My Journey into Alzheimer’s Disease (1989); Diana Friel McGowin’s Living in the 
Labyrinth: A Personal Journey Through the Maze o f Alzheimer’s (1993); Thomas DeBaggio’s Losing My Mind: 
An Intimate Look into Life with Alzheimer’s (2002) and When It Gets Dark: Enlightened Reflection on Life with 
Alzheimer’s (2003); Christine Bryden’s Dancing With Dementia: My Stoiy o f  Living Positively with Dementia 
(2005); Richard Taylor’s Alzheimer’s From the Inside Out (2007); Lisa Snyder’s Speaking our Minds: What It's 
Like to Have Alzheimer’s (2009); Norman McNamara’s More Than Words: Poems Written and Spoken by an 
Alzheimer’s Sufferer (2010); and John du Preez Alzheimer’s My Stojy: Alzheimer’s Sufferer's Personal Journey 
and A Journey o f Hope: Diary o f an Alzheimer’s Sufferer (2011).
98 Philip Sandblom, Creativity and Disease: How Illness affects Literature, Art, and Music (London & New 
York: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1992), p. 67.
99 Sander L. Gilman, Disease and Representation: Images o f  Illness from Madness to AIDS (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), p. 3.
100 Ruth Nadelhaft, ‘The Experience of Illness’ in Imagine What I t ’s Like: A Literature and Medicine Anthology, 
ed. by Ruth Nadelhaft (USA: Maine Humanities Council, 2008), p. 3.
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keener images, metaphors untrammelled by conventional logic.’101 However, as medically- 
attuned literary formalism, it also represents over-determination in literature, as both the 
narrative and the interpretative processes of the reader are dictated by medical nosologies and 
the specific symptomatology of Alzheimer’s disease. What I shall analyse is the relationship 
between literary erudition and clinical reasoning in narratives that contrive a jointly 
neurological and representational sense of affliction through use of mimetic form. I shall 
analyse how writers present the very narrative construction as a topography of the disease, 
and in turn not only offer insight into the nature of disease and acclimatise readers to strange 
modes of thought/speech and the people who live them, but shows the didacticism (as 
opposed to the elitism) in literary experimentalism, and transform reader-text relation from 
the interpretative in the literary sense to the diagnostic in the medical sense. Such narratives 
conflate logico-scientific and narrative modes of expression, clinical reasoning and literary 
hermeneuticism, and together represent ‘the science in narrative and the narrative in science
[...] mixing two different ways of knowing (epistemologies) so that they can be integrated
102into a single “way of knowing.’”
The critical framework within which I analyse mimetic form in Alzheimer’s fiction is termed 
‘narrative medicine’. Narrative medicine is gaining prominence as a field of inquiry, with 
many clinicians now being sensitised to the importance of narratology and storied 
experiences as guiding medical practice and perspective. Narrative medicine recognises 
people, specifically in moments of crisis, as homo narrans (as story-telling beings); it 
considers literature, from entire novels to short vignettes, an important diagnostic tool; and 
seeks to explore ‘how narratology and literariness might illuminate the clinical situation, or
101 Ibid., p. 74.
102 James P. Meza & Daniel S. Passerman, Integrating Narrative Medicine and Evidence-Based Medicine: The 
Eveiyday Social Practice o f  Healing (London: Radcliffe Publishing Ltd., 2011), p. xiv.
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what the clinical situation can reveal to the literary scholar.’103 The notion that diagnoses can 
be arrived at not simply through the ‘medical gaze,’ as Foucault tenns it, but through literary 
erudition, unites the rhetorical style of literature with the biomedical rationality of the 
physician. Lewis Mehl-Madrona argues that ‘making a diagnosis is synonymous with 
constructing a story. It is an act of making meaning from isolated observations. It is a social 
activity,’104based not on strictly empirical truths but storied experiences we accord a truth 
status to. Current scholarly work has stressed the importance of narrative competence in 
medical practice -what Charon defines in terms of ‘close reading, reflective writing, and 
bearing witness to others’ suffering.’105 Suffering gives rise to a bodily or corporeal 
hermeneutics, or what Foucault has termed ‘the verbalization of the pathological.’106 
Idiopathic etiologies are ‘propelled [...] into a narrative mode of reasoning,’ with aspects of 
clinical practice led by a ‘reframing of a diagnostic mystery into a narrative one.’107Narrative 
offers explanatory, elucidative links between cause and symptom: ‘such representations guide 
the clinical gaze of therapists, what they foreground and background, how they ascribe 
causality, who they blame or praise, and how they experience their illness.’108 Lewis Mehl- 
Madrona comments on the humanistic role of literature in medicine, arguing that ‘medicine 
has progressively diminished the importance of the doctor-patient relationship, and of caring, 
compassion, and intent, in favour of diagnosing imaging and technical procedures.’ Mehl- 
Madrona goes on to describe how ‘Narrative Medicine is about revising our concept of
103 Rita Charon, Narrative in Healthcare: Healing Patients, Practitioners, Profession, and Community (Oxford: 
Radcliffe Publishing Ltd., 2008), p. xi
104 Lewis Mehl-Madrona, Narrative Medicine: The Use of History and Story in the Healing Process (Vermont: 
Bear & Company, 2007), p. 10.
105 Ibid., p. 26.
106 Michel Foucault, The Birth o f  the Clinic: An Archaeology o f  Medical Perception, trans. A.M Sheridan 
(London: Tavistock, 1973), p. xii
107Cheryl Mattingly, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 12, No. 3, Special Collection: 
Rationality in the Real World: Varieties of Reasoning in Illness and Healing (Sep., 1998), pp. 273-297 (284) 
http://www.istor.org/stable/649684 [accessed 11/11/11].
108 Cheryl Mattingly, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, pp. 290 & 291.
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medicine to enable the incorporation of these voices into modem medicine.109 However, 
whilst narrative medicine has gained recognition as a source of medical inquiry, some 
scholars are wary of it, critiquing the ‘truthfulness or accuracy of language’110 and arguing 
that narrativised, rhetorical, or discursive accounts of illness potentially misrepresent the 
objective, pre-discursive realities of the disease. As Vieda Skultans points out, ‘some 
clinicians [feel] that emphasis on patient narratives ignor[e] the complexity of medical 
situations and deny the physician a voice.’111 The more conspicuous and idiosyncratic the 
patient’s evocation of their illness, the less apt the language is at conveying the objective 
truths of the disease. One criticism is that patient narratives present a potentially misleading 
or aberrating vision of illness, with the language used ‘seen as having a reflexive or 
constitutive function which rather than revealing knowledge or reality, produces or constructs 
that reality.’112The chapter, then, is on how the pathologies o f age have challenged literature, 
inspired the creation of alternative modes of expression, and reveal an inherent pragmatism in 
literary experimentalism and literary erudition. Alzheimer’s disease is a subject that has 
united the realms of literature and medicine, and I hope to show how these disciplines are 
united by a desire to understand and elucidate mental and perceptual processes in 
Alzheimer’s patients -literature through mimetic form and medicine through developments in 
neurological imaging. I seek to analyse how literature can enlighten medical practice, but also 
how a working medical knowledge can advance the study of literature.
Chapter four discusses how aspects of prolongevity medicine and the commodification of 
immortality in discourses of consumerism have impacted the representation of time, organic 
decay, and death in science fiction. This chapter starts from the premise that the ‘science-
109 Lewis Mehl-Madrona, Narrative Medicine, p. 2.
110 Alex M. Carson, ‘That's Another Story: Narrative Methods and Ethical Practice, Journal o f  Medical Ethics , 
Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), pp. 198-202 (198) http://www.istor.org/stable/27718706 [accessed 11/11/11]
111 Vieda Skultans, ‘Narrative-Based Medicine’ in Anthropology Today , Vol. 17, No. 6 (Dec., 2001), pp. 23-24 
(p. 24), http://www.istor.org/stable/2678255 [accessed 11/11/11].
112 Alex M. Carson, Journal o f  Medical Ethics, p. 198.
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fictional’ is now consigned to the everyday, with phrases more befitting time travel narratives 
coded as trite and trivial, and the reification of science fictional nova, or new things, part of a 
consistently evolving programme of meliorism in an ever expanding ageing populace. The 
science fictional is not alternative to, but deeply embedded in, our own empirical reality, and 
I question how the blandishments and bathetic transcendentalism of medico-consumer 
discourses have affected the writing and interpretation of science fiction. Whilst scholarly 
material on the effects of scientific/technological progressivism on science fiction is rife, 
there is comparatively little consideration given to the effects of prolongevity medicine and 
the west’s litany of anti-ageing slogans/ideologies (and our habituation to them) on 
representations of time, organic decay, and death in science fiction. Today, consumers can 
avail themselves with a range of interventions, ‘from various regimes and techniques of body 
maintenance to increasingly sophisticated medical technology, promising the prospect of
t  i  ' i
erasing boundaries between chronobiology and physiological capacities in old age.’ ‘We 
are on the verge,’ writes Michael Fossel, ‘of realizing a dream we have had at least since the 
beginning of recorded history: the cure of ageing and age related disease.’114 How, and to 
what extent, is the empirical here-and-now of contemporary medical and scientific 
achievement demystifying or de-sensationalising science fiction and the Gnostic 
imagination? Adam Roberts argues that the ‘attention of detail and the density of the 
described reality in many SF texts mean that, very often, they read like realist novels; or 
perhaps a better phrase would be pseudo-realist.’115 Although elements of realism pervade its 
own internal logic, science fictional realities must surpass scientific capability, must contain 
scientific impossibilities and alternative epistemologies, for it to retain its inherent 
transcendentalism. Whilst we are neither able to ‘turn back time’ nor ‘defy age’, postmodern
113 Pia C. Kontos, ‘Multi-disciplinary Configurations in Gerontology’ in Ageing and Place: Perspectives,
Policy, Practice (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), p. 33
114 Michael Fossel, ‘Reversing Human Aging’ in The Science o f  Anti-Aging Medicine, ed. by Ronald Klatz & 
Robert Goldman (Chicago: American Academy of Anti-Aging Medicine, 1996), p. 7.
115 Adam Roberts, Science Fiction, 2nd ed. (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 15
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consumer society has nevertheless passed off epistemologically suspect and empirically 
untenable ideas as real. Consequently, if only the level of discourse, ‘the fantastic in SF is 
coded as real rather than unreal.’116The object of this chapter is to examine how this 
encroaching prosaicism is affecting science fiction, and how, whilst the pathologies of ageing 
have sparked a creative surge in literature, prolongevity medicine and the humanist fallacy of 
anti-ageing are having the opposite effect. Ageing is an extraordinarily apt subject with 
which to study science fiction. It is a genre with an in-built obsolescence; a genre forced to 
confront its own waning transcendentalism and eventual terminus many times over as science 
fiction becomes scientific reality, and as particular nova are increasingly perceived as 
realistic or within the remit of scientific/medical capability. I shall use the subject of ageing 
to address the ways in which authors deal with the shift in science fiction from an oneiric 
fictional novum to an ‘increasingly widespread mode of cultural description and analysis.’117I 
shall examine how a more conventionally science-fictional parlance -expressions such as 
‘turn back time’ -now typifies the everyday consumer vernacular, and will argue that the 
secular optimism of anti-ageing and our habituation to notions of defying or reversing time 
not only render science fictional nova far more quotidian, but bring some time travel 
narratives closer to postmodern discourses of ageing. I shall argue that there is a body of 
earlier literature that might be considered proto-postmodem texts of ageing. These include: 
Oscar Wilde’s philosophical fiction The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), as a text about the 
wiles of perpetual youth; F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Curious Case of Benjamin Button (1922), 
as a text about backwards ageing; and Virginia W oolfs parodic biography Orlando (1928) as 
a text as much about a triumph over biography as anatomy. However, the primary texts I shall 
examine in this chapter, including Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) and Michel
116 J. Timothy Bagwell, Intersections: Fantasy and Science Fiction, ed. by George E. Slusser et al. (USA: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), p. 41.
117 Veronica Hollinger, ‘Science Fiction and Postmodernism’ in A Companion to Science Fiction (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005), pp. 232-48 (p. 233).
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Houellebecq’s The Possibility of an Island (2005), are characterised by the representation of 
environments resistant to periodisation -that is, betwixt and between past and future, 
antiquity and futurity -and characters existing on both sides of the divides aged/ageless, 
young/old. I will examine how far these novels’ semiology of age and representation of time 
(both historical and bodily) are germane to contemporary consumer and medical discourses 
of ageing.
Recent scholarship has stressed the science fictional in consumer, biomedical, and
gerontological discourses. In consumer discourses, ageing is not presented as natural, but
liberticidal -as an affront to, and destruction of, liberty. Jay Sokolovsky remarks how
‘consumer culture places a strong emphasis upon the body and body maintenance' and how
‘the active cultivation of youthful lifestyles, including the potential to renew and transform
the body.’ He moves onto comment how in Anglo-American culture the body is perceived as
‘renewable, and ageing as something which can be held at bay and even “defeated” through
118purchase, hard work and dedication.’ Sociologist Andrew Blaikie has asked whether it is 
‘more normal [...] to grow old naturally, or, conversely, to conform to convention and attempt 
to defy or disguise such a process?’119 In a similar vein, sociologist Simon Biggs comments 
on how, in consumer culture, ‘ [a] multiplicity of options present themselves without shape or 
coherence - a  belief in the possibility of avoiding the “old” traps through an assumption of 
agelessness.’120 Consumer culture provides individuals with ‘permutational possibilities,’121 
towards the creation of a self-generative, potentially ageless identity. In a postmodern spin on 
Pound’s dictum ‘make it new’, consumer society has conferred a far more radical uncertainty
118 Jay Sokolovsky, The Cultural Context of Aging: Worldwide Perspectives (USA: Praeger Publishers, 2009), 
p. 141
119 Andrew Blaikie, Ageing and Popular Culture (Cambridge: University o f Cambridge, 1999), p. 87
120 Simon Biggs, ‘The “Blurring” of the Lifecourse: Narrative, Memory and the Question of Authenticity’ in 
Journal o f  Aging and Identity, vol. 4, No. 4 (1999), pp. 209-221 [211].
121 Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 27.
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on age identities, as ageing consumers, revelling in the illusion o f ‘creative autonomy’122 
from age and its vicissitudes, enter a more adolescent crisis of identity. Biggs comments that 
discourses of ageing today involve a ‘rejection of deterministic narratives in favour of the 
elder as a consumer of more youthful lifestyle choices.’123 In all its postmodern recyclability, 
the elderly are adopting attitudes and lifestyles more conventionally associated with the 
young: ‘fixed conceptions of ageing have, for many, been replaced by a much more fluid 
notion of later life as a period of experiment with a diversity of activities and identities.’124 In 
a similar vein, Ian Rees Jones comments that ‘it is no longer appropriate to categorise people 
entering later life as a homogenous group of “retirees”, “third-agers” or indeed “pensioners”. 
Instead, post-working life is based around a variety of lifestyles, uncertainties, anxieties and
• • 125aspirations.’ Consumer culture, as Jean Baudrillard describes, provides the ‘veils which, 
happily, protect us from the objective illusion, the illusion of truth, from the transparent 
relation of the world to an objective truth, from the transparent relation of man to his own 
truth’126 -mortality. Anti-ageing products offer the illusion of regaining one’s youth, or the 
illusion or ‘assumption’ of agelessness ‘we want this immortality here and now, this real-time
127 •afterlife,’ argues Jean Baudrillard, ‘without having resolved the problem of the end.’ With 
recourse to the aforementioned literature, I ask how the commodification of immortality, and 
its apparent crude attainability and bathetic, secularised, and egoistic appropriation in 
consumer culture has impacted science fiction -a  genre, after all that ‘distinguishes its 
fictional worlds to one degree or another from the world we actually live in: a fiction of the 
imagination rather than observed reality, a fantastic literature.’128 This prescient, future-
122 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination: The Dynamics o f  Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999), p. 46
123 Ibid., p. 59.
124 Biggs, Journal o f  Aging and Identity, p. 211
125 Ian Rees Jones et al., Ageing in a Consumer Society: From Passive to Active Consumption in Britain 
(Bristol: Polity Press, 2008), p. 114.
126 Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion o f  the End, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), p. 94.
127 Ibid., p. 90.
128 Adam Roberts, Science Fiction, p. 1.
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orientated genre has in recent decades had to confront the prospect of its own obsolescence 
and growing prosaicism as medical and scientific developments have to increasing extents 
reified science fiction’s earlier conceptual, or imaginative, realities. However, with anti­
ageing the challenge presented to science fiction is on more of a linguistic and conceptual 
level: that is, whilst anti-ageing dominates aspects of medical practice and bio-gerontological 
research, its greatest impact can be found on the level of language -that is, from slogans and 
their encroachment upon consumer verbal habits/expectations and the broader cultural 
parlance.
The primary focus in this chapter is on the role of science fiction in the context both of the 
contemporary cultural sophism and humanist fallacy anti-ageing and its antecedent medical 
literature outlined in this introduction. The central contestation in this chapter is that science 
fiction is destabilised, de-sensationalised, as much by present as historical discourses on 
ageing -and in particular by the realist and positivist connotations present anti-ageing 
discourses gain by virtue of immortality and rejuvenation’s consistent presence in medicine 
throughout history. A key feature of this chapter is the apparent affinity between the 
postulated future cultures imagined by science fiction and antecedent medical literature on 
the subject of rejuvenation -united, that is, by their 4obsess[ion] with transcending the body 
and achieving immortality.’129 There has been much scholarly work on the ways in which 
contemporary scientific/cultural advances have rendered science fiction more quotidian. 
However, where my chapter differs is in the consideration of how science fiction is de­
sensationalised as much by the past as the present: that is, by the medical and scientific 
legacies of antiquity. I want to consider the affinity between the science-fictional parlance 
and historical medical discourse on prolongevity and rejuvenation. As I have attempted to 
demonstrate in this introduction, anti-ageing ideologies and ideas of immortality define no
129 Gary Westfahl, The Science o f  Fiction and the Fiction o f  Science: Collected Essays on SF Storytelling and 
the Gnostic Imagination (USA: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009), p. 7.
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one particular chronological period, and because of the diachronic character of what is now 
termed ‘anti-ageing’, its appropriation in, or indeed as, as science-fictional discourse is 
inherently problematic. With the subject of immortality and defying age, the future-orientated 
nature of this genre is challenged -de-sensationalised and rendered more prosaic not by 
present-day science and the actualisation of its postulated futures but by the medical and 
scientific legacies of antiquity. However, perhaps the ultimate challenge for science fiction, 
and literature more generally, is representing age, be it youth, adolescence, middle age, or old 
age, in the context of a culture adroitly resisting the realities of age through ‘marketing 
strategies aimed at “ageless” consumers’130 -in  a culture, as Baudrillard describes, 
‘attempting] to construct and entirely positive world, a perfect world, expurgated of every 
illusion, of every sort of evil and negativity, exempt from death itself.’131
Historically, western culture has offered the ageing individual a regimen of dietary, hygienic, 
surgical, cosmetic, and biochemical interventions. It is a period of life that has undergone 
radical change as medicine and science have developed. As such a clear, uncontested 
definition of old age, in both contemporary and historical cultures, remains powerfully 
elusive, and despite many of the prejudicial attitudes and negative stereotypes that still 
persist, ageing remains a powerful force for change and innovation in literature -one that 
places demands on readership, language, literary formalism, genre, and disciplinary 
boundaries. In a postmodern spin on Pound’s dictum ‘make it new’, ageing is both a plaintive 
and deeply innovative subject in contemporary literature -one that that places demands on 
readership, language, literary formalism, and genre -and thus it offers a new paradigm of 
hope for an increasingly aged culture. Paradoxical though it is, what I argue pervades the
130 Stephen Katz, Disciplining Old Age: The Formation o f  Gerontological Knowledge (USA: The University 
Press of Virginia, 1996), p. 6.
131 Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Murder of the Real’ in The Vital Illusion, ed. by Julia Witwer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), p. 67.
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literature of ageing is a semiotics of immortality. The literature of ageing is most resistant to 
binary thinking, implicitly conflating young and old, mortal and sempiternal, the plaintive 
and the transcendent, and gerontological and trans-/posthumanist discourse. Whilst 
thematically each text offers an unproblematic address to the subject of ageing, the very 
language, and in some cases the literary or aesthetic formalism, that is employed by these 
authors liberates the characters from or permits them to transcend the limitations and pathos 
of age that prevails or is imposed upon them thematically. In each chapter I shall examine 
how the formal features of the literature of age are at odds with its thematic preoccupation, 
and how, like the medical interventions or cosmetic deceptions we have grown so familiar 
with, the very language intervenes on the fate of the characters. Indeed, what we find in a 
great deal of contemporary age narratives is that the technical innovations, the poeticisation 
of prose style, abstract self-referentiality, suggestive symbolism, and the semantic open- 
endedness of rhetorical as opposed to medical accounts of age, are all inherently salvatory. 
From the works of Beckett to post-2000 Alzheimer’s fiction I shall discuss how 
contemporary literature offers a semiology and language of decay that subsumes and equates 
itself with its antitheses: discourses of youth, rejuvenation, and sempitemity. I shall analyse 
how counterrealist thinking is implicit in traditional realist narratives of ageing, and how the 
very language and semiology of ageing implicitly denies, precludes, or even inverts the 
canonical indices of decay, decline, and death, or plunges them into a counterintuitive 
latency-indeed has already achieved what medicine has dreamt of for generations and what it 
still strives toward: the disinvention of age.
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IRRESISTIBLE ENTROPY: THE AESTHETICS OF FAILURE AND THE 
COMPULSION TO INCAPACITY IN THE WORKS OF SAMUEL BECKETT
Fig. 1 Otto Dix, ‘The Scat Players’ (1920) Fig. 2 Stelarc, ‘Evolution’ (1982)
‘The Scat Players’ (1920) by German Expressionist/Dada artist Otto Dix (fig. 1) depicts 
degradation, incapacity, and death in wartime. The grotesqueness o f the figures’ deficiencies, 
contortions, and prostheses, combined with the apparatuses that surround them, give these 
disabled veterans both a Shelleyean monstrosity and Dadaist grotesqueness. However, this 
anti-war painting represents a heightened, if distorted, image of disability and mortality at the 
same time it does fantastical, technologised, and potentially immortal bodies. The 
technological annexations that comprise these obscure bodies represent a jointly brutalising 
and salvatory force. The veterans are at once menaced and immortalised by these 
technological adjuncts, and it is unclear whether they are victims of war, with the prostheses 
as a benign, commemorative monuments to lost limbs; or victims of technology, with the 
allusions to war framing an anti-technological critique. Fifty years prior to D ix’s painting, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson writes in ‘Works and Days’ (1870):
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Our nineteenth century is the age of tools. They grow out of our structure [...] The
magazine of inventions, the patent-office, where are the models from which every hint
was taken. All the tools and engines on earth are only extensions of its limbs and
1
senses [...] Machines can only second, not supply, his unaided senses.
The world of technology for Emerson is, or should be, an anthropocentric one. Technology, 
for Emerson, should not supplant or replace the human body, or even enhance it, for 
enhancement predicates insufficiency or limitation in that which is being enhanced. Rather, it 
should aid or ‘second’ the body, and in both design and use -should reflect the human body 
back sycophantically at the individual, like Narcissus beguiled by his own specular double. 
Emerson conveys a cautionary attitude to technological Man and the idea of extending the 
body and allowing oneself to ‘experienc[e] the world through an artifact, a technology’133 -a  
mediated existence, highlighting both the thrilling and threatening duplicability of the body. 
This anxiety is reflected in Dix’s painting, as we see the body burdened with prostheses and 
having lost all referential status. ‘Each man has injuries that could not possibly be survived 
and wears fantastic prostheses,’134 and as such technology seems both a palliative and 
suggestively adversarial force, meliorating these figures’ physical injuries in the same 
instance it inflicts them. The figures’ prostheses offer both a utopian and dystopian image of 
the technology and its relation to the human body: utopian, in the sense that technology is 
subordinated to the body, and can be use to lessen human suffering and substitute loss; and 
dystopian in the sense that the body becomes subordinated to technology, ‘converting the 
worker into a living appendage of the machine’135 as Karl Marx writes in Capital (1867-94). 
Clearly the technologisation of Man has both positive and negative connotations, both bound
132 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Chapter 7: Works and Days’ in The Collected Works o f  Ralph Waldo Emerson: 
Society and Solitude, vol. VII (USA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 79.
133 Don Ihde, Bodies in Technology (London & Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. xi.
134 Carol Poore, ‘Disability in the Culture of the Weimar Republic’ in Disability in Twentieth Centuiy German 
Culture (USA: University of Michigan Press, 2007), p. 30.
135 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. by Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 503.
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inextricably with humanistic concerns. The introduction of technology into the body 
predicates transcendence of the constitutively fragile body. This is implied in some of the 
work of transhumanist artist Stelarc (Fig. 2) who views technological prostheses in terms of 
expansion and extension rather than substitution, surrogacy, and lack. However, Dix does not 
depict humans advanced by technology, but a company of machinic uncannies -veterans lost 
amongst a superabundance of apparatuses. As such, technology also signifies oppression, 
expendability, a utilitarian view of human life and, more politically, subordination to 
Germany’s insistence of war -what Carol Poore describes as ‘the war machine [my 
italics].’136
This chapter starts from the premise that the technologisation of Man is anti-humanistic, and 
moves on to view ageing in the twentieth century not in terms of the failure of the body but of 
the success of technology. In this chapter I approach the subjects of ageing and organic decay 
through the philosophical study of technology. I propose Dix’s ‘The Scat Players’ as the 
image of contemporary ageing. It is comparable to Paul Virilio’s description of technological 
Man, and the irresistible sedentariness we are beguiled into through the presence of self- 
substituting devices: ‘prostheses that make the super-equipped able-bodied person almost the 
exact equivalent of the motorized and wired disabled person.’137 In the painting, the figures’ 
sensoria are rendered visible and extraneous to the body, and each figure is overcome by a 
series of complex, maladroit, and demonstrably needless apparatuses. The process of 
exhuming the body’s invisible, visceral geographies, although linked implicitly to wounding, 
might relate to epistemological changes in medicine from the development of perceptual 
technologies such as the X-ray: ‘the body could be penetrated by a barrage of devices: the
136 Poore, p. 32.
137 Paul Virilio, Open Sky, trans by. Julie Rose (London & New York: Verso, 1997), p. 11.
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stethoscope, ophthalmoscope, laryngoscope, speculum, high-intensity light, [and] X-rays.’138 
The atomization of Dix’s bodies does not simply convey injury and decapitation in wartime, 
but the changing nature and depth of knowledge about the body, and the rendering of specific 
senses such as hearing, sight, and touch, more conspicuous and external by technology. As 
Diana Ricco comments:
machines have progressively developed the acquired capacities of the perception of 
sensory data. [...] Nowadays, as a consequence of research in the fields of science 
information, cybernetics, robots, and more particularly artificial intelligence, the two 
partners -human and machine -sometimes look interchangeable.139
Each figure in Dix’s painting seems more like an appendix to a machine than a human being. 
Technology, in this painting, isolates and externalises the body’s senses and functions, and 
thus we gain no impression of the totality of the body, but the body, instead, as a series of 
occlusions with each constituent part functioning independently. Technology is a malign 
rather than salvatory force, and the prostheses not corrective or palliative, but superfluous, 
untranscendent, and menacing. The figures’ injuries and disabilities are inflicted not so much 
through war and violence as by the ‘rendering of the boundaries between [...] corporeality 
and technology threateningly and thrillingly permeable.’140 The bodies in the painting are 
debased, lateralised, and abject spectacles, and instead of elevating the figures from their 
constitutively fragile bodies, the technological prostheses simply recapitulate aspects of their 
corporeality: notably, the innate weakness and penetrability of the body. The painting offers a 
sense of victimisation and (self-)destruction through a disturbing sense of needless or
138 Tim Armstrong, ‘Prosthetic Modernism’ in Modernism, Technology, and the Body: A Cultural Study 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 2.
139 Diana Ricco, ‘Artificial Sensory Perception: Vicarious Technologies for Synaesthesia’ in Mediating the 
Human Body: Technology, Communication, and Fashion (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Publishers, 2003), p. 177.
140 Laura Salisbury, ‘Linguistic Trepanation: Brain Damage, Penetrative Seeing, and a Revolution of the Word’ 
in Minds, Bodies, Machines,1770-1930, ed. by Deidre Coleman and Hilary Fraser (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 179-209 (p.180-1).
enforced reliance, and as Jacques Derrida remarks of the typewriter in Paper Machine, 
reminds us that humanity is ‘“in danger,” particularly of being downgraded by the 
machine.’141
In Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Sigmund Freud wrote ‘Man has, as it were, 
become a kind of prosthetic god. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly 
magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble 
at times.’142 It is this ‘trouble’ that this chapter, like Dix’s painting, is concerned with. The 
permeation of technology has clear existential imputations which are highlighted in Dix’s 
painting, namely that the technologisation of Man does not presuppose transcendence in a 
trans- or posthumanist vein, but is brutalising -tantamount to a self-crafted, self-perpetuating 
obsolescence, or even death. Dix shows that whilst technology and prostheses can enhance 
and extend the body, they also highlight the in-built obsolescence and threatening 
permeability of the body -in  which sense it is not technology but luddism that is salvatory, as 
is perhaps implied by Emerson. Thus the technologisation of Man also becomes a powerful 
and candid admission of the frailty of the human form and, ultimately, that it ‘should be 
replaced by another entity better suited for the pressing challenges imposed by an 
environment that is ever more strongly conditioned by new technologies.’143 With this 
argument in mind, what I shall be arguing in this chapter is that with technological innovation 
and intervention, old age becomes less a process of inexorable bodily decline, and more a 
condition of Man’s own contrivance. Through the increasing dependence upon technology, 
Mankind wilfully and calculatingly ‘retires’ the body, and lapses into a self-fashioned
141 Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 
19.
142 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents: The Standard Edition o f  the Complete Psychological Works 
o f Sigmund Freud, 24 vols., general editor James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press & the Institute for Psycho- 
Analysis, 1953-73), p. xxi, 86-92.
143 Tomas Maldonado, ‘The Body: Artificialization and Transparency’ in Mediating the Human Body, p. 18.
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pseudo-senescence -o r what Virilio has described as ‘citizen-terminal. ,144It is in this vein that 
I argue technological discourses inevitably and unavoidably implicate gerontological ones, 
with the various indices of decay and decline and conventionally associated with ageing 
typifying technological Man. Technological progress renders the body infelicitous -an  
obstacle or impediment that must be overcome -and the individual a ‘mere intelligence 
fastened to a dying animal.’145 It is within this context that I study the subject of age in the 
works of Samuel Beckett. In this chapter I seek to examine how the works of Samuel Beckett 
advance the philosophical study of technology in the context I have placed it. I shall discuss 
the relationship between technological and gerontological discourses through an analysis of 
the ageing/victimisation nexus in the prose and dramaturgy of Beckett. I use Beckett’s work 
because, firstly, ageing is narrated with a sense of subjection or affliction, and secondly, 
because organic decay is rarely depicted as a natural, normal, unconditioned process. I will 
analyse representations of inertia, fatigability, anarchic bodily sensations, 
wordlessness/inaudibility, self-alienation, decrepitude, discreation, and loss of self­
sovereignty in selected works. For Beckett’s characters, to senesce is not to acquiesce to 
natural forces and bodily inclinations, but to be afflicted suddenly, and perhaps even 
temporarily, by a malign, arbitrary imposition -a t the heart of which, I argue, is the image of 
the machine. Although anachronistic, this chapter seeks to provide insight into the ways in 
which a 21st century audience/reader can re-read Beckett’s choreographic, scenic, and 
linguistic sparseness, plus his characters’ estrangement from their bodily functions (and even 
body parts) and all that is natural, as an allegorical critique of the mediating and substitutive 
presence of technology in our lives -and more specifically the many absences that it entails.
It is the intention of this chapter not to impose a meaning on the Beckett canon, rather to
Virilio, Open Sky, p. 20.
145 W.B Yeats, cited by Hugh Kenner, Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study (London: University of California Press 
Ltd., 1973), p. 124.
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contribute thought into what additional meanings and interpretations Beckettian austerity and 
strangeness gains with changing cultural contexts.
i) Dramaturgical Bodies
Inertia, enfeeblement, abjectness, strangeness, nomadism, and a disregard for causality are a 
few characteristics in the Beckett canon that this chapter will examine. To view Samuel 
Beckett as the laureate of ageing in 20th century literature would not make for a particularly 
novel or contentious reading of his works. ‘The impact of time and ageing on the 
characters/actors,’ writes Khaled Besbes ‘is immediately recognizable,’146 yet at the same 
time Beckett’s depiction of age -o r conditions conventionally associated with old age -also 
subtly repudiate the realities of ageing. The themes of victimisation and subjection (i.e., of 
being under domination, control, or influence), and allusions to technology or 
anthropomorphic machines, are all salient characteristics underpinning Beckett’s description 
of old age. Far from being acquired naturally, his characters seem subjected to various age- 
associated ailments and conditions, and senesce in a suggestively artificial, often maladroit 
and histrionic manner -as if not through biological failure, but through premature 
intervention or some malevolent, celestial or inquisitorial force. Michael Worton comments 
that ‘time indubitably exists as a force of which the characters are aware in that they become 
increasingly decrepit, but they have no sense of its continuity CU1 The characters are aware of 
the inexorable passage of time and its effects on their bodies; but far from a natural, organic 
process of decline they senesce in a putatively unnatural, sudden, and profoundly alienating 
manner. Indeed, to age in the Beckett canon, is a compulsion, a form of mania or self-abuse,
146 Khaled Besbes, The Semiotics o f Beckett’s Theatre: A Semiotic Study o f  the Complete Dramatic Worlds o f  
Samuel Beckett (Florida: Universal Publishers, 2007), p. 191
147 Michael Worton, ‘ Waiting fo r  Godot and Endgame: theatre as text’ in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, 
ed. by John Pilling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 67-88 (p.73).
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and occasionally represented choreographically in complete inertia or alternatively a series of 
serio-comic, spasmodic affectations on the parts of the characters -as if their bodies are 
endowed with a malignant sentience compelling them to senesce. This may be a hyperbolic 
rendering of the body’s predisposition to age and the sense of forced or reluctant 
acquiescence to the nihilating effects of time. In much of Beckett’s prose, particularly Molloy 
(1950) and The Unnamable (1952), the use of the pronouns ‘they’, ‘them’, ‘he’, and ‘she’ -to  
whom no character is assigned -personify these temporal forces; and likewise Beckett’s 
stagecraft and directorial suggestions stultify his characters, render them speechless, inert, or 
discombobulated in a tragicomic sense.
Ageing in Beckett’s oeuvre is not a condition of the body, but an affliction linked, in his 
prose, to Beckett’s own disobligation, as author, to create -to  animate his characters -and in 
his dramaturgy, Beckett’s directorial decisions and the tormentful machinations of the 
theatre. Ageing is a theatrical contrivance, not biological but situational, and in his prose, in a 
similar vein, seems not biological but authorial in origin: the anatomical is indistinguishable, 
or at least implicated in, the dramaturgical and authorial in the same way the body in 
Lessness (1970) blurs into the ruins of the surrounding milieu:
Slow black with ruin true refuge four walls over backwards no sound, legs a single 
block arms fast to sides little body face to endlessness [...] Only upright little body
148grey smooth no relief a few holes.
The malign external forces in his prose and dramaturgy coerce the protagonists into acting, or 
not acting, and even compel their bodies to senesce. Beckettian bodies become sites where 
exogenous and endogenous forces converge, and consequently the pronouns ‘I’, ‘me’ and the 
possessive ‘my’ are treated with great hesitancy and scepticism: ‘[b]ut enough of this cursed
148 Samuel Beckett, Lessness (London: Calder & Boyars, 1970), pp. 10-11.
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first person, it is really too red a herring, [...] Bah, any old pronoun will do, provided one sees 
through it. Matter of habit. To be adjusted later.’149 The fact that all of his characters age, and 
demonstrate an often obsessive preoccupation with the nature of mortality, serves to 
substantiate the existence of their bodies -which, in works such as Breath, Play, Happy Days, 
and The Unnamable, is under some doubt -and secondly the relative normality of their bodies 
-both of which are under scrutiny in his immensely aporetic art. However, it is problematic to 
assume that the characters’ decrepitude is in any way an admission of their mortality, and 
likewise a misconception to think that the universality o f ageing makes Beckett’s anti-heroes 
some of the most identifiable in 20th century literature. Many of Beckett’s works give a sense 
not of a natural but coercive, perennial senescence, and the characters rarely act through their 
bodies with tacit self-command, but operate their limbs inexpertly and maladroitly as if they 
are mechanisms or apparatuses. Ageing is often linked to a sense of subjection, victimisation, 
or even sadomasochism, and consequently the theme of ageing is saturated with allusions to 
optionality or cessation, lending a wry defeatism to his characters’ plights and a latent 
congeniality to ‘anti-ageing’ discourses (the hallmark of which is that ageing is optional). 
Ageing, in Beckett’s works, is something at once intrinsic/internal to and imposed on (or 
external to) the body -o r as is more succinctly captured in Watt (1953): ‘ [everything that 
happened happened inside it, and at the same time everything that happened outside it [my 
italics].’150
In The Unnamable this sense of coercion is not always linked to organic decay but 
mechanical production:
Why don’t they wash their hands of me and set me free? [...] Perhaps then I could go
silent, for good and all. [...] All this business of a labour to accomplish, before I can
149 Samuel Beckett, Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable (London: Calder Publications, 1994), p. 345.
150 Samuel Beckett, Watt (London: Jupiter Books, 1963), pp. 41-2.
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end, of words to say, a truth to recover, in order to say it, before I can end, of an 
imposed task, once known, long neglected, finally forgotten [...] I have to speak, 
whatever that means, having nothing to say, no words but the words of others [...] 
Nothing can exempt me from it.151
His ‘habitual utterance’152 represents a compulsion to act (i.e., to do or to speak), or in some 
cases a compulsion not to act. For instance, in Molloy - a  comic, Beckettian adaptation of the 
detective genre -the protagonist is compelled to seek his mother, just as Malone is to seek 
Molloy; the narrator in The Unnamable is compelled to speak with an automatised 
incessantness ‘with this voice that is not mine,’153 just as Winnie is driven to loquacity and 
perpetual self-address in Happy Days (1961); Krapp is committed obsessively to his phonic 
self-memorialisations; the figures encased in urns in Play are commanded to talk by 
spotlights; and in Waiting fo r  Godot (1952), a play speaking deterministically about ‘the 
continuing futility of mankind,’154 Vladimir and Estragon are compelled to wait:
Vladimir: Well? Shall we go?
Estragon: Yes, let’s go.
[They do not move].155
As readers/spectators we do not know whether these characters act under compulsion, which 
has a physical or psychological locus, or command, which implies external agency. His 
characters are dispossessed of a will, and on occasion a voice, and become the obliterated, 
narrative property of some unidentified, clandestine character. As well as a compulsion to act, 
his characters’ plights and physical, psychological, or situational traumas also represent
ls]  Ibid., p. 316.
132 Ruby Cohn, A Beckett Canon (USA: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 263.
153Trilogy, p. 309.
154 Mel Gussow in Conversations With (and about) Samuel Beckett (London: Nick Hem Books, 1996), p. 139.
155 Samuel Beckett, ‘Waiting for Godot’ in The Complete Dramatic Works (Kent: Faber & Faber, 2006), p. 203.
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subjection to an act (i.e., Beckett’s own dramatic works). His characters are afflicted by an 
inability to do, which seems as much a consequence of physical decomposition as Beckett’s 
authorial disobligations and successive de-theatricalisations. Beckett delimits the actors’ 
interpretative liberties and creative deviations by ‘relentlessly demanding] that his actors and 
actresses control their body accurately like a machine.’156 Moreover, comparing theatre to 
prose, Beckett also states that he likes ‘the limitations of theatre as compared to the non­
limitations of prose. I turned to theatre as relief -from the blackness of prose [...] Then it 
became its own darkness.’157 Beckett’s art is to some degree, then, eschatological in the sense 
that his theatre -his characters’ world -is, like their bodies, coming to an end. Rather than 
being domesticated and enformed by the necessities of plot, character development, structure, 
specificity of scene and environment, and literary subjectivism, it emerges out of the very 
lack of all this. His theatre is, ostensibly, in the extremes of deprivation; it is produced out of 
its very antithesis, anti-theatre, and pivots exhaustedly and stoically around a non-event, 
represented moments of speechlessness, inertia, and scenic and choreographic austerity. John 
Calder comments that many ‘giv[e] way to apathy, treating art as an escape from reality, a 
comfortable, insulated world’ and that Beckett’s necrotic minimalism is a compulsion in
1 f O
itself: ‘Aesthetically, he needed to suffer pain.’ His characters senesce, then, out of a 
jointly physical and directorial/aesthetic constrictiveness, which makes his representation of 
age fissured -that is, both endemic and external to the body. Beckett’s ascetic art lends itself 
to ageing, or even models itself on the characters’ senescing bodies. Biologically and 
dramaturgically we witness a conjoint sense of depletion and necrosis, with the possibility of 
inexistence immanent or, paradoxically, even present: both Beckett’s theatre and Beckett’s 
bodies seem to be rehearsing their own insufficiencies and eventual demise, whilst the
156 Yoshiki Tajiri, Samuel Beckett and the Prosthetic Body: The Organs and Senses in Modernism (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 42.
157 Samuel Beckett, quoted by Mel Gussow in Conversations With (and about) Samuel Beckett, p. 32.
158 John Calder, The Philosophy o f  Samuel Beckett (London: Calder Publications UK Ltd., 2001), p. 3.
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frequent moments of wordlessness, changelessness, and stasis give the impression of 
endlessness, of being constructed out o f  time.
In Act Without Words I  (1956) the character is ‘flung backwards on stage’159 repeatedly by an 
invisible force as he attempts to flee the stage. The boundlessness and featurelessness of the 
desert is complemented by the characteristic austerity of Beckett’s theatre space. However 
the scene is in conflict with the intimacy of the theatre and, spatially, its limitations -which 
Beckett comically reminds us of each time the character is thrown back on stage. The 
character reluctantly inhabits the stage, during which time several items descend -three 
boxes, a pair of scissors, and a pitcher labelled ‘water’ -but ‘the spectator, together with the 
stage figure, does not succeed in discovering any causality in the events, which are 
interrelated only by a time sequence.’160 The play is a parable of subjection and resignation, 
and the play’s intertextual link with the Tantalus myth provides Act Without Words I  a 
deterministic quality as the fate of the unnamed character is preimposed: ‘having displeased 
the gods, Tantalus was condemned to be “tantalized” eternally by a spring from which he 
could not slack his thirst, and by a tree whose fruit was always beyond his reach.’161 The man 
is not simply condemned to centre stage but divested of a voice as well a name, and is 
tantalised by intractable objects. Even if they did not disappear, these objects would be 
ineffectual. For instance, the elusive tree from which he intends to hang himself folds up, 
‘close[s] like a parasol’162 -as if Beckett, with a tragicomic metatheatricality, is using the 
mimetic space of the theatre to taunt the character or remind him of his subjection. Rendering 
the tree comically and candidly two-dimensional also reminds the audience of the incongruity 
of the tree in a barren desert, or alternatively, in its conspicuous artifice and elusiveness -its
159 Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 203.
160 Shimon Levy, Samuel Beckett’s Self-Referential Drama: The Sensitive Chaos (Brighton: Sussex Academic 
Press, 2002), p. 37
161 Cohn, A Beckett Canon, p. 218.
162 Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 203
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hallucinogenic properties borne from the character’s desperate desire for respite, initially 
from the sun and then from life. What we are presented with is a necrotic minimalism, where 
the character is forced into inertia and resignation by the disappearance of what few props 
comprised the set. The result of being ‘tantalised’ by elusive objects is that he has ‘learned 
not to use his hands, in defiance of whistled temptations.’163 The critics Ruby Cohn and S.E. 
Gontarski have interpreted victory at this point of cessation: ‘[a] conscious rebellion, a 
deliberate, wilful refusal to obey.’164 However, this may just as easily be interpreted as 
conditioned inactivity, with the objects’ intractability revealing nothing but dependency —he 
is, as Shimon Levy comments, ‘[ujnable to live without the help of external objects.’165 The 
play, then, is about the inability to do, a parable of the illusion of competence and potency in 
an object-strewn world, and a painful and candid reminder the incompetence and impotency 
that we are forced to confront in the absence of the objects that enabl e us: ‘[h]is immobility 
is, finally, willed’ with the removal of the objects, and he is ‘inadequately created or adapted 
to deal with hostile environmental forces. He is pathetic; bom, indeed created to fail, a caged 
rat frustrated by an inept or malicious handler.’166 At points throughout the play, he sits 
meditatively in a half-contented domiciliary inertia, or in the throes of puzzlement, Took[ing] 
at his hands.’167 He is the image here of Kenner’s Cartesian man who, without his 
apparatuses or accessories, is ‘a mere intelligence fastened to a dying animal’ -or, in this 
case, a wantonly dying animal.
In Play (1963), we are presented with a similar sense of subjection. It opens with the 
directions:
163 Cohn, A Beckett Canon, p. 219.
164 S.E. Gontarski, “Birth Astride of a Grave”: Samuel Beckett’s Act Without Words I  in The Beckett Studies 
Reader (USA: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 32.
165 Levy, Beckett’s Self-Referential Drama
166 Gontarski, pp. 31/30.
167 Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 206
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Front centre, touching one another, three identical grey urns about one yard high. 
From each a head protrudes, the neck heldfast in the urn’s mouth. The heads are 
those, from left to right as seen from auditorium, ofW2, M, and Wl. They face  
undeviatingly front throughout the play. Faces so lost to age and aspect as to seem 
almost part o f  urns. But no mask. Their speech is provoked by a spotlight projected on 
faces alone.168
The characters are prompted into speech by inquisitorial spotlight. They ‘become animated 
(not only lively in their behaviour but literally brought to life out of their torpor) when light 
shines on them; their words, we feel are extracted from them by the light as a sort of 
torture.’169 The lights are both a life-giving and purgatorial force, and as such Beckett 
conjoins creation and destruction. The play is the ultimate diminishment of theatrical action 
and dramaturgical energy and flair; the ‘performers [...] have to subdue their theatricality’170 
—as Beckett describes: faces impassive throughout. Voices toneless except where an 
expression is indicated [...] Voices faint, largely unintelligible.’171 Beckett curtails the 
creative liberties and deviations of the actors: their contribution to the theatre must, in this 
play, reside not in expression and theatrical elan, but in the accretion of detail -towards 
discreation, if you will. As Joanne Shaw comments: ‘[f]or Beckett, making can never be 
isolated from not-making or not being able to make,’172 and this is certainly implicit in his 
artistic direction, as Jean Martin describes: ‘Beckett does not want his actors to act. He wants 
them to do only what he tells them. When they try to act, he becomes very angry.’173 This 
seems fundamental to Play as well as to Act Without Words /; they are plays where action 
cannot be disengaged from inaction, and where the creative act of producing theatre is bound
168 ‘Play’ in The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 307.
169 Shaw, p. 69.
170 Cohn, p. 282.
171 ‘Play’ in The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 307.
172 Joanne Shaw, ‘Introduction’ in Impotence and Making in Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy (The Netherlands:
Editions Rodopi, 2010), p. 7
173 Jean Martin, quoted by Michael Worton in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, p. 67.
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up in its very antithesis: ‘total impotence.’174The restriction that the actors are subject to is 
analogous to that in Happy Days. Martha Fehsenfeld describes playing the part of Winnie:
The eyes were, of course, of enormous importance in this act. The side gazes required 
a use of the eye muscles in an intense, highly concentrated manner. Everything was 
narrowed in, contained, right. All my responses were limited to the strongest possible 
kinds of reaction, which were then registered on my face. The ritual was so closely 
observed, often unbearably so. I have never felt my body so confined and my mind so 
active simultaneously.175
However, when we look at Billie Whitelaw’s description of performing in a production of 
Play it is evident that not even this economy of theatrical expression is permitted. She 
describes how Beckett ‘wanted the effect of the face disintegrating like the urns,’ and adds 
that the makeup ‘was a mixture of porridge oats, cruder oats, oatmeal, mixed with liquefied 
jelly and surgical glue [...] As this stuff dried, it stuck to your face like a crazy face pack and
•I n/:
as you spoke, bits of it flicked off our faces.’ In a manner that is comparable to What 
Where (1983) where each character is ‘as alike as possible. Same Long grey gown. Same 
long grey hair,’177 in Play Beckett restricts the actors’ movements, makes them indivisible 
from the scenery and indistinguishable, physically and vocally, from each other, and, using 
the spotlights, determines when and for how long each speaks -the spotlights even 
‘sometimes interrupts mid-phrase, and [they] seem compelled to repeat in order to 
continue.’178 Technology, just like Beckett’s artistic direction, is not a reciprocating, 
congenial presence in this play; it controls but does not facilitate the action, it enables but is
174 John Calder, ‘The Failure of Art’, The Philosophy o f  Samuel Beckett (London: Calder Publications, 2001), p. 
81.
175 Martha Fehsenfeld, ‘From the Perspective of an Actress/Critic’ in Myth and Ritual in the Plays o f  Samuel 
Beckett, ed. by Katherine H. Burkman (London and Toronto: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1987), p. 54.
176 Billie Whitelaw, quoted by Ulrika Maude in Beckett, Technology, and the Body (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 108-9.
177 Beckett, ‘What Where’, in Complete Dramatic Works, p. 469
178 Cohn, p. 283.
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central to this negligent, necrotic art: ‘And now, that you are...mere eye. Just looking. At my 
face. On and off [...] Mere eye. No mind. Opening and shitting on me. I am as much —\ 179 
The characters’ verbiage is provoked by the spotlights, as if desperately and exhaustively 
obliging a malevolent, dictatorial force -o r maybe this simply represents life in the age of 
mechanical reproduction, ‘re-imagining creation in the age of the machine.’180 Here the 
characters are controlled and impeded by technology; but this very notion is problematised by 
the fact that electricity, which powers the spotlights, is a fundamental part of the characters’ 
(and everyone’s) bodies in the central nervous system. Given that technology -o r more 
specifically, electricity -is  the necrotizing force in this play, insufficiently illuminating the 
stage and precluding a complete, coherent narrative, it must also follow that humans -  
humanity, even -are the necrotic, destructive force behind this theatre. In the symbolic 
equivalence struck between the antagonistic, inquisitorial spotlights - ‘the character’s
101
enemy’ -and the central nervous system and life-giving properties of the body, Beckett 
juxtaposes the creative and destructive, and the characters are quickly transformed from 
victims to perpetrators, or more accurately they are both simultaneously -which may resonate 
with post-war minds. They are antagonised by technology but more disturbingly are 
indistinguishable from and even created out of it, which calls to mind Otto Dix’s ‘The Scat 
Players’.
Beckett makes an inconspicuous, assistive device -lighting -a  deliberately inhibiting feature, 
casting the characters in conspicuous indefiniteness: ‘Am I as much as...being seen [Spot o ff 
M. Blackout].’182 Katherine Weiss writes that ‘this tormenting light functions as the 
authoritative gaze of the camera, alienating the actors by erasing the audience, and alienating
179 Beckett, ‘Play’ in Complete Dramatic Works, p. 317.
180 Shaw, p. 69.
181 Katherine Weiss, ‘Perceiving Bodies in Beckett’s Play’ in Samuel Beckett: Endlessness in the Year 2000 ed. 
by Angela Mooijani et al (The Netherlands: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2001), p. 187
182 Play, p. 317
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the audience by merging them with the inquisitive spotlight.’183 The symbolic sameness of 
body and technology is extended further, as Weiss suggests, by directing the gaze of the 
audience, and even precluding the gaze entirely where Beckett stipulates insufficient light 
with the ‘urns just discernible’ 184or even no light at all. The audience is a part of this 
accretion of detail, of this deficiency-they are the ‘mere eye’185 perhaps. The lighting directs 
and sometimes even precludes a spectatorial gaze, just as it summons and puts a halt to the 
characters’ utterances. The inability of the audience to comprehend the dialogue is not simply 
because Beckett asks that the actors’ voices are ‘faint’ and ‘largely unintelligible,’186 but 
because the spotlights that animate the characters are controlled in such a way as to disallow 
a complete, and therefore intelligible, sentence. The audience’s reception of the play is 
impaired because, at the moment of disclosure in Play, Beckett withdraws from any 
obligation to reveal -in  other words, anything that would permit elucidation, or return these 
characters and their narrative from formlessness and incompleteness. What the use of 
technology in Play represents is subtraction and diminishment; technology might even 
function in this piece as a metaphor for Beckett’s asceticism in that it imposes itself at 
moments of disclosure. The spotlights invoke rapid and incomprehensible slew of sentence 
fragments from the characters -as if conscious of the brevity and austerity of the play they are 
in; conscious of the tormentful machinations of the theatre. Just as the verbiage is in conflict 
with the choreographic and scenic minimalism, and seems almost in danger of exceeding the 
remit of the play, the urns are of inadequate size to contain the characters’ bodies. Therefore, 
their bodies do not simply  look concealed or contained, rather the probability should arise in 
the spectator that they have no bodies at all -that each is, to rephrase Kenner, a mere 
intelligence fastened to a prop:
183 Weiss, p. 189.
184 Beckett, ‘Play’, p. 307.
185 Ibid., p. 317.
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In order for the urns to be only one yard high, it is necessary either that traps be used, 
enabling he actors to stand below stage level, or that they kneel throughout the play, 
the urns being open at the back.187
This extreme economy on Beckett’s part where actor and prop are merged into one another is 
best illustrated in Billie Whitelaw’s description of performing in a production of Play. From 
this we derive the image of the inhuman, histrionic decay of the characters -an  imposed, 
hyperbolic ageing, whose alienating spectacle belies the relative mundanity of the play’s 
subject matter: a love triangle. However, the sensation of restriction and deficiency is not 
only the characters’ experience on stage, constrained as they are in the urns; rather their 
physical restriction and exaggerated decline is a visual metaphor for the audience’s very 
experience of this play. Deficiency and ineptitude is not kept onstage, as if  conditions only of 
the theatre; rather Beckett stresses the universality of these conditions by implicating the 
audience -in  other words, making their experience of the play partial and inadequate. As John 
Calder comments, Beckett ‘did not want an art that made life more tolerable, or anything that 
might deflect the human gaze from the full realisation of its own horror.’188
Both Act Without Words I  and Play seem to revolve around the themes of subjection and 
victimisation, with one character trapped in a sadistic behaviouristic experiment, and three 
tormented or ‘tantalised’ by clinical, inquisitorial spotlights. Both plays convey restriction, 
inertia, and impotence. The choreographic and scenic sparseness, the theatrical tendency 
towards compression, the actors’ confinement or speechlessness, and even Beckett’s 
directorial instructions -which involve, as Whitelaw comments, ‘tak[ing] all emotion out of 
it. No colour, no colour’189 -serve as a pervasive visual metaphor for bodily (and perhaps 
mental) conditions: cripplement, wasting musculature, anarchic sensations, atrophy,
187 Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 319.
188 Calder, pp. 80-1.
189 Quoted in Conversations With (and About) Samuel Beckett, p. 85.
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dependency, dejectedness, and impotence. However, the paradox here is that whilst these
may represent natural, degradative processes in the human body, the visual metaphors, being
as conspicuous, hyperbolic, and absurd as they are, also connote conditions not innate to but
imposed on the body. Beckett’s bodies are, as aforementioned, victims of physical decay and
Beckett’s ascetic art, his anti-theatre, if you will. The characters, and specifically their bodies,
seem simply the appendix to the theatre, its obliterated, sacrificial victims, and they
occasionally address their tormentor: ‘Give me up, as a bad job. Go away and start poking
and pecking at someone else.’190 However, as we see in Catastrophe (1982), the protagonist,
named ‘P’, is manipulated as if he were a mannequin -quiescent, without protestation,
without resistance; he simply ‘submits, inert,’191 The play is, ostensibly, a parable of
determinism and dejectedness. The only indication that the protagonist is not a puppet -o r
prop, even -is  in his shaking and in the ‘fibrous degeneration’192 of his hands -neither bodily
condition he is in control of. Shaking, as Steven Connor comments, ‘will mean fragility’ and
1 01‘turns on into a quivering marionette,’ which he indubitably is. Shaking or convulsing, 
makes him a pitiful figure, rehearsing, anticipating even, his eventual decomposition:
The word ‘convulsion’ comes from con-vellere, meaning to tear apart, to pull in all 
directions. The prefix ‘con’ works to add the sense of pulling together; convulsion is a 
way of pulling yourself together, as well as being tom apart. It is the enactment of a 
dismemberment, the body tom into tiny pieces, that is nevertheless held in one 
place.194
Beckett, ‘Play’, p. 312.
191 Beckett, ‘Catastrophe’, p. 458.
192 Ibid.
193 Steven Connor, ‘The Shakes: Conditions of Tremor’ in The Senses and Society, vol. 3 Issue 2, (Oxford: Berg 
Publishers, July 2008), pp. 205-220 (p. 209 & 211).
194 Ibid., p. 212.
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This play conveys the loss of control over, or disownment of, one’s own body, and as we see 
the autocratic director and his obsequious assistant removing P’s clothing and manipulating 
his posture, it is possible that these two characters are the personification of Time. This has 
autobiographical resonance, as Beckett explains that when writing Catastrophe ‘in my mind 
was Dupuytren’s contracture (from which I suffer) which reduces the hands to claws.’195 As 
in Play and Act Two of Happy Days, the loss of control over the body is represented by the 
isolation of the head from the body. As if the mind and the body become completely 
extraneous to each other, the play ends with the division of the two, this time through lighting 
rather than physical confinement: ‘ [fade-out o f  light on body. Light on head alone.’1% If 
Beckett is representing the ageing body in his dramatic works, the histrionic, unearthly, 
suggestively artificial manner in which they age would suggest victimisation and subjection -  
and the possibility should arise that these characters are not ageing but victim to 
experimentation: ‘Is it something I should do with my face, other than utter? Weep [...] Bite
107off my tongue and swallow it? Spit it out? Would that placate you?’ However, his 
characters’ complacency belies this interpretation, and so the theme of imposedness and 
absurdity in which the subject of ageing ostensibly occurs is made more routine -is  even 
naturalised. By representing ageing as not simply unheimlich, but aberrant, instantaneous, 
and seemingly unjustified, Beckett tacitly offers a way out of ageing. The theme of 
victimisation gestures constantly to the vague possibility of release or respite, and through 
this he tantalises us with the symbolic possibility of anti-ageing. But as aforementioned, 
complacency belies the absurdity -and the subtle, unBeckettian optimism -o f  many of their 
situations. As such, the possibility arises that these outlandish, absurdist situations are visual 
metaphors for the aversiveness, constrictiveness, and abjectness of the ageing body; but the 
mundanity and inevitability of decline as represented through its antithesis -bizarreness, and
195 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life o f  Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 597
196 Beckett, ‘Catastrophe’, p. 461.
197 Ibid., p. 314.
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victimisation -offers the possibility of escape or cessation, and as such may be thought of as 
congenial to anti-ageing discourses. Winnie’s premature burial in Happy Days is such an 
example. Her burial may be read as a metaphor for the constrictiveness or aversiveness of, 
and alienation from, the ageing body: ‘My arms. [Pause. ] My breasts. [Pause. ] What arms? 
[Pause.] What breasts?’198 Yet Beckett once again offers us some indication or possibility of 
respite in his instructions for the set design:
What should characterise [the] whole scene, sky and earth,’ he wrote, ‘is a pathetic 
unsuccessful realism, the kind of tawdriness you get in a 3rd rate musical or 
pantomime, that quality of pompier, laughably earnest bad imitation.’199
Because Beckett’s rejection of naturalism and his rendering conspicuous the theatrical, 
artefactual nature of Winnie’s situation and indeed Winnie herself, what deterministic ideas 
come from the scene are undermined. The sense is that these characters would or might be 
young were it not for the machinations of the theatre, and as a result of the self-reflexive 
strangeness and austerity of Beckett’s theatre, an optionality pervades his representation of 
unruly or impotent bodies and organic decay.
This is certainly implied in Beckett’s minimalist monodrama Krapp’s Last Tape (1958). The 
aged character Krapp sits meditatively over a tape recorder, listening to tapes of his younger 
self and lamenting over ‘a life in which he sacrificed love to artistic ambition.’200 His phonic 
self-memorialisations render the present-tense Krapp an abject, pitiful, and above all empty 
figure as all the audience/reader knows about the character is from the nostalgic evocation of 
his past self. Although this reveals very human attributes such as regret, sentimentality, and 
fear of ageing/death -  ‘an old man indulging in morbid reflections on his former glories or
198 Beckett, ‘Happy Days’ CDW, p. 161.
199 Letter to Alan Schneider, 17th August 1961 quoted by Harmon, M. (ed.) No Author Better Served: The 
Correspondence o f  Samuel Beckett & Alan Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 94.
200 Cohn, A Beckett Canon, p. 238.
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regretting his past failures,’201 as James Knowlson comments -the figure on stage is, 
paradoxically, inhuman and Beckett depicts Krapp in such a way as to preclude any real idea 
of mortality. He is a candidly abject and senescent character, which implies an engagement 
with mortality, yet he also has a farcical, clownish, and self-referentially performative 
countenance, which somewhat renounces or undermines that engagement with mortality:
A wearish old man: KRAPP. Rusty black narrow trousers too short fo r  him. Rusty 
black sleeveless waistcoat, fo r  capacious pockets. Heavy silver watch and chain. 
Grimy white shirt open at neck, no collar. Surprising pair o f  dirty white boots, size 
ten at least, very narrow and pointed. White face. Purple nose. Disordered grey 
hair.202
As John Morreall comments, comedy or farce ‘encourages an emotional disengagement,’203 
and combined with this, although he is an emphatically pitiful figure his caricatural physique 
signals either a repressive or, more optimistically, non-deterministic conception of old age.
He is a senescing figure whose deteriorated, ill-fitting clothing provides a visual metaphor for 
his decay, but this pseudo-epidermis -and by extension his very age -is  removable, just as his 
performance (i.e., as a clown, or clown-like figure, or more self-reflexively as the character 
Krapp) is able to be abandoned or discontinued. In a similar vein, acoustic technologies and 
hearing ‘promise a certain expansion of corporeal boundaries’ and represent an overcoming 
or transcendence of ‘spatial and temporal confines.’204 Krapp is described as having a 
‘laborious walk’ and his movements are ponderous and fatigable as he ‘fumbles’, ‘stoops’, 
‘peers’, ‘feels about’205 or else remains hunched and motionless for the play’s duration.
201 James Knowlson & John Pilling, Frescoes o f  the Skull: The Later Prose and Drama o f  Samuel Beckett (New 
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However his vocalic dismemberment, or disembodiment, symbolically alienates him from his 
senescing body and although he has not become the spectral, post-bodied figure lost to an 
infinitising (but also destructively obliterating) technological milieu like in Breath, he has 
found, or rather created, an evanescent, acoustic immortalisation for himself, willing himself 
to ‘be again, be again [...] Once wasn’t enough for you.’206 As Tajiri comments, the ‘tape 
recorder successfully stages an uncanny resurrection of the young Krapp, even in the 
presence of the old Krapp.’207 Sound, temporally and spatially, has a transcendent status, and 
it is a status that physically Krapp is in obvious contrast to, but textually is replaced by -  
rendering him a jointly young and old figure. The act of listening summons his young self, 
and given that the audience remains throughout the play bereft of all knowledge of the 
present-tense Krapp, the younger past-tense Krapp takes precedence. In other words his 
embodied, senescing self is lost to the evanescent, younger, and potentially ageless, vocalic 
self, making him an inversely ageing subject. However, Beckett’s own descriptions of the 
play reveal a more eschatological tone as he describes Krapp as having ‘nothing to talk to but 
his dying self and nothing to talk to him but his dead one.’208 Even though a voice implies a 
body (as its origin), it cannot be completely dissociated from the body, and by extension 
mortality; but the locus of Krapp’s identity, at least for the reader/audience, remains within 
the tape recorder and as such extraneous to his dying body.
Knowlson describes that, for Krapp, ‘so painful is the gulf between past experience that 
seemed to offer a key to possible fulfilment and a present of failure, emptiness, and 
meaninglessness.’209 But the present-tense Krapp is not simply empty in the sense he is 
disillusioned, resentful, and lonely, but in that he seems like a mirage, a two-dimensional 
figure, whose ostensible falsehood and derisory lack of verisimilitude is compounded firstly
206 Ibid., p. 223.
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in the domination of the past-tense Krapp (to the neglect/absence of the on-stage Krapp) and 
secondly in his appearance, which is clownish and self-referentially performative —as if 
‘borrowed from the circus-ring.’210 With regards to this appearance, Beckett instructed Alan 
Schneider not to be ‘afraid of exaggerating,’211 and as such he exposes the mimetic theatre 
space and the performative, artefactual quality of Krapp, to the exclusion and deliberate 
failure of what naturalism would have been otherwise achieved. With it, the subjects of 
ageing and mortality are undermined, evaded, or even transcended. The physical Krapp on 
stage seems, particularly in his frequent motionlessness, more like a prop than a living, 
senescing person -and indeed his very name, Krapp, with its excremental connotations also 
implies a sense of loss, or more crudely, evacuation. But it is a loss not necessarily of 
identity, youth, or life as seems initially the case; it is a loss of life, not in the sense he is 
dying or has died, but in the sense that he -o r more specifically his aged countenance -is  
potentially not real, and as such the possibility of ageing and death is simply not possible. A 
visual representation of this is in the tape’s running on in silence as the play ends, and in 
particular Beckett’s desire to have ‘the luminous eye [the red light of the tape recorder] 
burning up as the machine runs on in silence and the [theatre] lights go down,’ which 
conveys a stoical persistence in the face of total annihilation. More particularly Beckett’s
919direction to have ‘two eyes, one on each side’ of the tape recorder -modelled perhaps on
human eyes -implies more a human than purely mechanical persistence. In essence, then, 
Krapp’s Last Tape is not perhaps as eschatological as initially it appears, or even as Beckett 
intended. In accordance with Beckett’s own directorial suggestions, Krapp is at times a 
candidly artificial figure, and because of this, ageing and death remain teasingly aleatory 
states in the Beckettian body. The confined and austere setting of the play -like many of his 
plays -is, suggestively, a space where ageing simply does not take place.
210 Ibid., p. 85.
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ii) Trilogy Bodies:
In Beckett’s dramatic works, wasting musculature, anarchic sensations, cripplement, inertia, 
atrophy, and dependency are conditions associated with ageing that are radically 
dehumanised, and attributed to forces outside of, rather than intrinsic to, the body. As Khaled 
Besbes comments, Beckett’s characters’ conditions ‘poin[t] to the kind of decay or 
displacement in time Beckett’s characters are often subjected to [...] They are typically 
presented as melancholy relics who are brought from a distant past just to suffer.’213 His 
prose works are no different. The trilogy bodies, which I shall analyse in this section, 
deteriorate through malign, nameless agency - ‘the old age they bestowed upon me [my 
italics],’214 as the narrator of The Unnamable laments -rather than through a process of 
natural, inexorable decline. In this section on ageing in his prose works, I will be arguing that 
Beckett does explore the fantasy of optionality, centring on ageing characters who attempt to 
take refuge from the biological reality of senescence be re-imagining their bodies as 
machines that may potentially be reparable. Beckett’s characters are amorphous, 
nontemporal, nonspatial beings, and as such resist preconceived and identifiable categories 
such as age or gender. Ulrika Maude comments that ‘through the incessant fallings, rollings 
and crawlings, all of which bring the body ever closer to the earth, Beckettian characters are 
ceaselessly reminded of their own inescapable materiality’215 -and it is of course the 
materiality of the body that gives it its finitude. It is the purpose of the forthcoming analysis 
to show that the characters’ physical maladies are not ‘their own’, as Maude writes, but are 
fundamentally unnatural states they are subjected to -that are inflicted upon them by another. 
As such, there is a pervasive non-relation between age and time in the trilogy, and the 
question arises, then, as to why the characters are in the states they find themselves in if not
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through age. Given that ageing in Beckett’s oeuvre is unnatural not natural, imposed on not 
intrinsic to the body, it is possible readers should eschew the glum fatalism and essentialist 
attitudes that ostensibly underpin his work. My analysis of the trilogy starts from the premise 
that the ways in which Beckett depicts ageing reveals a fervent incredulity toward ageing and 
mortality, and that as readers we should look less at Beckett as the laureate of ageing in 20th 
century literature and consider more the ways in which his work is prescient: iterating anti­
ageing discourses and ideologies. Moreover, I shall analyse the ways in which allusions to 
instruments, mechanisms, and bizarre apparatuses, pervade Beckett’s semiology of ageing; 
how, as a result, gerontological discourses become, if implicitly, bound in technological ones; 
and the ways in which biological determinism and technological determinism converge.
The loss of self-sovereignty and the profound alienation from the body is not a new or 
contentious way to depict the ageing process; but the narration of ageing as a departure from 
all that is natural and timely does belie the theme of mortality and invites ideas of ageing as a 
temporary imposition and possible cessation. Two of the ways Beckett depicts ageing is with 
recourse to mechanical or technological imagery, and alongside the themes of subjection, 
victimisation, possession, and even torture. Underpinning a great deal of age imagery is a 
very seamless symbiosis of body and machine, and as such his characters seem to exist 
between abject and transcendent states, anthropomorphised machine and mechanised human. 
In terms of why Beckettian bodies are decrepit and infelicitous, I shall look to some of the 
technological discourses outlined in the chapter’s introduction, and the anti-humanistic 
themes arising from them. Decrepitude and inertia in Beckett have, after all, no bodily cause 
or locus, and they are rarely depicted as natural, unconditioned processes. Beckett’s 
characters do not gradually senesce, but are menaced by a malign arbitrary force, rendering 
their physical conditions unnatural, unearthly, and instantaneous. This carries the implication 
that his characters are indeed not old but young, or both simultaneously: ‘ruined as I am and
still young in this abjection they have brought me to [my italics].’216 Yoshiki Tajiri 
comments: ‘Often in the trilogy, the body is disorganised. Its parts -the limbs and organs -are 
isolated from each other rather than forming a coherent whole. Concomitantly, they are often 
described as extraneous and alien, like mechanical or inanimate objects.’217 In The 
Unnamable, the protagonist’s body is an assemblage of inanimate, protean objects juxtaposed 
in space (not dissimilar to the fantastic prostheses of Dix’s ‘The Scat Players’), all of which 
throughout the narrative serve as proxies to bodily functions or anatomical features:
Ah yes, I am truly bathed in tears. They gather in my beard and from there, when it 
can hold no more -no, no beard, no hair either, it is a great smooth ball I carry on my 
shoulders, featureless, but for the eyes, of which only the sockets remain. And were it 
not for the distant testimony of my palms, my soles, which I have not yet been able to 
quash, I would gladly give myself the shape, if not the consistency, of an egg [...] I‘m 
a big talking ball [...] And after all why a ball, rather than something else, and why 
big? Why not a cylinder, a small cylinder? An egg, a medium egg? No no, that’s the 
old nonsense, I always knew I was round, solid and round, without daring to say so, 
no asperities, no apertures, invisible perhaps, or as fast as Sirius in the Great Dog.218
This passage seems as much to do with creation as it does entropy; the narrator is at once ‘the
91 Qindefatigable producer of form’ as well as ‘being degraded by form.’ The narrator is a 
demiurgical figure, creating and fashioning a body (at times depicted more as a receptacle) at 
once transcendent and abject, inhuman and carnal. He exists within the interstice between 
form and formlessness, living and inexistent, ‘fixed’ (as he terms) and ablative -o r at times 
tele-present. Like Winnie in Happy Days, he talks himself into existence (albeit under duress)
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in a similar ‘cris[i]s of loquaciousness’221 -o r as the narrator himself describes: ‘words 
pronouncing me alive’222 -whilst at the same time begging for quittance: for silence/death. 
He is an inadequate creation, and this is signalled in his inability to function as a whole: ‘I 
don’t yet know how to move, either locally, in relation to myself, or bodily, in relation to the 
rest of the shit.’223 This is also experienced by Watt, as he describes his body parts fatiguing 
at different rates: ‘my weary little legs must be carrying me as best they may away, my trunk 
that is wearier still and my head that is weariest of all.’224 Like Watt, the unnamable is not a 
totality, nonspatial, dimensionless presence, his body a series of occlusions, illogical 
extensions, and self-sufficient parts -a t times less like a human and more an 
anthropomorphised machine endowed with the power of speech. In Volume I of Capital 
(1867-1894), Karl Marx describes machinery as ‘constituting] a sort of industrial perpetual 
motion, which would go on reproducing without pause.’225 In The Unnamable we have its 
linguistic/phonic equivalent as the narrator is coerced into incessant and suggestively 
automatized speech, lamenting: ‘Ah, if only this voice could stop.’226 ‘Perpetual motion’ is a 
phrase used both by Marx when describing machinery and by Beckett when describing the 
narrator in The Unnamable. In The Unnamable not only do we have a mechanised, 
anthropomorphic being, but a machine/narrator whose ‘perpetual motion’ -in  this case his 
loquacity -is  ostensibly mediated and supervised (albeit inattentively), and whose output is 
an un-paragraphed monologue produced at the expense of literary conventions such as plot, 
structure, character development, and literary subjectivism. He conveys a sense of distance 
from what body he has, commenting: ‘[i]f I accomplish other natural functions it is
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unawares,’ before moving on to saying ‘I resume, having no alternative’228 -as if both 
dispossessed of a body and nothing but ‘instrument of civilised and refined exploitation.’229
What makes these descriptions pertain less to human enslavement and more to technological 
instrumentality are the descriptions of the narrator’s body and motility. He describes his 
movements and the relation of others to himself as having the precision and constancy of a 
machine, although likened more to the laws of celestial mechanics (which, whilst self- 
elevating still implies subjection to forces beyond his control):
I like to think I occupy the centre, but nothing is less certain. In a sense I would be 
better off at the circumference, since my eyes are always fixed in the same direction. 
But I am certainly not at the circumference. For if I were it would follow that Molloy, 
wheeling about me as he does, would issue from the enceinte at every revolution, 
which is manifestly impossible. But he does in fact wheel, does he not perhaps simply 
pass before me in a straight line? No, he wheels, I feel it, and about me, like a planet 
about its sun [...] It is equally possible, I do not deny it, that I too am in perpetual 
motion, accompanied by Malone, as the earth by its moon.230
Likening the narrator to a machine is not to say he is emancipated from all corporal 
limitations, but that, as an instrument or device, he is subjugated by those that, so to speak, 
use him. His unwitting incessantness likens him to what in A Critique o f Dialectical Reason 
Jean-Paul Sartre terms ‘being-outside-oneself which ‘is defined as bewitched matter (that is, 
precisely as an inorganic, worked materiality which develops a non-human activity because 
its passivity synthesises the serial infinity of human acts which sustain it.’231 As an 
instrument, the unnamable to some extent personifies ‘the negation of man by man.’ He is
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acquiescent to another’s command, and becomes a ‘'mere inert thin[gY without life, without 
sentience, and without agency of his ow n-in other words ‘sub-human’, his life justified ‘on 
the basis o f  a technical progress,’232 in this case his loquacity. Although Beckett is quite 
evidently not making such a political/humanistic/Marxist critique, the unnamable’s implied 
servitude, his sub-human countenance, and his dispossession of all sense of choice (‘I long to 
cease [...] I can’t cease’233), is analogous to such images and such discourses. His 
incessantness surpasses both his will and his (human) capability,234 and most of all, his 
vocalic alienation, described as a voice that ‘issues from me’ ad infinitum but ‘is not mine,’235 
both imply a clandestine tormentor or, more mundanely, user/worker. His loquacity signifies 
mechanical output, which itself implies a user, yet this output also brings him into existence, 
and so whilst the mechanism or technological apparatus should be in antithesis to the body it 
is its replacement or surrogate and symbolically births and sustains the unnamable. As Sartre 
writes in a Critique o f Dialectical Reason, ‘machines, by their structure and functions, 
determine the nature of their servants as the rigid and imperious future of undetermined 
individuals and, thereby, create mend236 His identity is fissured in much the same way as 
Krapp’s identity is between his physical and phonic self -the latter not emanating but 
extraneous to his body. If in Krapp’s Last Tape, the tape recorder is the locus or custodian of 
his identity -functioning as it does as his prosthetic memory -then in The Unnamable, the 
vestigial character is the tape recorder. Like an instrument or mechanical device, he cannot 
stop if commanded to ‘transmit the words,’237 and he is, if not a machine itself, then the ‘mere 
appendix to the machine or at worst the machine’s obliterated victim.’238 The state of being
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subordinated to another’s control as a mechanism or piece of apparatus has metaphorical 
value in terms of foregrounding a deterministic portrayal of ageing (e.g., the mechanism as 
the body, whose unruly nature forces the individual to acquiesce to moments of immobility or 
inertia). However, the nature of the metaphor precludes any real engagement with ageing 
insofar as the mechanism or machine, unlike a body, is inorganic, and above all, restorable, 
replaceable, and replicable. Sartre writes ‘objectification is alienation,’ and in The 
Unnamable where Beckett appears to confront aspects of ageing —or at least alienation from 
one’s body —in a technological milieu, and represent this senescing character as an enslaved, 
exploited, or as he describes ‘inhabited’239 object/tool, a simple analogy is made between the 
pathological and the technological. As an object of utility -a t once human and mechanism, 
susceptible and impervious to age -he is reminiscent of Marx’s description: ‘the products of 
the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter 
into relations both with each other and with the human race.’240
As J.E. Dearlove describes, ‘[h]e is made of words, but words belong to others,’ and he is 
dependent ‘upon the act of speaking but not upon the words spoken,’241 as if he is not the 
origin of the message but its mediation. He is the very apparatus that interposes itself between 
the voice and its origin, disassociating the two and in the process making the individual 
omnipresent and himself more dimensionless and nonspatial than before -this is conveyed by 
the narrator as he remarks: ‘I don’t know where I end.’242 However, he is not only the 
apparatus that mediates a message such as a telephone or tape recorder, but at once the 
speaker and recipient of his message, and this is hinted at in this schizoid dialogue below,
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which conflates human loquacity and mechanical incessantness, human desire or intent and 
robot teleology:
I can’t go on, you must go on, I’ll go on, you must say words, as long as there are any, 
until they find me, until they say me, strange pain, strange sin, you must go on, 
perhaps it’s done already [...] I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, you 
must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on.243
This voice is, as Tajiri describes, prosthetic. He defines the prosthetic voice as ‘the voice that 
is mediated by machines or technology -the voice coming from the tape recorder, telephone 
or radio.’244 Krapp’s phonic self-resurrection and his status as the origin and recipient of his 
messages is paradigmatic of the narrator’s alienating, automatised orality in The Unnamable - 
-what he describes initially as ‘my voice’ and then, dropping the possessive pronoun, ''the 
voice [my italics].’245 Both Krapp and the unnamable have technologised, vicarious 
existences, and this technologisation is consubstantial with their physical maladies, which 
necessitate a similar alienation, or distance, from their bodies (and consequently a similarly 
fissured identity). Beckett also represents a similar loss of self-sovereignty in Play, where the 
characters’ voices are provoked by stage lighting, as well as in Not I  where the speaker is 
likened explicitly to a disconnected machine: ‘...incapable of deceit...or the machine...more 
likely the machine...so disconnected...never got the message...or powerless to respond’246). 
This is also the case in Breath where the body is entirely supplanted by technology and where 
the self (in this case represented through the sound of breathing) is made present by way of 
detour through speakers, and deposited on stage through various proxies. Technology is ‘a 
metaphor that indicates alterity,’ but perhaps also ageing and more particularly death
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inasmuch as (like with Krapp’s Last Tape) it ‘ separate[s] the voice from the body and 
make[s] it resemble a ghostly voice.’247
In The Unnamable Beckett often seems to equate this amorphous, tele-present, technologised 
being with the simpler, more identifiable image of a pitiful senescing man alienated from and 
incapable of using his fatigable, atrophying body. At times it is as if Beckett is rendering the 
character’s abjection at once bodily and technological in origin, which creates an image of 
ageing and decrepitude saturated (albeit only in part) with promises of remittance or cure. He 
acknowledges his corporal form, writing unremarkably of his body: ‘here I can count on my 
body alone, my body incapable of the smallest movement and whose very eyes can no longer 
close as they once could.’248 He also conveys a sense of connectedness, totality, and self- 
possession, which is not always evident: ‘I know I am seated, my hands on my knees, 
because of the pressure against my rump, against the soles of my feet, against the palms of 
my hands, against my knees.’249 However, he withdraws from this human side, depicting a 
sense of self-distance and disownment: ‘the inside of my distant skull where once I 
wandered, now am fixed, lost for tininess, or straining against the walls with my head, my 
hands, my feet, my back’250 -which belies the theme of ageing as he becomes more abstract 
and his physical maladies less identifiable. His skull is a receptacle, or void, and his 
extremities and defining features a series of prostheses or unnecessary (technological?) 
annexations. However, although fundamentally abstract they remain a part of his 
disintegrative, abject carapace that he is at once entombed in and falls from him like a 
costume: ‘all those things have fallen, all the things that stick out, with my eyes, my hair, 
without leaving a trace [...] I’m a big talking ball.’251 He seems at once in the throes of
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decomposition and a sleek, appendageless, semi-infinite, and non-corporal being, thrown free 
of the mortal coil, ‘soaring above [his] own condition.’252 He is reminiscent of the hybridity 
underpinning Marx’s discussions of the industrialisation of manual labour: ‘[i]t transforms 
the worker into a cripple, a monster [...] [T]he individual himself is split up, is transformed 
into the automatic motor of some partial operation’ and, most befitting the Beckettian body, 
becomes ‘nothing more than a fragment of his own body.’253 The unnamable certainly 
becomes a mere fragment of his body, as indicated in the following passage:
I don’t feel it, I don’t feel a mouth on me, nor a head, do I feel an ear, frankly now, do 
I feel an ear, well frankly now I don’t, so much the worse, I don’t feel an ear either 
[...] I must feel something, yes, I feel something, they say I feel something, I don’t 
know what it is, I don’t know what I feel, tell me what I feel and I’ll tell you who I 
am, they’ll tell me who I am, I won’t understand but the thing will be said, they’ll 
have said who I am, and I’ll have heard, without an ear I’ll have heard, and I’ll have 
said it, without a mouth I’ll have sad it, I ’ll have said it inside me, then in the same 
breath outside me, perhaps that’s what I feel, an outside and an inside and mine the 
middle, perhaps that’s what I am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the one 
side the outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin as foil, I’m neither onside 
nor the other. I’m in the middle, I’m the partition, I’ve two surfaces and no thickness, 
perhaps that’s what I feel, myself vibrating, I’m the tympanum, on the one hand the 
mind, on the other the world, I don’t belong to either.254
He has reduced himself to a ‘fragment of his own body’ or mere function, the tympanum -  
which, uniting the physiological and the technological, is either the middle ear or the 
diaphragm of a telephone -o r more abstractly, a space or void (a recessed space bounded by
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an arch). Not only is his voice dissociated from his body, ‘dislodged from himself and 
coming from outside,’255 but as aforementioned, he seems to identify his very body (or what 
exists of his body) as not the origin or locus of his identity, but as some form of mediation -  
as if indeed he were nothing but an instrument condemned to ‘the field of practical 
passivity.’256 He ‘h[as] no mouth,’ is ‘short of a leg,’ is ‘possessed of nothing but my voice,’ 
is ‘bereft of hands,’257 and is condemned to a decaying but simultaneously inexistent body 
‘without feeling an ear on me, or a head, or a body, or a soul [...] [I]f only I could feel 
something on me it would be a starting-point.’258 He not only exists in the interstice between 
form and formlessness, but between a transcendent and senescent body, and at once present 
and tele-present. The narrator finds some unusual, nihilistic ontological allegiance to 
whatever instrument or apparatus he is, or envisions himself as, and similar to Breath, the 
implication is that he has been technologised to the point of absence -o r towards becoming 
simply a ‘practico-inert exteriority.’ Yet this is also bound up with the theme of ageing and 
the nihilating effects of time on the body, which is how the unnamable rationalises his 
condition: ‘I must be extremely old.’260 His body does represent time unfolding, or unfolded,
0f\ 1and his body is ‘worn out at last, or feeble with old age’ and he is decomposing (albeit in 
an abstract and hyperbolical manner). However, at the same time organic decay, the breaking 
down of physical matter, is also a metaphor for the various bodily absences that technological 
substitution entails -and again, this is represented in a hyperbolical manner, commenting ‘Ah 
if I were flesh and blood.’262 One might argue, then, there is little differentiation between the 
technological and the pathological.
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The descriptions convey both abjectness and survivability, and his identity is at once 
compressed and atomised -and at points even spectral -as if at once condemned to and also 
emancipated from his body. This is evident in the different ways he describes his movement: 
‘on my hands and knees in the later stages, then crawling on my belly or rolling on the 
ground’ and as ‘a succession of irregular loops, now sharp and short as in the waltz, now of a 
parabolic sweep that embraces entire boglands, now between the two, somewhere or other, 
and invariably unpredictable in direction.’263 Not only spectral and grittily corporal, he is of 
course mechanical -an  acoustic or communicative apparatus such as a tape recorder, 
telephone, or gramophone, even -and moves and speaks/transmits under duress:
The only problem for me was how to continue since I could not do otherwise, to the 
best of my declining powers, in the motion which had been imparted to me. This 
obligation, and the quasi-impossibility of fulfilling it, engrossed me in a purely 
mechanical way, excluding notably the free play of the intelligence and sensibility, so 
that my situation rather resembled that of an old broken down cart- or bat-horse 
unable to receive the least information either from its instinct or from its observation 
as to whether it is moving towards the stable or away from it, and not greatly caring 
either way 264
He conveys an evacuation of all natural, intrinsic reactions and, combined with his 
‘monstrous carapace,’265 the geometric shapes that comprise his body, and his ostensibly 
mechanical ‘perpetual motion’266 that he has no control over, he is rendered comparable to 
Marx’s depiction of the machine that supplants the human worker:
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid., p. 322.
265 Ibid., p. 327.
266 Ibid., p. 297
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[The] mechanical monster whose body fills the whole factory, and whose demon 
power, hidden from our sight at first because of the measured and almost ceremonious 
character of the movement of his giant limbs, discloses itself at length in the vast and 
furious whirl of his numberless working organs.267
The presence of technology in The Unnamable is an implied one. The image of the tape 
recorder or instrumental mediation of some sort is a particularly pervasive one when the 
unnamable talks of himself. His voice, and indeed his sense of self-presence, is ‘telephonic’ 
as his voice is dislodged from its point of origin: ‘What a joy to know where one is, and 
where one will stay, without being there.’268 Tajiri writes that ‘devices such as the tape 
recorder and telephone remove a voice from its origin and create distance or exteriority in the 
voice’269 -o r as McLuhan writes, invests an individual ‘with all kinds of nonvisual 
character.’270 Again, this is made evident as the narrator laments ‘I don’t know where I 
end.’271 That the narrator has no self-command and that his voice is, like his limbs, 
dissociated from his body, is not technological or pathological in origin: it is both. The 
narrator often describes defamiliarising postures, movements, or sensations that are 
consubstantial with his ‘mortal inertia.’272 As Ulrika Maude notes, ‘[t]he bodies in Beckett, as
973a result of their abject and unruly nature, threaten the subject’s autonomy,’ and as such his 
sense of self-differentiation is a result of this abjectness -his ‘idiotic pains’ and ‘state of 
decay.’274 However, his identity is fissured not only because of the defamiliarising sensations 
that retard and bring to conscious attention one’s formerly tacit command of the body, but 
because of technological mediation and tele-presence. Although subtle, Beckett equates the
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disintegrating body with evanescent speech, and as such presents technology -in  particular 
how it isolates, externalises, and renders unfamiliar body parts/functions -a  metaphor for 
pathology. The technological mediation of his voice is paralleled by his organic decay, as 
both entail absence and departure from the self. The strangeness, aversiveness, and 
constrictiveness of his body is equivalent to his ‘vocalic uncanny,’275 which is interesting 
inasmuch as the former is represents natural, organic decay, ‘bowed down with years and
• • 276impositions,’ and the latter a technological imposition -o r what the narrator describes as 
the ‘old age they bestowed upon me.’277 What is represented then is a techno-pathological 
affliction. Ostensibly, the narrator’s self-distance is pathological and telephonic, and this is 
represented through his lack of bodily and vocalic provenance. He occupies an abject, 
fatigable, vegetative, and ageing body that is unadulterated by technology, afflicted with 
‘multiple softenings, manifold hardenings, insensitive to blows, sight failing, chronic gripes, 
[...] heart failing, heart irregular, sweet-tempered, smell failing, heavy sleeper, no erections 
[...] inoperable [and] untransportable.’278 However, just as he is, at times, unconnected to his 
body, whether through injury or atrophy, so too is his mechanically mediated, disembodied 
voice. He has a vicarious nonspatial existence; his body and his voice resist any associationist 
conception which, as Merleau-Ponty describes, conceives of the body ‘parts [as] inter-related 
[...] not spread out side by side, but enveloped in each other’ over which the individual is ‘in 
undivided possession.’279 His vocalisations are made by him yet he hears them as if 
emanating from another, rendering him tele-present -a t once the speaker and recipient of his 
message:
275 Steven Connor, quoted by Tajiri in Samuel Beckett and the Prosthetic Body, p. 139.
276 Ibid., p. 339.
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This voice that speaks, knowing that it lies, indifferent to what it says, too old perhaps 
and too abased ever to succeed in saying the words that would be its last, knowing 
itself useless and its uselessness in vain [...] I’ll ask not more questions, there are no 
more questions, I know none any more. It issues from me, it fills me, it clamours 
against my walls, it is not mine, I can’t stop it, I can’t prevent it, from tearing me, 
racking me, assailing me. It is not mine, I have none, I have no voice and must speak, 
that is all I know, it’s round that I must revolve, of that I must speak, with this voice 
that is not mine, but can only be mine, since there is no one but me, or if there are 
others, to whom it might belong, they have never come near me.280
Elsewhere in the trilogy is a comparable sense of abjection and subjugation. Like in The 
Unnamable, in Molloy Beckett seems at times to juxtapose organic decay and technological 
vitalism. He describes the body, albeit only very suggestively, with recourse to 
technological/mechanical imagery, and as Molloy and Malone senesce, their physical 
conditions seem less a natural, inevitable consequence of time and more ‘the appendix to [a] 
machine’281 they have long since failed to control. He describes how ‘when I was walking, or 
even propped up against something, that I suddenly collapsed, like a puppet when its strings 
are dropped, and lay long where I fell, literally boneless.’282 Like the unnamable, he has an 
ill-defined sense of physical and bodily provenance, describing how ‘the limits of my region 
were unknown to me. But I felt they were far away [...] the confines of my room, of my bed,
283of my body, are as remote from me as were those of my region.’ His control over his body 
seems endogenous, coming from Molloy himself, inhumed within his deviant body: ‘I fell
280 Ibid., p. 309.ogl A
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asleep, I woke up in a bed, in my skin.’284 However, control over his body is also exogenous, 
coming from another, possibly malignant source or person, and rendering him, so to speak, 
teletopical (i.e., the space his body occupies, or alternatively his sense of emplacement, at 
once local and remote). Molloy depicts movement and posture not in terms of a tacit self- 
command, but as a conscious, mediated task, as if the body was simply an obstruction, 
impediment, or technological annexation, and his limbs constitutive of independent, 
intractable creatures gestating in, birthed by, and now emancipated from him. To continue the 
metaphor of before, he almost seems at once ventriloquist and puppet. In the following 
quotation, his conflicted identity is gained through his depiction of his hands’ self-sufficiency 
combined with his paradoxical retention of the possessive pronoun ‘my’:
And when I see my hands, on the sheet, which they love to floccillate already, they 
are not mine, less than ever mind, I have no arms, they are a couple, they play with 
the sheet, love-play perhaps, trying to get up perhaps, one on top of the other. But it 
doesn’t last, I bring them back, little by little, towards me, it’s resting time.285
This is similar to Beckett’s descriptions of limbs in Watt (1953) also: ‘the knees, on these 
occasions, did not bend. They could have, but they did not. No knees could better bend than 
Watt’s when they chose.’286 Although, physically, there is nothing to suggest Molloy’s limbs 
are not limbs but prostheses, they each seem to have the quality of both a fleshy limb and a 
maladroit, osteo-mechanical adjunct because of the way they are controlled. His movement 
and postures are not arrived at through unconscious self-command, but as if inexpertly 
manipulating an animal, child, or automaton. The idea of his limbs as childlike is not
284 Ibid., p. 36.
285 Ibid., p. 61.
286 Samuel Beckett, Watt (London: Jupiter Books, 1063), p. 29.
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unremarkable given Molloy’s declaration that ‘I have taken her [his mother’s] place. I must 
resemble her more and more. All I need now is a son. Perhaps I have one somewhere.’287 
However, his offspring are not, so to speak, separate beings, but his limbs; he has, at least in 
part, given birth to himself -or, to be more specific, to his limbs. Molloy is in this sense, then, 
a tenseless, nontemporal being, straddling infancy/childhood and senescence -a  senile infant, 
if you will, or ‘an old foetus’288 as Malone describes, ‘merging two times in one,’289 or as the 
narrator of Texts fo r  Nothing (1950-1952) comments: ‘[a]ll mingles, times and tenses.’290 
However, his limbs not only appear as children but automata, and this is implied in his 
physical movement, which often seems a highly conscious and mediated task: ‘[m]y feet, you 
see, never took me to my mother unless they received a definite order to do so,’ and ‘I would 
stick out my nose, then hastily call it in again.’291 Elsewhere in the Beckett canon there are 
similar passages. For example in Texts for Nothing the narrator, either in paralytic frustration 
or attempting to animate a broken machine, tries to provoke some movement: ‘I say to the 
body, Up with you now, and I can feel it struggling, like an old hack foundered in the street, 
struggling no more, struggling again, till it gives up. I say to the head, Leave it alone, stay
9Q9quiet, it stops breathing, then pants on worse than ever.’ Likewise, in Watt the narrator’s 
efforts at locomotion render his identity ambiguous, at once inhumed within a senescing body 
and manipulating an unresponsive machine. His body is indeed the locus where internal and 
external, machine and human converge:
Watt’s way of advancing due east, for example, was to turn his bust as far as possible 
towards the north and at the same time to fling out his right leg as far as possible 
towards the south and at the same time to fling out his left leg as far as possible
287 Ibid., p. 9.
288 Ibid., p. 207.
289 Ibid., p. 69.
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towards the north and to fling out his right leg as far as possible towards the south [...] 
and so on, over and over again, many many times, until he reached his destination.293
Steven Connor describes this as an ‘ongoing, chaotic compromise between the dimensions of 
up and down, left and right.’294
The narrative does not portray the traversal of space but an embarrassing plethora of 
potential, hypothetical, space, rendered so by the character’s tragicomic, maladroit, and 
inexpert command of his body. His descriptions of walking are comparable to those of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, who describes the act as:
...a perpetual falling with a perpetual self-recovery. It is a most complex, violent, and 
perilous operation, which we divest of its extreme danger only by continual practice 
from a very early period in life. We find how complex it is when we attempt to 
analyze it [...] We learn how violent it is, when we walk against a post or a door in the 
dark. We discover how dangerous it is, when we slip or trip and come down, perhaps 
breaking or dislocating our limbs, or overlook the last flight of stairs, and discover 
with what headlong violence we have been hurling ourselves forward.295
Walking is depicted by Beckett with a similar sense of violence. His characters’ movements 
seem hyperbolic and cerebral, part of a benign yet futile exodus untaken with bodily 
movements whose sheer number counterpose the amount of space traversed (i.e. very little, or 
quite possibly none). These moments of Beckettian imbalance and collapse are parodied -  
paid homage to -b y  the conceptual artist Bruce Nauman and his 1968 video ‘Slow Angle 
Walk (Beckett Walk)’:
“ Beckett, Watt, p. 28.
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Hands clasped behind his back, he kicks one leg up at a right angle to his body, pivots 
forty-five degrees, falls forward hard with a thumping noise, extends the rear leg 
again at a right angle behind [...] The unbalancing of the walk is doubled by the fact 
that Nauman taped the movements with the camera on its side, so that he appears to 
be walking up a wall, gravityless.296
Beckett even appears to connect the acts of wondering and wandering, and by extension those 
of reading and walking. In Molloy for instance, on occasion his descriptions of legs are 
tautological and cumbersome, allowing for no real sense of progression in the narrative that 
correlates with Molloy’s own thwarted locomotion:
For I no longer had one bad leg plus another more or less good, but now both were 
equally bad. And the worse, to my mind, was that which till now had been good, at 
least comparatively good, and whose change for the worse I had not yet got used to.
So in a way, if you like, I still had one bad leg and one good, or rather less bad, with 
this difference however, that the less bad now was the less good of heretofore.297
Like in The Unnamable, in Molloy technology has an implied presence. Although it belies the 
subject of organic decay, Beckett’s descriptions of the ageing body return obsessively and 
repetitively to the image of the mechanism and attendant notions of mediation and post- 
bodiedness. In the figure of Molloy, Beckett presents us with both a senescing character and a 
technologised character. Images of decline and decrepitude all invoke images of 
technological instrumentality. His limbs form a part of ‘the inventory of my possessions,’298 
which includes objects such as his bicycle and his crutches. His leg has an uncanny
"96 Steven Connor et al., ‘Slow Angle Walk (Beckett Walk)’
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congeniality with the crutch —he remarks at one point, ‘my leg as stiff as my crutches’299 —and 
the ambiguous boundaries between his ‘fatal skin’300 and the prostheses around him is 
compounded in his characteristic omission of the possessive pronoun ‘my’:‘[t]he stiff leg hurt 
me, admittedly, I mean the old stiff leg, and it was the other which I normally used as a pivot, 
or prop.’301 Both Molloy’s body and his bicycle, which is chainless, are deficient, and in his 
essay ‘The Cartesian Centaur’ Kenner observes that:
[i]n this tableau man and machine mingle in conjoint stasis, each indispensible to the 
other’s support. At rest it extends and stabilizes Molloy’s endoskeleton. In motion, to 
it complements and amends his structural deficiencies.302
He is, as Tajiri comments, ‘doomed to an ever deteriorating machine -that is, the human 
body.’ His limbs are secondary, lateralised, or debased additions to his body, and are often 
described as deficient or defective instruments:
Now my sick leg, I forget which, it’s immaterial here, was in a condition neither to 
dig, because it was rigid, nor alone to support me, because it would have collapsed. I 
had so to speak only one leg at my disposal, I was virtually one-legged, and I would 
have been happier, livelier, amputated at the groin. And if they had removed a few 
testicles into the bargain I wouldn’t have objected.304
Tajiri goes so far as to argue that ‘his crutches and foot [are] becoming parts of the machine, 
just like the cross-bar, axle and pedals,’305 and it is this seamless conflation of physical 
decomposition and technology or technologisation that is becoming increasingly prominent a
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theme in contemporary technophilic culture. At times decrepitude in Molloy and The 
Unnamable seem consubstantial with mechanisation or technologisation; that organic decay 
is as a result of, as opposed to being palliated or placated by, technology. Beckett’s characters 
are not humans extended by prostheses or mechanisms, but are decrepit, senescing, 
anthropomorphised machines, whose body parts -namely the limbs -do not form a totality 
but are a series of occlusions, each one self-sufficient and even sentient, or alternatively 
controlled by a malignant agency. The expression of physical malady as malign sentience is 
captured succinctly in Beckett’s phrase from Molloy: ‘the defection of my good leg [my 
italics]’306 -the noun ‘defection’ meaning both failure, lack, or loss, and the desertion from 
allegiance, duty, or loyalty.
Beckett’s senescing, at times unconvincingly human characters are at once controlling the 
machine and are the machine. Beckett’s representation firstly of this sense of subjugation and 
secondly of an ageing process that is unnatural, unearthly, and imposed, makes aspects of the 
trilogy comparable to aspects of the philosophical study of technology in contemporary 
culture. In Open Sky Paul Virilio critiques the growing dependency on technology:
Where the motorization of transport and information once caused a general 
mobilization of populations, swept up into the exodus of work and then of leisure, 
instantaneous transmission tools cause the reverse: a growing inertia; television and 
especially remote control action no longer requiring people to be mobile, but merely 
to be mobile on the spot.307
This calls to mind the narrator in The Unnamable who envisions everything as revolving 
around him in planetary motion, as well as Winnie in Happy Days and the inert narrator in 
Malone Dies:
306 Beckett, Trilogy, p. 78.
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I would identify them by touch, the message would flow all along the stick, I would 
hook the desired object and bring it over to the bed, I would hear it coming towards 
me over the floor, gliding, jogging, less and less dear, I would hoist it up on the bed in 
such a way as not to break the window or damage the ceiling, and at last I would have 
it in my hands.308
Similar to Virilio’s anti-humanist conception of technological advance, in Beckett’s prose 
and dramaturgy, technology is untranscendent. It is not a palliative or infinitizing force but is 
incorporated into the body as deficient limb, a necrotic organ, or an unwanted illness or 
impediment. Technology is an obstruction in the same way the abject body is; in some cases 
it even becomes a metaphor for the failing body, or a victimising presence as a result o f  
which Beckett’s bodies senesce. The technological and the pathological are in essence 
equivalent, and this is what Virilio moves on to depict:
This citizen-terminal soon to be decked out to the eyeballs with interactive prostheses 
based on the pathological model of the ‘spastic’, wired to control his/her domestic 
environment without having physically to stir: the catastrophic figure of an individual 
who has lost the capacity for immediate intervention along with natural motricity and 
who abandons himself, for want of anything better, to the capabilities of captors, 
sensors and other remote control scanners that turn him into a being controlled by the 
machine with which, they say, he talks. Service or servitude, that is the question.309
This is particularly relevant with regards to The Unnamable, where the character is static, 
bodiless, subjugated, victimised, and a cross between paralytic frustration, where he cannot 
control his body, and technological instrumentality, where what self-command he does have 
must oblige the whims of a remote user. Moreover, as the origin and mediation of his voice,
308 Beckett, Trilogy, p. 229.
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he is ‘telepresent, here and elsewhere, at the same time [...] both transmitter and receiver.’310
Likewise, Molloy’s body is victim to progressive subtractions as if his entire body were a
selection of prostheses either juxtaposed in space or simply missing: ‘My boots. They came
up to where my calves would have been if I had had calves.’311 Virilio moves on to argue that
technology ‘attacks the body of the able-bodied person, equipped to the eyeballs with
interactive prostheses, who is now modelled on the disabled person equipped to control his
environment without physically shifting.’312 It is possible to resituate analysis of Happy Days
within this type of discourse, not simply because it is an enduring image of physical
limitation and inertia, but because Winnie exercises complete control over her environment,
which she does so contentedly through use of a capacious black bag. Molloy often addresses
the matter of his physical decay and his ageing, yet negates all sense of that being a purely
physiological phenomenon in his confessing ‘I [...] was not natural enough to enter into that 
3 1 1order of things.’ And as Tajiri notes, Beckett continually denaturalises both the characters’ 
predicaments and their physical conditions: it is also well known that Beckett relentlessly 
demanded that his actors and actresses control their body accurately like a machine and 
moves to describe the trilogy ‘which exemplifies the constrained and constraining prosthetic 
body.’314 It is as if Beckett is wishing to confront the subject of ageing and decay in general, 
but doing so in such a way as to remove all human referents - a  task he succeeded with in 
Breath.
Virilio demonstrates how technology interposes itself between the individual and his or her 
body, and how in over-reliance on technology out of expediency or fashion rather than 
necessity or palliation, individuals are ‘doomed to inertia [...] deliberately limiting [their]
310 Virilio, pp. 10 & 11.
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body’s area of influence to a few gestures, a few impulses.’315 He shows how it is possible to 
approach disability as a technological, and fundamentally self-crafted, phenomenon -the 
implication being that, if knowingly done, technology invokes thanatotic reactions, 
symbolically hastening the course to age and death as one calculatingly displaces, renders 
redundant and obsolete, the human body. If we were to link this instead with ageing rather 
than disability, then ageing would take on an artificial quality and the image of senescing 
bodies would not have the same temporal connotations (i.e. would cease to be a marker, or 
signifier, of time passed). As I have stressed, ageing in the trilogy is unnatural, and the 
characters are seemingly without bodies when suffering from the sort of conditions that 
inescapably remind them of their status as embodied subjects. Malone remarks that ‘it is at 
the mercy of these sensations, which happily I  know to be illusory, that I have to live and 
work [my italics]’316 -as if his physical maladies are impermanent and in some way not 
endemic to his body, or at least his body in the present. As with Molloy, age is something 
exogenous, it is not something Malone experiences as if intrinsic to his body and this is 
evident when he describes his body, yet again as if it were another: ‘[t]wo old hands, veined, 
ringed, seek each other, clasp’ and ‘when I moved I saw nothing but the ground and the play 
of my feet, the good one springing forward, holding back, setting itself down, waiting for the 
other to come up.’317 At the times he confronts his physical pain, he curtly rejects his very 
humanness or implies his ageing countenance is in some way artificial or performative, with 
the promise or possibility of remittance: ‘For waking again towards dawn, this time in 
consequence of a natural need, and with a mild erection, to make things more lifelike [my 
italics].’318 He describes the ageing process in highly metaphorical terms, with recourse not to 
the flesh but to other natural imagery, and as such situating the very concept of his ageing not
315 Virilio, pp. 16-7.
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within body but outside of it in the environment (which is the implication Virilio’s Open Sky 
invites):
...what I saw was more like a crumbling, a frenzied collapsing of all that had always 
protected me from all I was condemned to be [...] But what words can describe this 
sensation at first all darkness and bulk, with a noise like the grinding of stones, then 
suddenly as soft as water flowing. And then I saw a little globe swaying up slowly 
from the depths, through the quiet water, smooth at first, and scarcely paler than its 
escorting ripples, then little by little a face, with holes for eyes and mouth and other 
wounds, and nothing to show if it was a man’s face or a woman’s face, a young face 
or an old face, or if  it is calm too was not an effect of the water trembling between it 
and the light.319
In Malone Dies (1951), there is a comparable mergence of the body with the environment, as 
Malone writes: ‘the noises of nature, of mankind and even my own, were all jumbled together 
in one and the same unbridled gibberish.’ With age Malone’s body has become akin to a 
once servile now disobedient animal, or even an unresponsive piece of equipment as if he is 
not sequestered in but tele-operates his body:
I have demanded certain movements of my legs and even feet, I know them well and
could feel the effort the made to obey, I have lived with them that little space of time,
filled with drama, between the message received and the piteous response actually
1outside of the body in the environment.
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Like Molloy and particularly the unnamable, he exists in the interstice between 
wholeness/totality and disintegration, and is an identifiable and unidentifiable figure. It is 
unclear as to whether he is in private residence, an asylum, care home, or hospital. He is an 
immobile, incurious, and senescent character, ‘neutral and inert,’322 with no knowledge of his 
age or the nature of his confinement, just spending each day ‘giv[ing] my body the old orders
• 323I know it cannot obey.’ Again Beckett has little regard for causality and literary 
subjectivism; he offers little in the way of prehistory, character development, plot, structure, 
and so on, and seems to suffer equally from his impotent body, which he cannot animate, and 
the negligent narrator/creator, who keeps him in this ‘habit of motionlessness.’324 Hence his 
predicament is endemic to his body and inflicted on his body from an external source, ‘as if 
he were not master of his movements and did not know what he was doing, while he was 
doing it, nor what he had done, once he had done it.’325 However, the boundaries between 
inside and outside, victim and victimiser, are yet again rendered ambiguous as Malone is also 
a self-narrated character, and his writing has -for the reader, at least -existential overtones in 
much the same way as Winnie, the unnamable, and Krapp’s loquaciousness have. Malone 
becomes an increasingly dimensionless and appendageless as he writes, and just as Molloy is 
reducible to his bicycle, the narrators are to stage lighting in Play, Krapp is to his tape, the 
unnamable is to telepresence technologies, and the invisible character in Breath is to the 
acoustic technologies, Malone’s senescing, vegetating body and the glum fatalism of that 
deterioration is to the very instrument/prosthesis that brings him into existence —his pencil: 
‘[s]o little by little my little pencil dwindles, inevitably, and the day is fast approaching when 
nothing will remain but a fragment too tiny to hold.’326 He envisions his body as such also: ‘I 
would shrivel and shrivel, more and more, until in the end I could be almost buried in a
casket, swelling.’327 Like the aforementioned works, he is made indistinguishable from that 
which animates him, which implies some benign sameness or equivalence between body and 
mechanism. Malone’s life is, so to speak, prosthetic in the sense that it is mediated —reducible 
to an instrument, in this case the pencil. He is a victim of what sedentariness and atrophy it 
brings about, yet these conditions are also self-determining -a t once unwitting victim to and 
ultimate cause of his timely/untimely decay. As Virilio describes of a mediated and in 
particular telecommunicated existence:
[t]he insecurity of their territorial hold extends from the space of their own world to 
the space of their own body. Once this happens, adoption of a sedentary life tends to 
become final, absolute, since the functions traditionally distributed within the real 
space of the town are now exclusively taken over by the real time of the wiring of the 
human body.328
In other words, people render themselves immobile - a  sedentariness Virilo likens to 
disability. Beckettian characters are not simply telepresent to the world as their presence 
seems mediated and their bodily functions substituted, but they are telepresent to themselves 
in such a way as to conjoin the technological and the pathological. Virilio describes disability 
‘by force of circumstance’ and disability by ‘circumstance of technology,’329 and if this is 
applied not to disability but to ageing then firstly a disjunction emerges between (bodily) age 
and time and secondly age is denaturalised as technological determinism takes the place of 
biological determinism. This is apparent throughout the trilogy as many of the trilogy bodies 
are abortive, amorphous and nontemporal -o r at the very least fissured between youth and 
senescence: ‘[y]es, an old foetus, that’s what I am now.’330 In Malone Dies, like in The
327 Ibid., p. 216.•>")o 1
Virilio, Open Sky, p. 56.
329 Ibid., p. 17.
330 Trilogy, p. 207.
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Unnamable and to some extent Lessness also, the bodies constitute simply an arrangement 
geometric, quasi-mechanical figures, parts, or objects that move or, in the following case 
desire to move, as a sleek apparatus:
Where he would never have to rise again and hold himself erect in equilibrium, first 
on the right foot for example, then on the left, and where he might come and go and 
so survive after the fashion of a great cylinder endowed with the faculties of cognition 
and volition.331
The narrator, whose body parts, at times receding or protrusive, automatised and inanimate, 
has little control over, or on occasion even knowledge of, his movements and excretions -  
many of which are in comic disproportion. To paraphrase Virilio, the narrator has no 
‘territorial hold’ over his unruly and disorganised body:
But that is not all and my extremities are not the only parts to recede, in their 
respective directions, far from it. For my arse for example, which can hardly be 
accused of being the end of anything, if my arse suddenly started to shit at the present 
moment, which God forbid, I firmly believe the lumps would fall out in Australia.332
The dispositions, rhythms, and cadences of his body -and Beckettian bodies more generally -  
are demonstrably repulsive and profoundly alienating to the point where Beckett radically 
dehumanises perhaps the most universal and identifiable of human conditions: ageing.
Ibid., p. 226.
332 Ibid., p. 215
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iii) Conclusion: Ageing and Mortality as ‘mechanical fatality’333
Beckett conceives space for the senescing body in his prose and plays within which no 
preconceived, preimposed categories or identities exist. Technology has an implied presence 
in many of the works of Samuel Beckett, and often it encroaches upon his imagery of ageing 
and mortality. Whilst technology might, certainly in terms of ageing, represent the antithesis 
to the human body, it is in Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable a metaphor for ageing, 
alterity, and the sense of foreignness and aversiveness in moments of crisis or collapse. 
Likewise, in Beckett’s dramaturgy, ageing and in particular cripplement and inertia are more 
situational than biological afflictions, extraneous not endemic to the body. Beckett does not 
permit a naturalistic setting when representing physical incapability or biological failure and, 
if one were to conceive of his oeuvre as in some way prophetic, the message would be that 
ageing has ceased to be a natural, gradual, degradative phenomenon, and is something self- 
imposed), something instantaneous, something artificial, and what many would regard as 
emphatically un-Beckettian, something impermanent -even optional. There is a great deal of 
pathos that will always reside in Beckett’s visual and textual imagery; much of that imagery 
connotes the glum fatalism of biological determinism, but it is saturated with allusions to the 
possibility of cessation or respite -the possibility of triumphing over age. Beckett’s publisher 
and friend John Calder remarks of his work that ‘nowhere does he offer us a hopeful 
message.’334 Like Beckett’s bodies, his oeuvre is in part defined by but most importantly 
exceeds and at times contradicts that pathos. He offers the optionality and attendant optimism 
that contemporary western bourgeois culture has grown used to with the hopes and 
blandishments of anti-ageing, and their reification through medical, cosmetic, and 
pharmacological interventions. However, between his dramaturgical and his trilogy bodies, 
the idea of ageing as imposed on the body by an exogenous force is juxtaposed with allusions
333 Sartre, A Critique o f  Dialectical Reason, p. 219.
John Calder, The Philosophy o f  Samuel Beckett, p. 1.
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to technology. Beckett equates biological determinism with technological vitalism, 
gerontological with technological. Time and again, images of senescing bodies are suffused 
with allusions to technological annexation, and often this is evident in the characters’ 
seemingly automatised physical postures, cadences, or actions. Beckett’s characters senesce 
under duress and, as if equating the geriatric with its antithesis —the trans- or posthuman —he 
conflates dysfunctional limb with technological adjunct, the constrictive, aversive ageing 
body with allusions to technological instrumentality. Beckett resituates ageing and death 
within a technological, technophilic milieu, and confronts the pathos of old age in exactly the 
same instance he would seem to repudiate it, or offer some sense of a way out.
However, Beckett’s depiction of inertia, cripplement, and ageing with recourse to 
technological or mechanical imagery does not mean this aspect of his writing is evasive, 
although such a reading is endemic to this sort of imagery. Philosophical work on technology 
highlights the ways in which technological use predicates a sort of agedness, or pseudo­
senescence when man deigns to produce technology that renders the body obsolete or 
impotent. Concomitantly, what I think Beckett’s imagery opens up is the possibility of 
thinking of the technological as constituting a fundamental part of the gerontological - a  
union Virilio often alludes to in his works, stating: ‘ The equipped invalid is thus 
paradoxically on a par with the overequipped able person.’335 In Beckett’s semiology of age, 
just like the relation of his stagecraft to the ordeal of ageing, the technological and 
gerontological seem indissociable at times. In his oeuvre the technological is quite 
emphatically untranscendent, primarily because his characters are not technologised humans 
but anthropomorphised machines, or ‘humanised materialities’336 as Sartre terms it. In the 
same way the grim fatalism of ageing may foster a sense of enforced acquiescence to the 
inexorable passage of Time, William Leiss describes our relation to technological
335 Paul Virilio, Polar Inertia, trans. by Patrick Camiller (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 26.
336 Sartre, p. 169.
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progressivism as ‘a vague sense of subjection to forces beyond our control.’337 Technology is 
a necrotic force, disempowering and depriving the body of its inherent functions and 
instigating a form of ageing comparable to but dissociated from time and nature - ‘the 
involution leading to inertia’338 as Virilio describes it in Polar Inertia. In Speed and Politics 
Virilio, discussing cars/transportation and describes ‘the animal body that disappears in the 
superpower of the metallic body’ that renders the human body inert, divesting it of its own 
powers of locomotion: ‘the mobile mass reduced to inaction.’ He describes ‘the doubly- 
unable body [...] deprived, as he has always been, of will, he now requires physical assistance 
from a vehicular prosthesis in order to accomplish his historical mission.’339 Virilio envisions 
a domiciliary inaction, a self-contrived, self-imposed sedentariness analogous to ageing 
which he speaks of in terms of the ‘[redundancy of man’s muscular strength in favour of the 
“machine tool,’” 340and the ‘substitute for bodily movement and an extension of domestic 
inertia which will mark the definitive triumph of sedentariness.’341 This is what both William 
Leiss and Jean-Paul Sartre speak of in terms of ‘the practico-inert,’342 where Man’s activity 
or potency is paradoxically the locus of inaction and surrogacy. In terms of what technology 
divests the body of, Sartre describes the machine as ‘a strange and living being with its own 
customs and its own movement,’ which is what, at times, Beckett’s characters seem to be 
inhumed within. He then goes on to describe how ‘the vampire object constantly absorbs 
human action, lives on blood taken from man and finally lives in symbiosis with him. It 
derives all its physical properties, including temperature, from human action’343 —the 
allusions to vampirism expressive of that which technology divests the body of.
337 William Leiss, Under Technology’s Thumb (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), p. 6.
338 Ibid., p. 23.
339 Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology, trans. by Mark Polizzotti (New York:
Semiotext(e), 1986), p. 62.
340 Virilio, Open Sky, p. 19.
Virilio, Polar Inertia, p. 18.
" William Leiss, Under Technology’’s Thumb, p. 70.
Sartre, Critique o f  Dialectical Reason, p. 169.
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Beckett’s prescient literature offers a rudimentary image of Man’s compulsion to inactivity 
that, for some philosophers, come to define late 20th- and early 21st century society. Ageing 
and physical maladies in the Beckett canon are rarely normal, innate, unconditioned 
processes; they are imposed, manufactured, and instantaneous, dissociated from time and 
emanating from a force tangential to, and very rarely within, the characters’ bodies. His prose 
and dramaturgy presents and sustains the intrinsically paradoxical equivalence of ageing and 
technology that is, increasingly, coming to characterise 21st century anti-technological 
discourses: the nihilistic fixation of the populace on sedentariness, atrophy, physical decline, 
and assisted living that, through deliberate and wilful dependence on the self-substituting 
devices, they contrive for themselves. It is a danger that pervades Beckett’s art as it becomes 
impossible to tell whether his aesthetics of failure takes its lead from the ordeal of ageing, or 
spitefully and vindictively inflicts it upon its unsuspecting, otherwise plaintively sempiternal 
characters.
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THE PROSTHETIC VISION OF AGE: SEMIOLOGIES OF AGE AND THE 
ILLUSION OF TRANSCENDENCE IN MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY PROSE
[Pain] shows us, too, how those around us 
Do not, and cannot, share 
Our being; though men talk animatedly 
And challenge silence with laughter
And women bring their engendering smiles 
And eyes o f  famous mercy,
These kind things slide away 
Like rain beating on a filthy window
344When pain interposes.
This chapter addresses the ways in which modem and contemporary writers conceptualise 
organic decay and the aversiveness, foreignness, and constrictiveness of age-related pain. My 
primary texts include: Edward Bellamy’s ‘The Old Folks’ Party’ (1898), John David 
California’s 60 Years Later: Coming through the Rye (2009), Philip Larkin’s poem "Skin’ 
from The Less Deceived, Kingsley Amis’ Ending Up (1972), Alice Sebold’s The Almost 
Moon (2007), Oscar Wilde’s The Picture o f  Dorian Gray (1891), and F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
The Curious Case o f  Benjamin Button (1922). I shall focus on the ways in which the image of 
the prosthesis governs writers’ visual lexicon of ageing, especially when depicting the 
altered, heightened, unruly, or aversive sense of embodiment occurring in moments o f pain, 
dysfunction, and collapse. I will discuss the ‘prosthesis’ in terms of the kinaesthesias and 
coenesthesias o f the unresponsive, senescing body. The prosthesis, I will argue, denotes a 
visceral, sensory event occurring within the body, rather than a physical adjunct or 
annexation always secondary to it. The prosthesis, then, is not a physical, literal addition but
344Iohn Updike, ‘Pain’, The New Republic, 26 December 1983, p. 34.
the sensation of addition or alterity brought about by the distinctiveness of pain and the 
defamiliarising postures it compels one to take. Moreover, I will discuss how the 
aforementioned writers confer aspects of senescence onto the physical world and its milieu of 
objects and structures, and thus how the physical environment becomes constitutive of an 
extended, maladroit, prosthetic body and recapitulates aspects of the characters’ corporeality. 
At the core of this chapter will be the paradoxes inherent in this prosthetic vision, and I shall 
speak of how the image of the prosthesis both expresses the realities and pathos of age, but 
also how, in the displacement of the flesh, constitutes a semiological transcendence of age.
Conventionally, the prosthesis is understood as a device, either external or implanted, that 
substitutes for or supplements a missing or defective part of the body. It helps to meliorate 
suffering, yet might also be construed as a metonym fo r  suffering. The prosthesis may 
include:
dentures, dental implants, assistive technologies, toupees, the artificial larynx, silastic 
penile prosthesis for sexual impotence, artificial ears, noses, and hands [...] the 
cochlear implant, vibrators, eyeglasses, contact lenses, the intraoral obturator, and the 
wheelchair.345
Whether it is associated with pain and dysfunction or used to cure or palliate it, the prosthesis 
inescapably reminds us of the constitutive frailty of the body and its susceptibility to decline, 
and represents the fullest measure of physical presence. The prosthesis substitutes, alters, 
enhances, and rehabilitates, and conveys an ideology about the body -specifically the 
wholeness of the body. The prosthesis is also associated with the pathologies and sobriety of 
old age. Simon de Beauvoir describes the senescing body as a confluence of prostheses: ‘he
345 Katherine Ott (ed.), ‘The Sum of Its Parts: An Introduction to Modem Histories of Prosthetics’ in Artificial 
Parts, Practical Lives: Modern Histories o f  Prosthetics (New York & London: New York University Press,
2002), p . 7.
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needs artificial assistance to carry out his natural functions -false teeth, spectacles, hearing 
aids, walking sticks.’346 The image of the prosthesis is rife in Simon Biggs’ sociological 
account of postmodernity, in which he describes the mature identity as the ‘sum of an 
arbitrary collection of constructed identities’ and, citing Munro (1996), a “‘complex process
• 347of prosthesis.’” The range of accoutrements available to the consumer allow for the 
construction of multiple, and perhaps ageless identities: ‘consumer culture,’ Biggs argues, 
‘supplies the props and the environment, allowing the construction of an eternal present, with 
no centre, origin or destination.’348 The prosthesis, then, supplies a deficiency, is a monument 
to that loss, and exists to a certain degree under a sign of mourning; yet the prosthesis fosters 
the construction of new identities -a  physical locus of identity that is continuously deferred, 
an identity spread across different substrates that exceeds the prophylactic containment of the 
constitutively fragile body. In O f Grammatology Jacques Derrida describes the supplement as 
a cohabitation of opposites -something that revives a presence yet exists under a sign of 
absence:
The supplement supplements. It adds only to replace [...] if it fills, it is as if one fills a 
void. If it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a presence 
[...] As a substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces 
no relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness.
Somewhere, something can be filled up o f itself can accomplish itself, only by 
allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy. The sign is always the supplement 
of the thing itself.349
346 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, trans. by Patrick O’Brian (London & New York: W.W Norton & 
Company Inc., 1996), p. 305.
Simon Biggs/Munro, The Mature Imagination: Dynamics o f  Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia: 
Open University Press, 1999), p. 59.
34* Ibid., p. 61.
Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London & Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 145.
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What I argue in this chapter is that the prosthesis denotes a sensory event occurring in the 
unresponsive, senescing body. Virginia Woolf describes how the healthy body is 
experientially absent, subliminal, or intermissive -  a nullpoint that tends toward self­
concealment in moments of health and wellbeing. One’s relation to the healthy body, she 
implies, is one of tacit self-command, and as such the habitual body is unperceived; it is ‘a 
sheet of plain glass through which the soul looks [my italics].’350 By contrast, whilst the 
aversiveness of pain does not necessarily change the body physically, kinaesthetically the 
body emerges as an unruly presence as the individual becomes more acutely conscious of it. 
Like the paradox of the prosthesis, an overbearing presence is borne out of and indeed 
becomes synonymous with deficiency or lack. In The Five Senses Michel Serres articulates 
pain in terms of noise and silence: ‘my organs fall silent -health returns. Illness comes upon 
me when my organs can hear each other.’351 Leder, too, in his theory of ‘dys-appearance’ 
describes the healthy body as recessive, unconscious or experientially invisible, and describes 
how the ailing body constitutes an oppressive emergence, ‘an alien presence that exerts upon 
us a telic demand.’ The sick body, then, is peremptory; it is an impasse, and not something 
through which one acts but in which one is inhumed. Woolf describes how one ‘cannot 
separate off from the body like the sheath of a knife or the pod of a pea for a single instant,’ 
and how the afflicted ‘must go through the whole unending procession of changes, heat and 
cold, comfort and discomfort, hunger and satisfaction, health and illness.’353 The transition 
from health to ill-health is marked by the transition from the body’s subliminality and one’s 
tacit self-control to its kinaesthetic and articular presence, where ‘one’s limbs come to feel 
like heavy prostheses, as if movements must be attended to and actively willed.’354 Thus, pain
330 Virginia Woolf, ‘On Being 111’ in Collected Essays, vol. 4 (London: Hogarth Press, 1967), p. 193
331 Michel Serres, The Five Senses, trans. by Margaret Sankey & Peter Cowley (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 
85.
352 Drew Leder, The Absent Body (London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1990), p. 71.
353 Woolf, ‘On Being IIP, p. 193.
354 Leder, The Absent Body, p. 84
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is bound up in an overbearing awareness of one’s status as an embodied subject, and of the 
interiority and invisible, visceral geographies355 comprising physical existence. However, like 
with the presence/absence dichotomy in the prosthesis, the individual, though burdened by an 
aversive body-consciousness, is also self-removed as the defamiliarising sensations 
associated with pain introduce an element of distance from the ‘habitual’ body. The sufferer 
is called upon to attend to the body, and they perceive their body, or relate to it, in a manner 
comparable to the objectifications of the modem physician.356 Through conjecture,
o r a
entailment, interpretation, or investigation -what Leder terms ‘corporeal hermeneutics’ -  
the individual desires to understand or regain control of, in essence cure or return to its 
habitual absence, a body acting as if under the tyranny and hegemony of external control. The 
afflicted limb, for instance, is comparable to an embodied technology or prosthesis, 
undifferentiated from the totality of the body yet eliciting a sense of alterity, inauthenticity, 
and self-differentiation. The totality does not take precedence over the parts of the body, but 
the parts take precedence over the totality. The body ceases to exist as a set of mutual 
relations, then, with its parts, or part, emerging as an affective presence, or call, that dismpts 
the recessive wholeness experienced in health.
In The Absent Body, Drew Leder describes how pain and dysfunction cause a ‘disruption and 
constriction of one’s habitual world’ and engender ‘a new relation to one’s body.’358 It is this 
‘new relation’ that is at the heart of this chapter on prosthetic visions of pain in narratives of 
ageing, and I shall explore it in three sections: ‘Affliction and Theatricality’, ‘Architecture 
and Domestic Furnishings’, and ‘Marionettes and Simulacral Youth’. In the first section I 
will explore the relationship between dysfunction and theatricality, the gerontological and the
335 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking o f  the World (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), p. 3.
356 Leder, The Absent Body, p. 77.
357 Ibid., p. 78.
358 Ibid., p. 76.
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dramaturgical. I will argue that the senescing body is constitutive of an emergent 
performance, and consider the image of the over-garment as a semiotic phantom of the 
ageing body. In the second section I will explore the altered kinaesthetic and articular 
impressions of the body in moments of pain and unresponsiveness, focussing in particular on 
how the writers create a sense of physical distance and externalise the innermost sensations 
and geographies of the dysfunctional body. I will analyse the conflation of the architectural 
and the anatomical, focussing on how the external features of the house -its furnishings and 
architectural occlusions -work as an extended, prosthetic body, recapitulating aspects of the 
corporal form. I will argue that the physical environment, notably worn or dilapidated 
architecture and the milieu of broken or eroded objects or furnishings, function as a 
topography of the ageing body, and examine the novels’ semiology of age alongside trans- 
and posthumanist discourses. The paradox in this section that I shall study is that pain and 
infirmity -conditions that inescapably remind us of our mortality -are often depicted with 
recourse to inorganic objects or structures. In the aforementioned literature the aged body is 
dispersed, spread out entropically, or perhaps posthumanly, across different substrates. The 
ageing bodies I shall explore in this section resist all holistic or associationist definitions; they 
are represented as excrescent, non-human, and their bodies are an ever deferred whole spread 
out across different, non-biological substrates that embody a permanence that, ironically, 
goes on to metaphorise the maladies and infelicities of the flesh. The senescing bodies are 
presented not as a totality, ‘its parts [...] enveloped in each other’ over which the individual is 
‘in undivided possession,,359but a disjunctive, unruly confluence of prostheses comparable to 
an amorphous yet unsettlingly anthropomorphised structure subjugated to external control. 
Moreover, sexuality and gender do not emerge through such discourse on ageing, since the 
prosthetic vision divests the body of form and of boundaries, and renders the senescing body
359 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility’ in The Phenomenology o f  
Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London & New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), p. 112.
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increasingly unassignable. The final section of this chapter takes up this theme of 
dispossession and alterity in age, analysing how the dysfunctional body works and exists as if 
under the hegemony of ‘occupying force[s].’360 I will explore the notion of carer as 
supplement, and puppet imagery in realist narratives of ageing both in terms of the 
humanising of the prosthesis and the prostheticising of the human. The overall objective of 
this chapter is to show how non-human structures are used to explore the infelicities of age -  
what I have termed the prosthetic vision o f age -and to examine how the prosthetic vision 
fosters mutually contradictory images of ageing: that is, conveying pathos, alterity, and 
abjection in old age, yet simultaneously rewriting the traditional realist narratives of ageing in 
which these images prevail as circumspectly science-fictional, as germane, even, to trans- and 
posthuman discourses. In short, I shall examine how the prosthetic vision of age offers a 
fundamentally conflicted and irresolute representation of later life, fixated on the pathos and 
abjection of old age but with recourse to images that belie its objective realities and, like 
Beckett’s tormentful, faux senescence, imply its transcendence.
i) Affliction and Theatricality
I f  a face retained its linear form, white hair replacing blond or black sufficed to make it 
look like that o f another. Theatrical costumiers know that a powdered wig so dis-guises a 
person as to make him unrecognisable,361
Pain is the ‘seed of a body-self division.’362 I would like to explore physical dysfunctionality 
and the affectivity of aesthetic change in terms of theatricality and performativity. After 
seeing an old photograph of himself Nathaniel Hawthorne describes how: ‘I was really a little
360Drew Leder, The Absent Body, p. 82.
361 Marcel Proust, ‘Time Regained’ in Remembrance o f  Things Past, vol. 2, trans. by C.K. Scott Moncrieff & 
Stephen Hudson (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 2006), p. 1202
362 Ibid. p. 70
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startled at recognising myself so apart from myself [my emphasis].’363 Photography embalms 
time, rescuing the body from the corruption and vicissitudes of age; and as he dotes on the 
photograph’s invariance -a  symbol, perhaps, for ludic fantasies of immortality -so  different 
is the photographic image from the body with which he holds and looks at that image, that his 
examination of his own image becomes a continuation of the neutrality and objectivity of the 
gaze of the other. This differential sense of identity in which one’s subjective self-image 
belies one’s objective body-image is depicted by Simone de Beauvoir in the following terms: 
‘So long as the inner feeling of youth remains alive [...] it is the objective truth of age that 
seems fallacious: one has the impression of having put on a borrowed mask.’364 The Roman 
poet Juvenal depicts the ageing body as an abject carapace, and even conveys age in 
ostensibly dysgenic terms:
What a train of woes -and such woes -comes with a prolonged old age. To begin 
with, this deformed, hideous, unrecognizable face; this vile leather instead of skin; 
these pendulous cheeks; these wrinkles like those around the mouth of an old she-ape
365as she sits scratching in the shady Thabarcan woods.
There is an unsettling sense of alterity and excrescence in age, as if the senescing body is a
secondary, debased, and carapacial addition-the ‘perception of bodily ageing as a mask’366 -
within which the individual remains the unwitting occupant. In Ageing in Society sociologists
Skinner and Vaughan depict ageing as a hyperbolic, caricatural corporeity where the body is
equated to an assembly of maladaptive, disunified parts simply juxtaposed in space and
approximating bodily functions like a series of disturbing mechanical uncannies: ‘if you want
to know what it feels like to be old, you should smear dirt on your glasses, stuff cotton in
363 Nathaniel Hawthorne cited by Celia Lury, ‘Retrodictive Prophecy’, Prosthetic Culture: Photography,
Memory, and Identity (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 46. 
de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 296.
Quoted by Simone de Beauvoir in The Coming o f  Age, pp. 121-2.
366 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination: The Dynamics o f  Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999), p. 62.
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your ears, put on heavy shoes that are too big for you and wear gloves.’367 This sense of 
artifice is conveyed by Andre Gide in his journal entry of 6th March 1941:
My soul has remained young to such a degree that I constantly feel as if the 
septuagenarian I indubitably am is a role I am playing; and the infirmities and failings 
that remind me of my age come along like a prompter to call it to my mind when I 
might be inclined to forget it. Then, like the good actor I want to be, I slip back into 
character and pride myself on playing the part well.368
The senescing body, for Gide, is akin to a spurious over-garment and, describing it as such, 
he conveys the ageing process as an obligatory or coercive performance he ‘slips’ into with 
jovial acquiescence: his behaviour scripted by the malign and iniquitous additions of age, and 
his very countenance a strange and counterintuitive affectation. His body does not mediate 
his sense of self in the way writing and speech mediates thought; rather, it misrepresents and 
is in excess of it. There is a clear distinction between the vicissitudes of the body and the 
obvious sense of continuity in his subjective self-image, and this is captured in the metaphor 
of performance. Simone de Beauvoir describes the discontinuities in rate at which we age:
...the physical and mental aspects do not follow a strictly parallel development. An 
individual may have suffered important mental impairment before his physical decline 
begins; or, the contrary, it is possible that during this decline he may make important 
intellectual acquisitions.
367 Multiple Contributors, Ageing in Society: An Introduction to Social Gerontology, ed. by John Bond et al., 2nd 
edn. (London: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 317
368 Andre Gide, Journals 1889-1949, trans. and edited by Justin O’Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1967), p. 667.
de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 12.
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Gide conveys this sense of self-division through the allusions to performativity and 
theatricality, as if age has rudely interposed itself; but although Gide’s descriptions convey 
both a sense of biological fact and cultural obligation, the word ageing takes on more positive 
connotations. The description conflates notions of embodiment with theatrical departure or 
aloofness, and ultimately the pathos and determinism of age with the promise of cessation or 
respite as implied in the twin metaphors of costume and performance -that is, a costume that 
can be removed; a performance that can be discontinued. The sense of coercion and 
obligation in this evocation are, as I suggest, both physiological and cultural in origin. The 
speaker ages under duress: coerced by the limitations of the body, which encroach upon and 
dictate what he can/cannot do, as well as by a sense of duty to conform or acquiesce to 
cultural expectations of the elderly. The notion of artifice thus signifies a sense of foreignness 
brought about by the aversiveness of age and its pathologies; yet it also reveals how ageing is 
not ‘solely a biological, but also a cultural fact’370 or cultural contrivance -as demonstrated in 
his obligation to act his age. This obligation represents a striving toward wholeness and 
totality, however: if fragmentation implies a dualism or antagonism, a breaking down, or 
decay, of a whole, then his acquiescing to age is suggestive of a symbolic return to health -  
his behaviour reflecting rather than contradicting the appearance of his body. Even though the 
allusions to performativity convey coercion or compulsion, whether physical or 
psychological, they still offer the possibility of escape or respite -the overcoming or 
transcendence of age correlated with the costume’s removal or the act’s discontinuance. This 
quotation, then, both expresses and repudiates the realities of ageing -fosters allusions to age- 
transcendence in the selfsame instance it proffers a more essentialist, fatalistic portrayal. In 
essence, the discontinuities between his subjective self-image and objective body-image are 
gained through the obvious contradictions between Gide’s semiology of age, which gestures
370 Ibid., p. 13.
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toward impermanence and artifice -o r in other words, agelessness -and the allusions to 
enforced obligation in his thematic exploration of age. This is also implicit in the following 
quotation by J.B Priestley who, when asked what it feels like to be old, responded:
It is as though, walking down Shaftesbury Avenue as a fairly young man, I was 
suddenly kidnapped, rushed into a theatre and made to don the grey hair, the wrinkles 
and the other attributes of age, then wheeled on stage. Behind the appearance of age I 
am the same person, with the same thoughts as when I was younger.371
Both Gide and Priestley juxtapose the natural and the synthetic, pathos and performativity, 
and Priestley’s alternation of the tenses of verbs and juxtaposition of T was’ and ‘I am’ in the 
concluding sentence does give some sense of the coexistence of younger self-image and a 
older body-image. Despite the covert optimism in this juxtaposition, however, his concluding 
in the past tense -which evokes a sense of nostalgia or sentimentality -undermines the 
positivity implied in present tense -which evokes a possessive individualism and sense of 
continuity. Whilst psychological and physiological age is represented in the oscillating 
past/present tense, the submission to age and organic decay is represented as ‘I am’ slowly 
merges into the distant, prospective ‘I will be’, to the retrospective T was’. The body seems 
to signify at once abjection and transcendence inasmuch as the ‘attributes’ of senescence such 
as wrinkles are likened to a costume, a pseudo-epidermis that renders the individual aged and 
potentially ageless. Even the noun ‘theatre’ evokes jointly medical and dramaturgical, 
surgical and theatrical allusions, the first working on or in the body through its epidermal 
layers and visceral depths, and the latter over the body adding layers of performance. Similar 
to Andre Gide, Priestley seems to suggest that there is something manifestly inauthentic
371 J.B. Priestley, quoted by Simon Biggs in The Mature Imagination, p. 76.
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about a senescing body, especially when, as de Beauvoir describes, its development does not 
parallel the minds. What we have in both examples is a hyperbolical disunion of body from 
mind, and the ensuing transformation of the individual from persona to personae with the 
constitution of the body as a separate identity and hence a secondary presence coexisting 
alongside of, or over, the self. Although theatricality is an inherently problematic expression 
of ageing, the theatrical distance between self-image and body-image, like that between 
oneself and the character one depicts, is nevertheless an interesting expression of the 
experiential departure from the habitual body. Thus one might term the senescing body, in the 
sense that Gide and Priestly conceive it, as a pathological theatricality. This is conveyed in de 
Beauvoir’s description in The Coming o f Age:
within me it is the Other -that is to say the person I am for the outsider -who is old: 
and that Other is myself [...] Old age is more apparent to others than to the subject 
himself: it is a new state of biological equilibrium, and if the ageing individual adapts 
himself to it smoothly he does not notice change.372
In The Language o f  Clothes, Alison Lurie writes of clothes that ‘self-protection has become a 
more and more important aspect of costume’ and that the ‘body is often disguised rather than 
revealed by protective layers of cloth.’373 In Gide and Priestley’s descriptions, however, 
pathology and performance, body and costume, are synonymous, blurring the boundaries 
between the visceral and the theatrical, the natural and the synthetic, historiated skin and ill- 
fitting over-garment. This suggests at once the anthropomorphising of the synthetic and the 
prostheticising of the natural: the retrograde alterations, such as wrinkling skin, ‘muscular 
stiffness and the fragility of the bones,’374 at once aversive, kinaesthetic presences and 
pseudo-natural additions to the body comparable to surfeit of maladaptive prostheses. In
372 Ibid., p. 284.
373 Alison Lurie, The Language o f  Clothes (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2000), p. xiv. 
de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 29.
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William Shakespeare’s King Lear we do not have this. The ageing monarch’s regality is the 
sum of his clothes, and as he cries ‘[o]ff, off, you lendings: come, unbutton here,’375 it is clear 
that the removal of his clothes correlates to his acquiescence to age and his fall into disrepute. 
In tearing off his clothes he becomes, in the words of editor R.A. Foakes, a ‘pathetic senior 
citizen,’ representative not of a nation, but ‘the pathos of an old man.’376 For Gide and 
Priestley, however, we do not appear to have that differentiation between costume and body; 
rather the senescent body is a costume, alluding to the sense of addition borne through the 
body’s clothing and adornment yet implying the weakness and vulnerability metaphorised in 
the uncovered body. There is a play on notions of presence and absence, as age is depicted as 
a malign, arbitrary burden or imposition not internal to but extraneous to the body. However, 
this sense of addition is used to express decay, wasting musculature, loss or impairment of 
the senses, and a clear sense of diminishment.
In many traditional realist narratives of ageing, the senescing body is depicted in 
demonstrably materialist terms, classified as an explicit, oppressive emergent presence, 
indistinguishable from -and often metaphorised in -the milieu of broken, eroded objects. In 
Somewhere Towards the End (2008), Diana Athill subtly conflates the cultural and 
pathological in her descriptions of senescent ‘uniforms’, writing:
In my grandmothers’ day a woman over seventy adopted what almost amounted to a 
uniform. If she was a widow she wore black or grey clothes that disregarded fashion, 
and even if she had a husband her garments went a bit drab and shapeless, making it 
clear that this person no longer attempted to be attractive.377
375 William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. by R.A Foakes (London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2005), 3:4, 106, p. 
279.
376 R.A Foakes, ‘Introduction’, King Lear, pp. 27-9.
377 Diana Athill, Somewhere Towards the End (London: Granta Books, 2009), p. 13.
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Clothes, here, work as a ceremonial declaration of age; a metaphor for the senescing, 
devirilized body they both cover and reveal. The uniform connotes sameness and anonymity, 
a sense of shared fate, with ‘old women [...] announcing by their appearance that they had 
become a different kind of person.’378 The description is reminiscent of W.B. Yeats’ 
description of the ‘mortal dress’ when describing age: ‘An aged man is but a paltry thing, / A 
tattered coat upon a stick.’ He externalises interior, retrograde biological processes of age, his 
xyloid metaphor expressing his wasting musculature and skeletal thinness, and the weathered 
over-garment his wrinkled, historiated skin. Like the metaphor of the photograph, and the 
allusions to costume and performativity, the individual, at once embodied and disembodied, 
has a prosthetic relation to his body, being simply ‘fastened to a dying animal [my italics].’379 
All of these descriptions, like those of Gide and Priestley, convey the pathos and infelicities 
of age, but with recourse to images implying the possibility of cessation.
In his poem ‘Skin’ from the collection The Less Deceived, Philip Larkin presents the ageing 
skin as pseudo-epidermis. He couples skin and theatricality in this poem, representing it as 
not a part of but in addition to the body, removable as any part, clothing, or accessory might 
be: ‘an obedient daily dress’ that ‘must thicken, work loose / Into an old bag.’380 The title of 
the poem, being as terse and uncomplicated as it is, allows Larkin to speak of organic decay 
in unbroken metaphor with no direct allusions to the flesh, to skin -that is, without recourse 
to any natural imagery, without recourse, even, to senescence. As an entirely metaphorical 
exposition, the linguistic processes involved in metaphor, in contrast to literal speech, subtly 
challenge, if not repudiate, the subject matter. Metaphor-the Greek prefix ‘meta-’ meaning 
above or beyond —implies a sense of overcoming. The ‘obedient daily dress’ is a paralogical 
metaphor, in which the organic and the synthetic -biological determinism and the prospect of
378 Ibid., p .14.
379 W.B. Yeats, W.B Yeats: Poems Selected by Seamus Heaney (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2000), p. 66
380 Philip Larkin, ‘Skin’, Collected Poems, ed. by Anthony Thwaite (London: Faber & Faber and The Marvell 
Press, 2003), p. 73. Line numbers will be given parenthetically.
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its deliberate and wilful discontinuance —are juxtaposed. In conflating costume and 
epidermis, Larkin depicts the body plus and the body minus —in other words, conveying the 
body’s physical wastage versus one’s consciousness of it, which constitutes an oppressive, 
emergent presence. One might say that this poem itself is dysfunctional in the sense that the 
clothing/costume conceit contradicts the pathos, gritty determinism, and sense of coercion he 
is depicting. He describes youthful skin as an ‘unfakable young surface’ (1. 3), yet in forgoing 
direct allusions to the organic and refusing to narrate ageing in the flesh, so to speak, he not 
only makes this poem a subtly evasive one, but depicts ageing skin using metaphors 
suggestive of its opposite: agelessness. The synthetic ‘daily dress’, whilst it does erode and 
thus convey an ‘age’ or a sense of ageing, does not exhibit a biological age. Larkin 
prostheticises the skin by viewing it as a pseudo-natural addition to the body, transforming it 
figuratively into a potentially ‘young surface’. The skin appears to be the addressee in the 
poem, separated from the speaker by the nominative ‘you’: ‘you cannot always keep / That 
unfakable young surface. /You must learn your lines’ (1. 2-4). The skin is presented as 
another body, constituting a second person perhaps, which is implied and represented in the 
dialogic nature of the poem. It is ambiguous as to whether he is speaking o f  time, lamenting 
the retrograde changes to his body, or as time, as inflicting or even commanding those 
changes on a body: ‘you must thicken, work loose /Into an old bag’ (I. 9-10). In the final 
stanza, this is not resolved, as the speaker addresses his skin, and suggests the body changes 
and deteriorates not because of a natural inclination to senesce, but because of the body’s 
malign sentience and autonomous command -ageing as if  out of spite. His relation to his 
body is one of disturbing, paranoic alienation, yet also has the familiarity and relative 
benignity of an argument with a spouse: ‘And pardon me, that /I could find, when you were 
new, /No brash festivity /To wear you at’ (1.13-6). He also writes ‘you must learn your lines’ 
(4), a double entendre coupling physiology and theatricality, his wrinkled, historiated skin,
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and a script or scripted performance. In The Book o f Skin, Steven Connor describes ‘the very 
wholeness that the skin possesses and preserves, its capacity to resume and summarize the 
whole body.’ He moves on to argue that this ‘means that it is always in excess of, out in front 
of the body [...] as another body.,3Sl Larkin’s evocation is comparable, particularly in his 
likening skin to a removable over-garment, and secondly in the dialogic nature of the poem, 
which gives the body-self relation in this poem the quality of argument or even sciamachy 
(the act or instance of fighting a shadow or imaginary adversary). This notion of the body as 
adversary is reflected in the following interview in The Ageless Self with Ida, aged 92:
SK: Tell me about being old.
IDA: There’s this feeling of being out of one’s skin. The feeling that you are not in 
your own body. I find myself acting in unfamiliar ways. Doing things that aren’t 
familiar to me. And generally, having an outlook that doesn’t seem to be my usual 
outlook. In a kind of way, disorientated.382
Larkin’s poem’s representation of age is ambivalent, then, as it conveys a sense of resistance 
to his embodiment, yet renders the attributes of age, namely wrinkles, as separable from him 
or even, in their disposition to age, a malign agency that can potentially be argued into 
submission. Thus, the speaker is both an ‘anonymous symbol of biological human fate,’383 
and a potentially ageless figure.
The themes of performativity, dissimulation, pretence, and optionality are dramatised in 
Edward Bellamy in ‘The Old Folks’ Party’. This is a story about a group of friends who 
decide to ‘dress up to resemble what we expect to look like fifty years hence, and study our 
demeanour to correspond to what we expect to be and feel like at that time [...] to talk over
38‘ Steven Connor, The Book o f  Skin (USA: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 29.
382 Sharon R. Kaufman, The Ageless Self: Sources o f  Meaning in Late Life (London: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1986), p. 8.
383 Mike Hep worth, Stories o f  Ageing (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), p. 31.
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old times and recall what we can, if anything, of our vanished youth.’384 Clearly arguing 
against any holistic conceptions of identity in age, Bellamy comments on the existential 
challenges presented by organic decay, and draws attention, interestingly, to how both ‘the 
fragile tenure of the sense of personal identity’385 and the surfeit of identities amassed 
through time are reflected grammatically:
...there are half a dozen of each of us, or a dozen if you please, one in fact for each 
epoch of our life, and each slightly or wholly different from the others. Each one of 
these epochs is foreign and inconceivable to the others, as ourselves at seventy now 
are to us [...] So that the different periods of life are to all intents and purposes 
different persons, and the first person of grammar ought to be used only with 
reference to the present tense. What we were, or shall be, or do, belongs strictly to the 
third person [...] The three persons of grammar are really not enough. A fourth is 
needed to distinguish the ego of the past and future from the present ego which is the 
only true one.
In dressing up as septuagenarians, there is a convergence of present and future selves that is 
comparable to gerontological rhetoric on psychological ageing and the subjective feeling of 
youth versus physiological ageing and the objective realities of age. Perhaps instead of a 
fourth person of grammar, we might suggest that the third person ‘he/she’, or even the plural 
‘they’, is more befitting the ostensible fluidity and disarticulation of the self. The retention of 
the first-person ‘I’ or the possessive pronoun ‘my’ contrives a sense of wholeness and unity, 
yet belies the sense of alterity and self-differentiation in the vicissitudes of age. The narrator 
comments how: ‘we shall doubtless have changed, as much in disposition as in appearance
384 Edward Bellamy, ‘The Old Folks’ Party’ The Blindman’s World and Other Stories (BiblioLife Publishers, 
2009), p. 60.
385 Ibid., p. 65.
386 Ibid., p. 64
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[...] Just think how different sets of faculties and tastes develop and decay, come into 
prominence and retire into the background.’387 There is at least some vestige of wholeness 
here in the sense that their mental age reflects rather than contradicts their physical age. In the 
context of the Gide and Priestley’s depiction of age, one might suggest of ‘The Old Folks’ 
Party’ that realism and counterrealism converge and even become synonymous. The aged 
bodies here may constitute a benign performance, a theatrical projection into the future; but 
that sense of theatricality and fallaciousness, albeit a more malign force, also characterises 
traditional realist evocations of age -as indeed we see with Priestly and Gide. This is 
arguably implied as Bellamy naturalises the counterfeit septuagenary, which is ‘illustrated by 
the ease at which actors can put themselves in the place of the characters they assume, so that 
even their instinctive demeanour corresponds to the ideal, and their acting becomes 
nature.’388 The relationship between body and mind, then, is one of correspondence rather 
than incongruity, but with a much more ambivalent relation between the natural and 
counterfeit identities, and present and prospective selves. For example, Bellamy writes of one 
character, Mary, how ‘it indicated how fully she had realized her part that, as she passed the
-2 O Q
mirror, no involuntary start testified to surprise at the aged figure it reflected,’ suggesting 
an encroaching custom and verisimilitude.
The imposition of the foreign other characterises John David California’s depiction of ageing, 
and particularly skin in his novel 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye. In this he offers a 
sense of anonymity and, like Diana Athill, uniformity, describing the ‘average old man,’ who 
consists of ‘gray hair, shrivelled skin and dried up bones.’390 Like the previous writers 
mentioned, California surreptitiously displaces conventional prostheses associated with old
387 Ibid., p. 62.
388 Ibid., p. 65.
389 Ibid., p. 66.
390 John David California, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye (UK: Windupbird Publishing, 2009), p.
225.
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age such as false teeth, hearing aids, walking sticks, and wheelchairs, for the dysfunctional 
body parts themselves. This novel is an unauthorized sequel to J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in 
the Rye (1951), examining the relationship between Salinger and Holden Caulfield, with 
Caulfield envisaged as a 70 year old man. There is indeed a self-consciousness to the aged 
character, Mr. C, as he wakes up to an unfamiliar senescent body that he immediately begins 
to pathologise: ‘perhaps I’m getting the flu or something, that’s why I feel heavy all over and 
my back hurts.’391 The novel comprises the same lexical choices as The Catcher in the Rye — 
phrases and colloquialisms such as ‘and all’ and ‘phony’ -and so the representation of Mr C 
is fissured: at once a nostalgic evocation of his 1951 counterpart, and an intensely 
defamiliarising rewriting. This process of rewriting or re-narration is bound inextricably in 
the representation of age, and the antipathy between his subjective self-image (Caulfield) and 
his objective body-image (Mr C) is represented in the novel’s intertextuality. California 
describes age as a process of dispossession and alterity, and his refusal to accept his body as 
his own offers a sly fictional self-consciousness as at times, it seems, the character is aware 
his identity has been reappropriated:
My skin is all prickly and covered with tiny dark spots, almost like freckles, and it’s 
loose and saggy, like my arms have shrunk two sizes during the night and my skin 
hasn’t had time to catch up. The veins on top of my hands are really visible, I mean, 
they sort of bulge out, and around my knuckles the skin has become wrinkled and
392scrunched together [...] These aren’t my arms.
That Salinger rejected this novel, disowning his now senescent character, offers an 
interesting, if inadvertent, parallel with the character’s own relation to his body, which he 
also rejects. Mr C is, then, at once an invalid and invalid character as the matter of his
391 Ibid., p. 14
392 Ibid., p. 18.
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senescence is coupled with the antagonisms surrounding the novel’s very publication. 
Throughout 60 Years Later Caulfield -anonymised by the abbreviated ‘Mr. C’, as indeed the 
author, Fredrik Colting, is by his pseudonym, J. D. California -is  struck by moments of 
almost Shellyean monstrosity, writing: ‘I’ve become some sort of monster with rotting 
flesh.’393 The flesh, but perhaps much more so the skin, is of particular significance. The skin 
is likened to a garment, a faux epidermis analysed by the de-subjectified gaze of Mr C.: ‘my 
skin, my hair, my face, my everything is covered in an old man’s body [...] my skin has 
turned into a sagging yellow bag.’394Mr C goes on to write: ‘It’s not me looking back at me, 
but an old man. My skin, my hair, my face, my everything is covered in an old man’s 
body,’395 and often describes the feel of his skin: ‘I pinch my arm and this skin I’m in is so 
soft and loose that I get a good piece of it between my fingers.’396 The body-self dualism 
seems akin at times to a costume/role dynamic, and just as Larkin implies double presence in 
his poem’s discursivity, so too does California, not simply in the sense that Mr C is an 
intertextual repetition of Caulfield, but in the fact the novel oscillates between standard 
typeset and italicised fragments. These fragments seem to represent a (benign/malign) third- 
person omniscience: ‘Look at the little rabbit, a young boy in an old man’s cloak, he doesn’t 
suspect a thing [...] Even though I ’m the one holding all the strings, I  don’t know what 
happens to them when we let them be without care fo r so long. ’397 This portentous extra- 
diegetic gaze is suggestive of authorial control, but also embodies the sense of neutrality and 
detachment that the character Mr C -diminished in name as well as in body -feels towards 
his body. There are allusions to ventriloquism in the italicised passage which map onto the 
aversive, unruly nature of his body, existing as if under external control. Senescence, and in 
particular paraesthesia (abnormal sensation in the skin such as tingling or numbness) elicit a
sense of metafictional self-commentary -his sense of diminishment and alterity 
corresponding to a subliminal awareness that his identity is but an intertextual echo and has 
little substance of its own:
This very moment he is nothing really but empty space. He is like a piece o f  paper 
upon which you have once started a story, and then locked in a box and buried deep 
in the ground. Now, 60 years later, you dig that same box up and continue the story 
[ ...] / have to build him from where I  left off. I  have to give him a past fo r  the simple 
reason that you can’t kill what doesn’t exist.398
Mr C’s degree of self-recognition is partial and the sociological metaphor of the mask, where 
the body is represented as covering or dissimulating one’s fundamental identity, is applicable: 
‘I think I can see parts of myself when I look in the mirror. I couldn’t at first, but now that I 
keep staring at one detail at a time until my eyes go blurry, I think I can see parts of myself 
under all that old stuff.’399 His pain precludes any tacit-self command whereby, as described 
by Woolf and Leder, he might act unconsciously or absently through his body, and instead he 
labours under a maladroit corporeality, which seems analogous to a burdensome, ill-fitting 
costume, just as senescence is to role or characterisation. Despite the heavy maladroit 
intrusion of the body, California also describes how Mr C is lateralized, removed from his 
body. He describes his senescing, unruly, and aversive body almost as a vehicular prosthesis 
ferrying him from place to place as if driven or operated by another person: ‘I really just walk 
[...] It’s mostly my legs that do the walking,’ and again: ‘The elevator stops [...] my body gets 
out and I walk up to our old door.’400 Moreover, we see the pathological and the more
398 Ibid., p. 36.
399 Ibid., p. 28.
400 Ibid., pp. 76/9.
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explicitly metafictional collide as Mr C, divested of all sense of self-command, writes: ‘I hear 
the clatter of the typewriter, it’s right in my ear, and suddenly I’m on my feet again.’401 His 
actions seem to bridge at once the prosthetic and the performative, in the sense of his 
deferred, mediated, or absent, command, and a phraseology that offers some degree of comic 
irony to the pronouns ‘my’ and ‘I’. This character’s identity is as much deferred, or 
anonymous, as it is multiple; it is an identity that, alongside its intertextual antecedent, is both 
familiar and intensely unfamiliar; but, moreover, it is an identity that is attested and rejected, 
set and deconstructed, not merely in the diegetic realm (i.e., within the fictional world of Mr 
C), but also in circumstances of its publication, which was condemned by Salinger and was 
banned in America. This, in itself, might be considered the representation of old age we 
gather from this text, hinging on rejection, disownment, and condemnation.
All of these examples are representationally evasive, and might be argued to bring to the fore 
questions regarding how to depict organic decay in the context of a society incredulous of the 
laws of nature, habituated to anti-ageing discourses and ideologies,402 and accustomed to 
ideas of its transcendence. More speculatively, it is the thought of how literary discourse may 
represent an ostensibly de-chronologized body when and if, medically or cosmetically, we are 
able have bodies divested of many of the signs of ageing. Fiction, fissured as it is by the 
impulse to imitate daily life on the one hand and the impulse to transcend it on the other, 
seems the perfect representation of a culture at once ageing and anti-ageing. The allusions to 
costume and theatricality, with associated notions of optionality and promises of 
discontinuance, represent a culture for which ‘the promise [...] is that one might somehow 
choose not to become old.’403
401 Ibid., p. 233.
402 See chapter 5.
Biggs, The Mature Imagination, p. 47.
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ii) Architecture and Domestic Furnishings
I  am nearing forty, nearer the weak
vision thickening to a frosted pain,
nearer the day when I  may judge my work
by the bleak modesty o f middle age
as a false dawn, fireless and average,
which would be just, because your life bled for
the household truth.404
The relationship between ageing and architecture is summarised in the phrase ‘gerontopia’ 
coined by Ruth Brent to describe places the elderly inhabit.405 The house reflects and 
disperses an individual’s sense of self, ‘possessing] our identities and communicat[ing] 
messages about our personalities and lifestyles.’406The home is a self-affirming and 
inherently communicative space, a private space that discloses information about oneself to 
others. It thus transgresses the boundaries between private and public realms, one’s inner 
self-image and the objective social image, and is ‘key to remembering one’s life courses and 
to strengthening the self for continuing independence. ,407The house also communicates 
information about the body:
...the very house in which one dwells is both a reconstruction of the surround world to
fit the body and an enlargement of our own physical structure. Its walls form a second
404
405
Derek Walcott, Selected Poems, ed. by Edward Baugh (London: Faber and Faber, 2007), p. 49.
Ruth Brent, ‘Gerontopia: A Place to Grow Old and Die’ in Aging, Autonomy, and Architecture: Advances in 
Assisted Living (USA: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 63.
406 Ibid., pp. 64-5.
407 Ibid., p. 67.
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protective skin, windows acting as artificial senses, entire rooms, like the bedroom or 
kitchen, devoted to a single bodily function.408
In The Poetics o f Space Gaston Bachelard describes the house as a ‘large cradle’ as life 
begins ‘enclosed, protected, all warm in the bosom of the house.’409 The house, with its 
familial connections, is also evocative of other visceral spaces, notably the womb in what 
Bachelard calls the home’s ‘maternal features.’410 In this section, however, I will be 
considering natural and architectural spaces, their plethora of objects and domestic 
furnishings, and their physical conditions, as a topography of the ageing body -rather than 
simply being evocative of the body. I shall discuss in this section how writers project, and 
even equate, the gauche, unruly, and intensely unfamiliar body onto the concrete, geometric 
spectacle of the house and its milieu of objects. In this, I argue, they offer a clandestine 
appropriation of the characters’ bodies -their waning sensory acuity, physical efficacy, and 
specific ailments -through mere description of their physical environment and the minutiae of 
domestic space. In turn I shall reappropriate Derek Walcott’s phrase ‘household truth’ to 
mean how architecture offers prognostic signs of and, with all the neutrality and impassivity 
of the Foucauldian ‘medical gaze,’411 commentates on and imparts clinical truths about the 
ageing body. I shall discuss how the ersatz bodies forged in the building-body conceit offer a 
conflicted representation of ageing conflating its pathos and its transcendence, with 
characters at once embodied and discamate or incorporal. They externalise the internal, 
invisible visceral depths, and the changing kinaesthetic and articular impressions of the body 
and its vicissitudes. However, the anthropomorphising of objects or structures does not in any 
way evoke or reproduce the holistic body, but instead isolates and magnifies a specific part or
408 Leder, The Absent Body, p. 34.
409 Gaston Bachelard, ‘The House. From cellar to Garret. The Significance of the Hut’, The Poetics o f  Space, 
trans. by Maria Jolas (Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1994), p. 7.
410 Bachelard, p. 7.
411 Michel Foucault, Birth o f  the Clinic (London: Routledge Classics, 2003), p. 9.
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function to the loss or effacement of the whole. This resistance to wholeness is a fitting 
representation of the sense of diminishment that comes with organic decay, or alternatively is 
suggestive of how, in pain, the affected body part emerges and becomes alienated from the 
totality of the body.
In his book The Past is a Foreign Country, the historian David Lowenthal argues that:
Things seem biologically aged owing to erosion or accretion. Ageing is a work chair, 
a wrinkled face, a corroded tin, an ivy-covered or mildewed wall; it is a house with 
sagging eaves, flaking paint, furnishings faded by time and use. Whatever their 
historical connections, objects that are weathered, decayed, or bear the marks of long- 
continued use look aged and thus seem to stem from the past.412
In a similar vein, John David California describes human ageing in the following terms: ‘I 
guess you could compare getting old to a deserted and run-down house that nobody cares 
about anymore. A house that people would rather tear down, instead of fixing the creaky old 
floorboards and the leaky roof.’413 Although intended as a pejorative likeness, alluding jointly 
to physical wastage and social ostracism, the symbolism is also evasive as it juxtaposes the 
infelicities of age with latent ideas of restoration and the possibility of undoing or 
disinventing age. In Ending Up (1974), Kingsley Amis’ depiction of organic decay hinges on 
a body-building conceit, and the faux organicity he depicts both expresses and repudiates the 
realities of age. He draws the mechanical into the anatomical, the object into the subject both 
to the extension and effacement of the flesh. The synthetic displaces, or plays surrogate to, 
the ageing body, and contributes toward a teasingly evasive, yet still conventional or 
canonical, vocabulary of ageing. Ending Up is a traditional realist narrative of ageing that 
becomes covertly and very suggestively transhumanist in its visual lexicon of age -something
412 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 125.
413 California, pp. 28-9.
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captured in the wry defeatism conveyed in the novel’s very title. Thematically, there is a very 
unequivocal engagement with ageing, yet lexically Amis precludes any real engagement with 
the flesh and therefore with organic decay. He displaces pain, dysfunction, and bodily failure 
onto the minutiae of domestic space, particularly broken, obsolete objects and furnishings 
such as ‘the egg-eroded teaspoon’, the ‘unrepairable cookoo clock’, the ‘leaky ceiling’, and 
the ‘bent silver tray’.414 Any visual idea of age-specific dysfunction is gathered from the 
terminal disrepair of such objects. As Lowenthal points out, objects convey a clear sense of 
age, and they do so either physically in erosion through use or neglect, in terms of fashion 
which connotes an era, or in their reinvention or obsolescence, which also signifies epochally. 
However, they also remain differentiated from human ageing in the sense that, although they 
undergo erosion, wear, and become obsolete, they can be restored, remade, or replaced. Thus, 
such objects connote ageing whilst imbued with the potential or promise of a more symbolic 
agelessness. The dilapidated cottage in which all Amis’ decrepit Beckettian anti-heroes reside 
in is an extended, prosthetic body. Because the synthetic governs Amis’ (apparently 
salvatory) visual lexicon of ageing, his geriatric characters live in bodies beyond bodies, with 
everything from clothes, furniture, and rooms both recapitulating aspects of their corporeality 
and ‘extending] the self beyond the boundaries of the material body [my italics].’415
The characters in Ending Up share a comic similitude with their surroundings, particularly 
with the items that festoon the cottage -the ‘forlorn mementoes ripped from their context.’416 
When interviewed for ‘The Paris Review’ by Michael Barber, Amis’ response to the remark 
‘I thought your last novel, Ending Up, was very bleak’ was:
Yes, well, no book is the author’s last word on any subject or expresses what he feels 
all the time. So if I were to walk under a bus this afternoon, then Ending Up would be
414 Kingsley Amis, Ending Up (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), pp. 15, 27, 79.
415 Mike Hepworth, Stories o f  Ageing (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), p. 73.
416 Amis, p. 61.
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my last novel, and people might say, “Well, he ended in a fit of pessimism and 
gloom.” This wouldn’t really be so. Each novel can only represent a single mood, a 
single way of looking at the world, and one feels bleak from time to time, and takes a 
fairly pessimistic view of one’s own future and chances. But there are other times 
when one doesn’t, and out of that other books would emerge.417
In this novel, one might suggest that Amis is in fact saving his characters from the 
inevitability and pathos of age. Representationally, their physical age is nonexistent as Amis 
creates a series of architectural uncannies, and does not even allow his character to die from 
old age, but from accidents associated with the objects that surround them: for instance, 
George falling off a ladder and Marigold tripping over a ‘damp and considerably lacerated’418 
tennis ball. The objects evade age in the sense they metaphorise it; they even embody 
mortality in the sense that they are harbingers of death -the characters dying as they come 
into contact with them. George’s nominal aphasia is metaphorised in the de-historicized 
artefacts and objects, each of which remains ‘of uncertain period’ or simply ‘vague’419 and 
are unidentifiable, anomalous, and collectively indivisible, both in their sheer number and 
equivalence in dilapidation. In this cottage with ‘too much furniture and too many 
ornaments,’420 and the few visual ideas for the reader as to the exact appearance of the 
cottage reflects both the characters’ amnesic episodes and the superficial, dilettantish interest 
they take in the curios they collectively hoard. Amis also uses functional or mechanical 
objects to describe and duplicate the body’s movements. This is pronounced in Bernard’s 
arthritic, painful leg -an  image repeated throughout the novel -and its corresponding 
domestic item of the backward-forward movement of the wrought-iron knocker as ‘the rust or
417 Kingsley Amis, The Art o f Fiction, No. 59, interviews with Michael Barber, The Paris Review 
http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/3772/the-art-of-fiction-no-59-kingslev-amis [accessed 12/10]
418 Amis, Ending Up, p. 85.
419 Ibid., p. 77 & 12.
420 t u - ,  1
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corrosion impede[s] its movement.’421 Likewise, the stiffness and immobility of the largely 
bedridden George seems subtly played out through the ephemeral, but nevertheless 
suggestive, mishandling of a journal, too rigid for him to ‘weaken its spine enough to make it 
lie flat.’422 Other features of the cottage such as doors and doorframes have an almost skeletal 
quality, and inversely the characters’ skeletal figures seem xyloid in nature. Dysfunctional 
objects gain a rather heightened significance alongside the characters’ dysfunctional bodies, 
such as the living room door whose route is impaired by an ill-fitting frame: ‘the door opened 
suddenly, with a thudding noise because it was considerably warped.’423 This seems implicit 
in Amis’ description of Marigold Pyke as ‘very well-preserved, ,424using the language of 
restoration as if she were a recovered or restored artefact, or even an object indivisible from 
the tatterdemalion mix of others in the cottage. The body-building conceit, then, feels 
reminiscent of Lowenthal’s depiction of eroded or broken artefacts as ‘like invalids suffering 
from some wasting disease.’425
Leder observes in The Absent Body how ‘physical experiences such as pain, exhaustion and 
illness [...] bring about the emergence of the body as explicit object.’426 Amis articulates the 
ageing process in comparable terms. Descriptions of objects far outweigh those of the body in 
this novel, and even the altered, defamiliarising sensations and postures associated with or 
borne out of pain have not an interior, visceral quality, but are ostensibly likened to an 
embodied, yet foreign and indubitably unruly, prosthesis. He establishes ‘significant points of 
similarity between older people, decaying material objects and buildings or parts of 
buildings. ,427These irreducibly varied objects are pseudo-natural extensions of the body, at 
once recapitulating and constitutively different from aspects of the characters’ bodies. Citing
4J’ Ibid., p. 37.
422 Amis, p. 45.
423 Ibid., p. 29.
424 Ibid.
Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, p. 147.




Munro (1996), Simon Biggs describes ageing in The Mature Imagination a ‘complex process
• 428of prosthesis.’ In Ending Up Amis displaces conventional prostheses such as the walking 
stick for the body itself, and just as the prosthesis is a metonym for yet palliates suffering so 
too do the characters’ bodies suffer from and cure themselves of age. They are at once 
plaintive and transcendent figures. However, the prosthetic vision of age may be argued to 
anticipate, rehearse, or even actualise the prospect of the characters’ death; it might be argued 
to be a mimesis of decay in the sense that they are broken down, post-bodied, spectral even, 
and representationally indivisible from their environment —lost within the plethora of 
metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms. Amis’ prosthetic age, then, has the 
presence/absence dichotomy constitutive of defining the prosthesis, and paints a picture of 
the characters existing both maladroitly and not at all. It is a highly conflicted portrait of 
ageing. Amis presents the reader with the notion of the home as an undifferentiated 
prosthesis, and although the prosthesis does connote disability and ill-health, the sense in 
which Amis uses it is germane to more contemporary anti-ageing (or even transhumanist) 
discourses in which ideas of disinventing age predominate. Finally, the theme of prosthetic 
extension and addition also has its lexical counterpart in this novel, seen in Amis’ heavy 
emphasis on hyphenated words and phrases -note the recurrence in the following phrase: 
‘...second-best trouser-suit, blue-and-green-striped shirt with high long-pointed collar, queen­
sized cameo brooch, cigarette-holder.’429 The use of hyphens in compound nouns and verbs is 
declining and is not as frequent in more contemporary writing -w e would, for instance, 
ordinarily omit the hyphen in ‘visiting-cards’. So, thirty-five years post-publication the 
preponderance of hyphens in Ending Up does not only age the syntax in a way hinging on 
extension and addition, but makes the process of reading and indeed typing it complex and 
maladroit. Grammatically and syntactically, then, there is some affinity between the book’s
428 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination: The Dynamics o f  Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999), p. 59.
429 Amis, p. 157.
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presentation and the sense of inefficacy experienced in the characters themselves, making 
reader-response both a reflection and prosthetic extension of the characters’ suffering.
In ‘The Ghastly Ordeal of Timothy Cavendish’ from David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas (2004), 
Timothy Cavendish is trapped against his will in a labyrinthine, abyssal old people’s home, 
Aurora House. He lives there with other the occupants he describes as ‘[t]he Undead,’430 and 
forges escape plans with a militarism that gives this traditional narrative of ageing a comic 
and disproportional sense of adventure. Unlike the possessive individualism431 that 
characterises the family home, the architecture and furniture of the residential home here 
suggests a sense of anonymity - a  sense of unsparing erasure comparable to those residents 
with dementia. The clinicality, asceticism, and communality of the environment do not reflect 
the any single personality but signify only to the collective plight of the patients. In Aging, 
Autonomy, and Architecture, Kaustenbaum writes of this sense of displacement and personal 
erasure that ‘residents are suspended in a floating world that bears little relationship to their 
previous lives and in which most of their deepest thoughts, feelings, and values are 
irrelevant.’432 Michel Foucault describes communal spaces that are not social or personal
• 4 3 3spaces, such as hospitals, prisons and care homes as ‘heterotopias of deviation.’ He 
describes these spaces as being occupied by individuals ‘whose behaviour is deviant with 
respect to the mean or required norm.’434 He places the aged in this anomalous, impersonal 
space, arguing that ‘since after all old age is a crisis and also a deviation, seeing that in our 
society, where leisure activity is the rule, idleness forms a kind of deviation.’435 In ‘The 
Ghastly Ordeal of Timothy Cavendish’ the utility and impersonality of the furnishings 
actually constitute an ersatz homeliness, and constitute the benign familiarity of home and the
430 David Mitchell, Cloud Atlas (Great Britain: Hodder and Stroughton, 2004), p. 179.
431 Brent, p. 70.
432 Kastenbaum, cited by Brent, p. 68.
433Michel Foucault, ‘Different Spaces’ in Aesthetics: Essential Works o f  Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 2, trans. by 
Robert Hurley et al. (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 180.
434 Ibid., p. 180.
435 Ibid.
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unsettling unfamiliarity and disconcerting communality of hospital. On being shown to his 
room, the sense of personal space is lost: ‘my bathroom had been designed for disabled 
people, it was all rounded edges and fitted with handrails.’436 There is an element of coercion 
or ventriloquism in the sense that Cavendish unconsciously adopts a dysfunction, as if his 
body, of its own accord, is colluding malignly with the nature of the environment, conspiring 
to keep him in residential care: ‘I had acquired a limp but was unsure how. I was lost.’437 It is 
suggestive of what Glenda Laws describes in terms of ‘complicity between body and 
environment embodiment and emplacement,’438 but one that is not benign nor affirms one’s 
sense of self.
Not only is Cavendish forced into the collective anonymity of ‘the Undead of Aurora 
House,’439 as he terms it, but he continually questions the verisimilitude of those in authority, 
even pathologizing their ostensible performance: ‘some demented bitch called Noakes is 
running about the place impersonating a chambermaid. She’s probably riddled with 
Alzheimer’s.’440 Another employee, transformed into a malign, inhuman agent is described as 
‘a sexless automaton,’441 furthering suggestions of inauthenticity and fictitiousness -itself 
alluding to this text’s suggestive, if dormant, metafictionality. This apparent artifice is 
emphasised stylistically in the hyperbolic, rhetorical passages relating to the nature of his 
ostracism, imprisonment, and fatalism of age -all of which Cavendish construes as an 
obligatory performance:
Behold your future, Cavendish the Younger. You will not apply for membership, but 
the tribe of the elderly will claim you. Your present will not keep pace with the 
world’s. This slippage will stretch your skin, sag your skeleton, erode your hair and
436 Mitchell, p. 176.
437 Ibid.
438 Glenda Laws, cited by Mike Hepworth in Stories o f  Ageing, p. 78.
439 Mitchell, p. 179.
440 Ibid., p. 111.
441 Ibid., p. 183.
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memory, make your skin turn opaque so your twitching organs and blue-cheese veins 
will be semi-visible [...] Language, too, will leave you behind, betraying your tribal 
affiliations whenever you speak [...] Sooner than you fear, you will stand before a 
mirror in a care home, look at your body, and think, ET, locked in a ruddy cupboard 
for a fortnight.442
There is a mock-essentialist treatment of the elderly in this chapter. Mitchell gives human 
ageing a tragicomic terror, writing: ‘Oh, once you’ve been initiated into the Elderly, the 
world doesn’t want you back.’443 Other descriptions include: ‘senile boors’ (371), ‘the 
Kingdom of the Dying’ (371), ‘the Undead’ (374), ‘the zombies’ (389), ‘sentient Undead’ 
(393), and ‘semi-animate autopsies in mildewed tweeds and colourless blouses’ (382). The 
manner in which he speaks of the elderly (i.e. as a dysgenic collective) is mimicked by the 
communality of the hospital enviromnent. There is some suggestion of Cavendish’s 
‘initiation’ into this collective in the opening to the second part of ‘The Ghastly Ordeal’ with 
the lines: ‘Mr Cavendish? Are we awake? [my emphasis].’444 The plural ‘we’ might be 
construed both pathological and phenomenal terms: pathological in the sense the patients are 
amnesic and dehumanised, even, by their intransient physical maladies; and phenomenal in 
the sense that the clinical, communal, ascetic environment fails to ‘extend’ or reflect them as 
individuals, designates them collectively as the sick. Cavendish describes his ‘cell’ with a 
sense of both determinate entrapment and a sense of provisionality. For instance, the 
recurrent descriptions of wipeable surfaces metaphorise the consummate blankness of the 
amnesic patients in the sense that all vestige of self, of inhabitation, is ultimately erasable: 
‘Door, locked from the outside, no keyhole. Window that opened only six inches. Heavy-duty 
sheets made of egg-carton fibres with plastic undersheet. Armchair, washable seat-cover.
442 Ibid.
443 Ibid., p. 376,
444 ti . j  0 ’
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Moppable carpet.’445 The shining surfaces, or surfaces made explicitly washable, to some 
extent elude the marks of continued inhabitation and activity. The surfaces seem to aspire not 
simply to utility, but to erasure -to  some form of foreboding eschatological preoccupation 
with ends that is, paradoxically, revealed in the illusion of perpetual newness. The 
architecture and furnishings imply absence and, in the fact they are reflective surfaces, 
abolish some degree of depth, which maps back metaphorically onto the ostensible 
fictionality of the carers’ roles from the perspective of Cavendish, and the two-dimensionality 
of his own status as patient.
Although hands play a relatively negligible role in the representation of age, they are 
nevertheless an important feature in any semiotic analysis of ageing in contemporary 
literature. Muriel Spark’s Memento Mori (1966), Marika Cobbald’s Guppies fo r  Tea (1993), 
Pat Barker’s Another World (1998), Stanley Middleton’s Necessary Ends (1999), Alice 
Sebold’s The Almost Moon (2007), and Julian Barnes’ Nothing to be Frightened O f (2009) 
are all examples of novels (with the exception of the latter, which is a memoir) that place the 
aged subject on both sides of the divide human/nonhuman. Although the physical 
environment is not implicated in the representation of senescence, each writer gives the hand 
a theriomorphic quality, bestowed with a malignant agency and animalistic movements, and 
as such alienated from the totality of the body and with it any holistic, associationist 
conceptions of the body. In Another World, a novel on memory, loss, and how one’s distant 
past affects one’s relation to the present, Barker describes Nick observing his grandfather, 
Geordie: ‘he watches the brown-spotted hand crawl across the counterpane.’446 The lack of a 
possessive pronoun his implies self-differentiation, whilst its ostensible sentience and 
animalistic qualities and macabre self-command dissociate it not simply from Geordie’s body 
but the human body. In The Almost Moon, Alice Sebold writes of her mother that ‘her hands
445 Ibid., p. 180.
446 Pat Barker, Another World (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 233
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clasped the curved ends of the armrests [...] like involuntary claws [my emphasis].’447 Despite 
the possessive pronoun ‘her’, there is a sense of deferred, alien, or perhaps even absent 
agency as she describes how her hands clasped the armrest, not she clasped the armrest. This 
slightly unusual phraseology is also found in Muriel Spark’s novel Memento Mori in which 
she writes: ‘his fingers worked slowly, clutched around the large barrel of his fountain pen. 
His fingers were good perhaps for another year - i f  you could call these twisted, knobble- 
knuckled members good.’448 And we also find this, in all its suggestions of self-division, in 
Marika Cobbald’s Guppies for Tea, a novel commentating on the spaces the elderly inhabit, 
sequestered from the rest of society: ‘his hands, black-bruised and wrinkled, gripped the 
handles of the sticks at his sides [my emphasis].’449 In Stanley Middleton’s Necessary Ends -  
a novel on the banality of a bourgeois retirement and later life -w e find, like Sebold and 
Barker, how the hand is narrated with an eerie self-command, similar to Barker and Sebold: 
‘her claw-like hands came from within the blanket [...] brown-spotted, lined, twisted with 
arthritis.’450 All of these examples, I suggest, convey the tactile apprehension of the senescing 
body, its kinaesthesias and coenesthesias, on the level of grammar. In The Absent Body, Drew 
Leder describes the healthy body as tending towards self-concealment, experiential absence 
or awayness, whilst the ailing body emerges as an explicit object, removed from all tacit self- 
command, and dissociated from the holistic body.451 The different phraseologies mentioned 
above arguably have such medical and phenomenological imputations. Using the example 
from Sebold’s The Almost Moon, the phrase ‘she clasped’ may be regarded as the ‘healthy’ 
counterpart to the phrase ‘her hands clasped’. In the former, the hand is implied in the verb 
‘clasped’; representationally, then, the hands are recessive -invisible, if you will. Conversely, 
the latter phrase, ‘her hands clasped’, renders the hands ostensibly autonomous -implicitly
447 Alice Sebold, The Almost Moon (London: Picador, 2007), p. 5.
448 Muriel Spark, Memento Mori (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 202.
449 Marika Cobbald, Guppies fo r  Tea (London: Bloomsbury, 1993), p. 97.
450 Stanley Middleton, Necessary Ends (London: Hutchinson, 1996), p. 49.
451 Leder, The Absent Body, p. 70.
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disconnected from the totality of the body in their explicit allusion. The descriptions in these 
novels are comparable to 19th and 20th century gothic short stories in which the hand’s eerie 
self-command is a reoccurring theme.452 In the few contemporary novels on ageing, the hand 
may not always be represented as explicitly animalistic, yet notions of a detached sense of 
ownership and agency prevail in these descriptions -notions that buttress Cartesian 
mind/body oppositions as the senescing body is represented as constitutively alien and 
separable from one’s core sense of self. Drew Leder describes how dysfunction exerts ‘a new 
relation to one’s body’ which constitutes an ‘alien presence’ or ‘something foreign to the 
self.’453 The descriptions in the novels mentioned are a hyperbolic rendering of this, as the 
hands seem increasingly theriomorphic, or beast-like, in quality, and xyloid in nature, 
resembling twisted branches. They are described as: ‘involuntary claws,’454 ‘claw-like 
hands,’455 ‘clenched arthritic fingers,’456 ‘thickened Knuckles of old age’457 and ‘twisted 
arthritic hands.’458 These descriptions have sociological value, particularly with regards to 
western social ostracism of the economically inactive elderly. Simone de Beauvoir in The 
Coming o f Age describes how the elderly are treated as if they ‘belong to an entirely different 
species [...] as another being.,459 She writes how a culture built upon liturgies of youth ‘does 
not look upon the aged as belonging to one clearly-defined category,’460 and indeed the 
novels’ fleeting allusions to hybridity might be seen as a gesture towards this crude sense of 
reclassification, or quite simply a demonstrably pejorative representation of the aged as 
dehumanised.
452 E.g.,19th Century French writer Guy de Maupassant’s short stories ‘The Hand’ and ‘The Flayed Hand’; Le 
Fanu’s ‘The Narrative of a Ghost of a Hand’ (1863); Gerard de Nerval’s ‘The Enchanted Hand’ (1832); 
Theodore Dreiser’s ‘The Hand’ (1920); William Harvey’s The Beast with Five Fingers (1928); and Arthur 
Conan Doyle’s ‘The Brown Hand’ (1899).
453 Drew Leder, p. 76.
454Sebold, p. 5.
455 Middleton, p. 49.
456 Julian Rathbone, Intimacy (London: Indigo, 1996), p. 46.
457 Barnes, p. 1.
458 Spark, p. 75.
459 jde Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 3.
460 Ibid., p. 2.
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The semiology of ageing in all the narratives mentioned in this section distorts the corporal 
form, and plunges the characters into both a sexlessness and a bathetic posthumanity. The 
very transcendence of the body -its existence across different substrates —seems indicative 
both of the erasure of embodiment and of an aversive, constrictive and unruly sense of 
embodiment in moments of crisis, pain, or collapse -moments that remind the characters 
most of the abjectness of their own terminal humanity. Representationally, the body does not 
exist as a totality, but as a plethora of signifiers that emerge from the text that subtly conjoin 
architectural and anatomical, synthetic and organic, human and theriomorph, and a palpable 
sense of pathos embedded in a counterrealism stemming from the very semiology of age.
iii) Puppetry, Alterity, and Simulacral Youth
The aforementioned texts stress the ‘sense of continuous inner selfhood through the 
biologically changing body,’461 buttressing and at times implicitly parodying Cartesian mind- 
body dualisms: the metaphysicality of the mind versus the gauche physicality of the body. I 
have spoken of the prosthesis more in terms of a sensory event -the kinaesthesias and 
coenesthesias of the senescing body-than a physical adjunct: that is, the sensation of addition 
or alterity borne from the distinctiveness and foreignness of pain. The texts present the 
affliction -o r even the matter of human ageing as a whole -as something not integral to but 
extraneous to the body: something that compromises one’s sense of self-sovereignty and the 
sense of the body’s wholeness, and renders the affected part alienated from the totality of the 
body which, as a result of this, acts as if under the auspices of a malign, exogenous force 
rather than through one’s tacit self-command. Yet although the prosthesis is ineffably 
physical, it also signifies an internal, sensory event, the defamiliarising kinaesthetic and
461 Hep worth, Stories o f  Ageing, p. 43.
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articular impressions of the body, occurring in moments of collapse. The two previous 
sections of this chapter have discussed the orientation of the prosthesis to the body: that 
which covers, like the over-garment, and that which extends, disperses, or augments, such as 
the home. This section on puppets and marionettes considers the prosthesis in more holistic 
terms, for it deals with the whole body and that which supplants it in its entirety. The puppet 
is as a simulacrum of the organic, but without the vicissitudes of age: it is, if you like, 
suspended in time, a symbol of perpetuity -the commodification of immortality in western 
discourses of consumerism. However, the puppet embodies the loss of self-sovereignty, and 
ventriloquism is a reasonable metaphor for entropy and the determinism of age. The puppet 
imagery suggests a stringently materialist evocation of age in this sense, ‘register[ing] time as 
anything but celestial sustenance [my italics].’ In Remembrance o f Things Past Proust evokes 
the image of the puppet to describe the experience of time, organic decay, and death:
These were puppets bathed in the immaterial colours of the years, puppets which 
exteriorized Time, Time which Habit is made invisible and to become visible seeks 
bodies, which wherever it finds it seizes, to display its magic lantern upon them.462
Although we cannot describe Amis’ characters as puppets, the space of the home almost 
becomes a repository of objects and structures from which he assembles his ostensibly 
synthetic, reconstituted bodies that both convey and transcend age. Their bodies constitute a 
chaotic, ungestalt malformation, with pseudo-natural parts unconnected but juxtaposed in 
space and vaguely approximating human characteristics and specific physical maladies. 
Because he rejects any holistic conception of the ageing body (again, fitting to the 
representation of organic decay), the characters seem like exploded xyloid figures, puppets
462 Marcel Proust, cited by Philip M. Weinstein, Unimowing: The Works o f Modernist Fiction (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 133.
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even -and comparable, perhaps, to Cornelia Parker’s Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View 
(1991) in which fragments of an exploded garden shed are loosely reassembled. In his book 
Pinocchio’s Progeny, Harold B Segel writes that our fascination with puppets is:
...clearly, a projection of the obsession of human beings with their own image, with 
their own likeness [...] More profoundly, it reveals a yearning to play god, to master 
life. By constructing replicas of human beings whose movements they can then exert 
complete power over, artists play at being gods instead of being merely playthings of 
gods. Inevitably, the impulse to exert domination over the human experience leads to 
research into the prolongation of life through advances in medicine and technology -  
the treatment and eventual cure of infectious diseases and the transplantation of 
organs, human, animal, or mechanical.463
I will be discussing the marionette as a metaphor for ageing in a postmodern consumer 
society. I will be looking at the ageing body as a deeply conflicted, hyphenated object, 
bridging youth and old age, finitude and perpetuity, determinism and its overcoming. I want 
to consider puppetry as a paradigm of western discourses of consumerism and medical 
progress and the pharmacological, surgical, and biochemical interventions on offer.464 
Moreover, I want to consider puppet itself as a metaphor both for the underlying desire to 
suppress, or wilfully defer, the ageing process, and of the cosmetic interventions transforming 
youth from the natural, originary state from which we stem to the surgical contrivance to 
which we strive —what I shall call prosthetic youth. Thus part of my analysis will deal with 
atemporality, which I shall juxtapose alongside brief discussion on medicalising and 
aestheticising one’s way out of ageing in a medically progressive and ideologically evasive 
culture. I use the term ‘prosthetic’ as a hyponym to explore discourses of ageing as well as
463 Harold B. Segal, Pinocchio’s Progeny: Puppets, Marionettes, Automatons, and Robots in Modernist and 
Avant-Garde Drama (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 4.
This discussion is taken up in greater depth in chapter 4.
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discourses of youth; I will use it to consider how, in this semantic conflict, the prosthesis 
emerges as the perfect representation of a culture at once ageing demographically, and anti­
ageing commercially and ideologically. In this section, then, the emphasis will be on how the 
prosthesis works as both a highly materialist representation of age and an evocation of 
(perpetual) youth, making the prosthesis germane both to gerontological and transhumanist 
discourses.
In her novel The Almost Moon, Alice Sebold explores the pathos of Alzheimer’s disease both 
for sufferer and carer. Spoken from the perspective of the carer, Helen Knightly, the novel 
depicts her dehumanisation and euthanasic murder of her senescent mother. The narrative is 
an internal, chiefly non-linear, free-associative monologue starting with the murder and 
working backward describing Knightly’s experience as a carer. Sebold describes the mother’s 
body as an impersonal, quasi-natural assembly of features, using puppet imagery to convey 
the loss of self-sovereignty, and visioning Knightly not simply as a benevolent carer but as a 
prosthesis/supplement or, more malignly, as ventriloquist: ‘my whole body acting merely as 
her own hand had once acted.,465Her mother spends the novel’s entirety wrapped in towels -a  
pseudo-epidermis in which she is very loosely contained like a cross between a child and a 
porcelain doll: an ‘open-ended package with her talking head sticking out.’466 This 
infantilisation is not an evasive depiction of ageing, being comparable to retrogenesis (i.e. the 
childlike dependency and inefficacies in the elderly), yet also repudiates this with counterreal 
likeness to a porcelain doll, aloof from the vicissitudes of age. Describing the relation of her 
mother’s body to her fathers, she describes how her mother’s ‘body had folded into his over 
and over again,’467 which is suggestive more of symbiosis than dependence. The disrobing of 
her mother’s body does not expose the abject flesh, but is a process of dehumanization as she
465Sebold, p. 33.
466 Ibid., p. 12.
467 tu;j - o
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deteriorates into a succession of puppet-like uncannies: ‘a life-size dolP, a ‘collapsing bag of 
air,’ ‘cross-hatchings of fine old porcelain,’ ‘an ancient baby doll,’ and ‘silent and broken.’468 
Helen is implicated into this imagery, also, as she describes handling her as ‘like 
manipulating a life-size doll,’469 and redefining her own identity very much within this 
conflicted representation of age. The lack of a more ‘natural’ lexicon on describing her 
mother’s body -that is, its effacement of the flesh -creates an increasingly and 
counterintuitively abstract image her. After her death, Helen forgoes any description of death, 
decay, or lifelessness in favour of ‘silent and broken’470like a toy. She both artificialises her 
mother and infantalises herself in her allusions to playing with, rather than caring for, her 
mother, and in the evasive, childlike parlance with which she expresses and explores her 
mother’s mortality. She describes entropy and organic decay in stringently materialist terms: 
‘her substance, demolished.’471 She even has macabre fantasies dividing her body, which are 
represented not in terms of mutilation but disassembly: ‘I plucked out her eyes, her tongue. 
While dusting the shelves I multiplied and divided her body parts.’472 Her mother is not 
represented as a totality but an ungestalt assembly of geometric objects juxtaposed in space, 
and her daughter gradually becomes the malign custodian of her body:
...she ran errands and massaged my feet while they sat begging on a leather ottoman. 
She’d bring me broths in bed and draw a shawl over my shoulders, rub the caked-on 
food at the comer of my mouth with a damp cloth. And I would begin to forget her, to 
scream at her, to say cmel things about her body and her love life and her brain.473
468 Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 14, 32, 58.
469 Ibid., p. 9.
470 Ibid., p. 58.
471 Ibid., p. 184.
472 Ibid., p. 58.
473 Ibid., p. 256.
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Her mother’s body is also liked explicitly to an android that has acquired sentience: ‘merely a 
robot that had gone off the rails and that, after serving its master faithful for years, had turned 
back predictably to the place where it was made.’474 However, her daughter, towards the 
novel’s conclusion, also conceives of her body as synthetic:
I stared down at my knees, which suddenly seemed as marbelized as my mother’s 
skin. I saw my joints, fat sheared off at a rendering plant. Scarsdale patties made of 
my thighs and arms and stored in a meat freezer, waiting to be broiled or pan 
seared.475
She describes her viscera in a similar way, as a unruly plethora of ‘bags of all kinds, holding 
my fluids, giving and receiving, an in/out system of effluvia, shit and urine.’476 She employs 
similar metaphors and similes to describe her own body as when describing her mother’s, and 
as such offers a sense of inevitability or glum fatalism in an image that becomes a semiotic 
echo of her mother. She is thus transformed from carer/ventriloquist to puppet, not dispensing 
but subject to the hegemony of external control. Retrospectively, this perhaps brings to the 
fore the image of Helen dragging, manipulating, and pulling her mother’s body through the 
house. I suggested that Helen’s body was a prosthetic addition to her own; but in the sense 
that Helen’s own aged body is represented by her as being apart from  rather than apart o f  
herself, and as the second half of the book effectively repeats the images and allusions of the 
first, I suggest that these early scenes be reconsidered as Helen struggling not with her 
mother’s but with her own body. One might consider there being not two people, Helen and 
her mother, present, but one person in this scene, with the presence of two people simply a 
literalisation of the perceived discontinuity between body and self. I evoke again
4/4 Ibid., p. 271.
475 Ibid., p. 205.
476 Ibid., p. 251.
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Hawthorne’s description of looking at a younger image of himself: ‘I was really a little 
startled at recognising myself so apart from myself [my emphasis].’
Although the marionette arguably metaphorises the loss of self-sovereignty, it also signifies 
an always averted death. Under the west’s discourses of consumerism, or their reification in 
prolongevity medicine and bio-gerontological research,477 the ageing body is endlessly 
manipulable, sculptural, and generationally ambiguous as the ‘postmodern adult [becomes] 
really an indeterminately young and possibly ageless person.’478 The ageing body is a site of 
terminal constructedness on which pejorative or evasive ideas over ageing -existing under the 
auspices of medical progress -are inscribed. Simon Biggs comments that the attention is 
‘towards surface manifestations of identity rather than its deeper structuration.’479 Like a 
puppet, the ageing body becomes a performing object, subservient to the hegemony of 
external forces - ‘consumer culture [which] supplies the props and the environment, allowing 
the construction of an eternal present with no centre, origin, or destination.’480 The puppet 
might be viewed as the exemplar of the ‘postmodern’ body. The ageing body is an indefinite 
series of prostheses: cosmetic surgery, for instance ‘ assume [s] the makeability of the human 
body, expanding the limits of how the body may be restyled, reshaped and rebuilt.’481 Kathy 
Davis moves on to describe how ‘the body is no longer simply a dysfunctional object 
requiring medical intervention, but a commodity -not unlike “a car, a refrigerator, a house -
• • 489which can be continuously upgraded and modified” (Finkelstein 1991).’ The ability to 
aestheticise and medicalise one’s way out of ageing through pharmacological and cosmetic 
interventions, or in the more dilettantish realm of bourgeois consumer culture, all signify 
youth’s endless reiteration, and enable the construction of a body outside o f  time. In this
477 See chapter 5.
478 •Biggs, The Mature Imagination, p. 64.
479 Ibid., p. 46.
480 Ibid., p. 61.
48'Kathy Davis, Reshaping the Female Body: The Dilemma o f  Cosmetic Surgery (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 17.
482 Ibid.
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context, I argue F. Scott Fitzgerald’s ‘The Curious Case of Benjamin Button’ and Oscar 
Wilde’s The Picture o f Dorian Gray might be construed as proto-postmodem texts of ageing.
‘Benjamin Button’ is a short story constructed around the conceit of ungrowth. It might be 
argued to parody the conflation of age categories in the Victorian novel and the 
representation of ‘wise old children who are unable to grow old as they uncannily embrace 
both youth and old age as their unchanging “essence.”’483 Button may personify the theory of 
retrogenesis in gerontological discourses, and thus may constitute a relatively traditional 
realist narrative of age. However, the short story might be argued to reveal a dialogue 
between literature (or popular culture more generally) and medical epistemology in the late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century-a ‘literary enhancement’ or ‘conscious’ allegory of 
Progeria.484 From medical specificity to cultural generality, what I shall argue is that 
Progeria485 in this text might be constmed as a metaphor for anti-ageing and the conflicted 
expectations about the ageing process that individuals have in the context of a culture 
habituated to notions of reversing age and expectant of their reification. Fitzgerald describes 
Benjamin as ‘baby of threescore years and ten.’486 His descriptions of Button certainly seem 
germane to anti-ageing discourses and ideologies:
Was the network of wrinkles on his face becoming less pronounced? Was his skin 
healthier and firmer, with even a touch of ruddy winter colour? [...] He knew that he 
no longer stooped and that his physical condition had improved.487
483Heike Hartung, Roberta Maierhofer (eds.), Narratives o f  Life: Mediating Age (USA & London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009), pp. 7-8.
484 W J . Maloney, ‘Hutchinson-Gilford Progeria Syndrome: Its Presentation in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Short Story 
‘The Curious Case of Benjamin Button’ and Its Oral Manifestations’ in Journal o f  Dental Research, October 
2009, vol. 88., p. 873.
485 Progeria: a congenital abnormality discovered in 1886, characterized by premature and rapid aging. The 
affected individual appears in childhood as an aged person.




There is also a pronounced emphasis on performativity as Benjamin, geriatric in appearance 
yet infantile in years, is forced by his father to act as a child:
One day he [Benjamin’s father] brought home a rattle and, giving it to Benjamin, 
insisted in no uncertain terms that he should ‘play with it,’ whereupon the old man 
took it with a weary expression and could be heard jingling it obediently at intervals 
throughout the day.488
It is not merely his willing self-infantilisation and ‘grotesque simulation of filial respect’489 
which is akin to performance, but his appearance as his father attempts to make Benjamin 
look younger: ‘he might cut off that long and awful beard, dye the white hair brown, and thus 
manage to conceal the worst.’490 However, he moves onto describe how these changes cannot 
conceal the abjection beneath: ‘his clothes did not conceal this, nor did the clipping and dying 
of his eyebrows disguise the fact that the eyes underneath were faded and watery and 
tired.’491
Although the text reflects the medical episteme of the early twentieth-century, there are 
aspects to the story that conspicuously mythologise Button. One interesting aspect of this 
short story is not simply Benjamin’s ungrowth, but how the matter of that ungrowth 
surreptitiously redefines those around him. The sheer impossibility of his birth —being ‘five 
feet eight inches tall’492 -combined with the few references to his mother, mythologises the 
circumstances of his birth. Moreover, Benjamin is a continual threat to his father’s identity. 
Roger Button might be perceived to suffer a comparable ungrowth, transformed from 
paterfamilias to offspring. Chronologically, Benjamin is his father’s son, but aesthetically, is
488 Ibid., p. 9.
489 Ibid., p. 7.
490 Ibid., p. 6.
491 Ibid., p. 8.
492 Ibid.
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his father’s father - a  dramatisation of what is now referred to as a ‘generational blur’493 
where aestheticising or medicalising oneself young occasions a flagrant destabilisation of age 
categories. Whilst Benjamin himself is simultaneously young and senescent, then, his father 
is also at once the younger and elder as his relation to Benjamin is at once filial and paternal. 
However, in the middle of the short story there is established a pseudo-fraternal relationship 
between Benjamin and his father: ‘his son was more and more companionable —in fact, since 
Benjamin had ceased to dye his hair [...] they appeared about the same age, and could have 
passed for brothers.’494 Similarly, towards the end of the narrative, the identities of Benjamin, 
who is growing younger, and his son Roscoe, who is growing older, are initially equated and 
subsequently inverted: they ‘were, in fact, often mistaken for each other,’ and later the 
adolescent Roscoe asks of his father: ‘you’d better call me “Uncle” all the time, so you’ll get 
used to it.’495 A similarly displaced or reconfigured age identity befalls Benjamin’s wife also. 
Growing younger, both psychologically and physiologically, Benjamin becomes 
progressively repulsed by his wife, revealing his own pejorative attitudes toward old age: 
‘[s]he was a woman of forty now, with a faint skirmish line of gray hairs in her head. The 
sight depressed him.’496 His wife becomes more of a maternal figure, just as his son does a 
paternal figure, and the rapidity with which his wife ages due to Benjamin’s ungrowth 
becomes as ostensibly unnatural as Benjamin’s septuagenarian infancy. One might postulate 
that no character in ‘Benjamin Button’ has a definitive age, and that ‘age’ is not bound up in 
chronological age or physical characteristics but the role one assumes over another.
It is a paradox in this short story that, being bom senescent and growing young, it is youth 
that comes to signify organic decay and death, whilst his descriptions of youth and infancy
493 Toni M. Calasanti & Kathleen F. Slevin, Gender, Social Inequalities, and Aging (California: AltaMira Press, 
2001), p. 53.
494 Fitzgerald, p. 14.
495 Ibid., pp. 21 & 23.
496 Ibid., pp. 18 -9.
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simply allegorise retrogenesis and the loss of self-sufficiency, efficacy, memory and personal 
recollections with age and senility. Youth becomes a signifier of old age here, in much the 
same way that, in bourgeois consumer culture and prolongevity medicine, aspects more 
associated with youth supplant, and indeed themselves become, the conventional or canonical 
signs of ageing. ‘Benjamin Button’ is a text that seemingly plays on this semiotic transition. 
As Benjamin grows younger he is met with greater disapproval, mistrust, and social 
ostracism, and, on studying his image and realising that he is growing younger, youth is 
connected to an ineffable and paradoxical fatalism: ‘He shuddered. His destiny seemed to 
him awful, incredible.’497 He describes how in his encroaching youth he has ‘grown so slight 
and frail,’498 and towards the end depicts a sense of diminishment and ostracism that can only 
be described as abject youth:
In 1920 Roscoe Button’s first child was bom. During the attendant festivities, 
however, no one thought it ‘the thing’ to mention the little grubby boy, apparently 
about ten years of age who played around the house with lead soldiers and a miniature 
circus, was the new baby’s own grandfather.499
Fitzgerald retains allusions to ageing and senility in his representation of youth, particularly 
in the sense that Button is still succeeded by his son, Roscoe, and of course in the fact Button 
does die a much diminished, insentient, and inefficacious figure. Because of the abject 
infantalization of Button (which is suggestive more of retrogenesis than it is actual youth), he 
ages youth in an inversely deterministic way.
The technologies of ageing used in the cinematic adaptation of ‘Benjamin Button’ (2008) 
have great sociological, gerontological, and metaphorical value. Simon Biggs, as I have
497 Ibid., 20.
498 Ibid., p. 22.
499 Ibid., p. 26.
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already mentioned, couples ageing with postmodernity, arguing that consumerism ‘has led to 
“a blurring of what appeared previously to be relatively clearly marked stages and the 
experiences and characteristic behaviour which were associated with those stages.”’500 The 
result is a fluid and liminal age identity as attitudes towards ageing, accompanied by the 
western ‘anti-ageing’ credo, ‘problematis[e] fixed age stages and their tacit basis in social 
expectation’501 -something ‘Benjamin Button’ could be said to allegorise. Biggs highlights 
the notion of youth as a cultural contrivance, a mask or prosthesis which covers or disguises 
the abject matter beneath. Yet fitting to the conflicted figure of the young/old Benjamin 
Button, we find that the same metaphor of the prosthesis or prosthetic layer is used when 
depicting old age, and thus what is suggested in this semiotic echo is the adequation of youth 
and old age. Brad Pitt, who plays the role of Benjamin Button in the cinematic adaptation, 
acts under layers of prostheses. This invokes, and indeed literalises, the journalistic, literary, 
and sociological accounts of ageing discussed in this chapter, such as J.B. Priestley’s 
depiction of organic involution as an emergent performance, subsisting not through the body 
but under a plethora of pseudo-natural additions and acting as if under the hegemony of some 
malign exogenous force. In ‘Building the Curious Faces of Benjamin Button,’ Laura Sydell 
alludes to the synthetic and digital prostheses that are used to make the face of Button: ‘[t]o 
make Benjamin Button, special effects experts needed to put the head of an aged-looking Pitt 
on a child's body for the first third of the movie. The results look just like Pitt — only it 
isn't.’502 Superimposing the image of the senescing man onto a much younger body, whilst 
intensely disturbing and even macabre, does not counterpose the realities of age in 
contemporary culture, neither does it sociological and gerontological discourses, or even the 
semiotics of age in the narratives discussed in this chapter. It is instead germane to such
500 Simon Biggs, ‘The “Blurring” of the Lifecourse: Narrative, Memory, and the Question of Authenticity’, 
Journal o f  Ageing and Identity, vol. 4, No. 4, 1999, p. 210.
Biggs, The Mature Imagination, p. 210.
502 Laura Sydell, ‘Building the Curious Faces of Benjamin Button’, National Public Radio 
http://www.npr.org/templates/storv/storv.t)hp?storvld-100668766 [accessed 01/2011]
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discourses and the cohabitation of youth and age in the antagonism between subjective self- 
image and objective body-image. For instance, a prevailing image in social gerontology is the 
mask, of the ‘objective truth of age [that] seems fallacious: one has the impression of having 
put on a borrowed mask.’503 Contemporary consumer discourses and prolongevity medicine, 
as I shall discuss in chapter five, work surreptitiously on the adequation of youth and age; and 
likewise, the image of the prosthesis in narratives of ageing conjoin age and the possibility or 
promise of its undoing. The filmic adaptation of ‘Benjamin Button’, then, yields an image 
that, quite inclusively, exemplifies contemporary discourses of ageing. In Sydell’s account 
notions of embodiment and alterity, presence and absence, youth and senescence, organic and 
synthetic, are juxtaposed. We have a plethora of identities and ages as Pitt’s expressions are 
‘digitally mapped, then recreated and imposed over the faces of other actors.’504 Both 
textually and cinematographically, then, masquerade is important in conveying age identities. 
As Biggs writes:
A focus on masquerade implies a division of the self into hidden and manifest parts. 
Further, if one only sees the performance of a masque, this begs a fundamental and 
controversial question: is there an authentic self beneath these surface appearances?505
The digitalization of Pitt’s face in ‘Benjamin Button’, as well as the superimposition of his 
head on a child’s body, dramatizes the dynamics of the mature identity, fissured as it is 
between the subjective self-image and its continuity versus the objective body-image and its 
vicissitudes. The technologies of ageing used to make the film, then, are to some extent a 
paradigm of this dualism underpinning both a great deal of social gerontology and the 
semiotics of age in some contemporary narratives of ageing. Moreover, inasmuch as Pitt’s 
expressions and movements are a conflation of his own, a child’s, and those of the ‘special
503 Simon de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, p. 294.
504 Laura Sydell
505 Biggs, p. 210.
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effects’ directors, notions of dispersed agency, a loss of self-sovereignty, and the 
puppet/ventriloquist dynamic are endemic to the performance. This provides an important 
metaphorical overlap with the themes of ageing, the loss of tacit self-command, and the 
putative sense of dispossession and alterity associated with the distinctiveness, aversiveness, 
and constrictiveness of senescence.
Extending the theme of masquerade, Oscar Wilde’s jointly Faustian and Narcissan fantasy, 
The Picture o f  Dorian Gray, is a text where paradoxes and doubles reverberate. This novel is 
germane to contemporary discourses of anti-ageing and the fight to prevent all predations of 
the self. Ageing in a postmodern consumer society is depicted in terms of an ‘indefinite 
postponement’ of age, and embodies a laissez-faire individualism where one recoils from or 
refutes the universality of human ageing for the promise ‘that ageing can be effectively 
abolished.’506 Dorian Gray studies and falls in love with his specular double, in particular its 
changelessness, uttering the fatal words: “‘How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and 
dreadful. But this picture will remain always young [...] Yes, there is nothing in the whole 
world I would not give! I would give my soul for that!”’507 In the text we have two Dorians: 
the seductive perdurance of his virtual, mimetic image which he comes to embody, and the 
portrait which ages grotesquely and clandestinely. Wilde confers visibility and, ostensibly, 
life on Dorian’s sin, and his ‘age’ exists seemingly as a malign presence -a  second person 
even -that comes to destroy the ageless Dorian. One may reapproproiate Dorian Gray as a 
21st century parable on anti-ageing and the fundamentally fissured identities it occasions
508between the ‘surface allure and concealed decay.’
There are indeed many parallels that can be drawn between the period in which the novel was 
written and our own discourses of ageing. For instance, the fin  de siecle in which Dorian
506 Biggs, The Mature Imagination, pp. 61 & 60
507 Oscar Wilde, The Picture o f Dorian Gray (London: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 34.
508 Mulvey (1991), cited by Biggs in The Mature Imagination, p. 74 [accessed 11/12/11].
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Gray was written, combined with the Decadent ideologies the novel espouses, offer some 
affinity with a more contemporary incredulity toward ageing. Although being a 
transformational movement, the fin  de siecle is not necessarily engaged only in the ‘new’, but 
preoccupied with, and always antagonised by, the f in  ’ and its associations with finitude, 
obsolescence, and decline -as indeed the very noun ‘decadence’ suggests.509 The Decadent 
movement is often characterised by its opposition and aesthetic indifference to nature: the 
artificial, opulent, and cosmetic takes precedence over the organic, primitive, and fecund, 
deviating from that which is considered natural or indeed normal.510 It is bound up in 
unnatural practices, the cultivation of drugs, and the renouncing of nineteenth-century 
naturalism, positivism, philistine bourgeois values of morality and utility, and the practical 
concerns of ordinary existence -in  essence, conditions that counterpose subjects such as 
ageing and decay. Yet the noun ‘decadence’ is defined as the act or process of falling into an 
inferior condition or state; deterioration; retrogression; and decay. With its joint allusions to 
decay and the high artifice that precludes decay, Decadence might be construed as useful 
paradigm of a contemporary society that at once rejects or recoils from Nature and is 
burdened increasingly by it -in  other words, a culture at once ageing, as a result of rising life 
expectancies, and eluding age through pharmacological, cosmetic, and medical interventions. 
Contemporary society is marked by a ‘denial of age, an effort to erase or efface age and to 
put on youth;’ yet the illusion of a perpetual present towards which the consumer strives -and 
may achieve -is  but a ‘creation of artifice.’511 Anti-ageing renounces Nature in the sense it 
reveals deep incredulity towards age and mortality; yet ironically, the result of anti-ageing 
practices —which I discuss at length in chapter five —is an ageing populous that becomes 
dependent to far greater degrees on medical, pharmacological, and cosmetic interventions
509 Clyde D. Le Ryals, ‘Towards a Definition of Decadent as Applied to British Literature of the Nineteenth 
Century’, Journal o f  Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 17, No. 1 Sept., 1958 http ://www. j stor. org/stable/428013 
[accessed 01/11], pp. 85-6.
510 M.H Abrams, A Glossary o f  Literary Terms, 5th edition. (USA: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1981), p. 3.
11 Biggs, The Mature Imagination, pp. 76 & 72.
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than ever before as life expectancies rise. In other words, anti-ageing culture is inextricably 
and paradoxically an ageing one: its healthcare services are stretched further to sustain the 
ageing population anti-ageing culture at once creates and transcends, whilst the anti-ageing 
parlance, ideologies, and practices continue to belie the reality they create.
The portrait in Dorian Gray exemplifies this paradox: on the one hand, the novel represents 
the ideal of unchanging beauty which recoils from the fecundity and vicissitudes of 
instinctual, organic life; but on the other, it represents an unchanging beauty that is haunted, 
defined and eventually destroyed by corruption, depravity, and decay. The painting represents 
an ideal but is also the exemplar of human mortality and mortal sin that comes jointly to 
destroy and define that ideal. Wilde’s cautionary tale is about the intractable passage of time 
on the one hand and its complete transcendence on the other. It valorises artificiality and 
opulence, surface over depth, rejecting naturalism whilst at the same time exhibiting an acute 
anxiety toward ageing and mortality, giving back the naturalism Decadent writers putatively 
reject:
For there is such a little time that your youth will last -such a little time. The common 
hill-flowers will wither, but they blossom again [...] But we never get back our youth. 
The pulse of joy that beats in us at twenty, becomes sluggish. Our limbs fail, our 
senses rot. We degenerate into hideous puppets.512
Senescence is represented as a grotesque, caricatural self-parody, with conflicting allusions to 
the pathos but also the performativity and artifice of age. The terms in which old age is often 
narrated are often hyperbolic, with the determinism old age represents taking on a highly 
pathologised, Gothicised, and even demonised form: ‘Yes, there would be a day when his 
face would be wrinkled and wizen, his eyes dim and colourless, the grace of his figure broken
51" Wilde, The Picture o f  Dorian Gray, pp. 30-1.
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and deformed [...] He would become dreadful, hideous and uncouth.’51j Ironically, Wilde’s 
depiction of mortality (like Samuel Beckett’s depictions514) here seems to have little to do 
with biological processes, and is more unnatural, supernatural, a thing of penance, and a 
malign external force -o r even, for Dorian at least, something one does to oneself. 
Furthermore, the representation of age as the incarnation of sin transforms the universality of 
ageing, for Dorian, into a persecutional, paranoiac, and highly tormentful individualised state 
-as if it is just Dorian alone who, as punishment for sin, must suffer it. Senescence is 
represented, then, as both natural and artificial, with the regaining of one’s youth at once 
intensely, and disturbingly unnatural, even sacrilegious, but also the exemplar of nature as he 
compares the desire ‘to get back one’s youth’515 to that of the flower’s transient but recurring 
fecundity. In Dorian’s fissured existence, Wilde probes the boundaries between youth and old 
age, transient embodiment and perdurant virtuality, ‘the normal and the pathological, the 
child and the adult, the animal and the human, even the living and the dead.’516 Dorian’s 
Faustian exchange of body for portraiture is foreshadowed in passages prior to its happening. 
For example, there is very early on in the narrative a subtle collapse of Dorian into portrait as 
Basil, at once artist and surgeon, says: “well as soon as you are dry you shall be varnished and 
framed, and sent home [my emphasis].”517 Wilde offers a tropological infinity in the 
adequation of artistic and surgical imagery, flesh and canvas -the vicissitudes of the body and 
the continuity of portraiture. The painter Basil Hallward sublimates his desire for Dorian in 
his portrait of him, whilst Dorian in turn becomes immortalised and devastated by this self- 
image. The novel conjoins the libidinal fear of mortality and the narcissistic love of one’s 
image, and oscillates between opulence, irreality, aesthetic detachment, an opposition to
513 Ibid., p. 33.
514 See chapter 2.
515 Wilde, p. 51.
516 Jenny Bourne Taylor, ‘Psychology at the fin de siecle’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Fin de Siecle, 
ed. by Gail Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 17.
517 Wilde, p. 36.
154
Nature and organic life, and a palpable sense of determinism associated more with the 
realism and naturalism Decadent writers purportedly elide. The portrait represents an almost 
sacrilegious re-creation or ‘makeability of the human body,’518and the object-cathexis where 
the ageing body is an unruly object awaiting restoration or replacement. In her chapter ‘The 
“Art of Cosmetic Surgery’, Susanne Fraser aligns surgeon and artist, coupling the pre- 
surgical body and blank canvass, describing ‘the natural body as raw material or “clay”, 
which the “artist surgeon” can mould.’519 This is implied in the suggestively medical lexicon 
Wilde employs -art being described with the positivism associated with medical 
epistemology, vivisection, experimentalism, and impious acts of creation. He describes how 
‘to a large extent the lad [Dorian] was his [Basil’s] own creation,’520 and also ‘a feeling of 
almost scientific interest’521 as the portrait begins to alter. The portrait is described often in 
physiological terms as it is transformed from ageless to aged, from aesthetic idolatry to 
medical inquiry: ‘What was that loathsome red dew that gleamed, wet and glistening, on one 
of the hands, as though the canvas had sweated blood?’
The soul’s ‘physiognomic extroversion’523 represents a demythologisation of the central story 
line, conveying the metaphysical realm of soul and mind in much more palpable, materialist 
terms. One might argue this has its counterpart in technologies of ageing such as cosmetic 
surgery, as one can re-sculpt the body to match one’s subjective self-image —and hence, like 
in Dorian Gray, collapsing the boundaries between appearance and subjectivity, or external 
and internal.524 Dorian has a desire for a seamless public appearance bearing no indicators of
518 Davis, pp. 28-9.
519 Susanne Frazer, ‘The “Art” o f Cosmetic Surgery: Medicine, Metaphor and Meaning’, Cosmetic Surgeiy, 
Gender and Culture (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 134.
520 Wilde, p. 60.
521 Ibid., p. 111.
522 Ibid., p. 199.
523 Christopher Craft, ‘Come See About Me: Enchantment of the Double in The Picture o f  Dorian Gray*, 
Representations , Vol. 91, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 109-136 (p. 115) 
http://www.istor.Org/stable/l0.1525/rep.2005.91.1.109 [accessed 03/12]
524 Wilde, p. 129.
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diet, class status, or age. Moreover, the actual portrait and the connection between one’s 
appearance and one’s subjectivity, although profoundly negative in this novel, still convey an 
ideal with respect to socio-medical discourses: the desire to match one’s objective body 
image to one’s subjective self-image. Dorian simply chooses not to age, and has some affinity 
with anti-ageing and the laissez-faire individualism inherent in it where one recoils from or 
renounces the universality of human ageing for ‘the promise [...] that one might somehow 
choose not to become old.’525 Dorian becomes his own specular mimesis, and the relation is 
comparable to Foucault’s work on the heterotopia of the mirror where:
In the mirror I see myself where I am not, in an unreal space that opens up virtually 
behind the surface; I am over there where I am not, a kind of shadow that gives me 
my own visibility, that enables me to look at myself there where I am absent -a  mirror 
utopia [...] Due to the mirror I discover myself absent at the place where I am [...] 
utterly unreal -since, to be perceived, it is obliged to go by way of that virtual point 
which is over there.526
Dorian does not simply transcend age by selling his soul so that he might, like the portrait, be 
unchanging; he transcends age in the fact that Wilde confers visibility on Dorian’s sin, 
imbuing the painting, ostensibly, with life and thus making Dorian’s ‘age’ quite literally 
separable from him. His age is something that he hides or conceals, and this process of 
concealing is comparable to the cosmetic surface versus the concealed abject matter beneath 
that for Biggs constitutes postmodern ageing.
5-5 Biggs, The Mature Imagination, p. 47.
5“6 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works o f  Foucault, p. 179.
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iv) Conclusion: Ageing and its Semiological Transcendence
This chapter has discussed the prosthetic vision of age as a sort of semiotic flux: in other 
words, how writers confer aspects of senescence onto inorganic objects and structures that 
surround the body, and how those objects and structures, in turn, recapitulate in ever 
expanding circles aspects of one’s corporeality in an extended, prosthetic body. Central to 
this chapter has been the representational paradoxes inherent in this. The prosthetic vision of 
age positions age in a representationally and interpretatively versatile narrative form that 
fosters disparate and mutually contradictory images of ageing. The semiologies of age in the 
literature discussed in this chapter relieves the characters from the infelicities of age yet give 
some indication of the foreignness of pain and the aversiveness of the body in pain. Each 
piece of literature discussed contains the traditional or canonical indices of decline, whilst 
simultaneously using them to offer tentatively transcendentalist representations hinging on a 
sense, or possibility, of agelessness and the eschewal, potentially, of death itself. I have 
discussed ‘age’ or ‘ageing’ as a signified with a constantly deferred and dispersed signifier or 
ever multiplying set of signifiers. In the prosthetic vision, the body is atomised, spread out in 
an abundance of signs, from over-garments, to buildings, to furnishings, and so on, and 
offering a visual lexicon of ageing in which the body is endlessly dispersed, perpetually 
deferred, and ostensibly unnatural. I have argued that the ‘prosthetic vision’, in its tacit 
rejection of the totality of the body and the individual’s holistic cosmos, expresses the pathos 
of old age. It literalises the sense of foreignness, alterity, and ungestalt deformity and fracture 
that comes with the defamiliarising kinaesthetic and articular impressions of the body, with 
the defamiliarising postures pain and dysfunction compel one to take, and the inaction and 
inertia they may force one into. The proliferation of the ‘signs’ or signifiers of age seem at 
times like a mimesis of decay, ceaselessly dividing and subdividing the body between a 
plethora of allusions, metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, juxtapositions and
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permutations, exemplifying how ‘[in] death, you break up: the bits that were you / Start 
speeding away from each other for ever.,527However, I have also argued that the selfsame 
imagery counterposes the realities of ageing, and may be thought of as covertly trans- or even 
post-humanist in its representation of bodies beyond bodies -bodies that extend spectrally 
(signifying or suggesting death) or posthumanly (signifying its transcendence) out beyond the 
prophylactic containment of the body. I have argued that immortality inheres within the very 
semiologies of age, and that, to continue to prosthesis imagery, it is the very writing, as 
Derrida says in O f Grammatology, that is the ‘sensible matter and artificial exteriority: a 
“clothing” [...] even a gannent of perversion and debauchery, a dress of corruption and 
disguise, a festival mask’528 under which and within which the ageing characters find their 
seductive but perhaps delusive reprieve from time and the vicissitudes of age. I have 
discussed the prosthesis, then, as a semiotic paradigm -as denoting a conflicted manner of 
representing age that places the characters on both sides of the divide aged/ageless. These 
characters, I have argued, are fissured: biologically they age, but semiotically they are 
age/ess. Such ambivalence, I have suggested, might be argued to be representative of a 
society at once beset with rising life expectancies and demographic change, yet incredulous 
of mortality and the laws of nature and habituated to ideas of their transcendence. The 
prosthetic vision provides an image of the west’s adroit repression of age -its prejudicial or 
gerontophobic attitudes -as well as offering a new paradigm of hope. Although the senescing 
characters discussed suffer from a disturbing cartography of physical maladies, the semiology 
of ageing, and in particular the constructivist representations of the body, is salvatory: the 
language of ageing implicitly rescues them from the spectre of death, and most importantly 
asks two things of the modem reader: not to associate ageing bodies with decline and 
closeness to death, and equally, not to essentialise the literature of age.
527 Philip Larkin, ‘The Old Fools’ in Collected Poems, p. 131.
528 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 35.
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MIMETIC FORM AND THE EVOCATION OF ALTERITY:
SUBJECTIVITY AND LINGUISTIC DYSFUNCTION IN CONTEMPORARY 
ALZHEIMER’S FICTION
I  fear I  am not in my perfect mind.
Methinks I  should know you and know this man,
Yet I  am doubtful; fo r  I  am mainly ignorant 
What place this is and all the skills I  have 
Remembers not these garments; nor I  know not 
Where I  did lodge last night.529
In 1901 Alois Alzheimer made clinical notes and observations on the behavioural and 
cognitive symptoms of Auguste Deter. Following her death and autopsy in 1906 the 
pathology and clinical symptoms of presenile dementia were first identified, with the term 
‘Alzheimer’s disease’ attested from 1911. Contemporaneous with Alzheimer’s research and 
the subsequent surge in clinical interest amongst European physicians were developments in 
narrative technique in literary Modernism: countertraditional experiments that sought to 
elucidate the non-linear, ffee-associational nature of mental and perceptual processes through 
innovations in imitative form (stream-of-consciousness). The elucidation of mental and 
neurological processes is a feature that is common both to medicine and literature: medicine, 
through autopsy and developments in perceptual mediations such as the X-ray; and literature, 
whereby a comparable exhumation of the innermost geographies of the thinking, conscious 
mind is undertaken through mimetic fallacy (or the theory that form should be dictated by the 
nature of its subject matter). In this chapter I shall analyse how literary erudition and 
developments in imitative form in contemporary ‘subjective’530 Alzheimer’s fiction can
529 William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. by R.A. Foakes (London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2005), 4.7, 63-8, p. 
355.
530 In contrast to objectively-narrated Alzheimer’s fiction (i.e. from the lucid gaze of the carer, and ‘objective’ in 
the sense that Alzheimer’s is not being narrated from the perspective of the sufferer but from that o f the non­
sufferer). Objective Alzheimer’s narratives/memoirs include literature such as John Bayley’s memoir, Iris: A
159
provide insight into the nature and experience of Alzheimer’s disease from the perspective of 
the sufferer. I shall view such narratives as a second, more consciously ‘medical’ phase of 
literary modernism seeking the same penetrative knowledge of the brain through imitative 
form as contemporary medicine through perceptual technologies such as the MRI. This 
analogy, likening language and literary form to the penetrative seeing offered by perceptual 
technologies is described by Rita Charon in Narrative Medicine. Here she describes narrative 
as Tike a prosthetic device or a tool with which to get to the truth, like a crowbar or a 
periscope,’ and others as ‘an object or means of inquiry.’
The chapter starts from the premise that literary form has a diagnostic potential and that its 
development and refining should not be viewed as a self-reflexive, exclusivist technical 
exercise but as a part of a continuing medical imperative to gain further insight into the nature 
of Alzheimer’s disease. Each novel that I shall mention in this chapter attempts to use 
narrative to ‘access’ and elucidate what it must be like to experience Alzheimer’s, and draw 
conspicuously on the fictionality of the novel to represent the reality of the disease. In her 
essay ‘On Being 111’ (1930) Virginia Woolf describes the body as ‘a sheet of plain glass 
through which the soul looks,’ and moves on to describe the experience of ill-health in the 
following terms:
The creature within can only gaze through the pane -smudged or rosy; it cannot 
separate off from the body like the sheath of a knife or the pod of a pea for a single 
instant; it must go through the whole unending procession of changes, heat and cold,
Memoir o f  Iris Murdoch (1998), Linda Grant’s Remind me Who I  am, Again (1998), Alice Sebold’s The Almost 
Moon (2007), Andrea Gillies’ Keeper (2009), Jonathan Franzen’s essay “My Father’s Brain”.
531 Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories o f  Illness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 
6 .
532 Valarie Raoul et al., ‘Making sense of Disease, Disability, and Trauma: Normative and Disruptive Stories’ in 
Unfitting Stories: Narrative Approaches to Disease, Disability, and Trauma (Canada: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2007), p. 3.
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comfort and discomfort, hunger and satisfaction, health and illness, until there comes 
the inevitable catastrophe.533
The salient characteristics of Alzheimer’s disease include memory loss, disorientation of time 
and place, decreased judgement, difficulty with spatial relations and coordination, visual 
disturbances, and behavioural and cognitive changes.534 Many scholars have written about 
dementia as a continuous and irreversible attack on first-person subjectivity. Andrea Fontana 
and Ronald W. Smith have described Alzheimer’s disease in the following terms:
The self has slowly unravelled and “unbecome” a self, but the caregivers take the role 
of the other and assume that there is a person behind the largely unwitting 
presentation of self of the victims, albeit in reality there is less and less, until where 
once there was a unique individual there is but emptiness. Witnessing, as the “other,” 
the “unbecoming” of self, creates a feeling of emptiness in the caregivers’ hearts. 
Thus, they act as agents for the victim and impute to him or her the last remnants of 
self.535
However, when studying the literature of forgetting it is important to delineate natural from 
pathological forgetting. ‘[Tjhere is no need to provide a didactic definition of the word 
“forget,”’ argues Harald Weinrich; ‘Man is by nature a forgetful being.’536 Forgetting is 
endemic to Man, yet the necessity and pathology of forgetting are two very different aspects 
of this blankness that can be thought of respectively as preservative and destructive. In his
533 Virginia Woolf, ‘On Being 111’ in Collected Essays, vol. 4 (London: Hogarth Press, 1967), p. 193
534 Prem P. Gogia & Nirek Rastogi, ‘Symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease’ in Clinical Alzheimer Rehabilitation 
(New York: Springer Publishing Company, LLC, 2009), pp. 65-83 (pp. 68-73).
535 Andrea Fontana and Ronald W. Smith, ‘Alzheimer's Disease Victims: The "Unbecoming" of Self and the 
Normalization of Competence’ in Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1989), pp. 35-46 (p. 45), 
University of California Press http://www.istor.org/stable/1389006 [accessed 12/01/12].
536 Harald Weinrich, Lethe: The Art and Critique o f  Forgetting, trans. by Steven Rendall (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), p. 1.
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epistemological fable ‘Funes, the Memorious’ Jorge Louis Borges highlights both the 
grandeur and abjectness of a continuous, uninterrupted recollection of events:
In fact, Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree of every wood, but also 
every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it. He decided to reduce each of 
his past days to some seventy thousand memories, which would then be defined by 
means of ciphers.537
This unbroken, insomnious recollection of what becomes his ‘intolerably precise world’538 is, 
paradoxically, represented by Borges as the antithesis o f wholeness. The message -and 
paradox -o f  this fable is that having a continuous, unsuppressed, and nonlatent recollection of 
events without intermission will not provide a coherent knowledge of the world, but the 
consummate incompleteness and moments of absence that comes with forgetting, will. In 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke describes an existential and 
ontological dimension to memory, where memory becomes a repository for the self which is 
self-affirming when one draws upon it, as well as enslaving, with the threat of existential 
death in moments of blankness:
in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far 
as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that same person; it is the same self now it was then; and ’tis by 
the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.539
537 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Funes the Memorious’, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, ed. by Donald 
A. Yates et al. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 93.
538 Ibid., p. 94.
539 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Roger Woolhouse (London & New York: 
Penguin, 1997), p. 302.
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However, Borges represents memory not as a salvatory but necrotic force -one that destroys 
rather than revives one’s identity. Without natural, diurnal forgetting, Funes is more 
cognizant of the ageing process and ephemeral grounds on which physical identity rests:
‘[h]is own face in the mirror, his own hands, surprised him every time he saw them [...] Funes 
could continuously discern the tranquil advances of corruption, of decay, of fatigue. He could 
note the progress of death, of dampness.’540 Funes does not have the abbreviated experience 
of time gained through forgetting or sleep, and as such memory is inhumane, causing an 
acute, interminable awareness of mortality and physical decay. On the other hand, forgetting 
is associated with more of an anosognosic blindness to the vicissitudes of age -to  each 
minute change in one’s appearance -and thus, to some extent, generates an illusion of 
‘sameness’ or continuity in physical appearance over time. Funes’ failure to forget, to ‘turn 
[his] mind from the world,’541 represents an impasse, an inability to understand any more than 
the surfeit of details that are presented to him at any given moment: ‘I suspect [...] that he was 
not very capable of thought. To think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions.
In the teeming world of Funes, there were only details, most immediate in their presence.’542 
The necessity of forgetting is outlined by David Shenk: ‘[w]hat makes details hazy also 
enables us to prioritize information and retain patterns. The brain eliminates trees in order to 
make sense of, and remember, the forests. Forgetting is a hidden virtue.’543 Likewise, Stefan 
Merrill Block comments in his debut novel The Story o f  Forgetting (2008), ‘that our success 
as a species is based as much, if not more, on our ability to forget than on our ability to 
remember.’544 Block allegorizes the necessity of forgetfulness in the story of Isidora, in 
which this fictitious land’s peace is determined by the residents’ collective amnesia, and its 
descent into war, the introduction of memory. The importance of forgetting is also expounded
540 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Funes the Memorious’ in Labyrinths, p. 94.
541 Ibid.
542 Ibid.
543 David Shenk, The Forgetting: Alzheimer’s, Portrait o f  an Epidemic (Anchor Books, 2003), p. 60.
544 Stefan Merrill Block, The Story o f  Forgetting (London: Faber & Faber, 2009), p. 81.
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in Samantha Harvey’s The Wilderness (2009), in which she writes: ‘One cannot be expected 
to remember everything, and in fact remembering everything is a hindrance to living; if an 
event comes as a thousand details the brain needs to forget nine hundred of them in order to 
derive any meaning from that event.’545 Friedrich Nietzsche writes in Genealogy o f Morality 
of how forgetting has an important function and is not simply a vis inertiae:
To shut the doors and windows of consciousness for a while; not to be bothered by the 
noise and battle with which our underworld of serviceable organs work with and 
against each other; a little peace, a little tabula rasa of consciousness to make room 
for something new, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for ruling, 
predicting, predetermining [...] -that, as I said, is the benefit of active forgetfulness, 
like a doorkeeper or guardian of mental order, rest and etiquette: from which we can 
immediately see how there could be no happiness, cheerfulness, hope, pride, 
immediacy.546
Pathological forgetting is an ‘existential syndrome.’547 The salient characteristics of 
Alzheimer’s disease include: memory loss; disorientation of time/place; decreased 
judgement; difficulty with spatial relations and coordination; visual disturbances; changes in
548mood, behaviour and basic personality; and decline in abstract thinking and reasoning. It is 
broadly conceived of in terms of retrogenesis, meaning that the individual ‘begins to lose 
abilities in cognition, coordination, behaviour, language, and feeding, in the reverse order that
545 Samantha Harvey, The Wilderness (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 43.
546 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Second Essay: “Guilt”, “Bad Conscience”, and Related Matters’ On the Genealogy o f  
Morality, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 35.
547 Jonathan Lethem, Introduction to The Vintage Book o f  Amnesia: An Anthology o f  Writing on the Subject o f  
Memoiy Loss (USA: Vintage, 2000), p. xiii.
548 Prem P. Gogia & Nirek Rastogi, Clinical Alzheimer Rehabilitation, pp. 68-73.
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they were acquired in the early years of life.,549I open with a quotation from William 
Shakespeare’s King Lear (1606) because the play is evocative of the role of literature in 
medicine and medical education that I wish to pursue in this chapter. It is remarked that
th‘during the 16 Century some of the best descriptions of senile dementia were to be found 
not in medical texts but in literary works.’550 This chapter will examine the extent to which 
this remains the case with fiction today, and how medical practitioners might solicit 
subjective Alzheimer’s fiction in order to gain further, more empathic insights into the nature 
of the disease. I also want to examine how the interpretative processes of the literary scholar 
become more medically-attuned, and defined by a more clinical rationality and impassivity 
than creative, interpretative deviations. For example, with regards to King Lear recent 
scholarship has revealed a more diagnostic response to the play: from studying the verbal 
evidence within the text, ‘King Lear has been diagnosed,’ writes Andrea Gillies, ‘with 
vascular dementia.’551 As a ‘Shakespearean examination of early Alzheimer’s disease,’552 
Shakespeare’s dramaturgy represents a space where illness and disease are localised -where 
the very soliloquies themselves harbour a diagnostic potential or diagnostic clues. One 
important aspect to this play is in the ‘medical gaze’553 it elicits and the diagnostic limitations 
by which interpretation is informed/enformed and domesticated. As I shall move on to 
examine with contemporary Alzheimer’s fiction, literature that becomes fundamentally 
etiological in nature prompts a clinical attitude to textual analysis -where, as Gillies points 
out, to interpret is also to diagnose. Concomitantly, it curtails the creative, interpretative 
liberties and deviations of the reader by implicitly establishing a medical discourse by which 
interpretation of the text is guided, and offering diagnostic limitations and possibilities within 
which interpretation should take place. The play’s construction around Alzheimer’s, I argue,
549 Dr Harold D. Foster, What Really Causes Alzheimer’s Disease (Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2004), p. 3.
550 Nawab Qizilbash, Evidence-Based Dementia Practice (Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 2003), p. 206
551 Andrea Gillies, Keeper: Living With Nancy: A Journey into Alzheimer’s (UK: Short Books, 2009), p. 75.
552 Jay L. Halio, The Tragedy o f  King Lear (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 61.
553 Michel Foucault, Birth o f  the Clinic (London: Routledge Classics, 2003), p. 9.
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represents a form of over-determination as medical positivism encroaches on literary 
hermeneutics -with both the narrative itself and the interpretative process of the reader 
subjugated to the aetiology and teleology of Alzheimer’s disease.
The texts I shall analyse in this chapter all use literary devices in different ways to convey the 
sense of obtrusive inseparability from the dementing mind. One of the main objectives of this 
chapter is to look at literary experimentalism as less of an elitist, florid, arcane, and densely 
self-referential gesture, and more in terms of how it illuminates the experience of 
Alzheimer’s as well as the potential value it has as a medical and gerontological resource. 
Some studies have tended to focus in an elitist way on the one-way traffic model where 
medicine has had an impact on literary topic and expression. Cynthia J. Davis’ book Bodily 
and Narrative Forms: The Influence o f Medicine on American Literature, 1845-1915 is one 
such example of this. At the core of her research is how ‘attempts to grapple with [...] diverse 
medical understandings through narrative means were not restricted to narrative content alone 
but necessarily involved formal features.’554 Whilst this chapter involves how medical 
epistemologies elicit innovations in imitative form in fiction, one central consideration is how 
medical understanding of Alzheimer’s, as a disease or site of therapy, can be significantly 
influenced using the insights that literature can provide. Anne Hunsaker Hawkins asks of the 
palliative function of literature -o f  whether ‘a personal narrative about illness, intended for an 
audience of listeners or readers, serve[s] as a way to “treat” illness.’555 The importance of 
literary hermeneutics in medicine and medical practice is examined by Rita Charon’s 
Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories o f Illness (2006) and Viv Martin’s Developing a 
Narrative Approach to Healthcare Research (2011), in which it is argued that: ‘by illustrating
554 Cynthia J. Davis, Bodily and Narrative Forms: The Influence o f  Medicine on American Literature, 1845- 
1915 (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 1.
555 Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, ‘Writing About Illness: Therapy? Or Testimony?’, Unfitting Stories, p. 114.
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and giving insight into illness experience, they contribute ‘narrative’ knowledge which can 
enhance the practice of ethical and effective healthcare.’556
The texts I shall analyse include: B.S Johnson’s House Mother Normal (1971), Paul Auster’s 
Travels in the Scriptorium (2006), Stefan Merrill Block’s novel The Story o f  Forgetting 
(2008), Lisa Genova’s Still Alice (2009), and Samantha Harvey’s The Wilderness. Each text 
attempts to portray Alzheimer’s from the perspective of the patient. These novels, to different 
degrees, are constructed around an imitative rather than commentative use of narrative voice. 
Johnson’s narrative polemics, as I shall examine, represent an explicit conversion of 
language, syntax, and typography into textual symptoms, transforming reader-response from 
the interpretative in the ‘literary’ sense to the diagnostic in the medical sense. Part of my 
analysis into this concerns how the characters’ amnesic states give rise to existential moments 
of self-inquiry and self-diagnosis, and how this is embroiled in a metafictional commentary 
on the novel’s own narrative and linguistic condition. I shall address how the author 
abandons the rational, impassive, mediating control of a heterodiegetic narrator, and draws 
self-consciously upon their own power to suspend, distort, or reinvent the ‘real’ in order to 
achieve these ostensibly ‘subjective’ portrayals. Thus the metafictionality of these novels 
correlates to the profoundly alienating, often hallucinogenic reality the sufferer is confronted 
with, and this converting of ‘fictionalism [into] a kind of realism’557 —the reality of a disease 
—is fundamental to sustaining the illusion of an unmediated account of Alzheimer’s disease 
from the eyes of the sufferer. It is an obvious paradox within some of these narratives that 
they appropriate a modernistic stream-of-consciousness narrative technique to examine the 
experience of a disease that irretrievably damages first-person subjectivity. I will study the 
ways in which these novelists textualise illness, and the circumscribed, diagnostic response it
556 Viv Martin, Developing a Narrative Approach to Healthcare Research (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing Ltd., 
2011), p. x.
557 George Graham, The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy o f  Mind and Mental Illness 
(Oxford & New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 231
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evokes in the reader. These narratives represent a growing body of work seeking a more 
reciprocal relation between the positivist epistemology of medicine and the creative, 
interpretative potentialities of literature -in  particular placing the self-reflexivity of literary 
experimentalism within the remit of medicine. Recent research has already revealed how 
grammar and syntax can involuntarily harbour diagnostic clues. Peter Garrard, of University 
College London’s Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, has studied the deterioration of the 
longhand and prose style of Iris Murdoch, remarking:
Iris Murdoch was known to write only in longhand, with few revisions of passages, 
sending the completed longhand manuscripts to her publishers with little allowance 
for editorial interference. Her manuscripts thus offer a unique opportunity to explore
r r o
the effects of the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease.
What this chapter analyses are the ways in which this can be achieved intentionally. I will 
study the ways in which medicine and literature illuminate each other, and whether in the 
context of rising life expectancies and attendant increases in age-related disease, the reading 
of such literature constitutes a form of social agency. I will study what sort of 
textual/representational criteria that currently exist in first-person narratives, and from here 
detennine how far it is possible to establish a ‘model’ of Alzheimer’s disease in literature. 
Such narratives ask whether it is possible to ‘see into the minds’559 and the bodies of the 
afflicted, bringing together narratology and teratology, and converting interpretation into 
diagnosis, reader into ‘narrative practitioner.’560
558 Peter Garrard, ‘Iris Murdoch’s last novel reveals first signs of Alzheimer’s disease’ (Feb. 2006), UCL Media 
Relations http://www.ucl.ac.uk/media/librarv/murdoch [accessed 09/11/11].
559 B.S. Johnson, House Mother Normal: A Geriatric Comedy (New York: A New Directions Book, 1986), p. 5.
560 James P. Meza & Daniel S. Passerman, Integrating Narrative Medicine and Evidence-Based Medicine: The 
Everyday Social Practice o f  Healing (London: Radcliffe Publishing Ltd., 2011), p. 8.
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i) Ars Moriendi: The Abyss and Salvation of Mimetic Form
The role of literary hermeneutics in attempting to ‘access’ or gain insight into the experience 
of Alzheimer’s has become a more prominent preoccupation over the last couple of decades -  
necessitated, perhaps, by the increase of age-related pathologies with rising life expectancies. 
Elizabeth Herskovits comments how:
Alzheimer’s discourse has also produced a troubling dilemma regarding the 
subjectivity of the diagnosed person. The problem of debased personhood is implicit 
in the current Alzheimer’s construct, due to its vividly disturbing metaphors and 
images of AD as “the funeral without end,” “the loss of self,” and “the death before 
death” (Conen and Eisdorfer). With the popularization Alzheimer’s, the subjective 
experience of aging and of “senility” have become increasingly horrific and 
monstrous; we are all afraid of losing our minds as we grow old. In response to the 
“loss of self’ assumed to accompany the disease, we now see a burgeoning literature 
representing and debating the nature of subjectivity in Alzheimer’s .561
The role of literature in medical practice is often referred to as ‘narrative medicine’, which 
Rita Charon defines as ‘a clinical practice informed by the theory and practice of reading, 
writing, telling, and receiving of stories.’562 In terms of narrating Alzheimer’s in literature, 
and in particular the teleology of the disease, there is an affinity between language as viewed 
poststructurally, with its complexity, irreducible polysemy, and densities in connotation -a  
meaning, or signified, that is always a product of ‘infinite reference’563 and passing words or 
signifiers, and thus is perpetually shifting and unstable -and reality as viewed through the
561 Elizabeth Herskovits, ‘Struggling over Subjectivity: Debates about the "Self1 and Alzheimer's Disease’ in 
Medical Anthropology Quarterly , New Series, Vol. 9, No. 2, Cultural Contexts of Aging and Health (Jun.,
1995), pp. 146-164 (p. 148) http://www.istor.org/stable/649114 [accessed 03/12]
562 Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine, p. viii.
563 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 36.
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eyes of the Alzheimer’s sufferer. David Keck describes the first-person Alzheimer’s narrative 
as ‘deconstruction incarnate,’564 because a deconstructive approach to language emphasises 
the instability and dubiety of meaning, dethrones or desacralises the monistic presence of the 
Author, and results in ‘a systematic exemption of meaning’ and a refusal ‘to assign a 
“secret,” an ultimate meaning to the text.’565 To represent Alzheimer’s subjectively, Keck 
argues, narratives must break down:
A first-person narrative about the effects of the disease would have to become literally 
unreadable as the person passed into severe dementia. A third-person narrative could 
still be grammatically readable, but to do justice to the disease, it would have to be so 
confused and disorientating as to be practically unreadable. Certainly, it should bring 
us very little pleasure to wander through its maze of words. We should not be 
surprised that we would have narrative troubles with Alzheimer’s disease.566
This is exemplified in B.S. Johnson’s House Mother Normal. The text espouses a ‘sick’ or 
‘symptomatic’ aesthetic formalism, with each monologue prefaced by a list of pathologies, 
and the ensuing narratives constructed mimetically around those pathologies. Each narrative 
represents a topography of the characters’ perceptual and somatic states - ‘a diagram of 
certain aspects of the inside of [the] skull,’567 as Johnson terms. The list of pathologies 
prefacing each monologue represent narrative determinants as changes in syntax, 
punctuation, grammar, and typography correspond to the pathologies listed in each preface: 
dementia, haemorrhoids, short-sightedness, and so on. Through this conversion of bodily 
symptoms into textual symptoms, Johnson makes pain —a sensation invisible to others and 
thus bereft of much representational content -an objectified, materialised, textualised, and
564 David Keck, ‘Deconstruction Incarnate: The Etiology and Teleology of Alzheimer’s Disease’ in Forgetting 
Whose We Are: Alzheimer’s Disease and the Love o f God (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), p. 28.
565 Roland Barthes, ‘Death of the Author’ in The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporaiy Trends,
3rd. edn., ed. by David H. Richter (USA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), p. 877.
566 Ibid., p. 30.
567 Johnson, House Mother Normal, p. 204.
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above all localisable phenomenon, a textual artefact. The list of pathologies prefacing each 
monologue is as much a diagnosis of the narrator as it is the narrative. The abstract, arcane, 
necrotic, and increasingly complex nature of each monologue, whilst profoundly alienating, 
represents a somewhat inevitable oscillation between the lists of symptoms prefacing each 
monologue. Johnson has a perverse fascination with the annihilating power of physical and 
psychic pain, and implicates the reader in this -their confusion and alienation paradigmatic of 
the speaker’s own aversive or constrictive psychic, perceptual, or somatic states.
Alternatively, it forces the reader to adopt a more impassive, positivist, diagnostic gaze, 
correlating textual symptoms with the physical symptoms we know them to have.
The intentions of his multi-perspectival narrative are made clear from the introduction by 
House Mother who, addressing the reader, comments: ‘you shall see into the minds of our 
eight old friends, and you shall see into my mind. You shall follow our Social Evening 
through nine different minds!’568 The nine monologues are simply transcriptions of the same 
event spoken by each resident, each in varying degrees of senility -and with each monologue, 
therefore, delivered in varying degrees of lucidity. The repetition across the narratives is 
unifying, implying both the communality of this scene and the objectivity of their 
surroundings. But this is deceptive. The more severe the speaker’s physical or mental 
pathology, the more ungrammatical and unsignifiable the narrative. Each monologue works 
toward a jointly mental, physiological, and representational sense of affliction, with each 
textual symptom mapping on to the different pathologies we are alerted to in each 
monologue’s preface. In this Johnson is not only asking ‘is or can language and narrative be 
“sick”’, but rather: to what extent can there be a stylistic equivalent of different illnesses -  
schizophrenia, for instance, dementia, or arthritis. Johnson does go some way toward 
demonstrating there can be: semi-consciousness and forgetting are represented in ellipses,
568 Ibid., p. 5.
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sentence fragments, blank spaces, and sometimes whole blank pages if the character falls 
asleep. For characters suffering from advanced dementia the prose breaks up and all we get 
are nonsensical words, non sequitur dialogic fragments, and letters thrown arbitrarily across 
the page as Johnson tries to recreate what might be going on in these minds. Yet he 
occasionally tunes into more specific physical complaints. He employs a very crude use of 
typography in Ron Lamson’s monologue, for example, using a different typeface, larger 
lettering, greater line length and line spacing in the passages where Lamson suffers most 
acutely from his haemorrhoids. This is also played out on a semantic level as his difficulties 
in moving are mimicked in highly tautological passages, resulting in a lack of narrative 
progression for the reader. Likewise, as his pain and immobility increase, the narrative 
becomes more complex and free-associational, which of course implicates the reader again. 
As the prose demands several re-readings just to be understood, it engenders a 
methodological slowness in the reader equivalent to that of the physical tardiness of the 
sufferer. It is at this point Johnson’s duplication of events in other monologues becomes 
significant. In the case of Lamson’s monologue where the reader is required to fill in the 
spaces, often this is must be done with recourse to another, more complete narrative. Not only 
his slowness, then, but his dependence on the more able-bodied is paralleled in the reader’s 
‘dependence’ on the more lucid accounts. Part of Johnson’s subjective vision of pain and 
senility, then, is not only in invoking a medical gaze in the reader through a symptomatic 
aesthetic, but a response analogous to that of the residents’ mentally, or in this case 
physically, slower engagement with the world. For Johnson, when depicting dysfunction, a 
lucid, communicable, and grammatically sound narrative is therefore tantamount to a 
concealment, or repudiation, of its subject matter. In striving for an ever closer approximation 
of the nihilating effects of time on mind, body, and identity, he is questioning what 
constitutes representation and also the role one takes when reading. In many ways, the extent
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to which the reader’s progression through and understanding of the text is compromised is 
itself constitutive of this disclosive act of ‘making evident’. The act of reading and 
interpreting is not just aligned with diagnosis, then, but more unsettlingly to symptom. By 
extension to this, our clarification of the grammatically unsound or ‘sick’ narratives is 
therefore implicitly curative. By seeking a causal relation between the condition of the ageing 
body or mind and that of the narrative, Johnson exhumes the invisible geography of the body 
and its innermost sensations, and converts the residents’ nonverbal, semi-conscious reception 
of the world into language and narrative. He does not passively represent the characters’ 
illnesses, enforming and domesticating them through narrative, but offers up a fiction about 
illness through creating an illness of fiction. It is comparable to Keck’s description of a ‘true’ 
first-person portrayal:
The disease challenges and relativizes all of our assumptions about language, 
meaning, and humanity itself. A true first-person, end-stage Alzheimer’s narrative - i f  
it were physically possible from someone who cannot speak, type, or hold a pencil -  
would be the ideal deconstructionist text.569
Central to Johnson’s aesthetic of disarticulation is ironically the translatability of the ageing 
body and senile mind; he stresses the diagnostic potential of language and form and the 
extent to which, in subjective age narratives, interpretation is diagnosis. Johnson conveys 
progressive senility through a progressive and insidious experimentality, and it is thus a 
paradox in his work that the abjectness, pathos, and determinism embodied in senility 
coexists with the flare, energy, and polemicism of his linguistic and stylistic decisions. In his 
experimentalism, Johnson’s representation of ageing might be said to hinge much more on
569 Keck, Forgetting Whose We Are, p. 32.
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innovation, novelty, artistic energy and flair-might, in a postmodern spin on Pound’s dictum, 
be said to ‘make it new’ -than with subjects of finality, fixity, and finitude that are perhaps 
more commonly associated with old age. The narrative structure, syntax, and typography all 
take their cue from the characters’ experience of organic decay, senility, and the inevitability 
of death. The text is a morbid text, a site of morbidity; yet the stylistic choices paradoxically 
lend it an experimentalism and ‘newness’ more associated with the nouveau roman than the 
subject of ageing. Philip Tew comments that Johnson’s narrative ‘conveys a type of 
immediacy in the sense of direct communication based on actions and eventfulness.’570 The 
stylistic choices conflict with the themes of ageing, organic decay, and determinism; yet in its 
complexity, its gradual accretion of detail, and its increasingly abstract and free-associational 
style, the text demands more of the reader. Tew calls this an ‘extended act of making evident 
by form,’571 and paradoxically the ensuing compromise to the reader’s ability to engage with 
and understand the text is constitutive of this disclosive act of ‘making evident.’ Tew argues 
that the ‘collective supersedes the individual’572 in this novel as each narrative can only be 
understood firstly in the context of an overarching sequence of events which is repeated, and 
secondly in the sense that each narrative is substantiated by the preceding one and anticipates 
the succeeding one. This interdependence between the narratives is enforced by their dialogic 
connection: ‘Mrs Bowen, can you pass me your glue, please? This one’s finished’, for 
instance, is answered forty-four pages later in Sioned Bowen’s narrative ‘Glue? Yes here. ,573 
Without cross-reference on the reader’s part, the first is rendered a rhetorical question and the 
second an unsolicited reply. Despite the sequential pagination, the narratives are unfolding 
simultaneously rather than linearly, and despite their introspective, monologic nature are in 
reality energetically and exhaustively dialogic with multiple points of connection. The role of
570 Philip Tew, B.S. Johnson: A Critical Reading (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press,
2001), p. 78.
571 Ibid., p. 74.
572 Ibid., p. 45.
573 Ibid., pp. 84 & 128.
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the reader seems at times compensative and perhaps even curative to make the narrative 
cohere -put more crudely, to ‘fix’ the narrative. The narrative structure effects a 
methodological ‘dependence’ on the part of the reader on the earlier, more lucid narratives. 
Modelled on the disintegrating perception brought about by senility and physical maladies, 
the monologues deteriorate, and as they do so the reader becomes dependent on the early 
sections of the text —the reader’s fulcrum in a progressively disorganised book, and a 
dependency mimicking that of the sicker residents on their carer, House Mother.
The narrative also elicits a sense of forgetfulness in the reader. House Mother’s concluding 
narrative is characterised by eclectic and ostensibly unsolicited comments and responses such 
as ‘Charlie, yes, I knew you’d ask. You’ve got corks from the ones which were full, haven’t 
you?9, the initial question to which - ‘What about corks? Here she comes, down. What shall I  
do for corks fo r  these, Miss?’574 -is  over one hundred pages earlier in Charlie Edwards’ 
monologue. Because of the complex and discursive nature of the book, the reader’s own 
amnesic response and difficulty or slowness is a protraction of that of the residents’ own, 
ostensibly contagious, psychic and somatic distress. Jonathan Coe writes in his biography of 
Johnson that: ‘an unaccustomed breadth of human sympathy coexists with -even arises out of 
-a  technical experiment that is as rigorous and audacious as he attempted’ and that Johnson’s 
‘technical brilliance is never given precedence over a humane and proper response to the 
characters’ pitiable situation.’575 Both Gloria and Sioned’s monologues are replete with 
sentence fragments, ellipses, a diverse and inconstant typography, a lack of punctuation, 
italicised passages, and incomplete dialogues mixed in with an introspective stream-of- 
consciousness. There is very little description of their environment, which conflicts with the 
residential feel of the novel as a whole, and seems to signify their waning sense-impressions 
as they near death. Prefacing these particular patients’ monologues, Johnson reveals a lack of
574 Ibid., pp. 41 & 194.
575 Jonathan Coe, Like a Fieiy Elephant: The Stoiy o f B.S. Johnson (London: Picador, 2005), pp. 24-5.
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visual acuity (both of which, we are told, are at 45%). As Philip Tew notes, ‘the old people’s 
power of recall varies according to their level of senility, with some accounts a random 
scattering of words and many mixing the particular evening at home with recollections of
576their own pasts.’ We, like Gloria and Sioned, have a very limited ‘view’ and understanding 
of their surroundings which have been distorted and ‘blurred through senility,’577 and in the 
narratives’ bridging of the textual and the mental, mediates between ‘sense and nonsense, 
between reason and unreason, between the readable and the unreadable.’578 Consciousness 
and typography are inextricably bound in Sioned Bowen’s monologue. This is rendered 
explicit in the page left completely blank, after which follows ‘<9/?/ Must have dozed off.’579 
Likewise in Gloria Ridge’s monologue, structured around perceptions, digressions, 
memories, feelings, mental images, and dwindling consciousness, which the narrative 
approximates:
...me and then get this down me and
Then I’ll be all right
Spuds and mashed and with knees
Try hard peas, peas, peas
Shovel peas in, more then I’ll be all right
More?
More
General sold his cockerel
576 Tew, p. 44.
577 Coe, p. 24.
578 Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness, trans. by Martha Noel Evans et al. (California: Stanford University 
Press. 2003), p. 5.
579 Johnson, p. 123.
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The meat is good, more meat, that’s 
The thing, must eat to get right, get this meat down me and then 
I’ll be all right, that’s it, ask for more meat. More meat?580
Through various grammatical, typographic, or syntactic ‘failures’, the reader is led 
circumspectly into a diagnostic rather than purely hermeneutic relation to the text, with the 
jointly mental and textual sense of affliction. In this respect, nonsense is disclosive rather 
than distortive, and the patient’s reality, which has little or no representable content (distorted 
as it is), is simultaneously made representable and communicable through Johnson’s use of 
imitative form. Johnson seemingly renders mimetic fallacy a teratology, using it to examine, 
exhume, or x-ray, the physical and neurological deficiencies and deformations of his 
characters/patients. His aesthetic of disarticulation seems to be a self-reflexive technical 
exercise and an evocation of the machinations of neurological decline, built on both the 
positivism of the medical gaze and the creative liberties and deviations of the author. It is a 
book where to refract reality is also to reflect it, and thus Johnson conjoins the pseudo­
realities that fiction can offer with the diagnostic certitude that medicine can offer. With 
recent developments in medical research, the narrative structure, whilst still obviously 
subjugated to the list of pathologies prefacing the monologues, can also signify differently. 
The disjointedness and eclecticism, rather than a mimetic portrayal of the patients’ disordered 
or waning perceptual states, may be read not as pathological but as palliative. Although the 
basis of an anachronistic interpretation, we see that in their paper ‘SenseCam: A 
Retrospective Memory Aid’ Steve Hodges et al. outline the use of cameras worn by 
Alzheimer’s sufferers to ‘capture a digital record of the wearer’s day, by recording a series of
580 Ibid., p. 96.
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images and capturing a log of sensor data.’581 The effect is that patients suffering from 
amnesia can retrieve portions of their day that they have forgotten from studying the visual 
images taken every few minutes. The experience of time, then, might be said to have the 
disjointedness and eclecticism that characterises Johnson’s stream-of-consciousness:
Scrape the plate, the mash off, mash off comers
Swinging on
Roles, nothing much on, just something round his
Unmentionables, as we
Used to call them, into all that mucky water and crawlies,
Out in the bare colds or rocks was it,
Only a picture after all.582
The narrative structure -particularly its typographically demented rendering of thought and 
consciousness -can arguably signify the pathological or the curative, in the same way that 
these stylistic decisions, contrasted with his subject matter, conjoin the pathos of age with the 
novelty, energy, and flair symbolic more of youth or youthfulness.
Through his use of mimetic form, Johnson asks the reader to consider the differences 
between an imitative over a commentative style. Similar to stream-of-consciousness, he does 
not attempt to tidy the vagaries of the (senile) mind, but strives towards linguistic and 
narrative dysfunction comparable to that condition. Whereas commentary effects distance
581 Steve Hodges et al., ‘SenseCam: A Retrospective Memory Aid’ in UbiComp 2006: Ubiquitous Computing, 
ed. by Paul Dourish & Adrian Friday (New York & Germany: Springer, 2006), p. 177.
582 Johnson, p. 97.
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from its subject matter, being always in excess of the signifier, Johnson creates a jointly 
neurological and representational sense of affliction, eliciting as he does so a reader-response 
that is both diagnostic and classificatory. He creates a fiction about illness through 
constructing an illness of fiction, and in the process transforms us from a reader of fiction to 
the arbitrator of a disease. The strong, imitative stylistic deficiency transforms syntax, 
typography, and punctuation both into the mediation -the means to gain greater insight into 
the nature and experience of bodily and mental deficiencies -and the symptom. A lucid, 
mediating, or formalistic narrative might be argued to deviate representationally from the 
nature of its subject matter, embodying that which its subject matter isn ’t: lucid and able. By 
contrast, in admitting specific ailments into language and form, Johnson embraces, 
stylistically, that which his subject matter is: compromised and deficient. He asserts the 
translatability of age-specific pathologies in language and narrative, and uses language to 
penetrate below the visible area of the body. Through imitative form he offers a 
representational equal, or equivalent, of the sort of instrumental mediations in modem 
medicine, such as the stethoscope or x-ray, which allowed physicians to see into and examine 
previously invisible corporal depths.
House Mother Normal is a text that presents its very narrative aesthetic as a site of morbidity. 
The text lends itself less to the interpretative deviations and liberties associated with literature 
and more to the positivism of medicine and clinical observation (or the ‘medical gaze’). 
Charon describes scientific and epidemiological knowledge as the attempt to discover things 
about the world that are ‘universally true,’ and by contrast narrative as ‘enabling] one 
individual to understand particular events befalling another individual.’583 For Johnson, 
however, his text ostensibly obliterates the individual, representing instead the degradative 
processes and objective truths of a disease. Whilst individuality is expressed in the book’s
583 Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine, p. 9.
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monologic structure, it is abandoned with the prefacing of each monologue with a list of 
pathologies. The erasure of the individual is fitting, perhaps, to the nature of dementia, and 
thus this ostensible narrative failure or paradox is transformed instead into the perfect 
expression. The narrative thus has qualities that, in Charon’s estimation, typify the sciences. 
Before the French Revolution of 1789, clinical work in hospitals involved doctors listening to 
patients’ stories of illness before basing their diagnosis on little more than conjecture. With 
the Revolution came a change in the organization of French hospitals and an effort to make 
medicine more rational, less theoretical and more practical and empirical. This brought a rise 
to prominence of new techniques and technologies, including the stethoscope and, arguably, 
separated medicine and narrative. Michel Foucault, focusing on this epistemological change, 
coined the term ‘medical gaze’ to denote the dehumanizing medical separation of the 
patient’s body from the patient’s identity. In many ways contemporary readership has 
undergone a similar change in narratives such as House Mother Normal seeking a subjective 
portrayal of Alzheimer’s disease. In connecting various representational and textual 
characteristics explicitly with specific symptoms, reader-response is grounded much more in 
diagnostic accuracy than interpretative deviation. For Johnson to admit the condition of 
senility and decay into literary form is to jeopardise the very nature of that form, for his 
characters’ ailments and deficiencies are the very opposite of form -it is the loss of form, the 
loss of identity. As Samantha Harvey commented in an interview about her Alzheimer’s 
narrative, The Wilderness, ‘how do you build a narrative out of mental collapse? How do you
• 584emulate confusion and chaos in an eloquent and sufficiently ordered way?’ This text really 
symbolises the forceful presence of old age in the literary canon, which is certainly important 
culturally. Yet in a postmodern spin on Pound’s dictum ‘make it new’ he has presented old 
age stylistically as a full-bloodedly novel and polemical force in literature. This is not a
584 Samantha Harvey, ’Samantha Harvey on The Wilderness’ The Man Booker Prizes 
http://www.themanbookerprize.com/perspective/articles/1268 [accessed 28/2/11]
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problem in itself, but being in such stark contrast with the themes and issues raised in this 
text, which include everything from the loss of self-sufficiency to the wish to die, stylistically 
one might construe this as tantamount to an effacement of the subject matter. In the same way 
people try to aestheticise, medicalise, and verbalise their way out of old age,585 Johnson’s text 
seems to stylise its way out of conventional associations with old age through this neo- 
modernist imperative to ‘make it new’. This text is fissured by its undeniable thematic 
engagement with old age on the one hand and its powerful stylistic repudiation of it on the 
other. Might House Mother Normal, then, be construed as the perfect representation of a 
culture at once ageing and anti-ageing?
Paul Auster’s novella Travels in the Scriptorium (2007) espouses similar techniques to 
Johnson’s geriatric comedy, correlating the text’s metafictionality and intertextuality with the 
character’s confused, amnesic state and lack of identity. Although Auster’s text is not 
outwardly designated an Alzheimer’s narrative, there are many stylistic features that 
constitute a mimetic reflection of his character’s neurologic state. Unlike House Mother 
Normal, Auster nowhere explicitly states what his character, Mr Blank, suffers from, 
although it is made surmisable, or diagnosable, through some of the text’s prevailing features. 
It might be argued that this is not simply a post-Beckettian text of ageing, but a subjective 
portrayal of Alzheimer’s with specific emphasis on the deleterious effects of the disease on 
both memory and consequently identity. This novella seems, at times, a contemporary 
counterpart to House Mother Normal. It is a book that does not disclose anything, whose very 
subject matter is ambivalent throughout and is not resolved but distorted further at the book’s 
conclusion. Auster presents us with an insufferably, disorientatingly intertextual novella, a 
text whose covert rewriting of at least five Beckett novels and countless of his dramatic 
works, plus much of Auster’s own corpus, results in a text with a much dispersed, deferred,
585 See both the introduction to the thesis and chapter five.
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and arguably absent identity of its own. There is, I argue, a mimetic relation between this 
text’s exhaustive, nihilating exercise in postmodern recyclability, and its antihero, the 
senescent, amnesic and therefore appropriately named Mr. Blank. This book’s failure to 
disclose and resolve does in this text constitute representation, in much the same way as 
Johnson’s syntactic and typographic irregularities do. The aged Mr. Blank wakes up in a 
featureless room with no memory of who he is, where he is, or the nature of his confinement. 
Auster prompts the reader into action asking: ‘Who is he? What is he doing here? When did 
he arrive and how long will he remain?’ ,586 Somewhat of an affront to the teleological needs 
of the reader, this invokes a jointly investigative and diagnostic reader-response as we are 
required to assemble his identity from the growing repository of covert intertextual 
references. Although it is a fundamental part of Auster’s representation of forgetting, we can 
use intertextuality toward more curative ends, so to speak. However, of course our very doing 
so, although suggesting the recuperable nature of the narrative, involves us in the selfsame act 
as Mr. Blank -who likewise is called upon to figure out, even author, his own identity. To 
represent Mr. Blank’s experience of amnesia, Auster plays self-consciously on and rejects the 
presumed authorial obligation to disclose. It is an obligation that he delegates to his very 
character, who is offered a manuscript he believes is about himself, and is told: ‘you have the 
beginning, now I want you to give me the middle and the end.’587 Auster not only uses a 
surfeit of intertextual references as a metaphor for Mr Blank’s amnesia and consummate lack 
of identity, but accredits the character’s condition to his very fictionality. Auster alludes 
frequently to the artefactual condition of Mr. Blank, his existence in typeface, and the world 
around him as a series of artifices, and impermanent structures. As such he symbolically 
conflates neuropathology, intertextuality, and metafictionality, and through that
586 Paul Auster, Travels in the Scriptorium (London: Faber & Faber, 2007), p. 1.
587 Ibid., p. 80.
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intertextuality, using the Anxiety of Influence as a metaphor for memory and the contingent 
nature of identity.
The novella has an intertextual link with Beckett’s minimalist monodrama Krapp ’s Last Tape 
(1958)588 and his trilogy novel Malone Dies (1951). Both Travels in the Scriptorium and 
Krapp’s Last Tape are perfunctory, ascetic narrations of the comparably empty, ascetic lives 
of their characters Krapp and Mr Blank -both names connoting evacuation and emptiness. 
Travels in the Scriptorium opens with an old man sitting in a featureless room, with no 
answers to the questions as to who he is, where he is, and what the nature of his incarceration 
is -whether he is hospitalised, imprisoned, or ‘the subject of psychological torture.’589 Auster 
seems to challenge the presumed authorial obligation to reveal and disclose as he renders Mr 
Blank’s situation, like his identity, frustratingly ambiguous. This is paralleled in Malone 
Dies, the second book in Beckett’s trilogy, in which Malone, an old man, wakes up in a room 
whose exact nature remains a matter of assumption and intuition rather than knowledge:
This room seems to be mine. I can find no other explanation to my being left in it [...] 
It is not a room in a hospital, or in a madhouse, I can feel that [...] And when I look 
out the window it is clear to me from certain things, that I am not in house of rest in 
any sense of the word. No, this is just a plain private room apparently, in what appears 
to be a plain ordinary house. I do not remember how I got here.590
For Auster’s amnesic and senescing Mr Blank, the only repository of knowledge is a 
manuscript on the table in his room. The boundaries between reader, character, and author are 
collapsed as the anti-hero, the aptly named Mr. Blank, begins to read the manuscript he
588 Travels in the Scriptorium spans only one chapter and Beckett’s drama a single act.
589 Stephen Poole, ‘Ghost in the Machine’, The New Statesman http://www.newstatesrnan.com/200610300053 
[accessed 21/02/11]
590 Samuel Beckett, ‘Malone Dies’, Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnameable (London: Calder 
Publications Ltd., 1994), p. 183.
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believes to be an unfinished report about himself, before realising it is fiction and then 
completing the narrative himself. Within his sparsely furnished room is a camera implanted 
in the ceiling, ‘the shutter clicking] silently once every second, producing eighty-six 
thousand four hundred still photos with each revolution of the earth.’591 The impassive and 
alienating ‘surveillance’ vocabulary Auster employs connects this camera with an 
investigative, perhaps even diagnostic gaze -a  gesture, perhaps, to the extradiegetic reader. 
The white ceiling within which this camera is implanted is likened by Mr. Blank to ‘a sheet 
of blank paper,’592 alluding in jointly metafictional and neurological terms to both this 
ostensibly deficient narrative and the character’s amnesic state. The noun and adjective 
‘blank’ implicitly connects fiction and syndrome, as the one-dimensionality of the anti-hero 
seems both symptomatic of the Auster’s authorial disobligation to tell (as well as, being the 
introductory point in the novella, the character has yet to be fully established) and of his 
presumed pathological state, which we are led to assume is Alzheimer’s (although Auster 
abandons the epithet ‘old man’ for the more temporally ambivalent ‘Mr. Blank’ by the third 
page). This narrative, then, is about the fictional construction and jointly metafictional and 
pathological disassembly of the identity of Mr. Blank.
The name ‘Mr. Blank’, combined with its neurological and metafictional undertones, bridges 
the n o m in al and the pathological, and notions of presence and absence -the name ‘Blank’ 
being a declaration of presence whilst the adjective ‘blank’ is constitutive of absence or 
emptiness. The name Krapp, too, in its obvious excremental connotations, suggests an 
assertion and negation, or more crudely, evacuation, of identity. Both the aged Krapp and 
empty signifier Mr Blank are engaged in acts of self-narration (or self-invention), Krapp 
through his tape recorder and Mr Blank through studying photographs and reading —and 
subsequently authoring —a story, or report, that he believes to be about himself. Whilst Mr.
591 Auster, p. 1.
592 Ibid., p. 107.
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Blank’s identity is reducible to, and dependent upon, various notations (i.e. the written word), 
Krapp’s is his annual, perfunctory utterances (i.e. the spoken word). In Krapp’s Last Tape, 
Krapp is depicted listening to a tape he recorded thirty years previously at the age of thirty- 
nine as he continues in his annual impassive documentation of his life:
Thirty-nine today, sound as a bell, apart from my old weaknesses [...] Celebrated the 
awful occasion, as in recent years, quietly at the Winehouse. Not a soul. Sat before the 
fire with closed eyes, separating the grain from the husks. Jotted down a few notes, on 
the back of an envelope. Good to be back in my den, in my old rags.593
Similar to Mr. Blank’s awareness of his fictionality -implied in his reference to his life as 
‘this story’594 -there are allusions to performativity and artifice in Krapp, for instance in his 
clownish, caricatural demeanour: ‘Rusty black narrow trousers too short fo r  him. Rusty black 
sleeveless waistcoat, four capacious pockets. Heavy silver watch and chain [...] dirty white 
boots, size ten at least, very narrow and pointed. White face. Purple nose. Disordered grey 
hair.’595 Moreover, the texts are replete with references to authorial gaze/control through 
recording devices within which the characters’ lives are contained, and through which they 
are narrated. These devices are explicit in Krapp’s Last Tape, as the title suggests, and more 
voyeuristic and investigative in Travels in the Scriptorium’.
It should be noted that in addition to the camera a microphone is embedded in one of 
the walls, and every sound Mr. Blank makes is being reproduced and preserved by a 
highly sensitive digital tape recorder. The least groan or sniffle, the least cough or
593 Samuel Beckett, ‘Krapp’s Last Tape’ in The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber & Faber. 2006), p. 
217.
594 Auster, p. 7.
595 Beckett, p. 215.
fleeting flatulence that emerges from his body is therefore an integral part of our 
account.596
These recording devices conjoin the acts of writing/speaking and remembering for these aged 
characters (inasmuch as they prompt/substantiate their respective identities), and blur the 
boundaries between the omniscient authorial voice on the one hand and the character’s self­
authoring on the other. Both characters narrate themselves, Krapp through the tapes he 
records and Mr. Blank through the report/fiction he writes. However, whilst these correlative 
acts transform them into authors, the act offorgetting transforms them into characters, or 
even readers, as they both become simply ‘the man in the typescript he has been reading’597 
or listening to.
C Q O
Tape recorder, pen/paper, and photos all act as a prosthetic memory for the characters.
Despite the fact he is in the throes of decay, for Krapp, the recorder and ledger offer him a 
non-linear experience of time. Through his cumulative self-documentation, his experience of 
time is recapitulative as he revisits past entries intended for when there is ‘perhaps no place 
left in my memory.’599 Similarly, for the amnesic Mr Blank, the photographs and report/story 
offer some repository of self-knowledge and, on the revelation that ‘it’s make-believe [...] A 
work of fiction,’600 a means of self-creation as he decides to complete the story himself: as 
Samuel Farr says to Mr. Blank of the incomplete manuscript, ‘you have the beginning. Now I 
want you to give me the middle and the end.’601 For Krapp, the tape recorder aids a similar 
self-authoring that Eric P. Levy describes as his ‘retrospective project [...] not to return to the
596 Auster, p . '
597 Ibid., p. 37
598 Carla Locatelli, Beckett at 100: Revolving it All, ed. by Linda Ben-Zvi et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Inc., 2008), p. 71.
599 Beckett, p. 220
600 Auster, p. 70.
601 Auster, p. 80.
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past, but to define his identity through the annual progression of perspectives on the past.’602 
The texts seem to allegorize the interrelationship of language and identity, playing the 
finitude and in-built obsolescence of body and (senile) mind off against the linguistic 
immortalisation of Blank and the phonetic immortalisation of Krapp. Despite both being texts 
of ageing, then, both narrate themselves out of old age, mortality, and forgetfulness:
It will never end [...] we, the figments of another mind, will outlive the mind that 
made us, for once we are thrown into the world, we continue to exist forever, and our 
stories go on being told, even after we are dead [...] Mr. Blank is old, but as long as he 
remains in the room with the shuttered window and the locked door, he can never die, 
never disappear, never be anything but the words I am writing on this page.603
This might also be considered the case for Krapp and his recapitulative project: ‘Be again, be 
again. [Pause.'] All that old misery. [Pause.] Once wasn’t enough for you.’604 Organic decay, 
one might suggest, is in direct contrast with language, and this contradiction is what might be 
seen to characterise both texts. For Krapp, his serial self-memorialisations seems simply to 
represent an absurd and vacuous servitude to habit, having ‘nothing to talk to but his dying 
self and nothing to talk to him but his dead one,’605 and so may represent some form of 
imprisonment. Likewise, for Mr. Blank this symbolic linguistic immortality is a kind of 
punishment, as is implicit in the likeness drawn between the blank ceiling of his cell and a 
blank piece of paper, with typescript signifying occupation —or as Patricia Waugh describes 
of language, a ‘prisonhouse from which the possibility of escape is remote.’606 Language and 
narrative —particularly for Auster’s ascetic, deficient novella —is at once pathological and
602 Eric P. Levy, ‘Krapp’s Last Tape and the Beckettian Mimesis of Regret’ in Trapped in Thought: A Study o f  
the Beckettian Mentality (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007), p. 184
603 Auster, pp. 129-30.
604 Beckett, p. 223.
605 Samuel Beckett, No Author Better Served: The Correspondence o f  Samuel Beckett and Alan Schneider, ed. 
by Maurice Harmon (USA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 59
606 Patricia Waugh, Metafiction: The Theoiy and Practice o f  Self-conscious Fiction (London: Methuen, 1984), 
p. 4.
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curative, compensating for a lack of identity and ensuring its perpetuity: ‘when is this 
nonsense going to end? [...] It will never end.’607
In Travels in the Scriptorium the interrelationship between language and architecture is 
important in Auster’s exploration of memory. The language of fiction, Mr. Blank’s physical 
enclosure, and his aphasia might all be considered synonymous. This becomes evident upon 
the realisation that this novella is highly intertextual. It is this intertextuality that highlights 
the incompleteness and brevity of this novella, which resonates in a sly fictional self- 
consciousness with Mr. Blank’s autobiographical incompleteness and endlessly deferred, 
displaced, or absent sense of identity. As aforementioned, Mr. Blank is given no prehistory in 
this text, which gives his character a self-consciously fictional one-dimensionality; rather his 
identity is dispersed: borrowed from other novels within Auster’s oeuvre as a personification 
of an exhaustive postmodern recyclability. It is unclear, in this sense, whether Auster is using 
‘the intertextuality, recycling, and self-referentiality of the postmodern form’608 from which 
to explore forgetting, repetition, and the attempts to salvage an identity in amnesic, perhaps 
senile patients, or whether Mr. Blank is used as the personification of and critique on these 
aspects of postmodemity. Indeed there is a paradox in all of this in that the suggested 
overabundance of intertextual identities is played out in Travels in the Scriptorium in a blank, 
empty room —a reoccurring feature in Auster’s oeuvre —and within its namesake, Mr. Blank. 
For instance, Anna Blume, the chief protagonist in The Country o f Last Things (1987), nurses 
Mr. Blank in what we assume is either a hospital or residential care home for the elderly, but 
more importantly has an undisclosed affiliation to him that acts as a source of self- 
knowledge. Anna Blume was married to David Zimmer, formerly the chief protagonist in The
607 Auster, p. 129.
608 Stuart Sim (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism, 2nd edn. (Oxford & New York: Routledge, 
2005), p. 109.
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Book o f Illusions (2002), whose death is ‘only indirectly’609 linked with the actions Mr.
Blank; Fanshawe, the author of the manuscript on the desk in Mr. Blank’s room, was the 
elusive figure investigated by private detective Quinn in The New York Trilogy (published 
sequentially 1985-6); Sophie, Fanshawe’s widow who looks after Mr. Blank; and Peter 
Stillman, again a character from the trilogy. Collectively these characters represent a potential 
repository of knowledge for Mr. Blank whose identity, being dispersed in this way, firstly has 
no cohesion and secondly is contingent upon the reader’s foreknowledge of these texts. 
Without knowledge of this intertextual genealogy, just as if one did not have any recollection 
of one’s autobiographical past, the reader is thrown into the same position as the amnesic Mr. 
Blank. The existential questions arise, then, if the reader has not read the aforementioned 
novels inasmuch as the characters within those texts are ultimately custodians of, and offer 
some intertextual prehistory and authenticity to the identity and existence of Mr. Blank which 
he otherwise lacks. It seems, then, that despite the people who care for Mr. Blank, we as 
readers become custodians of him as we assemble his identity from these disparate narratives 
and characters.
Although Mr. Blank’s appropriation of the story of Sigmund Graff (whom we assume could 
be our anti-hero) carries with it the suggestion he, rather than Paul Auster, is 
narrating/creating his identity, the intertextuality implicates the reader in the construction of 
that identity —‘unwillingly participating in the game Auster himself induces his readers to 
play,’610 as Paul Jahshan comments. This schizoid or compensative surfeit of voices is also 
represented on the level of punctuation. Throughout the novella Auster forgoes speech marks 
that would help delineate one speaker from another more definitively. When Mr. Blank 
adopts the narrative of Sigmund Graff, for instance, his monologue is interrupted by Samuel
609 Auster, p. 22.
610 Paul Jahshan, ‘Paul Auster’s Spectres’ Journal o f  American Studies, vol. 37, No. 3 (Dec. 2003), p. 389 
http://www.istor.org.ezproxv.lancs.ac.uk/stable/27557388 [accessed 21/2/11].
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Farr with T m  sorry. I won’t interrupt anymore,’611 with the response ‘Interrupt all you like. 
We’re involved in a complicated story here.’ Although one assumes this is dialogue, the 
speakers’ voices are not distinguished through the use of speech marks, and so not only is the 
presence of Farr in this scene equivocal, but this play between monologue and dialogue might 
be seen to allude to the many characters that constitute the Mr. Blank. In Auster’s layers of 
storytelling, we do not know whether this is real or imaginary dialogue, and the text as a 
whole is replete with such ambivalence on account of this ubiquitous lack of speech marks 
which may map back on to the dynamics of his identity in this way. Through a use of 
intertextuality comparable, as Sophie Harrison comments, to literary predecessors such as
f \  19 •T.S. Eliot, we are left to assemble the identity of Mr Blank and thus question ‘who the 
author of these sentences might be’613 just as Blank questions who he may be. In this, issues 
of authorship and memory, metafictionality and neurology are juxtaposed, as Blank’s failure 
to recall and recollect is bound up with Auster’s characteristic refusal to provide an easy, 
complete, or cohesive narrative. Mr. Blank’s forgetting and consequent incompleteness as an 
individual, then, is a nod to the author as well as to the reader who, due to the narrative 
deficiencies, is embroiled in the same struggles as Blank.
The many disparaging reviews Travels in the Scriptorium has received seem to focus 
primarily on its brevity and ostensible incompleteness. Linda L. Richards comments: ‘Paul 
Auster’s 13th novel is almost wonderful. One gets the feeling that the author was reaching for 
something here, something he doesn't quite attain. Part of the reason for this might be a 
simple lack of scope.’614 This novella gestures toward absence, lack, or incompleteness, what
611 Ibid., p. 86.
612 Sophie Harrison, ‘Sunday Book Review: The Content of his Characters’, The New York Times 
http://www.nvtimes.com/2007/Q2/18/books/review/Harrison-Sophie.html? i= l [accessed 21/2/11]
613 Auster, p. 5.
614 Linda L. Richards, ‘Mr. Blank’s Big Day, January Magazine 
http://ianuarvmagazine.com/fiction/scriptorium.html [accessed 21/2/11]
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Richards calls: ‘a half-cooked casserole; a partially baked idea.’615 But is this not the point? 
Like Johnson, part of what Auster seems to allude to is the extent to which, in representing 
the teleology of dementia -the consummate blankness that comes with forgetting and the 
ensuing compromise to identity -a  narrative should disclose, should clarify, should assert 
some definitive separation from other texts in the canon. This is not to say, for instance, that 
subjective narratives of boredom should be boring, but it does, nevertheless, raise the 
question as to what extent literature must become sick, must fail, in order to represent 
pathologies of ageing ‘subjectively’. The reader may be considered at once patient and 
practitioner: that is, patient if we are unfamiliar with Auster’s oeuvre meaning we remain as 
disorientated as the ailing character, and practitioner if we are familiar with it -as a result of 
which we can administer greater lucidity to, or rather ‘cure’, the forgotten identity of Mr. 
Blank. Auster arguably captures the pathological loss of one’s sense of identity through his 
narrative reticence, and through the breaking both the fictional illusion as well as the illusion 
of a self-contained textual/authorial identity independent from his predecessors (namely 
Samuel Beckett). In Mr. Blank, awareness of his presumed neurological condition, his 
characterisation, and the novella’s disconcerting brevity and intertextuality, all seem 
correlative concerns. Whether neurology or narrative is the subject of diagnosis and 
speculation, then, remains ambivalent. What I do suggest, therefore, is that, unlike most 
critics’ reception of this book, its brevity, its incompleteness, and failure to reveal anything 
does, like House Mother Normal, constitute representation and disclosure.
615 Ibid.
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ii) Pathological Forgetting and Insidious Fictionalities
In their study of narrative approaches to disease, illness and disability Valarie Raoul et al ask: 
‘what difference does it make if the story is framed as truth or fiction?’616 Lisa Genova’s Still 
Alice, Samantha Harvey’s The Wilderness, and Stefan Merrill Block’s The Story o f  
Forgetting are novels that draw conspicuously on the fictionality of the novel in portraying 
the reality of Alzheimer’s disease from the perspective of the sufferer. Their portrayal of 
Alzheimer’s has not the narrative polemics of Johnson and Auster’s texts. For Auster, I have 
said that a subjective account is gained through metafictionality, asceticism, a general 
negligence of detail, postmodern pastiche and a disorientating, nihilating glut of intertextual 
references; and for Johnson, I have argued that this is gained through explicit conversion of 
physical/mental symptoms into textual symptoms. Both House Mother Normal and Travels in 
the Scriptorium are texts that, through use of mimetic fallacy, are a site of morbidity, and for 
the reader bring together the realms of narratology and teratology -in  other words, the study 
of narrative equated to the study of disease and deformity. For Harvey, Genova, and Block, 
their novels are much more controlled, impassive, and vivid, yet this does not mean that they 
mediate the experience of Alzheimer’s. These novels are built upon a conceptual 
entanglement between neurological and semiotic realms, and they bring together a rhetorical, 
nominalist line of enquiry with a vivid, medically-attuned, essentialist, and (from the 
perspective of the reader) delimiting account in their representation of Alzheimer’s and the 
reality o f  alterity. What I shall be discussing in these three novels is the way in which the 
authors avail themselves of, and at times exploit very self-consciously, the various narrative 
techniques and alienation tropes at their disposal in order to represent the disease 
‘subjectively’. I shall discuss how moments of sly fictional self-consciousness serve at once 
to perpetuate a sense of fictional inclusivity and convey the objective realities of Alzheimer’s
616 Multiple Contributors, ‘Making Sense of Disease, Disability, and Trauma’ in Unfitting Stories, p. 7.
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disease -the rhetorical, imaginative realms of fiction constituted, in other words, with the 
positivism of medical epistemology. Whilst the two seem initially antipathetic, what the 
novels do is demonstrate the ways in which the fictionality of the novel correlates with the 
reality of Alzheimer’s.
The Wilderness is a highly disaffecting, non-linear heterodiegetic narrative following Jacob 
Jameson -a  sixty-five year old architect with Alzheimer’s. The novel returns frequently to the 
subject of entropy and offers a materialist depiction of Alzheimer’s that brings together the 
realms of architecture and neurology. In this novel, there is a clear sense of reciprocity and 
exchange between the rhetorical, henneneutical examination of Alzheimer’s and the 
positivism and impassivity underscoring its more objective, medical evocation. Harvey 
converts rhetorical into etiological discourses, and the language of entropy and the building- 
brain conceit are what Harvey draws upon to do this, conflating the demolition of buildings 
with the decay of neural structures. The reader is asked to be cognisant of the neurological 
references underpinning many of her metaphors as well as of the narrative structure itself, 
which is disorganised, free-associative, and entropic -mimicking, perhaps, the ‘neuron loss, 
neurotransmitter loss, [and] the destruction of synapses’617 that make it difficult for Jacob to 
recall memories. Like Mr. Blank in Travels in the Scriptorium and Krapp in Krapp’s Last 
Tape, we follow Jacob’s retrospective project to piece together the memories from his life -  
what he describes as a ‘sea of events and names that have been forgotten’ and have ‘no 
sensible order to them, nor connection between them.’618 Like House Mother Normal this is 
as much a declaration or diagnosis of Jacob’s condition as the narrative structure. There is 
little clear or predictable movement between the chapters, and she privileges a fractured, 
aleatory and non-linear narrative over a logical exposition of thoughts and recollection. The 
chapters move from: Jacob’s sixty-fifth birthday with him thinking about his son’s
617 Samantha Harvey, The Wilderness, p. 243.
Ibid., p. 1.
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imprisonment and his wife’s death; to the 1960s and his father’s funeral, his son being ‘only 
weeks old’619 at this point and his wife, Helen, alive; to a scene of domestic banality and then 
into the future as he meditates on Helen’s death, the nature of old age and ‘the banality of this 
land o f forgetfulness;’620 to the past and a scene at the zoo with Helen and his son Henry, now 
a baby; and then forwards as he muses on the fate of a girl named Alice who, it is implied, is 
his daughter, but whose existence remains ambivalent throughout. Instead of offering a 
totalising or holistic narrative befitting of its third-person omniscience, she offers a story built 
on a series of narrative fragments or occlusions and a general accretion of detail so that the 
novel does not simply depict but exemplifies Jacob’s disorientated and amnesic state. 
Methodologically, the reader either seeks distinction from or becomes implicated in the 
narrative structure: on the one hand, reader-response may be compensative, or symbolically 
curative, in the sense that one might forge or contrive links between narrative fragments; or 
on the other hand, reader-response may emulate the confusion and consummate blankness of 
the amnesic protagonist as he attempts to recall moments from his life.
Harvey provides a surfeit of disconnected images, and perhaps the most fitting expression of 
the abbreviated, non-linear evocation of Jacob’s life is in the description: ‘all of this he 
remembers and can see as plain as day -he just can’t say when it happened. Like a 
photograph that cannot be placed anywhere specific in the album.’621 Like House Mother 
Normal, the narrative disruption, its fragmentary, free-associative style, and impassive third- 
person narration, has implied neurological connotations, being comparable to ‘his mind 
tripping from one thing to another.’622 He describes how:
619 Ibid., p. 13.
620 Ibid., p. 43.
621 Ibid., p. 66.
622 Ibid., p. 183.
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...he pauses, interrogating his brain aggressively for the clarity that sometimes comes 
out of temporary confusion, but this time it didn’t come. After a lifetime of well- 
founded reliance on things just fixing themselves, he finds it disturbing to accept that 
they are more likely, now, to stay broken.623
The alienation tropes in this novel necessitate a comparable difficulty in the reader in 
engaging with and following the narrative, asking, as Jacob himself does: ‘When was this? 
Which episode of the past? How long has Eleanor been here?’624 This inability to delineate 
one timeframe or episode from another is comparable to Jacob’s failure to recall memories 
accurately and unequivocally, and on a more fundamental level delineate one word from 
another:
He forces his book into his coat pocket; he notes the name because Hansen sounds 
like handsome and the words intertwine until he can no longer tell them apart, and 
until the author is imagined as a striking, knowledgeable, middle-aged man despite his 
photograph that suggests otherwise. Hansen, handsome. Different words, same 
words.625
The narrative structure, correlated with his misrecollections and disordered perception of 
time, constitute ‘just happenings, a lack of signposts.’626 However, despite this chaotic 
structure and narrative amnesia, the repetition of several images such as the sound of gun 
shots, the cherry tree, the love letters, and the human skin bible offer some respite from an 
otherwise disaffecting and disorientating read. The building—brain conceit is one such 
consistent feature in the novel and offers some semblance of cohesion. The building—brain 
conceit emphasises the material, anatomical deterioration of the brain. Jacob describes
623 Ibid., p. 61.
624 Ibid., p. 226
625 Ibid., p. 156.
626 Ibid., p. 26.
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architecture as ‘an external consciousness [my italics],’627 which is what, in essence, the 
narrative structure is as Harvey, like Johnson or like stream-of-consciousness narrative 
technique, converts her character’s neurological processes into a textual artefact. In this 
narrative, Jacob’s mapping and building of houses (which is his vocation), the assembling 
memories of episodes from his past to help build, or like Mr. Blank author, his own identity, 
and the reader’s task in contriving links between the narrative fragments, are all correlative 
tasks. Harvey correlates the realms of the architectural, neurological, and narratological, any 
or all of which can be construed as the subject matter in Jacob’s meditations on the nature of 
entropy -o f  ‘the theory that says everything loses, rather than gains order.’628 He moves on to 
describe entropy in the following terms:
A house can become a mere pile of bricks of its own accord, but a mere pile of bricks 
will never become a house of its own accord. Everywhere nature’s fingers unpick as if 
trying to leave things as they would be if humans never existed.629
Because this encompasses so much in the novel -from its narrative structure, to Jacob’s 
neural structures, to the attrition of Jacob’s external environment, to its textual counterpart — 
Harvey gives a sense of universality to Alzheimer’s. Although The Wilderness is comprised 
of an impassive, third-person heterodiegetic narrative voice, there is also, paradoxically, a 
sense of interiority to it that is given by the broadly mimetic nature of the narrative structure. 
Thus the extradiegetic feel of the narrative’s third-person omniscience may not necessarily be 
representative of a mediating authorial control, or even the disaffection and clinical 
impassivity in the reader gained through the narrative-neurology conceit; rather it may be 
indicative of Jacob’s sense of alterity or self-removal as Jacob struggles to retrieve his own 
past. Alzheimer’s is narrated as a malign, arbitrary force, and Jacob describes it as if ‘all my
627 Ibid., p. 234.
ftid-, PP. 34-5.
" Ibid., p. 35.
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wires are being unplugged one by one. No, not even in an order, just unplugged’630 -a  
description that goes some way toward justifying, and hence rationalising, the comparable 
arbitrariness of the narrative’s structure.
Perhaps one of the most interesting phrases Harvey coins is ‘architectural amnesia,’ a phrase 
in which an explicit comparison is made between Jacob’s neural structures and the accretion 
and eventual demolition of buildings until they ‘disappeared as if [they] never existed.’631 He 
remarks earlier in the novel how ‘[t]here are no buildings to see. They are gone. A faint 
programmed guilt at the shamefulness of what he built, and a mounting amnesia over them 
(did they ever actually exist?).’632 The physiological and the architectural are also conflated 
as he describes how ‘[e]very day I feel -things become thinner [...] The world becomes 
thinner’633 —allusions to his senescing body and the demolition, and even ambivalent 
existence, of his architectural domain evident. Similarly, the geographical and neurological 
are also juxtaposed as becoming lost in the city functions, ostensibly, as a figurative 
engagement with Jacob’s moments of amnesic self-loss: ‘the streets become a jail; he is lost. 
One street just looks like another, and he finds himself climbing a hill steeper than his legs 
can manage, so that he sits halfway up catching his breath, striking the poor dog’s head and 
wondering at what point he became an old man.’634 Lisa Genova, too, collapses the categories 
of inside and outside, physical and mental, through use of the city:
Clustered pedestrian traffic on the sidewalks and intermittent negotiations with car 
traffic [...] crowds forming and milling around on street comers waiting for walk 
signals [...] a steady stream of joggers, dogs, and their owners, walkers, Rollerbladers,
630 Ibid., p. 166.
631 Ibid., p. 185
632 Ibid., p. 162.
633 Ibid., p. 162.
634 Ibid., p. 186.
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cyclists, and women pushing babies [...] Alice retained only a vague sense for what 
was going on around her.635
In both of these examples the labyrinthine, ‘meandering streets’ and the characters’ joint 
failure to navigate through them and subsequent alienation from their environment holds 
some similarity with the ‘neurofibrillary tangles and the plaques’ which result in 
neurotransmitter loss and an inability of neurons to communicate with each other.636 Harvey 
also describes this quite lyrically: ‘His past is just an electric impulse. Static flashes on a 
petticoat. Gradually he is being scattered and lost -hundreds of unread messages floating out 
across the sea.’ Harvey juxtaposes a more lyrical, rhetorical vocabulary with a vivid,
incisive neurological parlance, and this provides a generic antipathy between positivist and 
metaphorical realms -which themselves become paradigmatic of Jacob’s own subsistence 
between the realms of reality and hallucination as his Alzheimer’s worsens. As Jacob 
considers the unreliability of memory and his problems delineating reality and actuality, we 
are invited to consider the ways in which medical versus the metaphorical evocations of 
Alzheimer’s constitute not so much a reciprocal as antipathetic relation. The linguistic 
contrast between them maps onto the double reality Jacob experiences as he worsens. The 
more incisive medical parlance correlates to a clarity and lucidity he loses as he deteriorates, 
whilst the linguistic processes involved in metaphor offer a sufficient distortion of or distance 
from its referent to make it comparable to the reality of alterity that Jacob experiences with 
his Alzheimer’s. He comments of his recollections: ‘Maybe it is not true. And if it is true,
• • 638maybe the disease will make him forget it before he can be sure of it.’ This invokes a sense 
of mistrust and blurring of the fictionality of the novel and his reality with Alzheimer’s: ‘was 
all of it a dream? Is the dog real? Did he feed her the lamb, and has he ever fed her lamb, and
635 Lisa Genova, Still Alice (London & New York: Simon & Shuster, 2009), pp. 20-1.
636 Harvey, pp. 242-3.
637 Ibid., p. 188.
638 Ibid., p. 228.
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has he ever fed her at all?’639 Similarly, the nature of Jacob’s wife’s death, the existence of 
his daughter, Alice, and the content of the love letters is ambivalent. For instance, as one 
chapter ends, poignantly and definitively, ‘surely their heads would come back up and their 
bodies would be swimming. Nothing,’ the next opens: “‘Your mother and Rook didn’t 
drown,” she [Eleanor] says. “Where did you get that idea from?”’640
Jacob’s deterioration is articulated as an emergent fictionality as he becomes aware that 
aspects of his life are not ‘memories] at all, but a fabrication,’641 and at this point the 
differences between a hermeneutical versus medical examination of Jacob’s Alzheimer’s is 
forefront. Stefan Merrill Block’s The Story o f Forgetting hinges on such a linguistic 
difference, contrasting a medical with a highly allegorical parlance, a didactic versus an 
explicitly evasive, even puerile, rhetorical examination. The novel is, in the words of the 
author, about ‘the disease's persistent march through the generations of [a] family.’642 It is 
comprised of three narratives: Abel, living with his twin brother, Paul who suffers from 
Alzheimer’s, and Paul’s wife Mae, whom he loves and eventually has a child with, Jamie; 
Seth Waller, a precocious adolescent who begins ‘empirical investigations’ to uncover the 
genetic history of his mother’s Alzheimer’s; and finally a fable about Isidora, ‘<z land without 
memory, where every need is met and every sadness is forgotten.’643 The novel, in short, 
includes a fictional account of familial Alzheimer’s, a didactic account constructed as a 
report, and a highly allegorized portrayal of forgetting in the world of Isidora. The differential 
narrative modes are important in this novel, as they embody linguistically that which the 
Alzheimer’s sufferer experiences perceptually (i.e. actual versus hallucinogenic reality). Like 
The Wilderness this novel offers a materialist portrayal of Alzheimer’s disease, focussing on
639 Ibid., p. 167.
640 Ibid., 216-7.
64^  Ibid., p. 87.
642 Stefan Merrill Block, ‘On the Origins of The Story o f  Forgetting' 
http://www.stefarmierrillblock.com/bio/origin.html [accessed 03/11]
643 Merrill Block, The Story o f  Forgetting, p. 13.
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retrogenesis -a  consequence of the disease that justifies, and gives neurological connotations 
to, both the non-linear narrative structure and the puerility of his discourse on Alzheimer’s. 
Seth describes how ‘it’s not just memories that people with my mom’s disease forgot but 
increasingly basic things. How to write, how to speak, how to walk, how to sit up, how to 
swallow, how to breathe, and -eventually, after five to seven years —how to stay alive.’644 
Abel depicts the gradual unmaking of his mother in similar terms, again implicating the 
novel’s occasionally ambivalent timeframe:
For every one day we grew older, Mama regressed ten. It was as if she were observing 
a movie of her life, except with the reel of film playing backward. For a brief time, the 
reversal of her life and the progression of ours came into perfect alignment [...] After 
a time, I became so accustomed to Mama’s life in reverse that, as Paul and I would 
eat, I would watch Mama, half-expecting her to un-eat: to un-digest, to un-chew, then 
return food to plate [...] Every reversal, every subtraction of memory, was a little 
death. The border between the existent and the non-existent, so certain for most, was a 
thing Mama would cross carelessly, constantly.645
For Abel, bodily amnesia is not constitutive of absence, disappearance, or diminishment, but 
emergence. For the Alzheimer’s sufferer, amnesia is narrated in terms of the body’s 
emergence as an explicit, unruly object as the individual loses or ‘forgets’ the tacit self- 
command and experiential invisibility that characterises the unobtrusive, unconscious healthy 
body. Abel describes the anarchic sensations and postures that become more pronounced with 
ageing: ‘my body parts instantly rebelled. My liver puckered, my heart rose, my colon
644
645
Ibid., p. 51. 
Ibid., pp. 181-2.
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constricted, my elbows locked, all of my hair wriggled in their follicles.’646 He moves onto 
describe how:
I would crouch to lift eggs from the collection tray, and my knees would lock with a 
firm no, the jutting bones of my rear end crashing pitifully to the old hay, the eggs; 
gelatinous goo exploding in my fists. When I would bend to uproot my newly 
tumescent potatoes, my arms would have for a moment with a slow yet determined 
maybe, but my spine would soon pop with a harsh not on your life. As a right angle, I 
would hobble home.647
It is, then, the pathological ‘emergence’ of the body (or body part) with the aversiveness, 
constrictiveness and foreignness of pain that constitutes amnesia. Pain and dysfunction, 
giving the sufferer a heightened awareness of embodiment, reminds them of the incontestable 
reality of the body; yet the relation that pain invokes is construed as ‘amnesic’ in the sense 
the body is simply aversive and unfamiliar. Michel Serres articulates the healthy possessive 
terms: 6My body, my belonging, which behaves like a circle and turns in on itself [my 
italics].’648 Seth describes the total dissociation of mind from body: ‘[i]t’s just that her body is 
still here with us, but her soul has already gone to Isirora.’649
This materialist evocation of Alzheimer’s, focusing foremost on the body (although 
inextricably connected to intellectual and cognitive losses), is characteristic of all texts 
mentioned this chapter. The Story o f Forgetting, like the others analysed, attempt to give the 
mind of an Alzheimer’s sufferer representable content. Johnson and Auster render 
Alzheimer’s a textual artefact, offering a jointly mental and representational sense of 
affliction that is either very visual to the reader or disrupts, compromises, or over-determines
646 Ibid., p. 67.
647 Ibid., p. 65.
648 Michel Serres, The Five Senses, trans. by Margaret Sankey & Peter Cowley (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 
57.
649 Block, p. 175.
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their interpretive processes. These texts are not simply about elucidating but exhuming the 
innermost geographies of the brain, and Merrill-Block’s focus very much on the body and 
embodiment rather than on changes to intellect, personality, or cognition, foregrounds this 
physicality. What The Wilderness, The Story o f Forgetting, and Still Alice do is foreground 
linguistic transitions, so that the neurological and the narratological (i.e. the subjective 
experience of Alzheimer’s and the transitions the reader becomes cognisant of in narrative 
structure or voice) correspond to each other. Similar to The Wilderness, Merrill-Block 
compounds this physicality by correlating the neurological, the physiological and the 
architectural and makes absence paradoxically localisable. In the quotation below Block 
conflates mental oblivion, defecation, the clinical anonymity of the building, the loose and 
wrinkled skin of the residents’ bodies, and the open, wordless mouths gesturing toward 
silence and vacuity:
Always the same smells of ammonia, urine, and the strong detergent used to over the 
odors more awful and true, those of old men and women crapping themselves.
Always the same blank linoleum hallways, as sunny and empty as the dementia- 
ridden, Haldol-pumped brains of the residents. Always their mindless gaping. Gaping 
at the enormous televisions screens everywhere. Gaping out windows. Gaping at the 
lime and ivory synthetic tiles of the floor. Always the loose skin of the old, skin 
hanging in ways skin was never meant to hang. Hanging in wobbling lobes from 
oversize ears. Hanging in sagging ridges from resting arms. Or hanging in jowls from 
the snarled, upturned faces of stroke victims650
Absence is a very physical evocation, just as the consummate blankness of amnesia is 
manifested and made localisable in the use of different linguistic registers and, for Johnson 
and Auster, an over-bearing and obtrusive narrative polemicism (which correlates to narrative
650 Ibid., p. 83.
presence). Throughout the novel, Merrill-Block narrates Alzheimer’s as a descent into 
anonymity, but, like Harvey’s building-brain and narrative-neurology conceits, does so with 
recourse to the character’s physical environment rather than psychical interiority. In the 
following quotation, he conveys an almost anticipative ‘invisibility’ or nothingness brought 
about by the characters’ apparent indivisibility from their environment (which itself is 
brought about by their prosthetic relation to or symbiosis with it):
...the sidewalk bent to meet the artificially circular shore of a pond in a spanking- 
white promenade crowded with the institution’s doddering residents, their expressions 
as meaningless and happy as the roses, their enfeebled bodies relying on all means of 
external structural support: aluminium walkers, the kinks of volunteers’ elbows, the 
shoulders of visiting sons, wheelchairs both electric and manual.651
In terms of this novel’s focus on the neurological, however, the most valuable aspect to 
consider is the different narrative registers and what they imply about the nature of 
perception. Merrill-Block contrasts the directness of medical positivism and the ethereal 
detachment of allegory. The vocabularies in this novel are diverse and changeable, and the 
vicissitudes of the narrative are at times in obvious antithesis to the theme of determinism and 
ineluctable genetic destiny that governs this portrayal of familial Alzheimer’s: ‘I mean, 
really, what’s the point of me existing at all when I’m just going to lose my mind?’652 The 
novel, oscillating between case study and allegory, collides evasive and at times puerile 
rhetoric and lyricism and, as he terms, ‘the strange lexicon of nucleic acid,’ in which the 
latter is reduced to a sequence of letters: ‘CAGATACAGAT’ and so forth.653 Through these 
different vocabularies, he offers a sense of the pathos and ideality of forgetting: retrogenesis
Ibid., p. 189.
652 Ibid., p. 259.
653 Ibid., p. 106.
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and ‘unsparing erasure’654 on the one hand and on the other the utopian world of Isidora -the 
etymology of ‘utopia’ of obvious significance here, combining the Greek ou, meaning no, 
and topos, meaning place, identifying utopia as no place.655 Merrill-Block describes how 
‘Isidorans can’t hold on to any memory, even the memory of death, they never know that 
death is a possibility. The moment that an Isidoran dies, she will likely have just fallen in
i • ,656love again.
Whilst Block’s more neurological parlance offers at times a too intensely morbid 
preoccupation with mortality, the fable is connected to a more idealistic amnesia bound up 
paradoxically in the notion of immortality and the idea that ‘nothing was ever possessed and 
so nothing could ever be lost.’657 It is similar to Harvey’s depiction of Alzheimer’s as a 
different world, perhaps the world of fiction: a ‘land o f forgetfulness.’658 Despite the 
linguistic differences, however, the delineation between the report and the allegory are 
arguably more equivocal. The allegorical portrayal of Alzheimer’s is, ostensibly, evasive, 
grounded as it is in notions of immortality and written with a child-like nature that is in 
obvious contrast to the subject of old age. However, as a result of frontal lobe damage in 
Alzheimer’s patients, many behavioural traits do approximate childlike behaviour, which is 
the meaning of retrogenesis - ‘good second children’ 659as Johnson describes, or as Merrill- 
Block comments, ‘not dead but returned,’660 The symptoms of retrogenesis are a generalised 
inefficacy, insentience, in some cases inability to read or recognise words (aphasia), and 
dependence upon others -all of which are depicted in Andrea Gillies’ poignant memoir
Ibid., p. 180.
655 Alcena Madeline Davis Rogan, ‘Utopian Studies’ in TheRoutledge Companion to Science Fiction, ed. by 
Mark Bould (Oxford & New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 308-17, (p. 314).
656 Block, p. 38.
657 Ibid., p. 174.
658 Harvey, p. 43.
659 B.S.Johnson, p. 185.
660 Block, p. 182.
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Keeper,661 Block describes the influence for writing the novel in a similar vein: ‘1 began to 
think about the terrible and inevitable role reversal that has taken place in every generation of 
my mom's family: the time when the child must become the parent's caretaker.’662 Thus the 
childlike allegory is not evasive but may be construed as a neurological marker, and might in 
fact be argued to be comparable to the incisive, genetic and neurological that Merrill-Block 
juxtaposes alongside it. Rhetorical or metaphorical vocabulary, he seems to suggest, does not 
necessarily evade or repress but present itself as a topography of the demented or dementing 
brain, existing reciprocally with (or perhaps as) neurological discourse.
In addition to his linguistic oscillations, Merrill-Block, in a sly fictional self-consciousness, 
alludes to the act of writing when conveying the ineluctable fate -the ‘doomed neurology’663 
-o f  Alzheimer’s sufferers. Whilst this novel is in no definitive sense metafictional, he alludes 
to the writing process as a metaphor for the deleterious effects of the disease on the 
individual, describing life itself as:
...burdened with its endless typing and retyping, making its small innovations as it 
perpetually will. A typo here, an omission there, a rearrangement of genetic test for 
the sake of diversity itself, an endless process of trial and error, making new offerings 
that may or may not prove helpful to its living creations.664
One might offer this quotation up as a description of House Mother Normal, a text that 
explicitly offers up typographic oddities and mistyping as textual symptoms. Whilst The 
Story o f  Forgetting has not the narrative polemics of House Mother Normal or Travels in the 
Scriptorium he offers the fictionality itself up as a metaphor for symptom. When Seth’s 
empirical investigations take him to Alzheimer’s sufferer Mr. Hamner, he describes the diary
66’ Andrea Gillies, Keeper, p. 77.
662 Block, ‘On the Origins of The Stoiy o f Forgetting ' .
663 Block, The Story o f  Forgetting p. 45.
664 Ibid., p. 54.
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he keeps with names of visitors, their business, and the date visited, which functions almost 
as a prosthetic memory for Hamner. On reading of these events the man describes how:
I pull it out and just read it through like a novel. Like a novel, except that I’m the 
main character and every day it seems almost entirely new to me. I guess I’m lucky 
that way. Most people don’t ever get to read about their own lives with complete 
objectivity.665
The very reader is embroiled in the sense of determinism that Merrill-Block conveys. For the 
reader, the novel is inevitably complete on first opening -and so, therefore, is the character, 
with his or her fate already ‘written’, condemned to typescript. This relation between reader 
and text is comparable to the relationship between Seth and his genetic diegesis -his DNA 
and, as he describes, the ‘strange lexicon of nucleic acid.’666 His genetic ‘narrative’ is already 
written in the body and all its constituent parts, and the reader’s possession of a character’s 
past, present, and future, is paradigmatic of Hamner’s possession and reading of the ledger. 
Seth and Abel’s narratives both hinge on a sense of confonnity to or fulfilment of genetic 
destiny as well as a suggestively metafictional subservience to a narrative which itself is 
metaphor for genetic predisposition: ‘[h]ow can I live when I know I’ll just end up like that? 
Forgetting everything.’667 Merrill-Block gives the reader a jointly textual and genetic sense of 
condemnation in the sense that the very book they are reading is the exemplar of familial 
Alzheimer’s, for the character’s life and fate is complete even prior to the animation 
bestowed on them through reading. Thus the ‘story’ of forgetting is the genetics, aetiology, 
and teleology of Alzheimer’s disease.
Ibid., p . 153.
666 Ibid., p. 106.
667 Ibid., p. 264.
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In the postscript to her novel Still Alice, Lisa Genova describes how it is the intention of the 
novel to:
...sit the reader right up against her [Alice’s] Alzheimer’s. It should feel 
uncomfortably close at times. You should feel her confusions and frustrations and 
terror right along with her. And yes, this choice forces us to lose what’s going on 
inside her thoughts of her husband and the other characters, but we get an insider’s 
perspective into the mind of someone slipping further and further into Alzheimer’s. 
Most people without Alzheimer’s never get to sit in that seat.668
This novel follows the character of Alice Howland who is diagnosed with early-onset 
Alzheimer’s. It follows her as she ‘loses her ability to rely on her own thoughts and 
memories, as she loses her cerebral life at Harvard, when she’d placed all her worth and 
identity.’669 The novel dramatises both Alice’s experience of Alzheimer’s disease and the 
narrative problems inherent in a first-person account of a condition that irretrievably damages 
first-person subjectivity. Like The Wilderness and The Story o f Forgetting, some of Genova’s 
stylistic decisions are indicative of the ways in which literature and neurology can illuminate 
each other. In the preface to the novel, Genova writes with a dispassionate, clinical 
impassivity: ‘Even then, more than a year earlier, there were neurons in her head, not fa r
670from her ears, that were being strangled to death, too quietly for her to hear them.’ In 
providing the reader with a definitive prognosis prior to the character’s awareness, she tacitly 
conditions an impassive and anticipative ‘medical gaze’ in the reader. Privileged with this 
foreknowledge, we are not simply asked to anticipate, but search the text for evidence of, 
Alice Howland’s decline. As such the interpretative liberties of the reader are delimited to 
some extent by the aetiology and teleology of Alzheimer’s disease. Genova, on revealing
668 Lisa Genova, ‘Postscript’, Still Alice, p. 307.
669 Ibid., p. 298.
670 n - ,  .Ibid., p. 1.
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Alice’s condition, sets up clear diagnostic boundaries, limitations, and possibilities within 
which literary erudition takes place. Genova does not simply construct a fiction about illness, 
but seeks to equate aspects of the fiction -specifically the linguistic processes involved in 
metaphor —to the illness. The diagnostic clues or textual symptoms encompass everything 
from the dropping of possessive pronouns (e.g. my daughter becomes ‘the pretty woman 
(260); ‘the actress’ (261); ‘the mother’),671 to the transition from a lucid and dispassionate 
etiological vocabulary to imprecise and explicitly metaphorical speech. This text is not only 
grounded in the positivism of medical epistemology, but offers statistical information, which 
emphasises the novel’s didactic role: ‘There are an estimated five hundred thousand people 
in the United States with early-onset Alzheimer’s disease. Early onset is defined as
f 672Alzheimer’s under the age o f sixty-five. Symptoms can develop in the thirties and forties. ’ 
However, in contrast to this and the nomenclature Genova is familiar with as a neuroscientist, 
the more poetically and rhetorically embellished passages, whilst being more accessible to 
the literary scholar, effect a sense of distance from the subject matter. The novel oscillates 
between medical and literary discourse, the former offering a crude, unambiguous, 
unembellished and excessively morbid account of Alzheimer’s, and the latter pushing the 
reality and pathos of the disease into a counterintuitive latency. Literary discourse, for 
Genova, is an aesthetics of deviation, a language whose connotative dimension and semantic 
open-endedness give the illusion of multiple realities and makes the reader aware of a ‘literal 
sense’ that is always ‘transported, diverted from itself.’673 Genova tacitly equates 
metaphoricity and neuropathology. The changing linguistic registers in the novel carry 
implied neurological connotations, which are played out in reader-response: in the more 
florid or densely metaphorical sections the reader must infer its meaning, whilst the literal,
671 Ibid., pp. 260-1.
672 Ibid., p. 208.
673 Catherine Malabou & Jacques Derrida, Counterpath: Travelling with Jacques Derrida, trans. by David Wills 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 215.
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medical vocabulary is built much more on logical entailment. There is a palpable tension in 
this novel (embodied in its linguistic inconsistencies) between Genova’s obvious desire to 
educate -to  procure insight into the biomedical realities of Alzheimer’s -and her authorial 
obligation to create, invent, imagine and embellish. It is this very antagonism that is central to 
Genova’s portrayal of Alzheimer’s disease, and as I shall be arguing in this part of the 
chapter, we are no more aware of the reality and teleology of the disease than in this novel’s 
stylistic fluctuations.
The narrative is in the form of an internal monologue with occasional dialogue, and this lends 
it some degree of subjectivity; but her voice is split: it dramatizes her condition while at the 
same time analysing it with some degree of rational control. The protagonist, Alice, is both a 
sufferer of Alzheimer’s disease and a neuropsychologist analysing her own deterioration 
‘with a passionate quest to understand the mind.’674 Her self-distance, then, might be 
considered to be at once pathological and vocational, self-alienated and self-diagnosing. The 
most notable quality of this novel is Genova’s attempt to represent the differential quality of 
Alice’s voice as her role as a practitioner collapses into that of patient with the onset of the 
disease. This is made evident in the letter she writes herself before the onset of her most 
severe symptoms:
Dear Alice, You wrote this letter to yourself when you were o f sound mind. I f  you are 
reading this, and you are unable to answer one or more o f the following questions 
then you are no longer o f sound mind: What month is it? Where do you live? Where is 
your office? [...] You have Alzheimer’s disease. You have lost too much o f yourselves,
675too much o f what you love, and you are not living the life you want to live.
6/4 Ibid., p. 51.
675 Ibid., p . 271 .
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Whilst Genova has not the narrative polemics of B.S. Johnson, she does exploit and draw 
self-consciously upon the fictionality of the novel when attempting to depict Alice’s 
experience of Alzheimer’s. Alice is a neuropsychologist and her early reaction to her 
symptoms is one of clinical impassivity; she exercises an objectivity and self-distance that is 
initially vocational, but as she worsens, becomes more pathological. This transition is 
revealed as Genova alternates between positivist, neurological discourse in one moment, and 
a more rhetorically embellished, hermeneutical fictionalist account the next. Metaphor, 
which interferes with language’s literal usage676 and interposes itself between the ‘real’ and 
the imaginative, is correlated with Alice’s increasingly compromised engagement with her 
environment, her waning perceptual and somatic states, and even her cognitive/intellectual 
losses. Although correlated with her increasingly ‘unresponsive, disobedient, weakening’677 
and less analytical mind, Genova’s use of metaphor -indeed her use of literature -is  in no 
way pejorative. In tacitly equating metaphoricity and neuropathology, she draws conscious 
attention to the role of literary discourse in communicating medical information and 
procuring insight into the subjective experience of sickness and disease. Alice’s greatest 
anxiety in the novel is over language and the nature of thought, and on several occasions she 
attempts to convince herself that ‘the fact she had Alzheimer’s didn’t mean that she couldn’t 
think analytically.’678 The dispassionate neurological parlance in the novel signifies the 
control and lucidity of the medical gaze, objectifying Alice’s condition and implicitly 
equating itself with health. But poignantly, the inclusion of a more rhetorical style, combined 
with the reader’s conscious awareness of its polysemy, preciosity, imprecision and 
narcissistic self-referentiality, work to subjectify Alice’s condition and conflict with the 
incisive, technical neurological parlance that has come, if implicitly, to signify control. Sofie
676 Terence Hawkes, Metaphor: The Critical Idiom, ed. by John D. Jump (London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1972),
p. 2.
677 Genova, p. 166.
678 Genova, p. 187.
210
Vandamme and Arko Olderwald comment how ‘metaphorical thinking should be avoided 
when talking and writing on personal experience of illness because metaphorical language 
colours the “real” experience of illness.’679 Yet, in Still Alice, metaphor is an extension of 
medical discourse and the nomenclature of Alzheimer’s disease; it does not depart from but 
equates itself with the realities of disease, and is a significant part of what is a thoroughly and 
self-consciously didactic novel. As Alice falls victim to Alzheimer’s the text lapses more 
frequently into a decorous, florid, non-literal vocabulary, and as Alice comes to question the 
accuracy and verisimilitude of her reality Genova draws increasingly heavily on the 
philological and exegetical problematics of textuality. Paradoxically it is the fictionality of 
the novel, as made explicit through the change in linguistic register, becomes synonymous 
with the reality of Alzheimer’s disease -literary discourses here working as a neurological 
marker in the same instance it departs from empirical reality.
Speaking of the role of narrative in elucidating the experience of illness, Arthur W. Frank 
comments that ‘hearing traces of the body in the story is not easy. Observing what stories say 
about the body is a familiar sort of listening; describing stories as told through the body 
requires another level of attention.’680 Alice’s experience with Alzheimer’s is explored 
through her declining language skills. Genova describes how ‘her ability to use language, that 
thing that most separates humans from animals, was leaving her, and she was feeling less and 
less human as it departed.’681 The transition from medical explication to literary evocation, 
with its lack of semantic constraints, its complex and aleatory inventory of allusions, 
juxtapositions and permutations, and its plethora of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms, captures that loss of control that Alice Howland finds in medical
679 Sofie Vandamme et al., ‘Myths and Metaphors Reconsidered: Nancy Versus Sontag’ in Making Sense o f  
Health, Illness, and Disease, ed. by Peter L Twohig and Vera Kalitzkus (The Netherlands: Eidtions Rodopi, 
2004), p. 141.
680 Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (London: University of Chicago Press, 
Ltd., 1995), p. 2.
Genova, p. 270.
discourse, as well as the hallucinations and the plural, inimitable realities that she alone 
experiences. David Keck describes of Alzheimer’s that ‘when we are confronted with the 
reality of living cognitive dissolution, we may be inclined towards respecting the integrity of 
everyday language, something which we had heretofore taken for granted.’ 682 This ‘everyday 
language,’ for Alice, is that of medical discourse. Genova draws attention to the different 
ways in which reality changes depending on the discourse, the lens, through which it is 
articulated and perceived. For instance, we are invited to contrast this much more figurative 
description:
The words, the information, the meaning in the woman’s questions and in Alice’s 
own answers were like soap bubbles, the kind children blew out of those little plastic 
wants, on a windy day. They drifted away from her quickly and in dizzying 
directions, requiring enormous strain and concentration to track,
With the more elucidative and medically attuned:
The neural pathways I use to try to understand what you are saying, what I am 
thinking, and what is happening around me are gummed up with amyloid. I struggle 
to find the words I want to say and often hear myself saying the wrong ones. I can’t 
confidently judge spatial distances, which means I drop things and fall down a lot and 
can get lost two blocks from my home.684
Whilst the latter communicates Alice’s problems directly and dispassionately, the manner in 
which the first quotation is written plays more conspicuously on the tacit association built up 
over the course of the novel between metaphoricity and neuropathology. In the first example, 
Alice is unable to articulate ideas scientifically as she ordinarily would, and the implied
68“ David Keck, in Forgetting Whose We Are, p. 79.
683 Genova, p. 241.
684 Ibid., p. 251.
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distance embodied in metaphor and simile matched by the comparably remote third-person 
pronoun ‘her’ and the adoption of a heterodiegetic narrative voice. This is indicative of her 
pathological self-distance. By contrast, the second example, whilst spoken with recourse to 
metaphor is lucid and scientific, narrated homodiegetically with the possessive pronouns T  
and ‘my’ and with more of a vocational self-distance. She writes how ‘soon, although I’ll still 
now what it is like, I’ll be unable to express it to you,’685 and this tension between a didactic 
versus hermeneutic fictionalist account -between medical discourse (which aims to be direct, 
transparent, and precise) and literary discourse (with its recourse to metaphor and 
indeterminacy) -forms the basis of this ‘subjective’ portrayal. As Terence Hawkes 
comments, ‘poetical effects are seen, outside of poetry, almost as a vice of language’ in the 
sense that, being less transparent, they can constitute ‘distracting effects.’686 This is precisely 
what Genova creates as she alternates between a specialist neurological parlance and a more 
decorous and rhetorical style, as well as between a first- and third-person, homo- and
687heterodiegetic narrative voice, to give an indication of her loss of ‘psychic accuracy.’
688Arthur W. Frank comments that ‘in the silences between words, the tissues speak,’ and 
certainly for Genova it is the lacunae in literary discourse -the imprecision, implicature, and 
irreducible polysemy, and lack of a semantic teleology -that offers insight into the body, or in
• • 689this case brain, and embodies how, for Alice, ‘the whole landscape of life lies remote.’
Vandamme and Olderwald term metaphor a ‘linguistic problem’ for illness narratives -one 
that is ‘unrelated to the reality of being ill.’690 For Genova it conveys Alice’s cognitive and 
intellectual decline, rendering the linguistic traits more commonly associated with literature 
implicitly symptomatic, and correlating the non-metaphorical, more precise and analytical
685 Ibid., p. 251.
686 Terence Hawkes, Metaphor, p. 10.
687 Genova, p. 249.
688 Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller, p. xii.
689 Woolf, ‘On Being 111’, p. 195.
690 Sofie Vandamme et al., Making Sense o f  Health, Illness, and Disease, p. 144.
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paradigms with an inverse reality: health. This sense of indirectness or remoteness is 
something Alice experiences as she attempts to articulate herself:
She wanted to tell her that she was proud of her. But her thoughts from idea to mouth 
moved too slowly today, as if they had to swim miles through black river sludge 
before surfacing to be heard, and most of them drowned somewhere along the way.691
The nature of metaphor is fitting for what she is communicating here. The contrastive 
etiological rhetoric embodies that lucid medical gaze and is diagnostic, referring to Alice’s 
neurological state; but it is also meta-linguistic in the sense that Alice’s condition, 
specifically her waning intellectual abilities, is indistinguishable from, and reducible to, the 
metaphorical language employed to represent it. Thus Genova’s narrative has as much 
Alzheimer’s as itself as its referent -its implied subject of diagnosis. Genova compounds this 
narrative—neurology conceit as she represents the ‘world of dementia’692 and the 
neurodegeneration it entails as an insidious fictitiousness. Alice’s status as a character often 
blends with her status as an Alzheimer’s sufferer. Alice describes her ‘growing distance from 
her self-awareness [and] her sense of Alice [...] [of] what she knew and understood, what she 
liked and disliked, how she felt and perceived,’693 and in this the neurological bleeds into the 
authorial as her awareness of her condition seems at times synonymous with her awareness of 
her characterisation. Describing her condition, Alice comments on how she ‘almost felt like 
a character in a play, this woman with Alzheimer’s disease,’ and how ‘she felt like a fraud, 
posing as a Harvard professor.’694 She even envisions her fate less in terms of a reality and 
more in terms of a narrative: ‘John [her husband] would become the informant, and Alice
Genova, p. 225.
692 Ibid., p . 208.
693 Ibid., p . 242.
694 Ibid. pp . 131 & 96.
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would become the dying, incompetent patient. She wasn’t ready to turn herself in.’695 It is as 
if, at times, Alice has knowingly entered a fictional illusion and that she is aware of her status 
as a character in a novel and the need to ‘inhabit this new world she found herself in, this 
world of dementia’696 and navigate through ‘this Dr. Seuss land of neither here nor there.’697 
Her entire identity, like Mr. Blank’s in Travels in the Scriptorium, is reducible to a series of 
notations. Dropping the pronouns ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘my’ she begins to describe herself more 
impassively and objectively as simply ‘this poor unfamiliar woman,’698 or ‘a woman she 
didn’t know’699 She becomes reliant on a piece of paper which becomes her prosthetic 
memory (in the same way the ledger does for Mr. Blank and the tape recorder for Krapp) 
whilst also alluding to the artifice and terminal constructedness of her character. The textual, 
neurological, existential, and vaguely metafictional are conflated as her ability to remember 
her identity -indeed to have an identity -is  dependent on retaining a piece of paper upon 
details about herself are written. As she explains, ‘[everything she did and loved, everything 
she was, required language.’700 Genova writes how:
Alice tucked a piece of paper with her name, address, and phone number in her sock. 
Of course, if she became so confused that she didn’t know her way home, she might 
not have the presence of mind to remember that she carried this piece of helpful 
information on her person.701
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She raced to the front hallway, but then stopped before she could reach the door. It 
was the strangest thing. There was a large hole in the floor just in front of the door. It 
spanned the width of the hallway and was about eight or nine feet in length, with 
nothing but the dark basement below it. It was impassable [...] The mail had just been 
delivered through the slot in the door, and it lay on the top of the hole, somehow
7 0 7hovering there.
Genova suspends the ‘truth’, later revealing the hole to be a decidedly more benevolent
703‘black hallway rug,’ later qualified (and rationalised) by: ‘Floating mail. My brain is
fried!'10*
As Alice’s reality is experienced as a series of hallucinogenic, fictional occlusions, the 
novel’s very fictionality gains neurological, and hence realist, connotations. Alice’s allusions 
to herself as fictional character prior to this are certainly important, for imaginative or 
delusory realities, being clearly within the remit of a ‘fictional’ world, thus hold some degree 
of expectation, some normalcy, for the reader -as indeed it does for Alice. In the same way 
she plays on the tension between florid and scientific speech, Genova exploits mechanisms of 
pretense, make-believe, and non-existent things involved in hermeneutic fictionalism705 in 
this evocation of alterity. She also draws on the reader’s level or degree of expectation and 
acceptance, and what the reader expects and considers normal for fiction becomes 
synonymous with what is not normal for Alice, but what, ultimately, she comes to accept as 
normal as she deteriorates. In their study of narrative approaches to disease, illness and 
disability Valarie Raoul et al ask: ‘what difference does it make if the story is framed as truth
~ Ibid., pp. 206-7.
703 Ibid., p. 211.
704 Ibid.
705 Jason Stanley, Figurative Language, ed. by Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein, vol. 25 (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001), pp. 36-9.
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or fiction?’706 For Genova, it seems, placing the story in the interstice between truth and 
fiction, metaphorical and neurological parlance, is fundamental to the portrayal of Alice’s 
decline, and over the course of the novel it is the world, or more particularly the language, of 
fiction that embodies the profoundly alienating reality of Alzheimer’s disease.
iii) Conclusion
Critics across the medical humanities have stressed ‘the need of ill people to tell their stories, 
in order to construct new maps and new perceptions of their relationships to the world,’ as 
well as ‘the embodiment of these stories: how they are told not just about the body but 
through it.’707 The potential role of narrative in medical education and practice is highlighted 
by Arthur Kleinman, who comments:
Illness narratives edify us about how life problems are created, controlled, made 
meaningful. They also tell us about the way cultural values and social relations shape 
how we perceive and monitor our bodies, label and categorize bodily symptoms, 
interpret complaints in the particular context of our life situation [...] One unintended 
outcome of the modem transformation of the medical care system is that it does just 
about everything to drive the practitioner’s attention away from the experience of 
illness. The system thereby contributes importantly to the alienation of the chronically
• 708ill from their professional care givers.
I have argued in this chapter that the narrative polemics of B.S. Johnson and the narrative 
reticence of Paul Auster work as a topography of the dementing brain, whilst the use of
706 Multiple Contributors, ‘Making Sense of Disease, Disability, and Trauma’ in Unfitting Stories, p. 7.
707 Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Stoiyteller, p. 3.
708 Arthur Kleinman, The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition (USA: Basic Books, 
1988), pp. xiii-xiv.
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different linguistic registers in The Wilderness, The Stoiy o f Forgetting, and Still Alice 
ostensibly signal different levels of consciousness and offer an implied correspondence 
between neurological processes and representational content. The aim of these narratives is to 
procure insight into the subjective experience of Alzheimer’s. House Mother Normal and 
Travels in the Scriptorium in particular form an epistemological, or knowledge-based, 
aesthetic, despite the self-reflexivity, disaffection, and elitism that seems to underpin these 
hermeneutical examinations. However, like literary modernism, they also constitute an 
ontological, or being-based, aesthetic. The premise that this chapter has been working toward 
is that the Alzheimer’s sub-genre, tethered though it is to a disease nosology, constitutes a 
second, more conspicuously ‘medical’ phase of literary modernism in its technical 
experimentation, its self-reflexivity, its preference for spatial and rhythmic over 
chronological form, its scepticism towards the idea of a centred human subject, and its 
sustained inquiry into the uncertainty of reality. The modernistic aesthetic follows from 
scientific, imperial, technological, and social expansion, and the lucrative material changes, 
accompanied by a collective and individual sense of crisis, result in its characteristically 
rebellious, disaffecting, questioning, introspective, and innovative literary aesthetic.
Moreover, literary modernism is connected the overabundance of sense data with 
urbanisation, industrialisation, war, and technological changes, and a sense of estrangement 
or detachment from the empirical world. Alzheimer’s narratives, likewise, are constructed 
around the senses and their compromise, not as a result of technological but medical change.
It is a paradox that improvements in medicine and healthcare result in rising life 
expectancies, which in turn result in the creation and greater prevalence of age-related 
pathologies. Thus, while the modernist aesthetic is a reaction to industrialisation, 
technologisation, imperialism, urbanisation, and so on, the neo-modemist aesthetic of 
subjective Alzheimer’s fiction is the pathogeny of modem medicine.
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What makes contemporary subjective Alzheimer’s narratives a re-engagement with literary 
modernism is a clear awareness of the complexities of the mind and its expression through 
the use of different linguistic registers, innovations in typography, narrative structure/voice, 
and syntax, and suspicion over, or self-consciousness of, language and narrative as a medium 
for evoking it. But, unlike literary modernism, this stylistic innovation and technical 
experimentalism is not an attack on rationalism and empiricism as it is grounded the 
rationalism, empiricism, and positivism of medical discourse. Contemporary subjective 
Alzheimer’s narratives are a move away from logical exposition and often disturb the reader 
by adopting difficult, moot, or complex form or narrative voice, rejecting intelligible plots, 
characterisation or narrative structure, and at times defying clear interpretation. They 
constitute an exhumation not simply of the non-linear, free-associative processes of the 
thinking, conscious mind like with stream-of-consciousness, but the mind as afflicted with 
Alzheimer’s. Like literary modernism, subjective Alzheimer’s narratives offer a ‘direct, 
intimate entry into consciousness,’709 and can be considered at once an exclusivist, at times 
arcane, and densely self-referential strata as well as a clear evocation of the empirical, 
material, and demographic changes in society. They are a response to medical progressivism 
just as their modernist counterpart was technological progressivism, and constitute a 
positivist, medically-attuned address to literary modernism. However, the dialogue between 
modernism and Alzheimer’s that I have forged here does have farther reaching connotations. 
The work of Alois Alzheimer, to some extent, signified a reification of Classical etiological 
and proverbial discourses of ageing710 as well as mythical, philosophical, or alchemical 
rhetoric on immortality. Alzheimer’s work demonstrated how some of the salient 
characteristics of age —notably memory loss, behavioural changes, and cognitive and 
intellectual losses —are pathological, which gave greater credence to the quintessentially
709 Randall Stevenson, Modernist Fiction: An Introduction (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1992), p. 
39
710 See introduction to thesis
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western discourse of optionality -as seen in prolongevity medicine, the commodification of 
immortality in consumer society, the humanist fallacy and sophism anti-ageing, and of course 
the dictum ‘senectus morbidus e sf711 that characterised antecedent medical discourses 
centuries before. Such discourses have presented old age as having a much more malleable 
and contingent relation to its antonym, youth, and in a postmodern spin on Pound’s dictum 
‘make it new’ have surreptitiously repositioned or reconceptualised old age not in contrast to 
youth but a possible state of youth. The predilection in contemporary subjective Alzheimer’s 
narratives for stylistic innovation and refusal of a logical or holistic exposition signifies an 
energy and flair that is in stark contrast to, and seemingly repudiates, the nature of its subject 
matter. Indeed, one might express this by saying that forgetting in old age in contemporary 
literature is conveyed, stylistically at least, by forgetting o f  old age. Whilst the novels 
mentioned do offer, quite unequivocally, a thematic engagement with old age, the novelists’ 
appropriation of an energetic, disruptive narrative polemicism belies that subject matter and 
has more in common with youth and the modernist imperative to ‘make it new’. They may be 
construed as the perfect representation, then, of a culture at once ageing and anti-ageing, and 
the subtle repudiation of ageing can signify positively to medical accomplishments or 
negatively to social paradigms where people ‘avoid all reference to great age’ and where it is 
‘a kind of shameful secret that is unseemly to mention.’712
I asked in the introduction whether such literature is or could be considered medical or 
gerontological resource. Part of what the literature examined suggests is that our level of 
knowledge about a disease, as well as that disease’s prevalence in society, elicits or demands 
innovation and change in narrative technique and voice. The medical episteme has a 
formative role in the construction of these narratives, and the ensuing literary aesthetic is one
711 ‘Old age is a disease’ (Seneca) Multiple Contributors, The Cambridge Handbook o f  Age and Ageing, ed. by 
Malcolm L. Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 22.
712 Simone de Beauvoir, ‘Old Age and Biology’ in The Coming o f  Age, trans. by Patrick O’Brian (London & 
New York: Norton, 1996), p. 1.
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both modelled upon what Foucault terms ‘endlessly reproducible pathological fact’713 yet one 
that aggressively reasserts the experimentalism, self-reflexivity, and hermeneutic liberties and 
aesthetic deviations more characteristic of the literary idiom. Alzheimer’s necessitates 
narrative change, and indeed that sense of energy, flair, and polemicism belies its very 
subject matter; but at the same time, converting neurological into textual symptoms, 
Alzheimer’s narratives are constructed around a set of narrative determinants whereby both 
authorial choices and the reader’s interpretative/methodological processes are enformed and 
dictated by ‘pathological fact.’ Thus I have also argued that in their medically-attuned 
aesthetic, the novels mentioned do not necessarily promote interpretative licence but 
represent a form of over-determination in reader-response and ‘seek to emulate the methods 
and postures of scientists.’714 The texts discussed demand a clinicality or clinical impassivity 
when it comes to textual analysis. One becomes becomes cognisant not simply of what is 
being depicted, but how it is depicted and why. The narrative techniques instrumental to the 
evocation of Alzheimer’s -especially when the author intends the narrative voice to emulate 
that of the afflicted -both X-ray the sufferer’s mind and collude with the disease and its 
destructive path, giving a jointly mental and representational sense of affliction. However it is 
the very spectacle of decline and decrepitude that provides a surprising opportunity for 
experimental renewal in contemporary fiction, and shows how an engagement with the 
pathos of senility can succeed in the same instance old age is repudiated, placed sous rature, 
or under erasure, through linguistic and stylistic innovation.
713Michel Foucault, The Birth o f  the Clinic: An Archaeology o f  Medical Perception, trans. A M Sheridan Smith 
(New York: Pantheon, 1973), p. 97
14 Judy Z. Segal, ‘Interdisciplinarity and Postdisciplinarity in Health Research in Canada’ in Unfitting Stories, 
p. 12.
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LITURGIES OF A FICTION: ANTI-AGEING AND THE SEMIOTICS OF REALISM 
IN CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE FICTION
When defining science fiction, one might well turn to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s famous 
phrase ‘willing suspension of disbelief.’715 What this chapter examines are the ways in which 
Anglo-American incredulity and hostility towards the ageing process, the commodification of 
immortality in discourses of consumerism, the flourishing of biomedical interventions, and 
the cultural salience of anti-ageing are impacting literary representations of time, organic 
decay, and death, and de-sensationalising this fictional novum. Recent scholarship has 
focussed on the waning transcendentalism of this future-orientated genre, describing an 
incipient decline ‘[facilitated by technology’ and ‘the actualization of what science fiction 
narratives of old only imagined.’716 The libertarian possibilities and imaginative 
epistemologies of science fiction are overcome by a prosaicism, triteness, and pragmatism as 
prolongevity medicine, the blandishments of anti-ageing, the superabundance of anti-ageing 
nostrums, dilettantish anti-ageing regimes all portray the limitations and cadences of the body
717as endlessly revisionary, and strive to give the illusion of a ‘continuous present tense.’ As
unrealistic cultural representations of ageing as optional or reversible718 prevail and 
transcendentalist ideas and evasive, jargonised phraseologies such as ‘turn back time’, ‘age 
rewind’719 and ‘age defy’720 begin to typify the everyday consumer vernacular, discourses of 
time travel and sempitemity are constituted within a new semiotics of realism. No longer the
715 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, quoted by Amar Nath Prasad in Recritiquing ST Coleridge (New Delhi: Sarup & 
Sons, 2007), p. 211.
716 D. Harlan Wilson, Technologized Desire: Selfhood and the Body in Postcapitalist Science Fiction (USA: 
Guide Dog Books, 2009), p. 25.
717 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination: The Dynamics o f  Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999), p. 60.
718 Stephen S. Hall, Merchants o f Immortality: Chasing the Dream o f  Human Life Extension (New York: 
Mariner Books, 2003), p. 3.
719 Boots No. 7 foundation but chiefly Maybelline products. See also products such as Maxfactor Ageless 
Elixir’ Foundation; Age Defy Dermatology and Wellness, Inc. products/treatments with the slogan ‘turn back 
the clock’ [see: http://www.agedefV.com/products/revercel/1; and the ‘Re:Nu Age Defy’ range/treatments.
7-0 This phrase is not brand-specific as with ‘age rewind’, but is common to the majority of anti-ageing products.
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cloistered, utopian realities and postulated future cultures of fantasy, the presumption of 
agelessness and perhaps even deathlessness pervade contemporary culture, from ‘cosmetic 
treatments and surgery; exercise and therapy; food and beverages; vitamins, minerals, and 
supplements; and cosmetics and cosmeceuticals.’7211 will consider the extent to which 
aspects of the science-fictional idiom emerge as a new prescriptive literature in the context of 
rising life expectancies and demographic change -associated more with humanity’s libidinal 
fears of death, welfare systems, and meliorist efforts to restore public health in an ageing 
society, than they are the escapism, transcendentalism, and alternative vocabularies and 
epistemologies of science fiction. As Zygmunt Bauman argues:
mortality and immortality (as well as their imagined opposition, itself construed as a cultural reality
through patterned thoughts and practices) become approved and practised life strategies [...] They also
offer formulae for defusing the horror of death through hopes, and sometimes institutional guarantees, 
722of immortality.
With regards to the subject of age-transcendence, then, an element of realism pervades the 
postulated future cultures that science fiction has to offer, but also a historicity, rationalism 
and positivism given the domination of immortality and rejuvenation in medical practice and 
epistemologies for generations.723 This chapter works on the notion that immortality, 
rejuvenation, and prolongevity fail as transcendentalist or ‘quintessentially ’ science-fictional 
tropes given both their historicist persistence in the medical episteme and their cultural 
saliency today in consumer discourses, welfare systems, and prolongevity medicine. I shall 
explore these issues with recourse to Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) and Michel 
Houellebecq’s The Possibility o f an Island (2005). Both novelists raise questions about the
7-1 Juergen Bleudau, Aging, But Never Old (USA: Greenwood Publishing Company, 2010), p. 14.
7“2 Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality, and Other Life Strategies (California: Stanford University Press,
1992), p. 9.
7 0 3
See introduction of thesis.
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representation of ageing in the context of a culture whose discourses of ageing remain 
steeped in transcendental idiom that remains still largely contrary to its empirical 
environment. Moreover, I shall examine the questions both novels raise about the 
representation of time, trans- and posthumanity, and futurity in the context of a culture 
incredulous of mortality and alongside the realist tableau in which the subjects of immortality 
and rejuvenation now seem ensconced. Linguistically, these novels alternate between a 
social-realist and science-fictional parlance; ideologically, the technologisation of Man in 
these novels is construed as both humanistic and anti-humanistic, and conflates the subjects 
of affliction and transcendence; physiologically their characters are at once primordial and 
posthuman, mortal and sempiternal; and temporally, their novels are at once a projection of 
the future and a nostalgic evocation of the past. The narratives equate mortality and 
immortality, youth and age, corporal longevity and non-corporal immortality, antiquity and 
futurity/novelty, nostalgia and prognostication, imagination and entelechy, social realism and 
science fiction. Margaret Atwood retrofits her immortal, futuristic beings with typically 
human anxieties and maladies. Likewise Michel Houellebecq renders his sleek, futuristic 
neohuman figures phlegmatic, incompetent, and above all, mortal, and as such implicitly 
correlates technological discourses with gerontological ones, utopian immortality with 
technofatalist dystopia, naturalism and transcendentalism. Both authors abandon any lucid 
separation of past from future, mortal from immortal, biomedical reality and humanist 
fallacy, and in the process render their characters highly conflicted, portmanteau figures with 
the attributes both of death-susceptible Neanderthals and potentially ageless trans- or post­
humans. Both Oryx and Crake and The Possibility o f an Island are novels where opposites 
collide. Atwood and Houellebecq construct binaries only to deconstruct them, and 
consequently the representation of time, both bodily and epochal, is demonstrably 
ambivalent.
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i) Postmodern Timelessness: Prolongevity Medicine and the Commodification 
of Immortality
Audrey Niffenegger’s The Time Traveler’s Wife (2003) portrays an individual, Henry, 
suffering with a genetic disorder, chrono-displacement, which causes him to time travel 
spontaneously and uncontrollably. He is, as Niffenegger describes, a ‘man out of Time.’724 
She conflates a transcendentalist and reductionist, etiological rhetoric -the fantasy of time 
travel and the pathos of disease. Exploring this fictional novum within a mock pathography, 
she roots the literary and Gnostic imagination within the positivism of medical epistemology, 
and most provocatively of all brings the quintessentially science-fictional theme of time 
travel ever closer to biological reductionism. A palpable realism pervades and stultifies her 
fantasy as she ‘naturalizes her conception of time travel, characterising it as a genetic 
condition in an ordinary world and describing it in terms of concrete physical sensations and 
reactions.’725 The patho-transcendentalist condition of Henry places makes him both 
suggestively immortal and ineffably mortal, and lends this novel an apparent but a self- 
doubting and attenuated science-fictionality. Both the novel and its protagonist are betwixt 
and between opposites: realism and escapism, mortality and immortality. Age in this novel is 
a fluid and completely unassignable concept, and often the protagonist, in his jointly
• • • 726transcendent and plaintive condition, is two different ages: ‘Henry is 28 and 33.’ For Henry, 
‘past present and future all coexist simultaneously’ and describes how ‘you can always go 
back. Most people are glued to the present; you get to be there again and again’727 -a  fable 
perhaps of consumer society and the hopes, promises, and blandishments of anti-ageing. The
7"4 Audrey Niffenegger, The Time Traveler’s Wife (London: Vintage Books, 2005), p. 5.
7-5 Geoff Hamilton et al., Encyclopaedia o f  American Popular Fiction (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), 
p. 348.
7-6 Niffenegger, The Time Traveler’s Wife, p. 131.
727 Ibid., pp. 77 & 207.
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themes and various conceptual antinomies arising from this novel are a useful way to explore 
the postmodern lifecourse. In an anti-ageing culture, empiricism falters in the face of such 
ideology: that is, Anglo-American culture has never been more familiar with the concepts of 
immortality and rejuvenation (or reversing age) than in the period where medical and 
scientific capability extend life and render unavoidable that which it seeks to disinvent: old 
age. In other words, anti-ageing is contradicted by the very reality it creates. Contemporary 
culture is placing antithetical and incompatible demands on literature. Oneiric fantasies of 
immortality are both contradicted in and validated/reified by contemporary medical practice. 
Like time travel for Niffenegger, sempitemity is naturalised in contemporary culture: 
incorporated into the very fabric of reality and rendered far more quotidian as it becomes the 
hallmark of consumer capitalism, a bureaucratic and scientifically sophisticated ideology, a 
new form of humanism in an ageing society, and new healthcare paradigm loaded with 
possibilities o f ‘buy[ing] this prolongation.,728In the same way The Time Traveler’s Wife 
combines the sobriety of a disease and the oneirism of time travel, anti-ageing discourses too 
conflate the positivism of medicine with the transcendentalist argot of the science fictionist.
The trend toward a postmodern agelessness might be seen as yielding significant semantic 
change in works of science fiction, as alternative or conceptual realities and fantastic 
epistemologies are appropriated in discourses of consumerism and, if the central tenets of the 
American Association of Anti-Ageing Medicine (A4M) are to be believed, brought within the 
remit of medical and scientific plausibility. There is a growing affinity between time travel 
narratives and postmodern discourses of ageing. As Gary Westfahl describes, ‘[ojne 
foundation of fantasy appears to be a longing return to the past, accompanied by the sense
7-8 Dimitrije E. Panfilov et al., Cosmetic Surgery Today, trans. by Grahame Larkin (New York: Thieme, 2005), 
p. 45.
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that the passing of time has brought humanity only decline and degeneration.’729 However, 
such a description might as readily refer to current healthcare paradigms and the medical 
episteme as science fiction and fantasy. Substantive research has been conducted into 
decelerated and arrested ageing, which are defined respectively as slowing the processes of 
ageing and increasing life expectancy and/or maximum lifespan, and reversing the processes 
of ageing ‘to restore vitality and function -akin to the rejuvenation theme that has been 
present in prolongevity myths and quests for millennia.’730 Although in previous eras 
reaching old age was something to aspire to, current demographic alarmism and the 
problematisation of age have recast ageing as something to avoid and the elderly as ‘just one 
more burden imposed on future generations by a society which continually feels ill at ease 
with nature.’731 The commodification of youth and the seduction of a perpetual present seem 
to become increasingly dominant, or alternatively take on a different significance. Reflected 
in the medical episteme and not simply postmodern consumer discourses, one might purport 
ideas of reversing, suspending, or even disinventing age as not evasive but prescriptive. The 
President of A4M, Ronald Klatz, describes the ‘end to ageing and the birth of the ageless 
society.’732 To what extent does the ideological force and cultural saliency of such discourses 
implicitly rewrite texts such as Mary Shelley’s short story ‘The Mortal Immortal’ (1833) 
about a protagonist who becomes immortal after drinking an elixir, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
Benjamin Button (1922) with its depiction of backwards ageing, and Virginia W oolf s 
parodic biography Orlando (1928), with its depiction of a potentially ageless, transhistorical 
protagonist, as proto-postmodem texts of ageing? In a similar vein, how far can narratives
729 Gary Westfahl, ‘The Quarries of Time’ in Worlds Enough and Time: Explorations o f  Time in Science Fiction 
and Fantasy (USA: Greenwood Press, 2002), p. 1.
730 Stephen G. Post et al., Introduction, The Fountain o f  Youth: Cultural, Scientific, and Ethical Perspectives on 
a Biomedical Goal, ed. by Stephen G. Post & Robert H. Binstock (Oxford & New York: Oxford University 
Press, Inc., 2004), p. 3.
731 Frank Furedi, Foreword in The Imaginaiy Time Bomb: Why An Ageing Population is not a Social Problem 
by Phil Mullan (London & New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), p. xv.
73~ Ronald Klatz, Introduction, The Science o f  Anti-Aging Medicine (American Academy of Anti-Aging 
Medicine: Chicago, 1996), p. xiv.
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conveying nonlinear time733 be considered postmodern fables of ageing in the context of a 
culture that has naturalised alternative conceptions of time and sacrosanct promises of eternal 
youth?734 Although ludic fantasies of perpetual youth, rejuvenation, and immortality are in 
firm contradistinction to the empirical environment,735 they nevertheless flourish as 
discourses of ageing, become integrated into the everyday vernacular, and form new 
egalitarian hopes of dissolving age-consciousness and age prejudice through the presumption 
of agelessness. By converting nonlinear conceptions of time from science fiction to 
biomedical fact or possibility, anti-ageing articulates transcendentalist notions of the human 
lifecourse within quotidian, welfarist discourses, and in the process, perhaps, even yields new 
pragmatist conceptions of time travel and other fictional nova.
As Paul Nahin writes, ‘time travel is the ultimate fantasy, the scientific addition to the human 
quest for immortality’736 -a  notion exemplified in the phrases ‘turn back time’, ‘age defy’, 
‘age rewind’, and ‘turn back the clock’ that dominate anti-ageing discourses. Immortality has 
become a form of liberal humanism and secular optimism as people seek control over and 
insight into the ageing body, and reconceptualise as optional, reversible, or preventable the 
most quintessential^ human of conditions: mortality. Anti-ageing is defined as:
...the application of advanced scientific and medical technologies for the early 
detection, prevention, treatment, and reversal of age-related dysfunction, disordered 
and disease. It is a healthcare model promoting innovative science and research to
733E.g., George S. Kaufman and Moss Hart’s play Merrily We Roll Along (1934), Edward Lewis Wallant’s The 
Human Season (1960), C.H Sisson’s Christopher Homm (1965), the underground chamber called ‘Eternity’ 
where time stands still in Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman (1967), Philip K. Dick’s Counter-Clock World 
(1967), Harold Pinter’s Betrayal (1978), and Martin Amis’ Time ’s Arrow (1991), The Time Traveler’s Wife, or 
even J.G. Ballard’s short story ‘The Garden of Time’ where one can suspend the passage of time at will by 
picking flowers.
734 E.g. some products, including Gamier BB cream and Stem Cell 100, speak in terms of ‘miracles’. 
http://www.stemcelllOO.com/ [accessed 03/12]
735 Phil Mullan notes that by 2050, the number of individuals aged 65 to 84 world-wide is expected to grow 
from 400 million to 1.3 billion, and those 85 and over from 135,000 to 2.2 million. The Imaginaiy Time Bomb, 
p. xv.
736 Paul Nahin, Time Machines: Time Travel in Physics, Metaphysics, and Science Fiction, 2 d edn. (Durham, 
N.H.: Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 1999), p. 3.
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prolong the healthy lifespan in humans. As such, anti-aging medicine is based on 
principles of sound and responsible medical care that are consistent with those applied 
in other preventive health specialities.737
As Stephen Katz argues, ‘the chances of experiencing the aging of the body in a meaningfully 
temporal, open and unalienated way are slim.’738 Discourses of ageing today have naturalised 
alternative conceptions of time. Anti-ageing aims to ‘slow, arrest, and reverse phenomena 
associated with ageing’739 and to construct a body outside o f time in a perpetual present. 
Medicine works on the basis that there is no intrinsic limit to age and can suspend or 
significantly delay the ageing process. Similarly, ‘consumer culture supplies the props and 
the environment, allowing for the construction of an eternal present’ and representing an 
arena where ‘ageing can effectively be abolished.’740 Linear conceptions of time are 
deconstructed as ‘consumerism and reversibility invites the possibility of eliminating many of 
the consequences of ageing all together,’741 whilst prolongevity medicine likewise works
7 4 9toward ‘the reversal of age-related dysfunction, disorders, and disease.’ Consumers are 
invited to aestheticise or medicalise their way free from the infelicities of old age, and 
consequently the rhetoric of old age in affluent western cultures is dominated increasingly by 
a presumption of agelessness. The mature identity is articulated more in terms of reinvention, 
novelty, and subversion —a ‘transformation rhetoric’743 as Mike Featherstone describes —than 
fixity, fmitude, and loss. As Ray Kurzweil comments, medical/scientific capability and life
737 Robert Goldman, ‘Anti-ageing Medicine: The Future is NOW’ in The Science o f  Anti-Ageing Medicine 
(USA: American Academy of Anti-Ageing Medicine, 2003), p. 253.
738 Stephen Katz, ‘Imagining the Life-Span: From Premodem Miracles to Postmodern Fantasies’ in Images o f  
Aging: Cultural Representations o f  Later Life, ed. by Mike Featherstone et al. (London & New York:
Routledge, 1995), pp. 69-92 (p. 70).
739Astrid Stuckelberger in Anti-Ageing Medicine: Myths and Chances (Hochschulverlag AD an der ETH Zurich, 
Switzerland, 2008), p. 2.
740 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination: The Dynamics o f  Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999), p. 61.
741 Ibid.,. p. 65.
747“ Astrid Stuckelberger, Anti-Ageing Medicine, p. xiv.
743 Mike Featherstone (ed.), Body Modification (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2000), p. 2.
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extension or rejuvenation technologies will provide us with the means to ‘reprogramme our 
bodies' stone-age software so we can halt, then reverse, ageing.’744 Science, medicine, and 
consumer capitalism together represent a demystification and dissemination of comparatively 
occult or transcendentalist notions of immortality, as well as secularising the premise of 
victory over death that underpins many monotheistic religions. As Gerald J. Gruman argues, 
the modem era has displaced religious orthodoxy. The subject of immortality ‘has become 
centred on the things of this world, especially on the increasing production and distribution of 
goods and services.’745 The range of accoutrements and biomedical interventions made 
available are proxies for religious doctrine -specifically, beliefs in salvation (i.e. through 
resurrection) by divine fiat. As Thomas Cole argues, ‘[ujnable to infuse decay, dependency, 
and death with moral and spiritual significance, our culture dreams of abolishing biological 
aging.’746 Irrespective of actual, manifest changes to the ageing process, immortality -ideas 
of transcending, defying, or reversing age -is  an abiding feature of contemporary verbal 
habits. Some scholars have viewed the cultural rationalisation of immortality as contributing 
not simply to an increasing secularism but to what D. Harlan Wilson describes as a ‘science 
fictionalization o f reality’ also. Wilson continues: ‘[wjhat used to be an alternative genre of 
scientific speculation and fantasy is rapidly becoming mainstream [...] and normalized in the 
real world’ 747 as ageing is placed under the remit of personal choice, and immortality the 
praxis of consumption.
744 Ray Kurzweil, quoted by Amy Willis, ‘Immortality only 20 years away says scientist’, The Telegraph (06 
September 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/6217676/Immortalitv-onlv-20-years-awav- 
savs-scientist.html [accessed 09/11/11]
745 Gerald J. Gruman, A History of Ideas about the Prolongation of Life: The Evolution of Prolongevity 
Hypotheses to 1800, Transactions o f the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 56, No. 9 (1966), 
pp. 1-102 (1), http://www.istor.org/stable/1006096 [accessed 20/02/12],
746 Thomas R. Cole, ‘The “Enlightened” View of Aging: Victorian morality in a New Key,’ in What Does it 
mean to Grow Old? Reflections from the Humanities, ed. by Sally A. Gadow et al. (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1986), p. 129.
747 D. Harlan Wilson, Technologized Desire: Selfhood and the Body in Postcapitalist Science Fiction (USA: 
Guide Dog Books, 2009), p. 22.
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In contemporary affluent societies, ‘the life-span has been infused with rich cultural imagery 
based on the commodification, rather than the scientificity, of timelessness.’748 Through the 
apparatus of youth -including surgical, pharmacological, cosmetic and technological 
interventions —immortality and rejuvenation are subjects no longer mired in superstition, 
mythos, and religion, but reconceptualised in far more corporeal terms, bound in rational, 
humanist discourses and medical probability. Woven into meliorist efforts to revive or restore 
public health in an ageing culture, immortality becomes a panacea to demographic change 
and transforms gerontophobia and pejorative attitudes towards the elderly into enlightened 
prejudice. Immortality and rejuvenation may be considered the epiphenomena of age 
prejudice and gerontophobia, commodity fetishism, scientific ambition, and egalitarian goals 
of health and wellbeing. The model of time ‘most often used in the sciences, including 
gerontology, is chronological, physical and “objective;”749 yet it is precisely this model of 
time that is challenged as medicine and consumerism avail us of products or treatments -  
cosmetics, surgical interventions, pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals -to help us ‘choos[e] 
how and when to age.’750 Ostensibly, time travel and immortality are no longer necessarily 
the antithesis to the empirical here-and-now: physical ageing is to a lesser extent identified 
and articulated in terms of the ‘linear flow of objective time,’751 and as such discourses of 
ageing are opened up to more alternative conceptions on the direction of time. They are, to an 
increasing extent, articulated in terms of biomedical realities, postmodern discourses of 
ageing, and the ‘postmodern self-discipline on keeping the body “ageless,”’752 rather than 
theological doctrines or fictional nova. Postmodern culture of ageing:
748 Stephen Katz, Images o f  Aging, p. 69.
749 C. Davis Hendricks et al., ‘Concepts of Time and Temporal Construction among the Aged, with Implications 
for Research’ in Time, Roles, and Self in Old Age, ed. by Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: Human Sciences Press, 
1976), p. 14.
750Paul Higgs et al., ‘Ageing and its Embodiment The Body: A Reader, ed. by Miriam Fraser et al (Oxford and 
New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 119.
751 C. Davis Hendricks et al., Time, Roles, and Self in Old Age, p. 32.
75^" Stephen Katz, Images o f  Aging, p. 61.
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...presents itself as freedom from constraint [...] For the postmodern sensibility, time, 
aging, and the historical past are not entirely real. They represent a “social 
construction” that we can change at will, whether in societies or in our individual 
lives [...] We have been told over and over again that it is time to “reinvent” old age 
and overcome demeaning stereotypes.753
One might postulate the time traveller or ageless human as representative more of the 
postmodern consumer and his or her dilettantish anti-ageing regimes, than the idealised 
indigenes of a remote and perfect future. One might even argue the time traveller or ageless 
human to be a personification of ‘our cultural preoccupation with challenging the limits of the 
human life-span.’754 The non-essentialism and nonlinear concept of time that pervade 
contemporary discourses of ageing bring time travel under the auspices of medicine and the 
remit of medical insight or capability. Through interventions such as ‘chemical skin peels to 
rejuvenate the appearance of the skin, scleropathy (removing distended veins on the legs), 
hair transplantation, facelifts and tucks, forehead lifts and blepharoplasty (correction of 
drooping eyelids),’755 the body becomes a site where past and future, youth and senescence, 
converge. The ‘postmodern’ body, Simon Biggs argues, is ‘a process of dispossession and 
cover-up, an exercise teetering on the brink of the grotesque.’756 It is an effort in disguise, 
suppression, and denial as the cosmetic surface strives toward the illusion of a perpetual 
present alongside the abject matter and concealed decay beneath. The outcome, Stephen Katz 
argues, is a postmodern lifecourse that is characterised by the ‘blurring of traditional
• • 757chronological boundaries and the integration of formerly segregated periods of life.’ The 
following dialogue from Victor Pelevin’s The Helmet o f Horror (2007) is perhaps an apt
753 Harry R. Moody, ‘What is Critical Gerontology and Why is it Important?’ in Voices and Visions o f  Aging: 
Toward a Critical Gerontology, ed. by Thomas R. Cole et al. (New York: Springer Publishing Company Inc.,
1993), p. xxxviii.
734 Stephen Katz, Images o f  Aging, p. 61.
735 Paul Higgs et al., The Body: A Reader, p. 118.
756 Biggs, The Mature Imagination, p. 75.
Stephen Katz, Images o f  Aging, p. 70.
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representation of what, with anti-ageing, has become a deconstructionist undermining of 
binary oppositions, youth and age:
“‘What is the difference between an old man and a young man if you put them side by 
side?”
“One of them is old and one of them is young.”
“Yes, but what does that mean? That there is only a tiny little piece of the old man left 
in our dimension -he is almost completely submerged in Lethe’s waters of oblivion. 
But the young man is still all here -he has just barely touched the surface of the water. 
Isn’t that it?”
“I don’t know. The way things are these days, they could both go down together at the 
same moment.’” 758
Whilst the naturalisation of immortality and our habituation to such discourses may be seen 
as a rationalisation of science fictional tropes, it is also the fictionalisation of reality. As 
‘none of the anti-aging products can truly treat aging or reverse it,’759 the presumption of 
agelessness that underpins anti-ageing places the ideology -and by extension western culture 
—between medical and scientific progressivism on the one hand, and the liturgy of a fiction on 
the other. Whilst prolongevity medicine is viewed as valid medical research grounded in 
diagnosis and prevention, the hegemony of youth and commodification of immortality in 
discourses of consumerism have been construed as a continuation of the stigmatisation of the 
elderly, a tendentious repression or evasion of the realities of ageing, and both a cultural
758 Victor Pelevin, The Helmet o f  Horror, trans. by Andrew Bromfield (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2007), pp. 155- 
6 .
759 Juergen Bleudau, Aging, But Never Old, p. 18.
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mythology and practice that disseminates and implicitly legitimises evasive or derisive 
attitudes towards ageing and the elderly. Ideas of preventing age characterise a great deal of 
the discursive medical and cultural history of ‘anti-ageing’, whilst the pathologisation of and 
institutional solution to age with the development of geriatrics heralded ideas of curing age. 
The prevention/cure dichotomy currently persists in medical and consumer discourses of 
ageing: anti-ageing medicine works on ‘preventing or rehabilitating a range of age-related 
diseases and incapacities,’ and is defined in far less contentious terms as simply ‘ageing
760“successfully.”’ Anti-ageing in consumer culture is bound up more litigiously in promises 
of an indefinitely protracted youth, and presents the abundance of self-prescribed nostrums as 
‘the solution to the “natural” ageing trajectory [my italics].’761 One might suggest that 
contemporary culture is beset with a reality-fantasy nexus stemming from ideological and 
epistemological conflicts between medicine and consumerism -the first of which brands anti­
ageing as rehabilitative, and the latter a more transhuman self-overcoming or vampire 
agelessness. Discourses of consumerism are regarded by some in the medical profession as 
comprising ‘misleading or unsubstantiated claims’ and has having ‘little or no supporting 
scientific evidence of safety or efficacy.’762 Anti-ageing, then, is beset by a disjunction: 
commercial and clinical efforts, reality and fictionality, science fact and science fiction. As 
Paul Higgs and Ian Rees Jones argue, the fight is to ‘make a distinction between legitimate 
attempts to treat old age and the diseases of later life by highlighting the quackery of much 
anti-ageing’ —the latter of which they term the ‘“feckless” pursuit of vanity,’763 which has 
little or no medical legitimacy. However, contemporary consumer culture has to some extent 
naturalised agelessness and rejuvenation —should perhaps have as its axiom the concluding
760 Astrid Stuckelberger, Anti-Ageing Medicine, p. xiii.
761 Higgs et al., Medical Sociology and Old Age, p. 87.
762Astrid Stuckelberger, Anti-Ageing Medicine, p. 88.
763 Paul Higgs et al., Medical Sociology and Old Age, p. 88.
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like of T.S. Eliot’s ‘East Coker’ from Four Quartets'. ‘In my end is by beginning.’764 
Immortality, it seems, has slid under the egalitarian ideology of health and wellbeing, and has 
become an increasingly prominent in welfarist discourses as life expectancies continue to 
rise.
Commenting on the technique of maintaining science fiction’s internal logic, H.G. Wells 
describes how the writer must ‘help the reader play the game properly, he must help him in 
every possible unobtrusive way to domesticate the impossible hypothesis.’765 Contemporary 
Anglo-American culture has ‘domesticated’ agelessness, incorporated it into the very fabric 
of the everyday, and transformed immortality into a new healthcare paradigm, transhuman 
self-overcoming into dilettantish beauty regime, transcendentalism into realist neutrality. As 
Chris Gilleard and Paul Higgs comment:
...cosmetic surgery and related procedures will become part of everyday life, 
providing more and more people with the opportunity to mould their appearance to 
how they would like to be. Surgeons themselves see techniques improving as they 
become more widely used and the growth of computerized systems using photographs 
of patients that were taken in their youth in order to ‘redesign’ the face in advance of 
surgery offers further evidence of what Baudrillard termed the simulation and
766hyperreality of modem life.
Although for Mike Featherstone and Andrew Wernick consumer culture ‘with its images of 
youth, fitness and beauty lifestyles’ produces ‘a new set of exclusions for older people,’767 for 
some proponents of anti-ageing, old age is not in contradistinction to but a possible state of 
youth. This blurring of the life stages has both positive and negative connotations. It is well
764 T.S. Eliot, ‘East Coker’, Four Quartets (London: Faber & Faber, 2001), p. 20.
765 H.G. Wells, Seven Famous Novels (New York, 1934), p. viii.
766 Chris Gilleard and Paul Higgs, The Body: A Reader, pp. 118-9.
767 Mike Featherstone et al., Images o f  Aging, p. 7.
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documented to the point of cultural cliche that the elderly are infantalised by the betrayals of 
their ageing bodies and the attendant frailties and dependency on others. The physical habitus 
of extreme old age is said to emulate infancy -and geriatrics likewise to mirror paediatrics768 
-and carries with it, albeit in more negative terms, the ideologies and central precepts of anti- 
ageing: turning back time. Similarly, Alzheimer’s disease is described in terms o f ‘walking 
backwards in time.’ As Mark L. Warner moves onto describe:
As the disease progresses the patient loses his short-term memory, leaving him with 
only his mid-term and long-term memory. In time he loses his mid-term memory, and 
only his long-term memory remains -leaving him living in a world based on 
recollections of his past. As such, the past becomes the present.769
In this sense, youth is capable of connoting extreme old age and the pathologies of ageing, 
and this is paradoxical as youth implies growth, development, and fecundity but is used here 
to represent weakness, organic decay, and proximity to death. Articulating extreme old age 
through the ideology of youth, it might be argued, is perhaps a particularly familiar 
paralogism offering, if only implicitly in comparison to anti-ageing, a subtle repudiation of 
the realities of age. It is one such example where eternity has become located in discourse 
and not necessarily in medical intervention and actual, manifest changes to life expectancy 
and quality of life. As Jenny Hockey and Allison James argue:
[t]hrough metaphorical recourse to the positively perceived “limitations” or the 
child’s body [the] adults shield themselves from the approaching vision of illegitimate
768 Juergen Blaudau, Aging, But Never Old, p. 12.
769 Mark L. Warner, In Search o f  the Alzheimer Wanderer: A Workbook to Protect Your Loved One (USA: 
Purdue University Press, 2006), p. 5.
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social dependency in old age. In doing so, however, the basis for the denial of elderly 
personhood is formed.770
The youthful body is a signifier of old age, and as Simon Biggs describes, ‘the past has 
become metaphor for the present.’771 The physiological and representational are clearly at 
odds, and although the image of infancy, by its very incongruity, connotes loss and a 
pathological rather than transcendentalist reversion to youth, as Hockey and James note, the 
verbal habits which juxtapose youth and senescence in this way are in some senses salvatory. 
With anti-ageing, however, the young/old dichotomy is deconstructed not in the theory of 
retrogenesis and the infantalisation of the old, but in the emergence of what one might term 
the hetero-youth. The words ‘elderly’ or ‘old’ arguably do not reflect how malleable and fluid 
the mature identity is perceived to be under postmodern conditions. Under postmodern 
conditions one might understand the elderly as hetero-youth. The term refers to the nature of 
ageing the apparatuses and simulacra of youth, and the antinomies of the postmodern 
lifecourse that cannot be adequately expressed in the existential trinity of youth, middle-age, 
senescence, but transcends the cadences of physical nature and linear time toward a reality 
superior to that trinity and Eliot’s concise summation of ‘birth, copulation, death.’772 
Consumer culture and technological innovation have yielded the sort of novelty and 
subversion that was ushered in by modernity at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Almost a century later, this modernistic upheaval and novelty is evoked in the postmodern 
lifecourse where, to put a postmodern spin on Pound’s dictum, the emphasis on the mature 
identity is to ‘make it new.’ The conventional indices of decay and decline were ‘based 
largely upon assumptions about the adult lifecourse as a period of productive labor followed 
by an unproductive retirement.’ However, the elderly —or hetero-youth —have entered an
770 Jenny Hockey et al., ‘Back to Our Futures: Imaging Second Childhood’ in Images o f  Aging, p. 143.
771 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination, p. 63.
772 T.S. Eliot, cited by James Kreuzer et al., Modern Writings on Major English Authors (USA: The Bobbs- 
Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), p. 622.
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ersatz adolescence by virtue of physiological changes in the senescent body but by the 
semantic changes that this category we tenn ‘old age’ is undergoing. Such is the ideological 
force of anti-ageing, old age is a period of upheaval, experimentation, and newness: ‘[f]ixed 
conceptions of aging have, for many, been replaced by a much more fluid notion of later life 
as a period of experiment with a diversity of activities and identities.’ The theory of 
retrogenesis, or the demonstrably pathological ‘second childhood’ is here given more positive 
connotations. Biggs continues that ‘the management of identity is increasingly becoming a 
matter of surface impressions which can be adopted or shed with relative ease,’773 including 
that of senescence.
Although immortality, rejuvenation, and self-overcoming are qualities within the province of 
consumer capitalism and (albeit far less litigious) medicine, paradoxically they also exist 
within the auspices of gerontology -the branch of science that deals with the problems of 
ageing. I have suggested that discourses of immortality and fantasies about the conquest of 
time constitute a new semiotics of realism with the growth of the anti-ageing revolution.
Mike Hepworth describes the lifecourse as ‘evidence that change is a fundamental feature of 
the human condition,’ but goes on to argue that this ‘does not mean that there is no such thing 
as a “core self’ or sense of continuous personal identity.’774 This sense of continuity is 
particularly pervasive in sociological discourses of ageing as well as personal testimonials,775 
meaning that couched within the verbal habits relating to old age is a celebration of 
continuity as well as a lamentation of the betrayals of the body and the losses that ageing 
entails. The psychology of ageing does not entail the same losses and sense of decline as 
physiological ageing; whilst the body may deteriorate the mind has its own distinct trajectory 
of decline, and may represent a source of continuity —even agelessness. As Simone de
773 Simon Biggs, ‘The “Blurring” of the Lifecourse: Narrative, Memory, and the Question of Identity’ in Journal 
o f Aging and Identity, vol. 4, No. 4, 1999, pp. 209-221 (211).
774 Mike Hepworth, Stories o f  Ageing, p. 29.
775 See Andre Gide and J.B. Priestly in chapter two.
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Beauvoir argues, the individual possesses ‘a fluid, adaptable potentiality that does age, and a 
crystallized part of his mind, made up of acquired mechanisms, that does notd776 She moves 
on to describe how ‘chronological age and biological age do not always coincide —far from it; 
and physical appearance tells more about the number of years we have lived than 
physiological examinations.’777 In a similar vein chronological age does not always reflect 
psychological age, whilst in terms of intellect ageing is synonymous with acquisition or 
consistency rather than decline and loss: ‘[djespite bodily changes related to aging, most of 
the older persons retain their cognitive functioning, and it has been demonstrated that 
intellectual decline is more related to illness and disease than to aging.’778 In the 
anthropological work of Sharon F. Kaufman, interviews with the elderly revealed that ‘when 
old people talk about themselves, they express a sense of self that is ageless -an  identity that 
maintains continuity despite the physical and social changes that come with age.’779
From a psychosocial as opposed to biomedical perspective, discourses of ageing might be 
argued, paradoxically, to have clear intimations of agelessness. The perceived antagonism 
between the objective body-image (which ages) and the subjective self-image (which does 
not) precludes a linear understanding of time as applied to human ageing. This discontinuity 
between physiological and psychological ageing is reflected in the popular sociological 
metaphor of the mask:
776 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, trans. by Patrick O’Brian (London & New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1996), p. 34.
777 Ibid., p. 30.
778 Roberta Provenzano, Roberta’s Papers on the Psychology o f Aging (USA: iUniverse, 2011), p. 6.
779 Sharon R. Kaufman, The Ageless Self: Sources o f  Meaning in Late Life (London: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1986), p. 7.
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A focus on masquerade implies a division of the self into hidden and manifest parts. 
Further, if one only sees the performance of a masque, this begs a fundamental and 
controversial question: is there an authentic self beneath these surface appearances?780
The binary truth/artifice becomes a proxy for that of young/old. The use of anti-ageing 
products is not necessarily understood in terms of a passive obeisance to the hegemony of 
youth, but a process of uncovering the putatively ‘true’ self -the origin lost under the 
cartography of physical maladies and inefficacies that cumulate with the passing of time. 
Psychosocial approaches to ageing challenge the notions of dependency, deterioration, 
stoicism, and passivity in old age and dissociate old age, it seems, from time: ‘I don’t think it 
really goes by the calendar at all. I think it goes by itself, your own attitude to life [...] People 
are never old, it’s only when they look upon themselves as being old.’781 This presumed 
agelessness and return to the historical past is, ironically, also a symptom of a notable 
pathology of age: Alzheimer’s disease. For the Alzheimer’s sufferer the illusion of youth can 
be a particularly poignant effect: ‘[h]e tends to live his life entirely for the present moment, 
although the present for him may be an era form his own distant past.’782With the exception 
of progressive dementias such as Alzheimer’s disease, the psychology of ageing challenges 
the conventional indices of decline often ascribed to the physiology of age. S.J. Lupien and 
N. Wan describe how ‘[m]any people see ageing as a time of cognitive and physical decline,’ 
but that recent findings have shown that ‘well-being and a positive view of ageing are major
783 • •protective factors against the effects of age on the organism.’ Delaying, reversing, or 
disinventing the signs of ageing is perhaps more often associated with external intervention:
780 Biggs, Journal o f  Aging and Identity, p. 210.
781 Paul Thomson et al., I  D on’t Feel Old: Understanding the Experience o f Later Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. 130.
782 Richard L. Gregory (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind (Oxford & New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), p. 185.
783 S.J. Lupien et al., ‘Successful Ageing: From Cell to Self in Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 
Vol. 359, No. 1449, The Science of Well-being: Integrating Neurobiology, Psychology and Social Science 
(Sept. 29, 2004), pp. 1413-1426 (p. 1422), http://www.istor.org/stable/4142144 [accessed 02/12]
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cosmetic surgery, pharmacological interventions (e.g. Viagra and Hormone Replacement 
Therapy), self-prescribed nostrums such as creams and cosmeceuticals, and ideas of 
rejuvenation and sempitemity that are dominating the contemporary vernacular and becoming 
a defining feature of late capitalism. However, a psychosocial perspective views the deferral 
of age as something already existing and inherent in each individual. The psychosomatic 
model of ageing outlined by Lupien and Wan postulates an element of choice and free will in 
the ageing process as decisions, particularly with regards to socialisation, ‘are linked to 
protection against physical and mental health conditions.’784 As previously discussed, the 
primary goal of prolongevity medicine and the specious interventions of postmodern 
consumer culture is (as the consumer axiom goes) to ‘reverse the signs of ageing’. I have 
termed the effect a bathetic transcendentalism, as sempitemity and notions of a mythical, 
Ovidian rejuvenation are placed within the remit of medicine and commerce. Oneiric 
fantasies of suspending or reversing age are naturalised further by virtue of their inclusion in 
psychosocial perspectives and the ‘strong evidence that positive self-concepts can have a 
reversing effect on what was once believed to be an inevitable declining process of 
ageing.’785
The implications arising are that the canonical indices of decline -and by extension, linear 
conceptions of time —do not adequately represent the human lifecourse, and even that the 
conquest of time may be articulated within discourses of ageing without entailing a denial or 
repression of the realities of age. Rejuvenation and sempitemity might be argued to be 
associated more with prevalence of old age than the absence of it: agelessness, deathlessness, 
and turning back time may be associated less with myth, religion, fictional nova and the 
Gnostic imagination, and perceived more as a bourgeois eschatology —connoting, in other 
words, a wistful preoccupation with organic decay and closeness to death in the face of the
784 Ibid.
785 Ibid., p. 1423.
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aptly named ‘demographic time bomb’786 in all its associations with finality. Rejuvenation 
and nonlinear or alternative conceptions of time are to a certain extent emerging within 
consumer, welfarist, medical and gerontological discourses. As such they may be associated 
more with age-consciousness, contemporary verbal habits, and demographic alarmism than 
with the imaginative epistemologies and futuristic utopias of science fiction. As Ann Bowling 
and Paul Dieppe comment, ‘medical advances, escalating health and social care costs, and 
higher expectations for older age, have led to international interest in how to promote a 
healthier old age and how to age “successfully.”’787 Whilst rejuvenation and immortality have 
roots in religion, mythos, philosophy, and science fiction, their cultural saliency may be 
attributed to the existential and cultural anxieties rising out of the significant demographic 
change witnessed over the last century. Moreover, they might also be argued to have been 
conflated with egalitarian ideologies of health and well-being, medical and psychosocial 
discourses of ageing, and consumer capitalism. Immortality and rejuvenation are subjects that 
remain contrary to our empirical environment yet at the same time become trite, overtly 
familiar, and demonstrably prosaic in their everyday appropriation. Between subliminal 
beliefs in religious salvation on the one hand and on the other a secular optimism in the 
power of medicine, immortality remains somewhere between the realms of faith and praxis. 
Whilst it problematises linear conceptions of time and renders simplistic and to an increasing 
extent fallacious the existential trinities youth, middle age, and old age, and ‘birth, 
copulation, death’, the ideology of anti-ageing has its own temporal paradoxes. I have said 
that western culture has never been better acquainted with immortality than in the period 
where medical and scientific progress has rendered unavoidable and even extended the period
786 Phil Mullan, The Imaginaiy Time Bomb, p. 2.
787 Ann Bowling and Paul Dieppe ‘What is Successful Ageing and Who Should Define It?’ in British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 331, No. 7531 (Dec. 24 -31, 2005), pp. 1548-1551 (p. 1548),
http://www.istor.org/stable/25455762 [accessed 20/02/12].
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of life that Anglo-American culture strive so persistently, wilfully, and adroitly to suppress: 
old age and its attendant ills. Contrary to our empirical environment, agelessness remains a 
reality towards which we strive, yet it is one so demonstrably familiar and with such a rich 
genealogy, it borders on cultural cliche and contributes a palpable realism to many fictional 
novums and a historicity and retrospection to the imaginative future cultures science fiction 
has to offer. We have naturalised, become habituated to, and rendered prosaic a reality that is 
yet to be created, and this cultural diegesis that has persisted for generations has shown 
western culture, with regards to ageing, to be built so fundamentally upon the liturgy of a 
fiction -upon a concept so unequivocally contrary to reality, yet so familiar and so quotidian, 
that reality is fiction and fiction is reality. To what extent have the antinomies of the 
postmodern lifecourse and postmodern culture affected science fiction? Michel Houellbecq’s 
The Possibility o f an Island and Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake are two novels that I 
suggest could be read as postmodern texts of ageing. The novels take the form of a cyclical 
rundown, oscillating between the prognosticative and nostalgic, the transcendentalist and the 
disappointly banal. The protagonists in both novels have futuristic bodies retrofitted with a 
crude, grotesque, and disappointingly familiar cartography of physical diseases and 
infirmities, and in a sly fictional self-consciousness echo the very novels’ attenuated, self- 
doubting science-fictionality. A sense of exhaustion and disillusionment pervade Oiyx and 
Crake and The Possibility o f an Island, and through the novels’ waning transcendentalism 
and their contrite, fatigable, and wilfully unconvincing novelty, Atwood and Houellebecq 
seem not only to be deconstructing science fiction and asking questions of its ongoing 
cultural function, but to be eulogising it. The characters are tenseless, transhistorical figures, 
both immortal and inescapably mortal, living in an environment resistant to periodisation, and 
I shall by analysing the extent to which the images of immortality, rejuvenation, futurity, and 
trans- and posthumanity constitute semiotic echoes of the postmodern lifecourse.
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ii) Ageless Humans and Senescing Machines: Posthumanity and the Mimesis of 
Decay in Oryx and Crake and The Possibility o f an Island
The worlds portrayed by Atwood and Houellebecq are constitutive of both reality and 
fantasy; where sempitemity is both a futuristic, utopian projection and a nostalgic, 
disappointingly familiar cultural contrivance. The Possibility o f an Island examines the 
human desire for immortality, and confronts the meaning of ageing and mortality in the 
context of technophilia and technological modification -and even considers posthumanism as 
a quasi-gerontological discourse. It is a parable of human development, examining the nature 
of humanity, society, morality, spirituality, emotion, and perception in the context of a 
technocratic society for which ‘the barrier of death is no more.’788 He confronts the question 
of what technophilia, technocracy, and extropianism (i.e. the idea that technological 
development will continue and expand indefinitely) mean to human evolution and our 
understanding of the categories of health and ill-health, youth and senescence, mortality and 
immortality, and secularism and spiritualism. Houellebecq interrogates binaristic thinking in 
The Possibility o f an Island as he examines the self-congratulatory and triumphalistic 
humanism created through scientific progress and humankind’s developing ontological 
allegiance to technology. Houellebecq confronts these binaries in his exploration of a reality 
in which ‘the world no longer has the power to destroy us,’ a reality where the 
technologisation and deification of the body are equivalent, and where technological Man is
789fundamentally messianic figure, or even godlike in ‘the power to create.’ He addresses the 
question: ‘is there a species destined to escape natural selection, natural disappearance —in a 
word, death?’790 Houellebecq’s attempt to answer this question is a complex and paradoxical 
one. In itially^ he alternates between two narratives, which together form a relatively obtuse
788 Michel Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, trans. by Gavin Bowd (London: Phoenix, 2006), p. 258
789 Ibid., p. 359.
790 Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion o f  the End (California: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 88.
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and unproblematic binary: on the one hand, the scabrous hedonist and comedian Daniel 1, 
whose material constitutes crass, eroticised, sardonic, and at times misogynistic commentary 
on female sexuality and the failings and foibles of mankind; and on the other, the sapient, 
sexually neutered, mechanical neohuman clones, Daniel24 and 25, set 1000 years in the 
future. Daniel 1 is representative of the beginning of a process to immortality: ‘today,’ he 
writes ‘we are entering a different era, where the passing of time no longer has the same 
beaming. Today we enter eternal life.’791 Houellebecq evokes what seems to be an 
unproblematically utopian vision of human eugenics, and consequently leads the reader into 
an all-too simplistic antithesis. Humanity is dystopian, characterised by predation, dereliction, 
class-consciousness, philistinism, xenophobia, misogyny, misanthropy, and the pseudo­
colonialism of sex tourism in which middle-aged men in affluent western cultures, afflicted 
with ennui and frustration, travel in search of sexual encounters. Neohumanity by contrast is 
ostensibly an enlightened, unified, disease-free, post-capitalist utopia. Daniel 1 represents ‘the 
first generation of the new species called upon to replace man [...] the zero point.’792The 
genealogy the reader is presented with (from Daniel 1 to Daniel25) connotes an increasing 
ontological allegiance to technology, associated with which is the neohumans’ increasing 
distances from the diseases and physical maladies associated with their human ancestors. 
Indeed, the succession of Daniels seems to be a Nietzschean formation, not dissimilar to the 
ubermensch, or over-man, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885): ‘I am that which must 
always overcome itself.,793 As a series of clones, Daniel, who is at once descendent and 
antecedent, does indeed ‘overcome’ himself, and in a moment of sly fictional self-
791 Ibid., p. 259
792 Ibid., p. 259.
793 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. by Adrian Del Caro & Robert Pippin (Cambridge. 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 89.
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consciousness alludes to this: ‘I played all the characters, thus taking my first steps down the 
road of the one-man show.’794
Houellebecq’s task, it seems, is to ‘mark a definitive break between the neohumans and their 
ancestors,’795 and it is a task, ultimately, that he fails to achieve. Houellebecq’s commentary 
is mixed, sometimes falling into banality and now and again sounding mystically portentous 
and evoking the transcendentalism which makes it more conventionally ‘science fictional’. 
Despite the binary on which this novel is represented structurally, the neohuman progenies 
Daniels 24 and 25 are more human than Daniel 1, both psychologically and physiologically. 
Houellebecq equates neohumanity’s desire to distinguish themselves from the ‘animal 
atavism’ of humans with Daniel l ’s hatred of mankind,796 and conflating transcendentalism 
with misanthropy renders it a far more necrotising, dysgenic force constructed out of 
ignominy and the wilful, deliberate destruction of humanity. Collectively, the neohumans are 
a nostalgic as well as a futuristic spectacle -residual, hyperbolic figures representative of the 
‘assumption of agelessness’ 797 instilled in the bourgeois mentality centuries before. 
Jacqueline Dutton argues that ‘the cult of youth has been embraced as the principal reason for 
regenerating oneself through cloning, so that youth represents the only remaining cause to 
strive for.’798 However, as Daniel 1 later recalls: ‘even when we live in apartments, in 
conditions of thermal stability guaranteed by reliable and well-honed technology, it remains 
impossible for us to rid ourselves of this animal atavism.’799 Immortality, for Daniel 1, is as 
transcendent as it is banal, associated less with enlightenment and more with consumer
794 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 12.
795 Ibid., p. 324.
796 Ibid., p. 364.
797 Simon Biggs, ‘The Blurring of the Lifecourse : Narrative, Memory and the Question of Authenticity’ in 
Journal o f  Aging and Identity, vol. 4 No. 4 (1999), pp. 209-221 (p. 211).
798 Jacqueline Dutton, ‘Forever Young? French Perspectives on Aging in Global Communities of the Future in 
Trans/forming Utopia: Looking Forward to the End, vol. 1, ed. by Elizabeth Russell (Switzerland: International 
Academic Publishers, 2009), p. 20.
799 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 364.
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capitalism, ‘turning youth into the supremely desirable commodity/800 Immortality is also 
defined simply as a phlegmatic, recreational detachment: ‘all we’re trying to do is create an 
artificial mankind, a frivolous one that will no longer be open to seriousness or to humour, 
which, until it dies, will engage in an increasingly desperate quest for fun and sex; a 
generation of definitive kids.,m  Daniel 1 speaks of humans in comparably reductionistic 
terms, focussing crassly on the particulars of senescing bodies such as sagging breasts and 
erectile dysfunction -conditions which, for Daniel 1, become metaphors for humanity. He 
holds the particularly deterministic view that in old age ‘there was not a new blossoming at 
the end of the road, but a bundle of frustrations and sufferings, at first insignificant then 
quickly unbearable.’802 The pathos of old age is depicted in Sisyphean, hyperbolic, grittily 
deterministic terms, and often in the text Houellebecq broadens out the subject of organic 
decay to hit more eschatological terms, commenting on: ‘the disappearance of religions, the 
difficulty of feeling love [...] the loss of our sense of the sacred, the crumbling of social 
ties.’803 However, as aforementioned, Daniell’s rhetoric on immortality is scarcely more 
inviting, as it is depicted simply as a continuation of his own licentious, vacuous existence 
‘and its emptiness.’804 Mortality and immortality are, in Daniell’s diegesis at least, relatively 
indissociable. A sempiternal existence is, for him, as quotidian as it is transcendental, an 
indefinitely protracted misery and vacuity, and ‘the endless cycle of the reproduction of 
suffering’805 -an  evocation indeed of Samuel Beckett’s thesis of procreation as a perpetuation 
of human suffering. Where Daniel 1 represents entropy and a glum fatalism, the neohumans 
represent ‘incomplete beings, beings in transition,’806 sharing an obvious affinity with Julian 
Huxley’s conception of transhumanity (humanity as a work in progress): ‘man remaining
man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.’807 
It is evident early on, however, that Houellebecq’s representation of technology is by no 
means utopian and panacean; rather he uses technology to metaphorise aspects of ageing and 
mortality, and Daniel 1 ’s own ideas of immortality as a protraction of human misery and 
misanthropy, not its solution.
Despite the futuristic parlance of Daniel24/5’s narrative, as the novel progresses it has less 
and less of an affinity with transhumanist discourses as the neohumans, demonstrably 
fatigable and afflicted with ennui, become ‘marked by a strangely human weariness, a 
sensation of vacuity.’ It is as if the science-fictionality of these chapters, which at first 
opposes the social commentary of Daniel 1, is itself afflicted with a reciprocal exhaustion.
The neohuman chapters in the novel, whilst separated from those of the human, exhibit a 
waning transcendentalism, a failure to elevate itself, in language, theme, and imagery, from 
the relative mundanity and triteness of Daniel 1 ’s narrative. Thus it not only ironises, and 
almost reconciles, the split narrative structure, but like Beckett’s dramatis personae the 
neohumans seem like decrepit machines, both mortal and sempiternal. Although remaining 
distinctly more pleasant than their human progenitors, Houellebecq’s neohuman figures are 
described in increasingly human terms and, in their asceticism, are defined more so by 
passivity, disaffection, ennui, and lack: lack of physical contact, lack of a society, lack of 
sexual pleasure, lack of empathy, and the ‘disappearance of poetry.’809 The neohumans suffer 
a disturbing cartography of physical maladjustments and infirmities, and as such a clear and 
incongruously banal existential alarmism seems to characterise the narratives of these 
ageless, post-historical, post-biological, even extraterrestrial figures. Technology, for the
807 Julian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation (1927), quoted by Nick Bostrom in ‘A History of Transhumanist 
Thought’ Journal o f  Evolution and Technology, Vol. 14 Issue 1 (April 2005), p. 7. 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/history.pdf [accessed 30/08/11]
808 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 153.
809 Ibid., p. 156.
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neohumans, seems to entail a succession of subtractions and, like the serio-comic 
afflictions/affectations of the Beckettian anti-hero, becomes a conceit —an extended metaphor 
for age and its attendant ills, diminishments, disaffections, and malaise. As transhumanist 
artist Stelarc writes, ‘[bjecause technology so successfully mediates between the body and 
the world, it disconnects the body from many of its functions.’810 For Houellebecq, 
technology seems to magnify the biological reality of senescence, and the neohumans exist 
apathetically and despondently through what seems to be a paradoxically decadent, biological 
phrase of posthumanity. Houellbecq offers a sadistic vision of immortality where the 
technologisation of humanity is linked jointly to a transcendence of age and the mimesis of 
pain and dysfunction, disaffection and social ostracism, which can be argued to embody more 
conventional, stereotyped depictions of age. The subject of ageing pervades the neohuman 
narratives, and Daniel24 describes how ‘even if ageing does not have for us the tragic
811character it had for humans of the last period, it is not without certain forms of suffering.’
The subject of mortality is not evaded or even repressed; rather, their evolution is described 
by Daniel25 as a ‘cycle of rebirths and deaths.’812 The neohumans and humans coexist, but 
the former reside in monastic, ascetic seclusion within electric fences and wait indignantly at 
times and with a quintessential^ mortal sense of foreboding, to be replaced by younger 
clones. For Houellebecq it seems, technological determinism becomes the equivalent of 
biological determinism, and as such he seems to render technological discourses indivisible 
from gerontological ones. His futuristic narratives are characterised by a sporadic 
sentimentality as his distinctly unfamiliar, apocryphal world, set 1000 years in the future, 
becomes comfortingly, if also disappointingly, familiar -sending the prefix ‘neo-’ spiralling 
into increasing irony. The neohumans’ elitist and eugenical, monastic compound seems to
810 Stelarc, ‘Prosthetics, Robotics, and Remote Existence’, Leonardo, vol. 24, No. 5 (1991) pp. 591-595 (p. 593) 
http://www.istor.org/stable/1575667 [accessed 20/02/12]
811 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 139.
8,2 Ibid., p. 419.
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connote anxiety and malaise, and a seclusion and social ostracism likened more to geriatry 
than neohumanity ‘since it was out of the question that neohumans would venture out of their
• 813 •residence.’ He even describes himself as being ‘from now on in unlimited, indefinite 
stasis.’814 What distinguishes human from neohuman is not that one ages whilst the other 
does not, but that ageing for the human is a condition intrinsic to the body, whilst ageing for 
the neohuman is a malign, arbitrary force that gives neither meaning nor purpose to their 
lives. Like Beckettian anti-heroes the neohumans simply wait for death. Each neohuman is 
‘penetrated by death and formatted by it’ and, at some point, has to deal with ‘the proximity
815of his Death.’ The neohuman undergoes a form of mechanical or cybernetic ageing which 
is merely the expiry of a ‘signal’ or ‘digital address,’816 or like any utilitarian object or tool, 
obsolescence in the face of reinvention. Moreover, the neohumans identify themselves as 
both more advanced than the humans, but obsolete in relation to the race that will succeed 
them, known as the Future Ones - i f  anything, not the glacial constancy of a machine but a 
very human mutability.
As the narrative progresses it is clear that the only way in which human and neohuman differ 
is linguistically -the neohuman defined by its futuristic, science-fictional parlance and the 
human its base, axiomatic social commentary. The neohumans have mechanical bodies but, 
like humans, are destined to decay and be succeeded by their progeny, or ‘offspring’: ‘[w]hen 
my life ceases, the absence of a signal will be registered in a few nanoseconds; the 
manufacture of my successor will begin immediately.’817 Houellebecq opens with a simplistic 
binary between human and neohuman that he collapses as he likens human mortality and 
procreation to the objectivity, utility, and expediency of mechanical reproducibility. The
813 Ibid, p. 172.
814 Ibid, p. 372 .
815 Ibid, p. 118.
816 Ibid, p. 118.
817 Ibid, p. 17
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technologisation of life is, like Daniel 1 ’s uninspiring vision, fundamentally dysgenic because 
what is created is ‘a society of inert, unengaged breathing corpses that do not enjoy the years 
of life that stretch out endlessly ahead of them.’818 It problematises the concept of past and 
future in the novel, as what opens as an untroubled antithesis between two narratives —one 
derisive social commentary and the other futuristic, prognosticative utopia —concludes with 
their uncanny congeniality. The sole feature distinguishing the figures throughout the novel is 
the language of their respective chapters. As such, we might say the neohumans represent 
less a futurist, transhuman race, and more the ways in which the abject, fatigable body is 
elevated firstly by discourse —whether that of technological and medical progressivism, or 
more banally anti-ageing -and secondly of the ideas about human ageing and the body one 
inherits from it. In the narrative of Daniel24, Houellebecq places rhetoric in direct contrast 
with the reality, and continually reminds us that the prefix ‘neo-’ is less a statement of 
distinction or novelty, and more a point of increasing irony in the text. Retaining the prefix 
even after he debunks all distinction between human and neohuman, Houellebecq invites us 
to consider this novel a commentary on the triumph of the rhetoric of transcendence over any 
actual, manifest improvements to humanity brought about by science and technology. The 
novel is not a eugenical portrait of human evolution but a paradoxically nostalgic one as body 
modification and human cloning simply create more and more attenuated versions of the 
same individual. It is linked to the evocation of past (i.e. human maladies), not the creation of 
the future, and comments on the adequation of technology and immortality not to 
deathlessness but to old age and a protracted awareness of death. Houellebecq’s science 
fiction offers a sadistic vision of immortality that creates thanatotic desires in its hosts that 
are exacerbated by the fact that the technology, for whatever reason, precludes their ability to 
socialise. They are, then, death-obsessed, nomadic figures with a patho-technological or
818 Jacqueline Dutton, p. 21.
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techno-pathological anatomy. Like the prose and dramaturgy of Samuel Beckett, technology 
is untranscendent, and becomes a metaphor for rather than a solution to the aversiveness and 
constrictiveness of the ageing body. The structural division that remains in the novel between 
Daniel 1 and Daniel24/5 becomes the vestige of a powerful illusion: the belief in the 
transformative, infmitising capabilities of new technologies and biochemical interventions. 
Daniel24’s narrative even contains the same eschatological tones of Daniel 1 ’s as he writes of 
how:
[t]he sea has disappeared, and with it the memory of the waves. We possess audio and 
visual documents; none of them enables us to truly experience the tenacious 
fascination that gripped man [...] Nor are we able to understand the thrill of the chase, 
the pursuit of prey; nor religious feeling, nor that kind of immobile, objectless frenzy 
that man called mystical ecstasy*19
Houellebecq offers an ‘inhumane form of immortality’820 which is not just comparable to 
mortality, but less preferable, and this renders their exaggeratedly primitive portrayal of 
humans not simply ironic, but indicative of an extreme repressive, even delusional state:
Took at the little creatures moving in the distance; look. They are humans.’821 This seems no 
more than a self-aggrandizing, delusional discourse on a taxonomy -a  sense of socio- 
evolutionary difference that is metaphorised in the split narrative structure —that seems 
increasingly illusory with each attenuated clone -each one of which suffers ‘the 
disappearance of contact [...] followed by that of desire,’822 and becomes less a transcendent 
machine and more plaintive human as time progresses. Despite their repudiation of religion
819 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 32.
820 Jacqueline Dutton, p. 23.
8-1 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f an Island, p. 17.
822 Ibid., p. 370.
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and religious feelings, in the above quotation, Daniel24 often declares: ‘I believe in the 
coming of the Future Ones,’823 which is markedly similar to the prophesised return of Christ 
to Earth and to the Nicene Creed -the profession of faith in Christian liturgy. This is one 
sense in which the human/neohuman nexus is strengthened. It is also the case with the nature 
of their existence, which is defined by electronic perpetuity -by  a signal that is transmitted 
and received -and death as simply the absence of a signal upon which ‘the manufacture of [a] 
successor will begin immediately.’824 Houellebecq retrofits his ostensibly transhuman figures 
with the sort of fmitude, failure, frustration, ennui, and anxiety that they disparagingly equate 
with human mortality -despite the claim ‘I would never know boredom, desire or fear to the 
same extent as a human being.’825 Daniel 24 even describes himself as an ‘improved
89 f\monkey’ , subject to an existence defined by the same electronic signal and the same 
memories and idiosyncrasies as his progenitors -an existence that amounts to nothing more 
than a restrictive repetition of the same patterns, or electronic signals, analogous more to 
geriatry than neohumanity: ‘our existence, devoid of passions, had been that of the elderly; 
we looked on the world with a gaze characterized by lucidity without benevolence.’827 
Moreover, as the neohumans have a lack of sensory acuity and kinaesthetic engagement with 
the world, their bodies represent an impasse -a  point of hindrance, as a result of which they 
have little knowledge of their environment. They are manifestly dysfunctional figures, yet 
whilst their lack or loss of knowledge implies an amnesic state they also have never had that 
knowledge. This gives them an infantile quality, and concomitantly a different meaning to the 
prefix ‘neo-’ which seems more representative of tabula rasa —the epistemological thesis that 
we are bom bereft of knowledge and experience (colloquially, a ‘blank slate’). Whether their 
inefficacies are defined as a dysfunctional lack or a natural absence depends on whether they
823 Ibid., p . 63.
824 Ibid.
825 Ibid., p . 416.
826 Ibid., p. 422
827 Ibid., p . 406.
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are considered infantile or senile, possibly even demented figures. As both connote 
dependence, neither allow for a transcendent representation of technological modification.
Neohumanity is not ‘a work in progress’ as transhumanism envisions; rather, it is a 
technologised sect that is meditative, sexually neutered, taciturn, and incapable. In his 
representation of these posthuman figures, Houellebecq includes all the conventional and 
canonical indices of decline one would expect to find in a traditional, realist narrative of 
ageing. The neohumans are not in contradistinction to ‘mankind in its weaknesses, its 
neuroses, its doubts,’828 but a reflection of it and inclined to inertia, enfeeblement, and mild, 
exhausted indignation. Decay is not lessened, palliated, reversed, or disinvented by 
technology, but created and sustained by it. For the neohumans, technology correlates with 
their decline, and in the case of Daniel25, he is at times consumed by the incremental 
repetitions and variations in human suffering which his ‘inhumane’ immortality condemns 
him to experience over and over again. We thus hear his existential musings and thanatotic 
desires as he laments: ‘why was I alive?’829 Commenting on body modification, prostheses, 
and other substitutive devices, Daniel Dinello writes:
Human bodies will become synthetic. Life will be prolonged and enhanced through 
cyborgization -body-improving prosthetic technology that will replace deteriorating 
body parts [...] “The distinction between us and robots is going to disappear”. In fact, 
many have already become cyborgs —machine-organic fusions —as science currently
830provides knees, shoulders, arms, elbows, wrists, fingers, and toes.
Indeed, Houellebecq’s vision of body modification is such that the technological annexations 
are undifferentiated from the body —undifferentiated to such an extent that the
828 Ibid., p. 154.
829 Ibid., p. 406.
830 Daniel Dinello, Technophobia! Science Fiction Visions o f  Posthuman Technology (Austin. University of 
Texas Press, 2005), p. 19.
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technologisation of Man has become indistinguishable from the humanising of the machine. 
Houellebecq is not making humanity immortal, but making technology mortal. He dissociates 
technology from futurism and indeed from immortality. Technology, he seems to imply, will 
not grant a new, alternative paradigm of human development, for technology is itself subject 
to the same processes we as humans think to differentiate it from: it is created; it is used; it 
erodes; with each wave of scientific or technological progress it becomes obsolete; and as a 
consequence of reinvention, it is discarded. He narrates technological systems as 
fundamentally biological formations. Technology, as Houellebecq’s narrative suggests, is 
itself entrenched in the selfsame laws of existence we believe it to cure us of -which is to be 
‘bom, evolve, and die in a totally deterministic manner.’831 The technological perversion of 
the body is, for Houellebecq, a fundamentally eschatological spectacle at times, signifying 
the thrilling but ultimately threatening permeability and duplicability of the body. 
Technological modification, it seems, is not a tool with which one can surpass the death- 
susceptible body; it is the holding up of a mirror to one’s own inadequacies, and rehearsing 
and duplicating one’s own lamentable condition across different substrates at once 
nihilistically and narcissistically. The neohumans are a machine-powered simulacrum of 
ageing, and what Houellebecq asks us to consider is the notion of technology as a causative 
agent in ageing and death, and the extent to which technological modification represents a 
reversion to nature. Daniel is the personification of human eugenics, and through the 
alternation between scabrous hedonist Daniel 1 and enlightened, sleek neohuman clone 
Daniel24 we are invited into simplistic, binary oppositions. However, the clones of Daniel, 
insofar as they are also attenuated copies of the same person, also form the basis for a parable 
of ageing. As Daniel evolves, his technological annexations —and eventually his entire body — 
begin to resemble impediments or obstructions, and paradoxically it is though the themes of
831 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 316.
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human eugenics, body modification, and immortality that this novel arrives at an uncanny 
similarity with traditional realist narratives of ageing. Each Daniel is a lesser figure than the 
preceding Daniel, and is evocative of the different people we become through time and the 
vicissitudes of age, as described by Edward Bellamy:
...there are half a dozen of each of us, or a dozen if you please, one in fact for each 
epoch of our life, and each slightly or wholly different from the others. Each one of 
these epochs is foreign and inconceivable to the others, as ourselves at seventy now 
are to us [...] So that the different periods of life are to all intents and purposes 
different persons, and the first person of grammar ought to be used only with 
reference to the present tense. What we were, or shall be, or do, belongs strictly to the 
third person [...] The three persons of grammar are really not enough. A fourth is 
needed to distinguish the ego of the past and future from the present ego which is the 
only true one.
Technology is a demonstrably ambiguous force, representing human transcendence and 
human dependence, salvation and condemnation. Houellebecq’s depiction of neohuman 
ageing, which conflates organic decay and machinic failure, harks back to earlier 
representations of technology in terms of the neutrality of the tool subordinated to human 
control. This perhaps provides a more compelling evocation of the pathos of age, as that 
sense of subordination —not to the human but to their deterministic universe (i.e. mortality) — 
is strikingly prevalent. In a similar vein, the neohumans are arguably a personification of 
mortality and death, inasmuch as technological modification to some extent necessitates the 
death and highlights threatening permeability of the human. As M.J McNamee and S.D
832 Edward Bellamy, ‘The Old Folks’ Party’ The Blindman’s World and Other Stories (USA: BiblioLife 
Publishers, 2009), p. 64.
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Edwards describe, technological modification represents ‘if not the death of human nature, 
then at least its dislocation.’833 The neohumans age not because their bodies decay or fail, but 
because they become increasingly obsolete with the design, manufacture, and perfection of 
technology that must either be integrated within, or wholly replace them. In this 
Houellebecq’s correlates biological determinism with technofatalism, misanthropy and 
transhumanity, and both optimistically futuristic and terminally artefactual figures. Despite 
the separation of a thousand years, then, neohumans are a disjunctive synthesis -a t once 
mortal and immortal, ageless human and senescing machine, geriatric and transhuman. They 
are neither protean figures, modelled as they are on their progenitors (and consequently their 
progenitors’ failings and foibles), nor have much capacity for intellectual or emotional 
development beyond that of their progenitors. They are subordinated to and defined by the 
glut of memories and experiences that comprised Daniel l ’s identity. Their subordination to 
their predecessor in this way is equivalent to that of the predecessor to his corporal 
limitations. Whilst in the case of ageing there is an extension of biological language to the 
neohumans’ electronic systems, the neohumans seem less capable, biologically, than their 
human counterparts in the sense that they have no intrinsic ability to ameliorate their 
condition: they simply cease to exist and are immediately replaced. Paradoxically 
transhumanity represents a form of over-determination in this novel, and this is made evident 
by the increasing encroachment of the subject of old age and human suffering in what 
initially reads as a relatively conventional science fiction narrative. Daniel24’s life, moreover, 
is purely utilitarian and servile; it seems, as he describes himself as ‘maintain[ing] the 
presence, to make possible the coming of the Future Ones.’834 It implies an evacuation of 
meaning of one’s own life, and the vacuity that pervades the neohuman existence is
833 M J  McNamee and S.D Edwards, ‘Transhumanism, Medical Technology and Slippery Slopes, Journal o f  
Medical Ethics, Vol. 32, No. 9 (Sept., 2006), p. 513, http://www.istor.org/stable/277196947seq H  [accessed 
30/08/11],
834 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 57.
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represented most acutely and poignantly in D a n i e l ’s awareness o f ‘twenty thousand days 
that would be identical’835 —which connotes a boredom and tedium he likens to old age. The 
selfsame sense of foreboding is also conveyed in Daniel l ’s narrative as he writes: ‘felt myself 
faced with infinity like a flea on a sheet of flypaper.’836 He writes that there has developed in 
him ‘as in all neohumans, a certain fatalism, linked to an awareness of our own immortality, 
that brought us closer to the ancient human peoples.’837 Immortality becomes fundamental to 
his representation of mortality, just as technological discourses -with allusions to 
dependency, surrogacy, and lack -are indistinguishable from gerontological ones. The 
neohumans’ lack of any sensory or kinaesthetic engagement implies physical deficiency; 
their lack of any familial or biographic memory implies an amnesic quality; their vague and 
contrived approximation of sex and sexual pleasure signifies another frustrating 
insufficiency; and the protracted calvary that constitutes their existence connotes not 
perpetual youth but perpetual dying. The neohumans’ bodies are portrayed as restrictive, 
aversive, and deficient, and as such the science fictional parlance that remains characteristic 
of their narratives is rendered increasingly ironic, having at times more in common with a 
traditional realist narrative of ageing. Technology is not transformative or transcendent; it is a 
malign external force, instigating deficiency and lack comparable to disability, injury, or 
senescence. The neohumans are infelicitous and bemoan their physical maladies: ‘perhaps I
838had, in the worst sense of the term, become human.’
For Houellebecq, modification is synonymous at times with subordination. Daniel24/5 
becomes subordinated to technology rather than emancipated by it, and this represents 
acquiescence to forces beyond his control. In this sense The Possibility o f an Island seems at 
times a cautionary narrative, warning not against the technologisation of the body, but against
the belief in the transformative and infmitising capabilities of new technologies. Technology 
is not a benign addition for the neohumans, but instead Houellebecq converts the 
technological adjunct into a metonym for old age, in the same way the walking stick or 
Zimmer frame might be in a traditional realist narrative of ageing. Towards the novel’s 
conclusion the categories of geriatry and neohumanity collapse as Daniel25, like Daniel24 
and his ‘calm and joyless life,’839 is transformed into an abject, fatigable, and nomadic figure 
not dissimilar to a Beckettian anti-hero. The humanisation of the neohumans is ‘here so 
marked that [it] could easily have been attributed to Daniel 1, our distant ancestor, rather than 
to one of his neohumans successors.’840 The failure of technology to advance humanity 
socially and, to some extent, physiologically is comparable to the unmodified mortal body’s 
failure to survive. In this sense, Houellebecq’s narrative is similar to Bob Shaw’s One Million 
Tomorrows (1970) in which immortality is made available through pharmacological 
treatments, but with the consequence of sterilisation, loss of physical desire and physical 
ability. It is similar also to Poul Anderson’s The Boat o f a Million Years (1989) where the 
characters’ immortal physiologies do not prevent them from physical trauma and so are 
rendered conflictingly mortal and immortal. Houellebecq does not simply conjoin disparate 
timeframes on bodily level, but on an historical level as the descriptions of the neohumans’ 
monastic, futuristic compound are suffused, if only subtly, with allusions to comparatively 
antiquated ideologies and anti-humanistic social regimes. The neohumans are exaggeratedly 
discriminative and instate a clearly oppressive social hierarchy, referring to humans as 
‘savages’: ‘When I kill a savage who, more audacious than others, lingers at the protective
• • 841fence [...] I have the sensation of accomplishing a necessary and legitimate act.’ Their 
obsessive preoccupation with limiting the human population seems loosely Malthusian, 
whilst their treatment of humans is evocative of the sort of biological racism constitutive of
Nazi eugenics —within which gerontophobic discourses are woven. This is also the case in 
their monistic views of human perfection and excellence, and their idolatrous, servile 
conviction of their own efforts toward the coming of a perfect race —a race termed ‘the Future 
Ones’ throughout the novel. Houellebecq seeks to destabilise, ironise, and strip the 
neohumans of their portentous and eugenical ‘neo-’ and collapse the past/future tenses on a 
jointly bodily and historical level: bodily in the sense that the neohumans are equipped with 
quintessentially human anxieties about ageing and death; and historically on a socially and 
ideological level. Despite the neohumans’ retrograde physicality, their self-aggrandisement 
raises humanistic concerns relating to the threat of social atavism brought by technological 
advance: ‘What will happen to political rights’ asks Fukuyama ‘once we are able to, in effect, 
breed some people with saddles on their backs, and others with boots and spurs? ,842Rather 
than a decisively linear, evolutionary strategy, technology within more conventional 
portrayals of human eugenics are, amongst some trans- and posthumanist thinkers, equated to 
the reinstatement of comparatively antiquated levels of social and economic inequality. 
Although such concerns are at times apparent, they remain a chiefly unrealised formation 
within the text as Houellebecq’s dysgenic portrayal of transhumanity -which here in The 
Possibility o f an Island means humanity as a work in progress, an intermediary stage -centres 
more upon neohumanity as simply a simulacrum of ageing, as biological rather than social 
atavism. As a consequence of the neohumans’ pathological anatomy, such hierarchies are not 
manifest in this novel’s physical reality, although the polemic remains with the neohumans’ 
reference to humans as base animals. Again the neohumans are advanced in rhetoric only 
which serves to disunify physical capability and linguistic expression, and foreground the 
disjunctive synthesis that comprises this race: ‘neo-’ and ‘human’. The rhetoric of 
transcendence and novelty then, although belying their physical constitution, renders the
84“ Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences o f the Biotechnology Revolution (New York. 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002), pp. 10-11.
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neohumans society an artefact. Technology that advances the few and not the many can only 
reinstate comparatively antiquated social and pecuniary inequalities and oppressive, 
discriminative ideologies. M.J McNamee and S.D Edwards write that ‘the human may be 
incapable of breeding with the posthuman and will be seen as having a much lower moral 
standing [...Jcritics may argue that transhumanism will increase inequalities between the rich
843and poor.’ With technological modification, then, antiquity and futurity collide, and this 
occurs in The Possibility o f an Island certainly on the level of discourse, and renders them 
atavistic as much physiologically as socio-politically. The neohumans’ elitism is all but 
evident in their depiction of the humans as base, animalistic, Neanderthal figures, and this 
social stratification evokes a scene analogous to Dieter Birnbacher’s description of the 
posthuman, who is ‘related to humans in a way similar to how humans are related to non­
human animals now.’844
The Epilogue is as ambivalent as the main body of the novel. It represents a reversion to 
nature, although it is unclear whether the concluding scenes are pre-technological or post- 
biological. The Epilogue connotes a peaceful, benign reconciliation of the split narrative and 
sense of equality, and ideologically seems comparable to Romantic primitivism and perhaps a 
typically Blakean innocence:
[W]hat I wanted to do was to continue to travel with Fox across the prairies and 
mountains, to experience the awakenings, the baths in a freezing river, the minutes 
spent drying in the sun, the evenings spent around the fire in the starlight. I had 
attained innocence, in an absolute and non-conflictual state, I no longer had any plan,
843 M.J McNamee and S.D Edwards, p. 514.
844 Dieter Birnbacher, ‘Posthumanity, Transhumanism and Human Nature’ in Medical Enhancement and 
Posthumanity ed. by Ruth Chadwick and Bert Gordijn (Springer, 2008), p. 96.
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nor any objective, and my individuality dissolved into an indefinite series of days; I 
was happy.845
On reading the Epilogue, one may recall less the science fictional foundation of this novel 
and more a humanistic primitivism similar to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s heuristic examination 
of human nature and human society in The Social Contract (1762) and his thesis of natural 
goodness. Daniel25 discusses:
the resurgence [...] of the beliefs and behaviours from the most ancient folkloric past 
of Western mankind, such as astrology, divining magic, and fidelity to hierarchies of a 
dynastic type. Reconstitution of rural or urban tribes, reappearance of barbarian cults 
and customs [...] A violent, savage future was what awaited men.846
The epilogue depicts ‘rediscovering the atavisms’847 of their predecessors, and a symbolic 
convergence of primitivism and transhumanism, antiquity and futurity. Daniel25 reconciles 
himself to a more natural existence, yet as aforementioned it is not clear whether this depicts 
a pre-technological or post-biological naturalness. The scene may convey luddism, in the 
rejection of the technological and the reversion to a natural, salvatory primitivism.
Conversely, it may signify the opposite as the technological has ceased to be the neutral tool 
and has entered into the order of the natural undifferentiated prosthesis, integrated not by 
some violent penetrative act but as if by osmosis: ‘technology in effect disappears [...] the 
human becomes technology.’848 Houellebecq renders this concluding scene characteristically 
ambivalent as images of futurism and are conflated with those of Romantic primitivism. 
Houellebecq does not simply reconcile human and neohuman, social commentary and science
845 Houellebecq, The Possibility o f  an Island, p. 392.
846 Ibid., p. 390.
847 Ibid., p. 391.
848 Eugene Thacker, ‘Data Made Flesh: Biotechnology and the Discourse of the Posthuman , Cultural Ci itique 
No. 53., posthumanism (Winter 2003), University of Minnesota Press, p. 78.
http://www.istor.org/stable/1354625 [accessed 31/08/11]
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fiction, but makes them equivalent -the one reflecting the other. William Gibson remarked in 
an interview with CNN: ‘I actually feel that science fiction's best use today is the exploration 
of contemporary reality [...] Earth is the alien planet now.’849 Indeed this is at the core of 
Houellebecq’s novel as he constructs a quintessentially science fictional narrative in some 
senses, yet one that neither evades, suppresses, or offers a way out of the pathos of ageing. It 
is paradigmatic, perhaps, of the west’s own paradox, being as it is a culture that is ageing and 
a culture that is habituated to and defined by discourses of anti-ageing. Houellebecq’s novel, 
often transcendent but also often falling into banality, conflates the categories of social 
realism and science fiction. One might readily class this novel a product of a society that 
dealing with rising life expectancies and attendant increases in age-related pathologies, but 
through the lens of an ideology that is itself set above or beyond those conditions. One of the 
enduring messages of Houellebecq’s novel is that irrespective of the formative role of 
science, medicine, and technology over the body, its limitations and potentialities, ageing and 
old age persists. The only real ‘elevating’ force in the novel is in the rhetoric of immortality: 
the neohumans are advanced by virtue not of technological modification, which seems more 
of an impediment, but of the only real addition: the combining form and increasingly dubious 
‘neo-’. In the narratives of Daniels24 and 25, the science fictional parlance remains strongly 
entrenched in what is, at times, a comparatively banal commentary on their physical 
infelicities. In this conflictingly futuristic and nostalgic, transcendental and banal evocation, 
we are presented with a tentatively positive image: a portmanteau figure, combining the 
virtues of humankind (which includes ageing and mortality) and a vernacular suffused with 
utopian promises and hopes of transcendence.
Margaret Atwood’s post-apocalyptic fiction Oryx and Crake represents a comparable
collapse of binaries to Houellebecq’s The Possibility o f an Island', the atavistic and the
849 William Gibson quoted by John Hamilton, ‘The Future of Science Fiction in Modern Masteis o f  Science 
Fiction: The World o f  Science Fiction (USA: ABDO Publishing Company, 2007), p. 28.
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futuristic, commercial exploitation and non-corporal afterlife, the natural and the contrived, 
spiritualism and secularism, the primitive, death-susceptible body and the ageless, post­
carbon, post-bodied figures known as the Children of Crake. The novel is about hubris, and 
focuses on the over-zealous scientist, Crake —a post-apocalyptic incarnation of Dr 
Frankenstein —and Snowman’s attempt to come to terms with the world he has created. The 
world is a biotech corporate oligarchy, with all power resting with the scientific elite within 
gated communities. It is a pastiche dystopia, a futuristic evocation of epochal-global trends 
such as economic globalisation, postmodernism in culture, immigration and multiculturalism, 
the digitalisation of communications, climate change and global warning, and the west’s 
current trends toward secularism, individualism, commercial exploitation, and incredulity 
toward mortality and the laws of nature. Nature is brutalised, recreated, and commodified in 
this novel, and consequently the most memorable aspect of this text is its surfeit of 
neologisms and ersatz creatures. Oryx and Crake is ‘an imaginative writer’s response to
or/\
contemporary situations of cultural crisis as they suppose what may happen.’ The novel
explores developments in science and technology such as xenotransplantation, genetic 
engineering, and the creation of transgenic animals. In this novel the:
...creation of a new humanoid species serves as the solution to the intractable crisis 
posed by an infernal constellation of unsolvable problems: unchecked capitalism, 
catastrophic climate change, the depletion of natural resources, and a hedonistic
851society that categorically rejects any limits on individual pleasure.
She condemns the dehumanizing effects of technological advance, which she envisions as an 
extreme commercialization and commodification of life —similar to Aldous Huxley’s Brave
850 Coral Ann Howells, ‘Margaret Atwood’s Dystopian Visions: The Handmaid’s Tale and Oiyx and Crake’ in 
The Cambridge Companion to Margaret Atwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006), p. 161.
85'Peter Yoonsuk Paik, From Utopia to Apocalypse: Science Fiction and the Politics o f  Catasti ophe 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), p. 119.
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New World (1932), Mortality Inc., and in part Larry Niven’s A World out o f Time (1976) in 
which people are brought back to life, used as commodities and, under the control of a 
totalitarian state, used to colonise and terraform other planets.
Atwood’s text is rife with temporal ambivalence. Her ambivalent treatment of time is 
represented stylistically, in her non-linear narrative structure: ‘it begins in the middle of 
events, we go back in time to find out how we got to that mid-point and then we go forward 
in time to find out what the protagonist will do next.’852 It is also represented historically, in 
her conflicted depiction of a retrofitted future and the jointly nostalgic and prognosticative 
imagery. Her depiction of a world at once technologically advanced and post-apocalyptic 
evokes images of a futuristic, post-religious technocracy working towards curing the mortal 
limitations of disease, ageing, and death; yet it is also a scabrous, post-war dystopia -a  
terminally historical scene controlled by a genocidal autocrat not dissimilar to Adolf Hitler 
and brought to this state through the unsettling deification of the scientist, Crake. It is, then, 
an advanced society, but also a nostalgic evocation of the past, with the concept of hubris all 
too clear throughout the text. The message of the novel is: render human nature irreducibly 
malleable and permeable, and the consequences, which for Atwood seem to be pure and 
simple entropy, will return humanity to a primitivism that is characteristic of a much earlier 
point in evolutionary history:
fiddle about with humanity as you will and modify genes as you hope to, ultimately 
human nature is so irreducibly bouncy and it will return and human beings will return 
to their traditions and their rituals and will reinvent those things that make them
853distinctive and recognisably to us human.
85“ Margaret Atwood, ‘Oryx and Crake Revealed’, The Abramowitz Lecture Series, Aits at MIT, MIT 
04/04/2004, 10:30, http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/196/ [accessed 10/08/11].
853 Michael Gove, Newsnight Review, BBC News (6th May 2003)
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/programmes/newsnight/review/3003883.stm [accessed 01/09/11]
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There is an element of Atwood’s futurism, then, that is always overshadowed by the past, 
which constitutes both a retrospective allusion and, conflictingly, a threatening prospection. 
This chronological ambiguity is matched by Atwood’s representation of physical age in the 
Children of Crake,854 for whom youth and senescence are correlated states. The novel opens 
with a character known as Snowman looking at his watch: ‘it no longer works. He wears it 
now as his only talisman. A blank face is what it shows him: zero hour. It causes a jolt of 
terror to run through him, this absence of official time. Nobody nowhere knows what time it 
is.’855 The expulsion of ‘official time’ is as much an indication of historical as physiological 
time. The synthetic seems to govern Atwood’s visual lexicon of ageing, as she represents the 
body as having the same inherently restorative potential as an object. She implicitly rejects 
any deterministic conceptions of old age through this, viewing the pathological anatomy of 
the human body as a recuperable condition (e.g. ‘NooSkins for Olds’ and the ‘neuro-
or r
regeneration project’ ) in a manner not dissimilar to etiological discourses of ageing in 
Classical Greek and Roman medical/proverbial texts.857 Atwood’s visions for human 
improvement are monistic, bringing bodies, machines, and commodity-capitalism into 
commerce with one another towards the amelioration of the species and the disinvention of 
age. In Atwood’s commoditocracy, within which the subject of ageing is presented, cosmetic 
and biochemical interventions are not treatments that are performed on or done to the body. 
Instead, they colonise the body’s invisible, visceral depths, and ablation and cosmetic repair 
occur microscopically. The cosmetic work then perpetuates itself as if by mitosis and anti­
ageing constitutes not a cultural contrivance but a fully integrated phenomenon performing at 
a quasi-biological level:
854 Hereafter referred to as ‘The Children’ for brevity.
855 Margaret Atwood, Oiyx and Crake (London: Virago Press, 2009), p. 3.
856 Ibid., pp. 62-3.
857 •See introduction to thesis.
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a method of replacing the older epidermis with a fresh one, but not a laser-thinner or 
dermabraded short-term resurfacing but a genuine start-over skin that would be 
wrinkle- and blemish free. For that, it would be useful to grow a young, plump skin 
cell that would eat up the worst cells in the skins of those on whom it was planted and 
replace them with replicas of itself, like algae growing on a pond [my italics].858
Here Atwood portrays an image of the non-neutrality of technology -what above is defined 
as ‘skin-related biotechnologies’859 —where the technological acts as an undifferentiated 
intervention colluding, as if it were an intelligence or a life form, with the disappointingly 
familiar ideas about ageing. Although Atwood has classed this novel ‘speculative’ fiction in 
many interviews, for those familiar with current pharmacological, cosmetic or ablative laser
oz:rv
resurfacing procedures, Oryx and Crake is a novel that emerges out of hegemonic rhetoric 
of immortality that defines 20th and 21st century consumer society. It is a tragicomic pastiche 
of prolongevity strategies and the commodification of immortality, with ‘Operation 
Immortality’ and the Fountain of Youth Total Plunge which ‘rasp[s] off your entire 
epidermis.’861 Immortality in the novel forms at once a speculative, fantastical projection and 
a disappointingly familiar (and nostalgic) commercial contrivance aimed at the ‘well-to-do 
and once-young, once-beautiful woman or man, cranked up on hormonal supplements and 
shot full of vitamins but hampered by the unforgiving mirror.’862 The absence of ‘official 
time’ in the novel, then, depends to some extent on the reader’s knowledge of prolongevity 
strategies and cosmetic treatments, which will either render the novel prognosticative and
Atwood, Oiyx and Crake, p. 62.
859 Ibid.
860 Astrid Stuckelberger, Anti-ageing Medicine, pp. 144 & 147.
861 Atwood, Oryx and Crake, pp. 25 & 205.
862 Ibid., p. 62.
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futuristic or artefactual —or as reviewers comment: ‘a near future that is both all too familiar 
and beyond our imagining.’863
The Children of Crake remain pre-pubertal throughout their lives. Their bodies quite simply 
do not function as signifiers of time passed, as middle age and senescence remain resolutely 
defined in terms of youth: ‘no ripples of fat around their waists, no bulges, no dimpled 
orange-skin cellulite on their thighs. No body hair, no bushiness. They look like retouched
o^4
fashion photos.’ Because of their doctored growth cycles, their physical appearance 
represents both protracted time and instantaneity, as a result of which infancy and 
adolescence are equated: ‘the yearling looks like a five-year-old. By the age of four he’ll be
O f . C  ,
an adolescent.’ This is similar indeed to Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World in which the 
advantages for manufacturing ‘age’ through reproductive technology are frequently 
deliberated:
...if they could discover a technique for shortening the period of maturation, what a 
triumph, what a benefaction to Society! “Consider the horse.” They considered it. 
Mature at six; the elephant at ten. While at thirteen a man is not yet sexually mature 
[...] Long years of superfluous and wasted immaturity. If the physical development 
could be speeded up till it was as quick, say, as a cow’s, what an enonnous saving to 
the Community!866
The Children are Tike animated statues,’867 both organic and synthetic, mortal and immortal: 
‘...“they’re programmed to drop dead at age thirty —suddenly, without getting sick. No old 
age, none of those anxieties.”’868 Atwood’s novel confronts the issue of how to represent age
863 Unknown, http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/46756.Orvx and Crake [accessed 09/2011]
864 Atwood, Oiyx and Crake, p. 115.
865 Ibid., p. 187.
866 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (London: Flamingo, 1994), pp. 11-12.
867Atwood, Oiyx and Crake, p. 187.
868 Ibid., p. 356.
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when and if medicine is able to give us bodies divested of the signs of ageing. The Children, 
like Houellebecq’s neohumans, are portmanteau figures, with the virtues of youth yet 
bestowed with a normal lifespan without the protracted boredom and frustrations of 
immortality, as represented in The Possibility o f an Island. They are both ageing and ageless, 
or as Crake suggests, mortal and immortal: ‘[i]f you take “mortality” as being, not death, but 
the foreknowledge of it and the fear of it, then “immortality” is the absence of such fear. 
Babies are immortal. Edit out the fear, and you’ll be...”.’869 They are immortal not because 
they do not age or die, but because they have no knowledge of those concepts. Immortality, 
then, is a state of ignorance (or repression), not infinity; it is a psychological not 
chronological phenomenon, and so what the Children signify is the coexistence of youth and 
old age, agelessness and agedness. As long as we have this cosmetic simulacral youth, we are 
all immortal; thus Atwood ostensibly retrofits her speculative vision by rendering immortality 
only a superficially realised condition analogous to that which consumers and patients can 
achieve under contemporary capitalism and medical epistemologies. Whilst Houellebecq’s 
figures populate a world ambiguously futuristic and banal, natural and crafted, and where 
ageing is constitutive of both organic decay and machinic failure, Atwood’s Children of 
Crake seem to be immortal and mortal, inhumed within a futuristic, sterilised technocratic 
compound and a contemporary capitalist commoditocracy. The two worlds, like 
Houellebecq’s categories of human and neohuman, are interchangeable -symmetrical even. 
Her polemic centres upon the notion that we become immortal not necessarily when medicine 
and technology can defer or cure us of the death-susceptible body, but when its promises of 
reversibility and correctability lessen the fear of death, and when the cosmetic illusions of 
youth, health, and vitality help repress awareness of the ageing process. Immortality is not 
contingent on actual, manifest changes in life-expectancy brought about by medical and
Ibid.
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technological advance, but the appeasement of mortal fears and the affirmation of that 
through the cosmetic deception. Immortality is a state which falls into banality with this view 
of perpetual youth as not the emancipation from an implacable reality but the simple 
repression of it. On this basis this novel can be considered as much speculative fiction as 
social realism, and therefore at once prognosticative and nostalgic.
Suggesting science fiction is fissured between the empirical and the imaginative, the present 
and the future, is by no means a new or contentious argument —science fiction often serves as 
social commentary, or in this case a pastiche of prolongevity medicine and promises of 
sempitemity in consumer society. What might be suggested of Oryx and Crake is that 
Atwood alludes to such divisions and uses this aspect of science fiction self-consciously as a 
metaphor for a similarly fissured mature identity in contemporary anti-ageing culture.
Atwood compounds the ambivalence that characterises the Children’s biological age by 
situating them trans-historically. The Children are our post-carbon, posthuman future, with all 
vestiges of age disinvented at a whim; but they are also artefacts, signifiers of our literary 
past. They have a naive, Wordsworthian childlike innocence, and just as we question the 
physical age of the children and even the literary genre to which they belong -science fiction 
or social realism —so too do we question whether they are a part of Atwood’s speculative 
futurist visions, or a nostalgic glance back to conditions and ideologies associated more with 
the literary Romanticism. It is an ambivalence compounded in her representation of the 
hermit protagonist, known only as Snowman, with which this novel opens. Snowman 
signifies the literary/historical past: the good or noble savage, the idealized indigene of a 
more primitive, pre-technological world. He is an anachronism in this novel, and this 
primitivism represented —as well as the clandestine intertextual references —form part of 
Atwood’s representation of hubris in this novel. The tree-dwelling Neanderthal figure of 
Snowman represents natural goodness and Romantic primitivism, as well as the sort of anti­
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corporate themes that Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984 were 
renowned for. Snowman signifies the past, then, and the Children of Crake even recognise 
him as a very distant ancestor, acting as a reminder of the past —of ‘what they [the Children] 
may have been once [...] your ancestor, come from the land o f the dead,87° with ‘grimy, bug- 
bitten skin, the salt-and-pepper tufts of hair, the thick yellow toenails.’871 His pseudonym 
‘Snowman’ is similarly paradoxical and may, on Atwood’s part, function as a subtle 
declaration of this ambivalence. ‘Snowman’ may refer to an Abominable snowman, a being 
or animal existing and not existing; it also refers to a snowman: that is, ‘the white illusion of 
a man, here today, gone tomorrow’ 872 and a metaphor for the finitude, but also the fluidity of 
the human form. This combines to create a jointly transhumanist and nihilistic spectacle -the 
creation of human form correlated with the destruction of human form. The protagonist’s 
nominally ‘transhuman’ nature is conflated with allusions to primitivism and goodness akin 
to some of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s philosophies expounded in The Social Contract -his 
benign nature combined with his primitive appearance. As a result of his disengagement and 
jointly monastic and animalistic seclusion, the Children fear his perceived 
‘monstrousness,’873 and even accumulate a ‘stock of lore, of conjecture’874 about him —to the 
point where he is mythologised into ‘a separate order of being.’875 However, inasmuch as 
‘Snowman’ also connotes more typically transhumanist conceptions of the human form as 
fluid —as a work in progress —this aforementioned primitivism is hauled by Atwood back into 
futurity. The character can, then, be read as both a novel and nostalgic figure, in the same 
way youth and senescence, science fiction and realist neutrality seem putatively equivalent 
states in the Children. As if to emphasise this, despite his obviously incongruent appearance
870 Ibid., p. 123.
871 Ibid., p. 11.
872 Ibid., p. 263.
873 Ibid., p. 116.
874 Ibid., p. 9.
875 Ibid., p. 116.
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in a science fiction novel he even becomes an unwitting participant and devotee of the very 
personification of the future he, ostensibly, is not a part of: the Children of Crake. He finds 
himself an accidental advocate of Crake’s morally dubious effort to create a race of 
perpetually young ersatz humanoids and animals from which to grow extra organs. He is 
required to oversee, or rather parent, this superior yet ironically subservient race with ‘built- 
in insect repellent, altered digestive systems so that they can eat grass and leaves, a self-
• 876healing mechanism’ designed to succeed humans -in  other words, him. Not only is he 
simultaneously superior to them in his parental role, but biologically he is inferior to them. 
Like the Children who exist in parenthesis, between mortality and immortality, the 
transcendent and the banal, Snowman is astride the primitive on the one side -in  his 
primordial and arboreal nature -and the futurist on the other in his (albeit unwitting) 
perpetuation of Crake’s work.
Many of Atwood’s characters, then, are highly ambiguous, and this is matched by what 
appears, at times, in the novel to be a pastiche of earlier (literary-)historical periods. She 
presents not a linear but recapitulative relation between youth and old age and, by extension, 
an isomorphic relation between organic subject and synthetic object or commodity. Like an 
object or commodity that can be brought back to its former condition through restoration, so 
too can the individual subject be returned to a ‘once-young, once-beautiful woman or 
man.’877Unlike her previous allusions to an insubstantial cosmetic deception, what seems 
analogous to the commodification of youth in discourses of consumerism becomes more akin
• 878to time travel: ‘why chain your body to the clock, you can break the shackles of time. The
nihilating effect of time on the body is presented almost as an arbitrary, malign force. As 
Peter Yoonsuk Paik comments:
technology that enables modem societies to diminish steadily the vulnerability and 
exposure of human beings to the condition of mortality produces the unintended 
consequence that human beings then come to regard suffering itself as unnatural.879
This process of auto-/self-restoration transforms humans into the ultimate site of perfectibility 
and customization —which in the novel is done through the breeding of transgenic, or hybrid, 
creatures such as ‘pigoons’ used to ‘grow an assortment of foolproof human-tissue organs.’880 
Because the novel moves between past, present, and future non-linearly -and because each 
chapter is written in the present-tense -it is often ambiguous as to which narrative fragments 
are speculative projections and which are retrospective. Similarly, as we read about 
Snowman’s past (when he is known as Jimmy), we are confronted with an unsettling blend of 
past and future. For instance, it is a tendency of Atwood’s to convey a mundane, domestic 
scene written in the past tense -a  scene we identify as Snowman’s youth -and then to pull 
back to reveal the alien, dystopian ‘future’. This is evident in the disturbing, but seamless, 
shift seen in the following passage:
Jimmy’s earliest complete memory was of a huge bonfire [...] He was wearing red 
rubber boots with a smiling duck’s face on each toe; he remembers that, because after 
seeing the bonfire he had to walk through a pan of disinfectant in those boots.881
In this chapter entitled ‘Bonfire’, as Atwood moves out from describing domestic scenes with 
Jimmy’s family to their broader environment, what is assumedly a benign middle-class 
suburbia becomes a sterilized, cloistered futuristic compound of Organlnc, partitioned off 
from the citified world known as the ‘pleebands’: ‘endless billboards and neon signs and 
stretches of buildings, tall and short, endless dingy-looking streets, countless vehicles of all
879 Peter Yoonsuk Paik, p. From Utopia to Apocalypse, p. 118.
880 Atwood, Oryx and Crake, p. 25
881 Ibid., p. 17.
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kinds.’882 Atwood recurrently plays with our idea of historical time in Oiyx and Crake, often 
suspending an illusion of the past before transforming it seamlessly into a futurist, 
technocratic, oligarchical society of Organlnc where, similar to Brave New World, all power 
rests with the scientific elite. The scenes of socio-economic inequalities are necessitated by 
technology, and so scientific and technological progressivism which defines ‘the future’ 
actually bring it closer to being more of an historical artefact. As alluded to briefly alongside 
The Possibility o f an Island, technological modification necessitates a species split: the 
human versus the posthuman (in this case the Children of Crake). This is clearly conveyed in 
the juxtaposition of prognostication with the Romantic primitivism of Snowman, and is also 
represented spatially in the Pleebands and Organlnc. As McNamee and Edwards comment 
‘the human may be incapable of breeding with the posthuman and will be seen as having a 
much lower moral standing [...] In the same vein, critics may argue that transhumanism will 
increase inequalities between the rich and poor.’883 From the non-corporal immortality to 
dystopian techno-fatalism, Dinello constructs a similar argument. He describes an elevation 
where ‘ordinary humans will be treated as servants or pets and will eventually become 
extinct’ unless elevated —or ‘resurrected’ -by technology.884 This largely typifies the 
relationship between Snowman and Crake (and his creations), and so whilst the clear division 
in some sense offers an untroubled portrayal of human eugenics, it is also its own antithesis, 
socially and politically, as it also reinstates antiquated social stratifications (to the moralistic 
indignation of Snowman), not the post-capitalist, age-and disease-free techno-utopia one 
might conventionally expect. Body modification evokes a neo-Darwinism, with natural 
selection is rebranded as technological selection as people wait for ‘robots [to] resurrect 
selected earthly humans as divine disembodied post-humans —immortal, telepathic,
882 Ibid., p. 31.
883 M.J McNamee and S.D Edwards, ‘Transhumanism, Medical Technology and Slippery Slopes’, p. 514
884 Daniel Dinello, Technophobia!, p. 18.
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omniscient, and omnipresent.’885 In Oryx and Crake, technological modification is 
characterised by a conflictingly primitive resurgence o f ‘survival of the fittest’. Like 
Houellebecq’s neohumans, although the technological is associated with elitism and 
deification, it also represents an over-determinism that is equal to, if even more oppressive 
than, biological determinism in humans. The two timeframes, and indeed the two species, 
form a parallel therefore, not a disjunction as one might initially expect. What is represented,
then, is the modified body of the future as a signifier of the past —not the ‘creation of a new
886social order’ but instead a protraction of human suffering and inequalities, an ‘ongoing 
critique of what it means to be human.’887 As Mark Lawson comments, there is in this science 
fiction 'a deep nostalgia, it's very much more about the past;’888 yet this past and this 
historicity is couched within the expressions and locutions of a posthuman future.
Atwood’s increasingly dubious utopia is characterised by continual allusions to loss, and this 
is the case in attention paid to names and naming: ‘It was one of Crake’s rules that no name 
could be chosen for which a physical equivalent -even stuffed, even skeletal -could not be 
demonstrated.’889 For example, roaming about the novel, we find various transgenic animals, 
such as the ‘spoat/gider’, ‘wolvogs’ (dogs with the ferity of wolves), ‘ratunks’ (raccoon- 
skunk hybrids), and ‘pigoons’ (pigs with bodies shaped as balloons used to produce extra 
organs for human transplantation). These creatures and the corresponding neologisms are 
emblematic of novelty, of ‘the future’. However, like many aspects of this novel Atwood 
undermines this representation inasmuch as these transgenic creatures are more signifiers of 
transience (i.e. the extinction of dogs, raccoons, skunks, pigs, and so on), which is a very
885 Ibid.
886 Tiziana Terranova, ‘Posthuman Unbounded: Artificial Evolution and High-Tech Subcultures in 
FutureNatural: Natures, Science, Culture, ed. by George Robertson et al., (London: Routledge, 1996), cited by 
Bart Simon in ‘Toward a Critique of Posthuman Futures, p. 2.
887 Bart Simon, ‘Introduction: Towards a Critique of Posthuman Futures’ in Cultural Critique, No. 53, 
Posthumanism (Winter 2003), p. 8 http://www.istor.org/stable/1354621 [accessed 01/09/11]
888 Mark Lawson, ‘Oryx and Crake’, Newsnight Review
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/programmes/newsnight/review/3003883.stm [accessed 01/09/11]
889 Atwood, Oiyx and Crake, p. 8.
human preoccupation, than survivability. Moreover, the volatile nature of wolvogs in 
particular, transforms Snowman, Crake, and the Children of Crake into prey, undermining 
their supremacy and most notably of all Crake’s creation and ultimate Godlike control over 
these creatures. So whilst these animals are metaphors for the future, they also invert the 
anthropocentrism that has elevated Man above animals. Again Atwood retrofits futurity with 
primitive and anachronistic associations, and paradoxically uses signifiers of the future — 
transgenic creatures -to  forge allusions to a much earlier point in evolutionary history. 
Running parallel to this is Snowman’s loss of verbal dexterity as he struggles to retrieve lost 
words and understand their meaning:
From nowhere, a word appears: Mesozoic. He can see the word, he can hear the word, 
but he can’t reach the word. He can’t attach anything to it. This is happening too 
much lately, this dissolution of meaning, the entries on his cherished wordlists drifting 
off into space.890
The word he cannot retrieve, Mesozoic, refers to an age where most dinosaurs developed and 
became extinct, which has obvious significance in the cautionary anti-corporate, anti­
globalisation themes in Oryx and Crake. Along with the decline of substance in the 
transgenic creatures and the ostensibly tenseless, trans-historical characters, Atwood 
comments in the novel that ‘language itself had lost its solidity; it had become thin, 
contingent, slippery, a viscid form on which he was sliding around.’891 Frequently in the 
novel, apparently unassignable words appear to Snowman, ‘rag ends of language are floating 
in his mead: mephitic, metronome, mastitis, metatarsal, maudlin [...] Fragments of words are 
swirling down it, in a grey liquid he realizes in his dissolving brain.’8 The transformative 
capabilities of technology have much more eschatological connotations, not only in the sense
890 Ibid., p. 43.
891 Ibid., p. 305.
892 Ibid., p. 174.
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that it is bound up with the end of language, but that the creation of neologisms arise out of 
the extinction of various species. As such linguistic novelty and experimentalism to some 
extent foregrounds the frailty and immanent, if not fully realised, death that underscores 
human —and animal —nature in the hegemonic presence of technology. Within the text, then, 
is the occasional word or phraseology that is novel and points, perhaps, towards a utopian 
future; yet these words and phraseologies and neologisms form the basis of the scattergun 
nihilism that eventually prevails in the text. As a cautionary novel it alludes to but ultimately 
seeks distinction from the future, the terminal condition of language and humans/animals 
alike, which it depicts.
The scenes Atwood creates are apocryphal yet also reified within our own culture, 
apocalyptic and destructive yet with allusions to creativity and fecundity. Crake scientises 
every aspect of humanity, and the work of Crake -the creation of people and animals -and 
the gravitas, elusiveness, and omniscience that increasingly define ‘Crake’ transform him 
from an individual human scientist into a monotheistic religion. Crake is a godlike figure and, 
seemingly, a religion. Paradoxically, Crake’s work is sacrilegious and anti-humanistic, yet it 
is also the affirmation of spiritual belief and, if not godlike, then representing the prophesied 
return of Christ in the sense that he is a spiritual, salvational, benevolent force —even if that 
spiritualism, salvation, and benevolence is sprung from scientism and the destruction of 
humanity. Atwood’s futurism, like Houellebecq’s novel, often seems couched within 
banalities of everyday existence, and even seems to be at times a parodic evocation of 
western anti-ageing discourses:
She was getting little creases on either side of her mouth, despite the collagen 
injections; her biological clock was ticking, as she was fond of pointing out. Pretty 
soon it would be the NooSkins BeauToxique Treatment for her —Wrinkles Paralyzed
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Forever, Employees Half-Price —plus, in say five years, the Fountain of Yooth Total 
Plunge, which rasped off your entire epidermis.893
Allusions to Crake’s sacrilegious creative acts are matched by the efforts of individual 
consumers in wanting to be ‘unique, self-created and self-sufficient,’894 which is specifically 
the case for ageing. This likens anti-ageing to a form of laissez-faire individualism, which 
Atwood exaggerates very satirically as consumers are elevated into messianic figures. 
Whether banal or transcendent figures, secular or religious, old or young, we get this sense 
upon reading Atwood’s novel that language has lost its solidity in representing age and time — 
historically and biologically. It is a contingent form on which her ostensibly tenseless, de- 
chronologised, or chrono-displaced characters slide around, signifying one thing then the 
next. Historical figures such as Napoleon and Einstein appear sporadically, as does Simone 
de Beauvoir who of course has written extensively on old age. This novel is replete with 
anachronisms and intertextual references which problematise this novel’s otherwise relatively 
conventional and unremarkable futurism. They comprise ‘zero hour’, i.e. the inability to 
distinguish nostalgia and futurity, comparable to what many sociologists term the 
‘generational blur’895 -as invoked by anti-ageing products, ideologies, and discourses. Whilst 
Atwood does comment ethically and politically on technology and our growing ontological 
allegiance to it, these issues are used more as vehicles from which to address representational 
problems when the body no longer works as a signifier of time passed. She has, after all, 
given us The Children of Crake, whose bodies, divested of all conventional signifiers of old 
age mean that they can be of any age. Alongside this we have a non-linear and trans- 
historical narrative with images and allusions that do not signify temporally, or do so 
ambiguously. What I suggest of this novel then is that there is a jointly bodily and
893 Ibid., p. 205
894 Ibid., p. 206.
895 Quoted by Toni M. Calasanti & Kathleen F. Slevin in Gender, Social Inequalities, and Aging, p. 53.
278
representational sense of atemporality, which brings to the fore possible connections that can 
be made between body and narrative in the context of anti-ageing.
iii) Conclusion
Both Oryx and Crake and The Possibility o f an Island are novels resistant to periodisation. 
Atwood and Houellebecq subtly conflate antiquity and futurity, geriatry and posthumanity, 
mortality and immortality, gerontological and technological discourses. Both novels reflect 
the cultural antinomies within which the subjects of age and age-transcendence are besieged. 
Ostensibly, the novels are built upon self-doubting, and attenuated science-fictionalities -  
prognosticative in some senses, but replete with allusions to the past (or present, depending 
on your perspective). As such Houellebecq and Atwood render the novels themselves 
paradigmatic of their similarly conflicted characters whose physiologies are a futuristic but, 
beset with atavisms, are not only immortal but recognisably and disappointingly mortal. Both 
novels ask the reader to question the on-going cultural function of science fiction in the 
context of a population already incredulous of mortality, habituated to ideas of perpetual 
youth and expectant of their reification. With the futuristic milieu combined with their 
semiotics of realism, both writers seem incredulous of the very future they depict, and give a 
sense of science fiction’s on-going cultural function. To some extent this seems a very apt 
reflection of the west’s discourses of immortality, which, although still contrary to our 
empirical environment, provide an element of realism given their dominance in consumer 
capitalism and the medical episteme, past and present, and the stoical reassertion in an ageing 
society of ‘a continuing “un-ageing” self.’896 Betwixt and between fantasy and reality,
896 Janine L. Wiles et al., ‘Embodied Ageing in Place: What Does it Mean to Grow Old? in Towaids Enabling 
Geographies: ‘Disabled’ Bodies and Minds in Society and Space, ed. by Vera Chouinard et al. (Surrey. Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 2010), pp. 217-37 (p. 229).
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novelty and cultural cliche, oneiric self-overcoming and meliorist efforts to restore public 
health, ideas of immortality and agelessness are highly conflicted. The transhistoricism of 
Atwood and Houellebecq’s novels, combined with the bathetic transcendentalism of the 
characters’ jointly mortal and immortal bodies, seems to embody this. In using science fiction 
and the themes of immortality and body modification to address or allude to mortality, 
organic decay, and death, these novels seem to be drawing on the cultural paradoxes of a 
society at once ageing and anti-ageing: a society replete with age-consciousness, age 
prejudice, gerontophobia, and demographic and existential alarmism, but a society that is in 
part adroitly evading the biomedical realities of senescence -a  society satiated with the 
positive cultural mythology that ageing is a time where individuals should be ‘healthy, 
sexually active, engaged, productive and self reliant.’897 These novels’ conflicted and 
ambiguous semiologies of age (both historical and bodily) might be argued to reflect many of 
the antinomies of contemporary anti-ageing culture, whilst their apparent attenuated, self- 
doubting science-fictionality seems indicative of a narrator coming to terms with the fragile 
tenure of this Gnostic genre. As life expectancies continue to rise, science fiction is tacitly 
embroiled in its adroit evasion, emerging with egalitarian fervour as a new prescriptive 
literature; and as immortality and alternative, nonlinear conceptions of time gain prominence 
as a mainstream cultural discourse and paradigm of ageing novels such as The Possibility o f  
an Island and Oryx and Crake emerge increasingly, it seems, as allegories of postmodern 
ageing.
897 Ibid., p. 230.
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CONCLUSION: INTIMATIONS OF IMMORTALITY
Is it not evident that no signifier, whatever its substance and form, has a “unique and 
singular reality?” A signifier is from the very beginning the possibility of its own 
repetition, of its own image or resemblance. It is the condition of its ideality, what 
identifies it as signifier, and makes it function as such, relating it to a signified which, 
for the same reasons, could never be a “unique and singular reality”. From the 
moment that the sign appears, that is to say from the very beginning, there is no
898chance of encountering anywhere the purity of “reality,” “unicity,” “singularity.”
What I have attempted to show in each chapter of this thesis is that a sense or suggestion of 
agelessness, perhaps even immortality, inheres within the semiology of age in contemporary 
Anglophone literature. The spectacle of decrepitude and decline clearly dominates the 
superficies of a great deal of contemporary literature, from the ascetic literary formalism of 
Samuel Beckett and B.S. Johnson’s typographically demented rendering of thought and 
consciousness, to the flourishing of the Alzheimer’s sub-genre in post-2000 fiction. However, 
analysis of the formal, structural, and semantic properties reveals that old age has, at the same 
time, fallen into repression and sublimation, has been placed so u s rature, or under erasure, by 
the contingency and irreducibility of the ‘signs’ of ageing —the constant slippage of meaning, 
that is, at the semiotic level. What I have asked in this thesis is how literary discourse, with 
its recourse to metaphor, indeterminacy, and its ‘substitutive voyage of signs, impacts the 
representation of old age. I have argued that in a number of modem and contemporary age 
narratives there is a latent semiotic equivalence between aged and ageless —that although 
the thematic content of this literature focuses unproblematically upon senility and decay, the
898 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 91. . j , , . . . .
899 Catherine Malabou & Jacques Derrida, Counterpath: Travelling with Jacques Derrida, trans. by David Wills
(California: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 210.
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signs, or signifiers, of age are a tacit monument to an inverse reality: immortality. In the 
literature of ageing studied in this thesis, we are confronted with a body of texts denuded of 
sophistry and illusion on the one hand, yet on the other are furnished with language whose 
metaphoricity, imprecision, displacement of the flesh, and semantic open-endedness give the 
illusion of multiple realities and subtly transforms the canonical indices of decline into a new 
paradigm of hope. Whilst the ordeal of ageing is apparent, it is also undermined, thwarted and 
deviated, couched in an ostensibly perfidious rhetoric that tempers and on occasion inverts 
the realities of age, and through its rhetorical devices and irreducible polysemy renders old 
age, at times, an occult nonknowledge.
A recurring theme in this thesis, then, has been the intimations of immortality in the 
semiology of age: the ostensible freedom and supernal privilege that exists within language, 
its rhetorical devices, polysemy and preciosity, its hedonistic self-referentiality and the 
philological and exegetical problematics of textuality. As Jacques Derrida comments:
A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance [...] The 
dissimulation of the woven texture can in any case take centuries to undo its web: a 
web that envelops a web, undoing the web for centuries; reconstituting it too as an 
organism, indefinitely regenerating its own tissue behind the cutting trace, the 
decision of each reading [my italics].900
Literary erudition in a poststructuralist vein, with its repeated recourse to the infinite, the 
endless, and the endlessly deferred, reprieved, or forestalled—the play, that is, of ‘infinite 
reference’901 and the lack of a semantic teleology —conveys a clear ideology, but no more so 
than when applied to the literature of age. As I discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, 
David Keck describes Alzheimer’s disease as deconstruction incarnate, and argues that
900 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), p. 63.
901 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 36.
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humankind s fear is not of ageing, per se, but of a ‘confrontation with deconstruction 
itself.’ This thesis has worked toward a broader consideration of the language of ageing as 
inherently deconstructive —a monument to poststructuralist thinking and, by extension, the 
antithesis to death and finality. By viewing a piece of literature poststructurally we offer both 
text and protagonist a seductive reprieve from Time, from fixity and finitude, from 
determinate contexts and ‘the closure of knowledge.’903 Throughout this thesis I have argued 
that the very subject of old age is contestable, lateralised, and sublated in many contemporary 
narratives of ageing: from Beckett’s semiological problematics, muted transcendentalism, 
fatuous quietism, ‘conception of the body as a machine’ and his ‘denial of organic life;’904 to 
the use of xyloid metaphors, the wry defeatism, the effacement of the flesh, and the 
representation in contemporary fiction of senescing bodies as pseudo-natural ungestalt 
malformations or deformities; and finally to the way in which the spectacle of senility has 
provided an opportunity for experimental renewal and neo-modemistic polemicism in some 
more recent Alzheimer’s fiction. Beckett, conscious though he is of ageing, gives little 
indication of time passed or time passing.
Ageing in Beckettian prose and stagecraft is caught up in this lacuna, this deconstructivist 
abyss and unwitting eternity which stems as much from Beckett’s choreographic, scenic, 
linguistic, and syntactic decisions as the perambulations, digressions and deviations that these 
provoke in the reader. Beckett’s bodies float about in the interstice between damnation and 
salvation, between senescence and sempitemity, and like many cultural discourses of age 
(which I come to later in this conclusion) seem to be built on an analogy between biological 
senescence and deviant robot teleology. Hassan points out how Beckett’s bodies, in their
902 David Keck, ‘Deconstruction Incarnate: The Etiology and Teleology of Alzheimer s Disease in Foi getting 
Whose We Are: Alzheimer’s Disease and the Love o f God (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), p. 36.
903 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Preface, O f Grammatology, p. lxxvii ^
904 Ihab Hassan, The Dismemberment o f Orpheus: Toward a Postmodern Literatuie, 2 edn. (London & 
Wisconsin, USA: University of Wisconsin Press Ltd., 1982), p. 226.
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troubled significations, are ungestalt figures, an almost anomalous slew of geometric objects 
or at best mechanical human simulacra. The characters seem liberated from time. However, 
with any mechanistic concept of temporality,905 Beckett’s dramatis personae soon become 
personifications of the objective, coercive passage of time their inorganic bodies putatively 
elude. Consequently, Beckett’s vision of ageing, like that of many authors mentioned in this 
thesis, is characterised by these terminal dualisms or doublings, flittering between plaintive 
spectacles of decay and begrudging, unwitting affirmations of immortality and 
indeterminacy.
The characters discussed in this thesis are tacitly immortalised by the very language that 
seeks to comprehend and lament their mortality. Many of the characters discussed embody 
the plight of Tithonus in the Homeric hymn to Aphrodite in which Eos asked Zeus to make 
Tithonus immortal but forgot to ask for eternal youth. I have attempted to draw attention to 
how literature’s poetic or rhetorical embellishments, its lack of semantic constraints, its 
formal innovations, aleatory and often self-deconstructive inventory of allusions, 
juxtapositions and permutations, and its plethora of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms, and theomorphisms render old age a reality, truth or literal meaning that 
is present in the text but always deferred or diverted away from itself, leaving the aged 
protagonist censured, obscured, thrown into obliquity and, most paradoxically of all, 
‘stubbornly inaccessible to time.’906 The literature of ageing studied is often self- 
deconstructing, delivered in language that articulates and comprehends the pathos of old age 
yet whose constructivist representations of the body, supervening allusions, metaphoricity,
905 See C. Davis Hendricks et a l, Time, Roles, and Self in Old Age, ed. by Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: Human 
Sciences Press, 1976), pp. 14-5.
906 Michel Foucault, ‘Language to Infinity’ Aesthetics, Method, an d Epistemology, ed. by James Fabion, vol. 2, 
trans. by Robert Hurley et al. (London: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 91.
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and poststructuralist trappings give the illusion o f ‘alternative possible worlds,'907 embroil the 
character in a semantic ascent beyond the limitations of the body, and ‘defe[r] the moment of 
encountering the thing itself, the moment at which we could lay hold of it, consume or 
expend it, touch it, see it, have a present intuition of it.’908 In its refusal to narrate ageing in 
the flesh, the signs of ageing in many contemporary narratives do not offer any sense of 
closure or finality. Instead they offer a teasingly and sometimes menacingly asymptotic 
relation to death, rendering the spectacle of decline, this ‘endless little body,’909 rarely far 
from and always haunted by semiotic phantoms of immortality. For Beckett’s characters this, 
their interminable age, is often explicitly alluded to, and in other literature such as Kingsley 
Amis’ Ending Up or Michel Houellebecq’s The Possibility o f an Island, this tormenting 
perpetuity is more implicitly present. In narrating mortality without recourse to the flesh, the 
characters are demonstrably and plaintively mortal yet subtextually immortal; immortalised 
by a visual lexicon that ‘could not end [them], left [them] maim'd / To dwell in presence of 
immortal youth, / Immortal age beside immortal youth.’910 Through the refusal to narrate 
ageing in the flesh we are presented with a language of ageing that equivocates and self­
doubts, prevaricates even in the face of character death, ‘posits meaning ceaselessly to 
evaporate it,’911 favours indeterminacy, recoils from coherence and closures, and through ‘the 
detour of the sign’912 allows realist or naturalistic portrayals to lapse into covertly trans- 
/posthuman ones, and the pathos of age the ideality (or tedium) of immortality.
907 Madan Sarup, Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, 2nd edn. (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 
p. 50.
908 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: and Other Essays on Husserl s Theory o f Signs, ed. by John Wild, 
trans. by David B. Allison (USA: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 138.
909 Samuel Beckett, Lessness (London: Calder & Boyars, 1970), p. 12.
910 Alfred Lord Tennyson, Selected Poetiy, ed. by Norman Page (London & New York. Routledge, 1995), p. 
138: 19-22.
911 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ in The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary 
Trends, 3rd edn., ed. by David H. Richter (USA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), p. 877.
9I~ Jacques Derrida, Margins o f  Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (USA: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), p. 9.
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Edward Bellamy s short story ‘The Old Folks’ Party’ (1898) introduces an important theme 
in this thesis: performativity. Bellamy describes a group of young friends and their droll 
imitation of age:
“My idea is this,” said Henry, leaning back in his chair, with his hands clasped behind 
his head, and his long legs crossed before him. “Let us dress up to resemble what we 
expect to look like fifty years hence” [...] Eight o’clock was the hour at which the old 
folks’ party began, and the reader will need a fresh introduction to the company which 
was assembled at that time in Mary Fellows’s parlor. Mary sat by her grandmother, 
who from time to time regarded her in a half-puzzled manner, as if it required an 
effort of her reasoning powers to reassure her that the effect she saw was an illusion. 
The girl’s brown hair was gathered back under a lace cap, and all that appeared 
outside it was thickly powdered. She wore spectacles, and the warm tint of her cheeks 
had given place to the opaque saffron hue of age. She sat with her hands in her lap, 
their fresh color and dimpled contour concealed by black lace half-gloves. The 
fullness of her young bosom was carefully disguised by the arrangement of the 
severely simple black dress she wore, which was also in other respects studiously
913adapted to conceal, by its stiff and angular lines.
By the thematising the ‘natural’ in a satirical context, Bellamy destabilises distinctions 
between youth and age, natural and performative, past and future, mortal and sempiternal. A 
central contention in this thesis has been that language, in effect, performs: that irrespective 
of the biomedical realities of age, it is paradoxically within the expressions and indices of 
decay and decline that both characters and consumers alike seem to locate and rehearse their 
immortality. What I would like to suggest is that Bellamy offers not so much a droll parody
913 Edward Bellamy, ‘The Old Folks’ Party’ in The Blindman’s World and Other Stories (New York: Garrett 
Press, Inc., 1968), p. 74.
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of age, but a parody of the discourses and signifying gestures through which old age is 
articulated and understood in contemporary western culture. The characters’ enactment of age 
suggests a morbid curiosity for a condition which, for them, is little more than a hypothetical 
future or the occult of a far distant and potentially assailable reality. Bellamy’s play on 
natural versus performative selves, youth versus age, past versus future, might may be argued 
to dramatise the fantasy of optionality and the postmodern de-conceptualisation of age: that 
is, the humanist fallacy of anti-ageing, and the avenues of escape and new modes of re­
embodiment sought in consumer capitalism and enacted through consumption.914 The 
garments and accoutrements in Bellamy’s short story are metaphors for age: for the 
foreignness, constrictiveness, and essentialisms of age, the anarchic, defamiliarising, and self- 
alienating sensations of the dysfunctional body, and the putative antagonism between 
objective body-image and subjective self-image. However, because the characters’ old age is 
caricatural, the signs, or signifiers, of age not only imply optionality, a possible cessation or 
reprieve mortality, but most paradoxically of all become tacit monuments to a potential 
immortality. It is through performing or enacting age that the characters repudiate it, and 
similarly in western culture and literature alike it is within the discourses and semiologies of 
ageing that we find our seductive, if perhaps delusive, reprieve from Time. The aged subject 
is couched in the western sophistry and specious reasoning of anti-ageing, and is poised 
against mortality, if not through medical, scientific, and technological innovation and 
success, then through linguistic pretense —that is, through a cultural-consumer vernacular that 
internalises and naturalises nonlinear conceptions of time and transcendentalist ideologies of 
defying or disinventing age. Bellamy’s characters can be thought of as simultaneously young 
and old, mortal and sempiternal, but the dynamics of the mature identity may be thought of in 
comparable terms, particularly as the biomedical realities of an ageing society conflict yet
914Mike Featherstone & Andrew Wemick (eds.), Images o f Aging: Cultural Representations ofLatei Life 
(London& New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 11.
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coexist with the expressions and locutions of an anti-ageing one. Irrespective of whether it 
becomes a reality, immortality has with a certain degree of insidiousness made a home within 
the rhetoric of age. It has come in part to define reality even though it is so clearly contrary to 
it, and should perhaps be thought of in terms of the linguistic performance —or rehearsal —of 
immortality that accompanies and dissimulates the increasingly prominent spectacle of age 
and decline. It is in this vein that David B. Morris comments:
Illness somehow defines us [...] Unlike robots or rabbits, humans possess a tendency 
toward repeated and often protracted illnesses that seem finally less a flaw in our 
design than a mysterious signature. Walk through any suburban mall, however, and 
you cannot avoid seductive displays promising miracle cures, ageless, bodies, and 
perpetual well-being, as if our main task in life were to defeat mortality.915
Literary expressions of age seem as closely pursued by semiotic echoes of immortality as 
cultural discourses of ageing are their disavowing prefix ‘anti-’. Literary discourses, I have 
argued, express a certain reality about the ageing process, but in their recurrent displacement 
and disavowal of the flesh, also intervene on that process and impinge on its trajectory. The 
semiology of age precludes any definitive sense of the body’s totality, its corporeity, rhythms, 
cadences, betrayals, and provenance, and offers a counterintuitively oblique relation to ageing 
and mortality. The language, it seems, immortalises these ageing figures, is akin to a 
‘revivalist discourse,’916 a renunciation of mortality or celebration of existence albeit rarely, 
or never always convincingly, human. The literary discourse of age embellishes, prevaricates, 
misrepresents, and dissimulates the themes of time, organic decay, and death that 
predominate —gives the sense of plaintively mortal figures couched in the rhetoric, the
915 David B. Morris, Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age (London: University of California Press Ltd.,
20 0 0 ), p . 1.
916 Clive Seale, Constructing Death: The Sociology o f Dying and Bereavement (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 104.
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lineaments, of eternity. It is difficult at times to distinguish whether an author is using fiction 
to explore and express age, or to seek and locate sanctuary from it within the vagaries and 
caprice of their own ambiguous significations. In the literature of age, and perhaps to a larger 
extent in the cultural narratives of ageing, the aged subject is never far from his or her own 
magus double: that is, the sempiternal or perpetually youthful self articulated into existence 
through discourses of consumerism; that is reinforced or reified by the abundance of anti­
ageing paraphernalia, by anti-senescence medicine, by Anglo-American culture’s ritualized 
deference and obeisance to youth, and by the successive de-conceptualisations of old age in 
an era that has, at the same time, made it an unavoidable and unassailable reality.
A central concern of this thesis has been the intimations of immortality in the language of 
decay and decline -o f  the premise that what is occurring, not necessarily on the level of 
theme and plot, but more implicitly at the semiotic level, is ‘warfare on the biology of old 
age.’917 When considering the semiology of age in contemporary literature and the discursive 
cultural representations of ageing -particularly with regards their displacement of the flesh -  
I am often reminded of the uncompromising materialism of iatrophysicists such as Julien 
Offray de la Mettrie, with their mechanistic depictions of biological phenomena. La Mettrie’s 
machine—man conceit, which is really a comparison between human and animal (and a
9 1 8 *reference to the Cartesian hypothesis that animals are machines bereft of souls) is an 
attempt to explain the workings of the body in terms of its material constitution alone:
The human body is a watch, a large watch constructed with such skill and ingenuity, 
that if the wheel which marks the seconds happens to stop, the minute wheel turns and 
keeps on going its round, and in the same way the quarter-hour wheel, and all the 
others go on running when the first wheels have stopped because rusty or, for any
917 David B. Morris, Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age, p. 2.
918 Ann Thomson, Introduction, Machine Man and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. xvi.
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teason, out of order. Is it not for a similar reason that the stoppage of a few blood 
vessels is not enough to destroy or suspend the strength of the movement which is in 
the heart as in the mainspring of the machine[?]919
He describes the human body as ‘a collection of springs which wind each other up,’ and that 
the body is endowed with energy but, ‘like that of a pendulum, can not keep up forever. It 
must be renewed, as it loses strength, invigorated when it is tired, and weakened when it is 
disturbed.’920 Much of La Mettrie’s unyielding materialism extends that of Rene Descartes, 
who in Treatise on Man describes how the bodily functions including digestion, respiration, 
circulation, and the movement of the limbs ‘follow from the mere arrangement of the 
machine’s organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton 
follow from the arrangement of its counter-weights and wheels.’921 Contemporary discourses 
and semiotics of ageing call to mind the same uncompromising materialism as iatrophysicists 
such as La Mettrie. Culturally, we have a tendency to view the ageing body as a machine or 
‘mechanism that is defined solely in tenns of its demoted status,’ the transition, that is, 
between the ‘once active human subject’ to the impuissant, ‘sick, elderly and malfunctioning 
entity.’922 Representations of the senescing body as a formless, inhuman, disembodied, post­
bodied, even post-biological corporeality, dramatise this sense of threat —the insidious 
metamorphosis the body undergoes. The ageing body in Anglo-American culture is ‘seen as 
something foreign, something to be resisted [....] an objective machine-body [...] an alien 
thing rather than one with the self.’923 1 have spoken often in this thesis about the 
displacement of the flesh in semiotics of age, of the self-deconstructing affinity in Beckett
919 Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Man a Machine (La Salle & Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company,
1953), p . 141.
920 Ibid., p. 135.
9-1 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings o f Descartes, vol. 1, trans. by John Cottingham et al.
(Cambridge: C am b rid g e  University Press, 1985), p. 108.
922 Sarah Fishwick, The Body in the Work o f Simone de Beauvoir, ed. by Peter Lang (USA: University of 
Michigan, 2002), p. 158.
923Jennifer Bullington, ‘Being Body: The Dignity of Human Embodiment’ in Dignity in Care for Older People, 
ed. by Lennart Nordenfelt (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009), pp. 73-4.
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and in more recent fiction of Michel Houellebecq between gerontological and technological 
discourse, between the physical involution of the body and deviant or defective robot 
teleologies, biological determinism and technological determinism, and ultimately, organic 
decay and sempitemity. The image of the self-directed, self-regulating machine or 
mechanical device in western culture might be argued to pervade gerontological discourse, 
emblemise ‘the culturally provoked fear of ageing,’924 and hyperbolise the disintegration of 
bodily boundaries involved in decay, the phenomenological foreignness, self-distance, or 
alienity in moments of pain, dysfunction, and collapse, the loss of self-command, and the 
disruptiveness, aversiveness, and involuntariness of the dysfunctional body -as if acting, or 
performing, under the hegemony of external control. As in iatrophysics, the semiotics of age 
offer mechanistic representations of physiological phenomena, but in this carries 
counterrealist inflections that tacitly immortalise the individual, or intervene on old age.
Technology may be argued to symbolise progress, the secularisation and bureaucratisation of 
the theological premise of victory over death, the instrumentality of the world around us and 
our ontological allegiance to it, and an occidental metaphysics that unites the Cartesian 
mind/body, the subjective self-image and objective body-image, towards an ageless, 
incarnate subjectivity. However, one of my key arguments arising from the erasure of 
embodiment and the suggestions and residual images of post-bodiedness in the semiologies 
of age has been the use of technology as a metaphor for old age and the various losses it 
entails: that is, technologisation as a metaphor for organic decay and retrograde biological 
processes, and with it the affinity between gerontocracy and techno fatalist dystopia. In 
attempting to capture the subjective, prelinguistic experience of the body natural, to locate 
and externalise the defamiliarising sensations, the kinaesthesias and coenaesthesias of the 
senescing body, and the existential challenges presented in moments of pain and impuissance,
9-4 Sarah Fishwick, The Body in the Work o f Simone de Beauvoir, p. 158.
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the image of the machine, or more specially a penal rather than liberating trans- 
/posthumanity, seems particularly prevalent in both literary and cultural discourse. One of the 
themes I have not emphasised in this thesis has been the gendered semiology of age, for the 
reason that the signs of ageing (in their semiotic sense) erase all biological markers, reduce 
the body to an unruly, protean object, a maladroit, post-carbon, degendered or even post­
gendered assemblage, inhuman and demeaning in its ‘thingness’, and to which all biological 
assignations seem curiously irrelevant or simply inapplicable. That said, Simone de Beauvoir 
is often credited with gendering the machine, narrating the reproductive body in post­
menopausal women as ‘a mechanism which fails to respond normally to crucial “signals” or 
“messages” [...] a system which is malfunctioning or out of control because it fails to respond 
to “authority” in the form of bodily “signals.”’925 The images of ageing in literary discourse 
are semiotic phantoms of immortality, or give indication of our posthuman futures. It is not 
necessarily technological discourse, extropian philosophy, and trans- or posthumanism that 
gives us an idea of the ‘unprecedented synthesis of the organic and the mechanical,’926 but 
literary and cultural representations of biological entropy and the plights of the old.
The literature I have discussed in this thesis engages with subject of ageing on a thematic 
level, but linguistically, stylistically, or typographically seems to prevaricate, distort or 
pervert the images of ageing and the plights of the characters. Whilst subtly transforming 
biologistic representations of age into constructivist ones, realist evocations into covertly 
trans- or posthumanist ones, and actual bodies into conceptual, Active, or imagined ones, the 
dehumanisation of ageing bodies does resonate socio-politically. One might suggest that the 
more abstract, immortalised, deified, or demonstrably inhuman the protagonists appear the 
closer they are to cultural and sociological cliche. Perhaps one of commonest verbs in
925 Ibid., p. 146.
926 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (London: University of Chicago Press Ltd., 1999), p. 8.
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sociological discourse on the elderly is dehumanise. Although this expression is a clear 
indictment of the attitudes towards or demeaning treatment of the elderly -whether in 
palliative care or in the broader cultural context —it also communicates a great deal about the 
linguistic expressions of age which seem to simultaneously express and vitiate, affirm and 
negate mortality. The cultural expressions of old age, ironically, have clear counterrealist 
inflections that disassociate or relinquish the aged subject from the putatively deviant and 
essentialising concepts of time, organic decay, and death. Victor Minichiello describes the 
‘dehumanising context’ and ‘dehumanising process’ within which the elderly are cared for, 
commenting that there is a threat of social castigation and a danger amongst carers of the 
elderly ‘to treat aged care residents in instrumental ways, regarding them as objects of work
927stress rather than as people.’ Minichiello goes on to describe discourses and perceptions of 
the elderly as essentialising, othering, and superannuating, which:
...have the effect of dehumanising older people. When we dehumanise certain groups 
it makes it easier for us to deny them basic human rights, to treat them with disrespect 
and to devalue their experiences and desires. Each of these strategies perpetuates a 
form of violence towards the ageing, perhaps not in the overt form of violence which 
marks the body, but in a disavowal of their humanness. It is important therefore to 
identify each of these strategies in our language and to begin to develop 
alternatives.928
Minichiello highlights the social, conceptual, and linguistic disengagement from ageing: that 
is, the perceptions and locutions of age which are demeaning, prejudicial, and disconcertingly 
taxonomical in their reconceptualisation of the elderly as sub-adult or even sub-human, and 
the ideas and expressions of otherness, deviance, parasitism, and alienation that are
927 Victor Minichiello, Contemporary Issues in Gerontology: Promoting Positive Ageing (Oxford & New York: 
Routledge, 2005), pp. 16-7.
928 Ibid., p. 30.
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internalised and naturalised in Anglo-American culture. Haim Hazan describes this as ‘social 
denial and a discursive process of dehumanisation [that] may be detected in the conspiracy 
of silence surrounding concerns associated with ageing and particularly with deep old 
age.’ The sociolinguistic exclusions, ‘otherings’ and oppressive essentialisms suggest a 
society ill at ease with ageing, and communicate a libidinal fear of death, or more specifically 
of the dehumanising and desubjectivising threat posed by extreme old age and the losses that 
degenerative conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease entail. Malcolm Johnson describes old 
age as ‘a deviant state in a society which celebrates youth and has not yet accustomed itself to 
the demographic revolution,,930and a threat to the ideological optimism of the anti-ageing 
revolution. Physical and aesthetic changes in the body exteriorise covert biological processes, 
and the locus or provenance of self-identity becomes instead an insidious manifestation of 
otherness, impuissance, and subjugation to forces beyond one’s control. John A. Vincent 
comments that ‘because there is a tendency for modern people to see their identity as 
increasingly associated with their bodies [...] the prospect of death and decay of the body 
poses specific existential problems,’ and that chronic or degenerative conditions ‘can serve to 
dehumanise people.’931 This notion of self-difference, deviance, or alienation -o f  acting or 
existing under the hegemony of external control -is perhaps most commonly represented in 
the invidious cultural metaphor of the ‘ageing body as a dehumanised machine that is
932disintegrating, disordered and out of control.’
Ostensibly, western culture presents ageing as a condition that is manifestly, although not 
always convincingly, human: it is, as Simon Biggs describes, ‘a process of dispossession and 
cover-up, an exercise teetering on the brink of the grotesque,’ whilst youth remains the
929 Haim Hazan, ‘Beyond Dialogue: Entering the Fourth Space in Old Age’ in Valuing Older People: A
Humanist Approach to Ageing (BnsioV.TheVoMty Vress,, 2009),^.
930 Malcolm Johnson, ‘Dependency and Interdependency’ in Ageing in Society: An Introduction to Social 
Gerontology, 2nd edn., ed. by John Bond et al. (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1993), p. 265.
931 John A. Vincent, Old Age (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 154.
93“ Sarah Fishwick, The Body in the Work o f Simone de Beauvoir, p. 159.
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‘normative state to which the body has to be restored.’933 In her preface to The Coming o f Age 
Simone de Beauvoir writes ‘I mean to break the conspiracy of silence,’934 and comments on 
senescence and the elderly respectively as a reality plunged into mythos, and a demographic 
(and an increasingly visible one at that) forced back into the mystique of a non-knowledge or 
curio. Beauvoir depicts the elderly as a demographic in the throes of existential or 
‘metaphysical’ vertigo in the sense that society ‘does not look upon the aged as belonging to 
one clearly-defined category.’935 Because the elderly do not form a body with any economic 
strength, she argues, ‘bourgeois thought aim[s] at holding up the elderly man as someone 
who is different, as another being? even to the extent of belonging ‘to an entirely different
Q 'J / '  f  t
species.’ Beauvoir describes the ‘aged’ or the ‘old’ as a condition or state of being that has 
slipped into the recesses of imagination, fancy, or conjecture:
age is removed from us by an extent of time so great that it merges with eternity: such 
a remote future seems unreal [...] Thinking of myself as an old person when I am
937twenty or forty means thinking of myself as someone else, as another.
Ageist attitudes, then, might be thought of as counterintuitively unfr'-essentialist and self- 
contradicting in the sense that by mythologising old age, by thinking of the elderly in terms 
of the occult and slipperiness of a non-knowledge -by making them, in effect, unknowable 
(however feigned we know that to be) -we move away from the generalisations, 
reductionism, and platitudes of ageism or stereotype towards a more libertarian discourse 
within which old age and presumably other ‘human’ biological markers are vacated, 
transcended, or rendered simply inapplicable. Old age is rendered a specious reality, placed at
933 Simon Biggs, The Mature Imagination: Dynamics o f Identity in Midlife and Beyond (Philadelphia. Open 
University Press, 1999), p. 75.
934 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming o f  Age, trans. by Patrick O’Brian (London & New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1996), p. 2.
935 Ibid.
936 Ibid., p. 3.
937 Ibid., p p . 4-5.
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arm s length, or rendered anachronistic, a socio-biological atavism, through the hubris and 
sophistry of affluent, medically/scientifically sophisticated cultures —cultures within which 
discrimination of the elderly is not only internalised and naturalised but has, with anti-ageing, 
become akin to a form of humanism or enlightened prejudice. However, Beauvoir claims that 
even in the veneration and ‘purified image’ of old age, the elderly remain set apart from 
society, called upon to be the ‘venerable Sage, rich in experience, planning high above the 
common state of mankind.’ Therefore, she continues, ‘either by their virtue or by their 
degradation they stand outside humanity.’938 Whether the elderly are revered or reviled, 
whether society offers prejudice or deference, the same points of exclusion and 
discursive/linguistic barriers remain. For some it is the metonymic expressions of age, rather 
than the pervasive and sometimes invidious liturgies of youth, within which ‘the basis for the 
denial of elderly personhood is formed.’939 Jenny Hockey describes how ‘selective use is 
made of the body as a referential source through establishing metonymic relationships. Thus, 
the adjective “wrinkly” can become a noun used to refer to elderly people.,940This draws 
attention to their plaintive corporeality with clear existential imputations, and articulates the 
elderly into a progressive and anticipative nonentity or nullity, a jointly transcendental and 
insidious absence, inexistence, metaphysicality, or lawness contingency. The metonymic 
expressions of age, like the mechanistic and constructivist representations of biological 
senescence, seem paradoxical in the sense that they render the individual reducible to their 
body’s pathologies whilst simultaneously denying them the body with which they are thus 
afflicted.
Whilst it is commented that the elderly ‘remind the rest of us of the possibility of nameless 
animal death and absolute annihilation [and] serve as vivid reminders of our animal and
^  Ibid., p. 4.
Jenny Hockey et al., Images o f  Ageing, p. 143.
940 Ibid.
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therefore mortal nature, the articulation of precisely this reality and this threat seems to 
efface and never fully or convincingly capture the ‘biological’. Whether through metonymy 
or the cultural metaphor of the machine, representations of age eschew the totality and 
organicity of the body, and contradict or nullify the very idea of organic decay through the 
implications of a post-bodied or post-biological corporeality. The spectacle of decline and our 
expressions, lamentations, revulsion and libidinal fear of it, convey an ideal not in the sense 
that old age is repressed, vacated or ignored, but because the disdainful and pejorative 
representations used to convey its pathos, its inevitability, and its social disapproval 
implicitly deny them, preclude, or invert the biological: the vicissitudes, fmitude, and 
constitutive frailty, that is, of the body natural. Paradoxical though it is, what I suggest, then, 
is that it is not in consumer culture’s eroticised images of youth, beauty, and health that we 
locate and rehearse our most oneiric fantasies of immortality, but in the abject and plaintive 
spectacle of decay. The idea of a ‘dehumanised’ old age seems to relate primarily to the 
ostracism, prejudice, and maltreatment of the elderly; it communicates a social reality of 
ageing as marked by ‘a negative mixture of pity, fear, disgust, condescension, and neglect.’942 
The dehumanisation of old age has conventionally been related to an inability or 
unwillingness to accept our own fmitude, and to a repressed or reticent awareness of 
mortality and a delusive belief in immortality -exacerbated, paradoxically, by rising life 
expectancies and the increasing salience of the elderly, and perpetuated and sustained by the 
hubris and ideological optimism of high-income, technologically advanced cultures. As 
Norbert Elias describes in The Loneliness o f the Dying, it is:
[the] attempt to avoid the thought of death by pushing it as far from ourselves as
possible —by hiding and repressing the unwelcome idea -or by holding an unshakable
941 Jeff Greenberg et al., ‘Ageism: Denying the Face of the Future’ in Ageism: Stereotyping and the Prejudice 
Against Older Persons, ed. by Todd D. Nelson (USA: MIT Press, 2004), p. 41.
942 Mike Featherstone et al., Images o f Ageing, p.30.
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belief in our own personal immortality [...] There is a strong tendency towards this in 
the advanced societies of our day.943
However, whilst this dehumanisation of the elderly is often perceived to distance young, 
middle aged, or ‘nonold’ 44 from the realities of old age, what I argue is that what in fact it 
does is distance the elderly from the realities of old age. In the appropriation of prejudicial 
and derisory attitudes towards senescence —in our very age-consciousness and compulsive 
scrutiny of age characteristics -we locate not the pathos of age, but its ideality. To narrate the 
elderly individual as demonstrably ‘other’, or with an impassive and dehumanising 
indexicality —as a mere catalogue, that is, of the body’s pathologies -we problematise the 
very idea of mortality. It is through these verbal habits that we rehearse an inverse reality -  
that of immortality -  and render conventional limitations, boundaries, or definitions of the 
body such as age and gender curiously inapplicable. Whilst the dehumanisation of old age 
connotes a social reality related to ageism, it simultaneously challenges, precludes, or even 
inverts the biological reality of senescence. The tacit artifice that underpins the 
representations and language of old age reaffirm the fact that old age is not simply a 
biological reality but a cultural construct. The successive de-conceptualisations of old age — 
that is, the images of robot-like human simulacra which seem to place the ageing subject 
indeterminately between the pathos of old age and the fantasy of its transcendence —go some 
way toward embodying the cultural non-acceptance of or incredulity toward ageing, the faith 
in science, technology, and medicine to intervene on the body, and the presumption of its 
transcendence. The images and linguistic expressions of age are paradoxical in the sense that 
they communicate disdainful attitudes towards old age and a clear preoccupation with the 
spectacle of decay and decline; yet they carry counterrealist inflections, displace the body
943 Norbert Elias, The Loneliness o f  the Dying (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc.,
2 ° 01 ), p. 1.
944Jeff Greenberg et al., Ageism: Stereotyping and the Prejudice Against Oldet Pei sons, p. 2 .
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natural, and, in the desubjectivisation’ of the elderly and the common metaphorical depiction 
of the sick and aged body as an old, out of control machine,’945 internalise ideas of its 
transcendence. The cultural expressions and indices of decay and decline seem self- 
deconstructive and anamorphic, offering no biological markers, no contours, defining 
features, limitations or providence to the body, and not always offering a determinable idea of 
chronological age. They place the aged subject beyond the scope of the organic, render the 
body natural suggestively post-biological, de-gendered or even post-gendered, and most 
paradoxically of all, vacate, displace and ignore the biological reality of senescence. As such, 
some of the cultural expressions of age, paradoxical though it is, may be thought of as pre­
empting victory over death and tacitly celebrating, or at least conceding the possibility of, 
immortality in the very spectacle of decay.
The semiologies of age discussed in this thesis embody a social reality of ageing, but at the 
expense of the biomedical reality. The aged figures studied in this thesis seem often to be 
satirical, anamorphic spectacles, de-gendered or post-gendered, divirilised, subjugated, and 
woefully plaintive figures; yet they are, as I have described, tacit monuments to an alternate 
reality, liminal, transitional figures, betwixt and between the geriatric and posthuman, 
putatively impoverished and abject in their age, but subliminally or subtextually eternal. With 
the commodification of immortality in consumer discourses, the blandishments and 
ideological optimism of prolongevity medicine, the genealogy of anti-ageing in antecedent 
medical and proverbial discourse, it seems that a rupture has occurred between the linguistic 
expressions of age and its biomedical reality. What makes western culture so fascinating with 
regards to the study of age is that language is beguiling and blandiloquous, convincing us of a 
reality our bodies cannot sustain. Physically humankind is mortal, and we are no more aware 
of this than today as rising life expectancies put strain on welfare systems and as consumer
945 Sarah Fishwick, The Body in the Work o f Simone de Beauvoir, p. 158.
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capitalism wantonly and immorally exploits the fact of demographic change and the 
existential challenges and corporeal hermeneutics prompted by the increasingly pervasive 
sight of age. However, linguistically we are in the midst of an inverse reality, a cultural 
vernacular that is prevaricative, habituates consumers to the language of time travel, 
rejuvenation, and sempitemity, and creates a culture in which the biological reality of old age 
is met with the dialogic reality of immortality. Through the language of ageing and in the 
spectacle of decay an alternate reality is located and rehearsed. It is not so much in 
medicalisation and aestheticisation out of age but rather the linguistic expressions o f  age 
where the limits and potentialities of the body are redefined and reconceptualised. Whilst the 
body senesces, grows more vulnerable, more impuissant, one finds in our discourse on it 
semiotic echoes of immortality. Through the antinomies in western culture -the warring, that 
is, between demography and ideology, or in other words, between an ageing culture and an 
anti-ageing culture -w e have become Tithonian figures. The myth of Tithonus and the image 
of immortality without perpetual youth is a striking emblem, and one that I have attempted to 
show pervades the contemporary semiologies of age. The literature of ageing, with its 
thematic preoccupation with age and its semiotic transcendence of it, offers a language 
capable of hosting a double reality. The socio-semiotic constructions of age offer up an 
aporetic, constructivist vision of old age, a jointly penal and liberatory ambiguity that 
apprehends and perverts the image of age and, with its thematic preoccupations with 
decrepitude but counterrealist inflections, transforms the depreciation of old age readily into 
its ideality, and makes the reader aware, perhaps, of the realities in which we —as members of 
a culture at once ageing and anti-ageing -operate.
The literature of ageing, specifically Alzheimer’s narratives, has in recent decades been 
applauded for its heuristic potential, its role as a gerontological resource and a valuable font 
of information about old age [...] because it portrays and interprets common-place thoughts
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and feelings about aging that are experienced in everyday life.’94^  Lindauer describes the 
visual arts as communicating meanings about old age directly, immediately, and 
unequivocally, and speaks of the signified concept as concretely held, thus ‘allowing] for an 
immediate impression, and a flow of ideas, thoughts, and images that are less subject to 
distractions, interruptions, and losses in information.’ He comments on how:
Paintings depicting the aged can be quickly comprehended [...] In contrast a novel or 
play about an old person requires a fairly long time to unfold, many characters have to 
be kept in mind together with their motives, often obscure, along with sub plots whose 
meanings are not immediately obvious. Complex information about a central aging 
figure is easily forgotten or distorted; and interruptions, delays, and disruptions that 
occur over an extended reading period increase the likelihood of memory lapses.947
Lindauer’s comments on ageing in literature and the visual arts encourage us to think about 
what literature contributes to our understanding of old age, and what ‘reality’ it is able to 
convey and with what effect. I have said that in western culture the aged individual is put at a 
distance, pushed into repression and sublimation both socially and discursively. What literary 
discourses of age offer is its equivalent: ‘an indeterminacy, a certain semantic 
openendedness, a living contact with unfinished, still-evolving reality (an openended 
present).’948 1 have described the signs of ageing (in their semiotic sense) as having an 
asymptotic relation to death and finality, and the literature of ageing to be characterised by 
experimental renewal and neo-modemistic energy and flair. In the semiologies of age in 
contemporary literature we are made aware both of old age, its pathos and ineluctable reality, 
and its incipient alternative. From the prose and dramaturgy of Samuel Beckett to post-2000
946 Martin S. Lindauer, Aging, Creativity, and Art: A Positive Perspective on Late-Life Development (New York: 
Plenum Publishers,2003), p. 25.
947 Ibid 28
948 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. by Michael Holquist, trans. by Caryl Emerson et al. (USA: 
University of Texas Press, 2004), p. 7.
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Alzheimer’s fiction, the senescing characters, these protei of contemporary fiction, are pitiful, 
plaintive, and moribund spectacles, revealing a morbid and quintessentially human 
preoccupation with mortality; but with equal measure are celebrants and tacit monuments of 
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